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This thesis examines how a moment in the Labour Party’s history was to lead to a protracted, 
yet inevitable, political transformation. It is a history of the events which led to up to the 
eventual breakaway of moderate members to form the Social Democratic Party in 1981, the 
reaction to its formation within Labour and its context in the party’s post-war Labour History. 
The aim is to demonstrate that the formation of the SDP was to influence the development of 
the Labour Party’s political thought in the 1980s and how consequently this shaped its 
development up until the present day. The thesis also argues that Labour’s transformation in 
the 1980s was undertaken despite, not because of, the founding of the SDP and that the 
continued electoral success of the Conservatives and the implementation of Thatcherism was 
to ensure Labour had to reassess what its purpose was. 
 
The culmination of the breakaway of the SDP and the aftermath of a third consecutive general 
election defeat was to eventually lead to the Labour Party’s Policy Review that commenced in 
1987. Labour was to go from an existential crisis at the beginning of the 1980s and finish it 
with a restated confirmation of its purpose that was essentially an assertion of a modified 
revisionism.  Repeated and humiliating defeat was to accelerate Labour’s gravitation to the 
political centre and an affirmation of a commitment to an economic model less wedded to the 
philosophy of nationalisation, acceptance of membership of the European Economic 
Community after years of hostility and the decision to adopt a defence policy that 
encompassed multilateralism. Labour was to survive the defections of the SDP and to evolve 
into a party that was to encompass the ideals of an updated revisionism. The defections may 
have sparked the catalyst for change within Labour but the transformation was undertaken 
despite of not because of the SDP’S creation. Repeated defeat to an increasingly strident and 
dominant Conservative Party was to ensure Labour assessed what its purpose was. It also 
examines the social liberalism of the Labour Party during this period, provides an examination 
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of the background of the Labour’s social democrats, their ideals and what differences there 
were between them and the so-called traditional right. It also provides analysis of the reactions 
to the defeat in 1979 and reaction of the remaining members of the Labour right and similarly 
those on the left and the impact the formation of this new political entity influenced its political 
ideas and practices in the early 1980s and throughout the decade and beyond. This thesis 
examines how Labour undertook the forward march from crisis in 1981 to renewal in 1988 and 
how the broad church of those social democrats who remained, soft leftists and eventually 
disillusioned far leftists coalesced and guided the party to a reformist, revisionist path.  
 
This thesis is relevant to Labour today as it again attempts to provide a sense of its aims and 
values in a time of political flux and a Labour Party that has a left-wing leader, buttressed by 
a growing and energised membership but faced with a centrist parliamentary party. What 
lessons could the travails of the 1980s offer to the current Labour Party in the age of populism 
and Brexit? 
 
Key Words: Labour, Social Democrat, revisionism, social liberalism, socialism, ideology  
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Reaction and Renewal – Labour’s ‘Broad Church’ in the context of the breakaway of 
the Social Democratic Party 1979-1987 
 
Introduction 
There is a further difficulty that no single constant and consistent body of socialist 
doctrine exists. R.H. Tawney has written that ‘like other summary designations of 
complex political forces, Socialism is a word the connotation of which varies, not only 
from generation to generation, but from decade to decade’. And not only has the 
doctrine varied through time, but different versions of it, as will be seen, are mutually 
consistent. In the case of the British Labour Party, matters are additionally 
complicated by the fact that it was not found on any body of doctrine at all, and has 
always preserved a marked anti-doctrinal and anti-theoretical basis. 
Tony Crosland1  
 
Research Questions 
This thesis examines how a moment in the Labour Party’s history was to lead to a protracted, 
yet inevitable, political transformation.  Focusing on the breakaway of moderate members and 
the formation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1981, it explores the reaction within 
Labour and its context in the party’s post-war history. The aim is to demonstrate that the 
formation of the SDP was to influence the development of the Labour Party’s political thought 
in the 1980s and has consequently shaped its development up until the present day.  
The breakaway of the SDP and a third consecutive general election defeat in 1987 was to 
eventually lead to the Labour Party’s Policy Review that commenced in 1987. Labour started 
                                                          
1 Anthony Crosland, The Future of Socialism, (London: Constable, 2006), p.52 
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the 1980s with an existential crisis and finished the decade by redefining its purpose through 
an assertion of a revisionism that had its roots in the 1950s.  Repeated and humiliating defeat 
accelerated Labour’s gravitation to the political centre and an affirmation of a commitment to 
an economic model less wedded to the philosophy of nationalisation. It accepted membership 
of the European Economic Community after years of hostility and adopted a defence policy 
that encompassed multilateralism.  
Yet how did Labour get to this point of requiring a Policy Review? Why did some leave Labour 
and some stay? Why were those who stayed such as Denis Healey, Roy Hattersley and Giles 
Radice more comfortable with the character of the Labour party than those who left yet with 
whom they shared common ideological opinions? Why was Labour’s right wing surprisingly 
resilient in the face of a dual onslaught from both the Labour left led by Tony Benn and the 
newly formed SDP? 
This thesis provides analysis of the reactions to the defeat in 1979 and reaction of the 
remaining members of the Labour right, and similarly those on the left and the impact the 
formation of this new political entity influenced its political ideas and practices in the early 
1980s and throughout the decade. It also highlights that, despite the uncertainty that many felt 
within the Labour right that they could continue as members of the party, they were to prove 
effective in re-establishing their influence within the party and stemming further defections. 
From being demoralised and divided in the late 1970s, Labour’s revisionists were to be much 
more vocal and confident by the end of the 1980s. 
An integral part of revisionism was a commitment to social liberalism of the form that had been 
championed by Crosland and Roy Jenkins in the 1950s.  This thesis examines the background 
of the Labour’s social democrats and shows how the pursuit of social liberalism which had 
flourished in the 1950s and 1960s was maintained in the 1980s. That this happened at a time 
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when it would have been politically expedient to drop such policies was to underline Labour’s 
broader commitment to equality and personal freedom.  
The defections to the SDP may have been the catalyst for change within Labour.  This thesis 
argues that the transformation was undertaken despite, not because of, the SDP’s creation. 
Thatcherism’s electoral success was to ensure Labour had to reassess its purpose. This study 
examines how Labour undertook the difficult transition from the deep divisions that led to the 
defections in 1981 to the Policy Review in 1987 and how the broad church of those who 
remained (democratic socialists/social democrats, soft leftists and in some cases a number of 
disillusioned far leftists) coalesced and guided the party to a reformist, revisionist path. 
This thesis is relevant to Labour today as it again attempts to provide a sense of its aims and 
values in a time of political flux and a Labour Party that has a left-wing leader, buttressed by 
a growing and energised membership but faced with a centrist parliamentary party. What 
lessons could the travails of the 1980s offer to the current Labour Party in the age of populism 
and Brexit?  
Methodology 
This study has used the archives of Labour and SDP figures to understand the motivations of 
politicians in the 1980s.  It draws upon the methods of Labour history with its attention to 
issues such as movement cultures and political strategy.   The approach to the research is to 
provide a new perspective on the events of the late 1970s and 1980s by means of interviews 
with some of the witnesses and in some cases main actors of the period as well as the 
utilisation of relevant archive material.  
There is a need to examine the history of the breakaway of the Social Democratic Party almost 
thirty years after events in order to detail how the revisionists eventually reasserted their 
influence within the Labour Party in the latter part of the 1980s. To assist with this, the Neil 
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Kinnock papers held at the Churchill College Archives have been examined. The papers of 
Lord Kinnock have not been used extensively previously, with Martin Pugh’s Speak for 
Britain!2 and the chapters written for  collection Labour and the Left in the 1980s by Jonathan 
Davis and Richard Carr being the exceptions.3 These archives were indexed and collated only 
relatively recently and their contents provide a strong source of primary source materials 
relating to the events of the 1980s, particularly in relation to the leadership elections which 
took place, campaign events and the Policy Review. The examination and utilisation of these 
papers within the thesis are a contribution to original research.  
The archival papers of David Owen which are held at the University of Liverpool’s Special 
Collections and Archives Centre were examined during the course of the research. These 
papers provided an insight into one of the leading members of the ‘Gang of Four’. 
The papers at the People’s History Museum for the following Labour Party members were 
examined: former Labour Leader Michael Foot; the Secretary of the Manifesto Group George 
Robertson, later to be Defence Secretary under Tony Blair before his appointment as 
Secretary-General of NATO; former General Secretary of the Fabian Society and Labour Party 
Chair Dianne Hayter; and the former MP for Liverpool Walton, Minister for Industry under 
Harold Wilson and deputy leadership challenger Eric Heffer. An examination of archive 
materials of leading Labour Party members and organisations such as the Manifesto Group, 
the Campaign for Labour Victory and Labour Solidarity has been undertaken to help provide 
additional perspective on the events of the time. 
In order to provide a different and original perspective on the events being researched, a series 
of interviews with from those who were witness to events were undertaken over a period of 
five years. The list of interviewees includes leading figures from the Labour Party from the 
                                                          
2 Martin Pugh, Speak for Britain! A New History of the Labour Party (London: Vintage, 2011) 
3 Jonathan Davis and Rohan McWilliam (Eds.), Labour and the Left in the 1980s (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2017) 
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period including the former Labour leader Neil Kinnock; former Socialist Campaign Group 
member and Secretary of State for Health Frank Dobson MP; Austin Mitchell, MP for Anthony 
Crosland’s old seat of Great Grimsby and a member of the Manifesto and Labour Solidarity 
groups; Dianne Hayter, former General Secretary of the Fabian Society and Chair of the 
Labour Party; Giles Radice, MP for North Durham Chester-Le-Street, co-organiser of Labour 
Solidarity and shadow Education Secretary under Neil Kinnock; Clive Soley, MP for 
Hammersmith North (later Ealing, Acton and Shepherd’s Bush) and later to become Chair of 
the Labour Party under Tony Blair; Joyce Gould, assistant to the National Agent for the Labour 
Party under Harold Wilson and James Callaghan and former Director of Organisation under 
Neil Kinnock; and Bryan Davies, former Secretary to the Parliamentary Labour Party and 
Shadow Cabinet and MP for Oldham Central and Royton. These interviews are of great 
importance as this is the first time that these key individuals have spoken about this issue in 
this way. Incorporating their recent reflections on the split and what happened afterwards will 
add much to our understanding of the Labour Party at this time. In addition to this will be the 
data obtained from interviewing members of three different Constituency Labour Parties who 
were activists at the time of the events in the thesis. The interviews took place in Cambridge, 
Bury St Edmunds and Oldham, thus encompassing a range of perspectives from the 
suburban, urban industrial and rural areas of Labour’s support. As mentioned earlier also, as 
the events took place over thirty five years ago it was necessary to obtain interviews from 
some of those present before the opportunity was lost. 
There were attempts to arrange interviews with some members of Parliament for whom initial 
agreement had been obtained but did not materialise further. These included Dame Margaret 
Beckett, Lord George Foulkes, Lord Tom McNally, Lord Bernard Donoghue and Sir Gerald 
Kaufman. Requests to Lord Roy Hattersley to arrange an interview were declined whilst those 
who kindly replied but declined the opportunity to participate included Tony Blair, Hilary Benn 
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and Roy Mason. Those who did not reply to requests for interviews included Dennis Skinner, 
Jeremy Corbyn, George Robertson and Gordon Brown. 
The importance of oral history is that it helps to add an extra dimension to what has been 
written or what is believed to be already known. Interviews with both active participants and 
observers who were involved in Labour politics at the time help to chronicle the reactions and 
reasoning of those who chose to stay rather than those who departed, something that helps 
to provide a new perspective on a period of history that has been otherwise examined quite 
widely.  In By Word of Mouth, the standard book on the practice and nature of elite oral history, 
Anthony Seldon and Joanna Pappworth note the advantages and drawbacks that arise in the 
process of undertaking interviews. The advantages, according to the authors , are that it helps 
to draw out facts that may not be already available in published texts,4 understand 
personalities better, how people reacted to events, about ‘how relationships function in 
practice’5, and in the case of political science helps to understand the policy-making process.6 
Seldon and Pappworth also contend that the ‘giving of broad perspective’ is advantageous in 
that just as ‘an individual made a particular contribution over a number of years, so too can 
they provide information on what issues were regarded important over a number of years’.7 
Whilst evidence may well be partial in such cases, Seldon and Pappworth assert that it is ‘no 
less important to hear the interpretations and assessments of those who witness or 
participated in events, if only as a point of departure’.8 Atmosphere and colour are also 
advantageous to Seldon and Pappworth in that they help to understand how people reacted 
in the way that they did as well, and the interview process helps to provide insight into a 
subject’s personality and thought processes.9 Oral history also enables the contributions of 
the ‘non-elite' to be heard when it may otherwise remain silent: ‘the contribution of history of 
                                                          
4 Anthony Seldon and Joanna Pappworth, By Word of Mouth: Elite Oral History (London: Methuen and Co., 
1983), p.37 
5 Seldon and Pappworth, By Word of Mouth, pp.37-38 
6 Seldon and Pappworth, By Word of Mouth, p.42 
7 Seldon and Pappworth, By Word of Mouth, p.43 
8 Seldon and Pappworth, By Word of Mouth, p.43  
9 Seldon and Pappworth, By Word of Mouth, pp.48-49 
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personal evidence will be confined to just those few whose subjective views and thoughts 
were anyway likely to be well recorded in the written documentation’.10 This was a particular 
reason for wanting to call upon the recollections and experiences of those activists whose 
observations of the events at the time not only provided a different perspective but a valuable 
contribution to local Labour Party histories. 
The obvious drawbacks to interviews, as noted by Seldon and Pappworth, are that, firstly, the 
problem of an interviewee’s inadequate memory may inhibit their recollection of events.11 On 
occasions, some of the interviewees have used diary entries in order to assist with their 
recollections but where there may be gaps attempts have undertaken to complete any 
omissions or unintentional errors.  
Secondly, an interviewee may be unfairly vindictive, lack perspective or show a distortion of 
events due to their own personal feelings.12 John Tosh makes a similar observation, noting 
that ‘his or her memories, however precise, are filtered through subsequent experience. They 
may be contaminated by what has been absorbed from other sources (especially the 
media)’.13 In politics this may not be seen to be surprising and due to the events being 
discussed in the thesis even less so and a person’s sometimes visceral reaction can help to 
provide understanding of the strength of feeling felt at the time (underlined by the fact that 
such sentiments still exist many years later). 
For Seldon and Pappworth there is the danger of an interview containing superficial 
information or gossip, or an interviewee relying on the benefit of hindsight.14 The transcripts 
of the interviews contributed for this study have been slightly abridged in order to take out 
extraneous details (small-talk, for example). Information which has been deemed pertinent to 
                                                          
10 Seldon and Pappworth, By Word of Mouth, p.50 
11 Seldon and Pappworth, By Word of Mouth, p.17 
12 Seldon and Pappworth, By Word of Mouth, pp.19-24 
13 John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, methods and new directions in the study of history (Sixth Edition) 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2015), p.269 
14 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, p.25 
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the thesis has been included but the transcripts of the interviews are provided in the appendix 
and audio recordings are available. 
Finally, there is the potential for the interviewer to undertake an unrepresentative sample of 
subjects, to be biased in their questioning or showing undue deference in towards an 
interviewee and to misrepresent what an interviewee said.15 In terms of a representative 
sample, attempts have been made to provide a cross-section of Labour Party membership 
and opinion in order to ensure that the contributions are too far tilted in one particular direction. 
Whilst the interviews have been taken in an atmosphere of respect, attempts have been made 
to allow the interviewees to make their own contributions which may have required the 
occasional guiding prompt, but without the aid of leading questions. 
Secondary source material in the shape of articles and clippings taken from the archives of 
the Guardian and Observer, The Times, the Daily Mirror, the Daily Express, and also 
publications such as Marxism Today, New Statesman, Political Quarterly, Socialist Review 
and Socialist Register have been examined for both contemporaneous and reflective accounts 
of the period. This has been examined and added in order to provide context to events and to 
cross check information in archival material and interviews. 
Literature Review 
Secondary literature on Labour and the SDP in the 1980s remains surprisingly limited. What 
follows is an examination of some of the more notable texts that are available on the era of 
the breakaway of the Social Democrats and its aftermath and those which examine the nature 
of social democracy. The biographies of the leading politicians of the period are excellent 
sources of information and in the case of some, such as Roy Hattersley and Denis Healey 
they offer strong defences of their actions and the positions taken, whereas Giles Radice’s 
                                                          
15 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, pp.27-32 
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account of Anthony Crosland, Healey and Roy Jenkins plus David Marquand’s pen essays on 
progressive politicians observe the evolution of the Labour Party up to and including the split 
and the creation of New Labour. Yet these texts whilst not in need of significant revision were 
written some time ago, either before or during the period of the New Labour governments of 
1997-2010. Therefore this thesis provides a reassessment of a period which for the most part 
has not been updated for some time. 
The first book about the SDP was provided by the The Times journalist Ian Bradley 
withBreaking the Mould? The Birth and Prospects of the Social Democratic Party. Bradley 
contends that the roots of the breakaway were sown as far back as 1960 with the creation of 
the Gaitskellite Campaign for Democratic Socialism (CDS) and the internecine battles over 
Europe. He chronicles how in the mid-1970s right-wing Labour MPs were being de-selected 
and their unsuccessful appeals to the ruling NEC led to the formation of the Campaign for 
Labour Victory (CLV) in 1977, an organisation similar to the CDS and augmenting the 
previously created Manifesto Group, with Bill Rodgers as the main organising force and David 
Owen as a supporter16 Bradley also observes how the CLV’s organiser, Alec McGivan, felt 
that the organisation was ‘a springboard for the launch of a new party,’ and that leading right-
wingers such as Denis Healey and Peter Shore declined to commit themselves and that Roy 
Hattersley expressed concern at backing a sectional group within the party.17 There was 
increasing dissent on the right of the Labour Party emerged around the 1979 General Election. 
Former Labour MP David Marquand openly questioned whether Labour was capable of 
delivering on the aims of ‘traditional welfare-state social democracy’.18 Dissent was also 
expressed by members of the right-wing Social Democratic Association (SDA).  Bradley’s 
book provides a chronological yet still informative history of the events alongside a pen history 
of the main protagonists Jenkins, Owen, Rodgers and Williams, including the class and 
                                                          
16 Ian Bradley, Breaking the Mould?: Birth and Prospects of the Social Democratic Party, (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 1981), pp.59-62 
17 Bradley, Breaking the Mould, p.63 
18 Quoted in Bradley, Breaking the Mould, p.66 
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educational backgrounds of the defecting MPs. Similarly, Bradley provides an analysis of what 
the SDP’s ideology was, establishing that there was a tension between those who were 
attracted to the idea of Jenkins’ ‘radical centre’ and those who wanted a ‘Mark II Labour Party, 
a tension between the working class, socially conservative grouping as epitomised by the SDA 
and the more progressively liberal that saw Jenkins as their leader. For Bradley it was ‘a slight 
disappointment’ that the SDP’s clearest policy commitments of all are to those now rather old 
and distinctly unradical institutions, the EEC and NATO,’ noting that this brought over the same 
policy commitments that those who had defected had held whilst in Labour.19 Bradley is clear 
that political theory was important for the SDP.  He explores David Owen and Shirley 
Williams’s discussion of socialism as the pursuit of equality and the eschewing of 
nationalisation and monetarism. He also includes David Marquand and Evan Luard’s call for 
the reduction of state power in order to promote equality. Yet at the same time, Bradley offers 
this conclusion: ‘social democracy, then is less an ideology and more a particular approach to 
dealing with society and its problems’.20 This summary could also be used to describe Neil 
Kinnock and Roy Hattersley’s approach to socialism also as will be seen later in the thesis. 
Bradley also makes the claim that Jenkins had ‘some claims to being regarded as the founder 
of the SDP,’ noting that many of the current or former MPs were formerly Gaitskellites and 
then Jenkinsites,21 although this claim would be strongly contested by the three other 
members of the ‘Gang of Four’. In his narrative, Bradley reports on the tensions on the 
possibility of an alliance with the Liberals, saying that of the four Jenkins was the most inclined 
and Owen the least, with Rodgers and Williams lukewarm at the prospect.22 Bradley provides 
a detailed account of the early incarnation of the SDP utilising contemporary polling data and 
offers the suggestion towards the end that tempers the optimism some felt that the SDP and 
Liberals could win, proposing that the best hope for the nascent Alliance would be a hung 
                                                          
19 Bradley, Breaking the Mould, p.124 
20 Bradley, Breaking the Mould, p.137 
21 Bradley, Breaking the Mould, p.101 
22 Bradley, Breaking the Mould, p.119 
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parliament and support for the Conservatives in return for support for the introduction of 
Proportional Representation.23  
Bradley's was not the only account at the time.  Hugh Robertson’s Claret and Chips is another 
short yet detailed contemporary report of the SDP’s breakaway and takes events up to the 
election of Roy Jenkins at the Glasgow Hillhead by-election.24  Like Bradley, Stephenson was 
a journalist for the Times and at the time of the publication was editor of the New Statesman. 
Stephenson reflects that there was nothing necessarily radical about the SDP’s ideology 
observing that ‘their instincts about particular policies had a slightly old-fashioned and Fabian 
tendency’ and that they ‘were united in disliking the radical and sometimes anti-
parliamentarian attitudes emerging on the Labour Party’.25  Like Bradley’s book, it explores 
the genesis of the split from Labour although it spends less time on ideology. Instead, it deals 
with the problems that came with dealing with the Liberals and accommodating their traditions 
and structures. It also includes the observation that, whilst Shirley Williams was of the Social 
Democratic tradition, she was not as socially liberal in all aspects of policy as Roy Jenkins, 
with Stephenson noting Williams being ‘able to attack confidently on the matter of abortion’ 
during the Crosby by-election of 26 November 1981 and that she had ‘opposed and voted 
against the 1967 Abortion Act, sponsored by David Steel’, something which would have played 
well with the ‘up to 20,000 Catholic votes’. Stephenson’s book also includes the Bermondsey 
by-election which is examined in detail in this thesis but he claims Peter Tatchell was a 
member of the Militant Tendency when he was not.26 
The books were essentially works of journalism.    Far more scholarly is SDP: The Birth, Life, 
and Death of the Social Democratic Party by Ivor Crewe and Anthony King.27 This is the 
                                                          
23 Bradley, Breaking the Mould, p.159 
24 Hugh Stephenson, Claret and Chips: Rise of the S.D.P. (London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1982) 
25 Stephenson, Claret and Chips: Rise of the S.D.P, p.8 
26 Stephenson, Claret and Chips: Rise of the S.D.P, p.152 
27 Crewe and King, SDP: The Birth, Life, and Death of the Social Democratic Party (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995) 
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standard history of the party, written by two leading political scientists.  Crewe and King argue 
that it was the period of the Wilson, Heath and Callaghan Governments that saw the failure of 
the post-war consensus. The widening of the ideological gap in the mid-1970s between 
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives and a Labour Party whose left-wing had been 
strengthening since the defeat of Wilson’s administration in 1970 provided the breeding 
ground for the SDP. Added to this was the sense that the right of the Labour Party was lacking 
leadership and inspiration and had effect been in retreat since 1970; the revisionist ideals 
identified with Tony Crosland were exhausted. 
As a critical history, Crewe’s and King’s book observes how the party conferences and, in 
particular, the 1980 Special Conference at Wembley were to have an effect on the then ‘Gang 
of Three’, Bill Rodgers, Shirley Williams and David Owen, soon to be four with the intervention 
of Roy Jenkins. Crewe and King devote a chapter to Jenkins and his supporters and how his 
Dimbleby Lecture of November 22nd 1979 was received warmly by David Steel of the Liberals 
while the reception was more mixed from the ‘Gang of Three’. The book  provides an analysis 
of the leadership battle between Denis Healey and Michael Foot and, via anonymous 
interviews, the revelation that some MPs who were later to join the SDP voted for Foot in order 
to exacerbate the split. Crewe and King also provide a more sober judgement in contrast to 
those who believed that a Healey victory would have propelled Labour to victory in 1983, 
suggesting that Healey would not have been successful (being similar to Callaghan) and 
therefore would have only delayed the defections; the defeats of 1983 and 1987 would still 
have occurred.28 Crewe and King state that, as a consequence, only a leader from the left was 
capable of leading Labour in the early 1980s.29 The book also provides an examination of 
those who defected and those who remained within the Labour Party and also of the 
Conservatives (and why only Christopher Brocklebank-Fowler was the only Tory MP to cross 
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the floor of the House of Commons). One of the findings Crewe and King came to was that 
‘what the Labour party lost was not a group or even a splinter group but a number of tiny 
fragments,’ which is correct in that those who defected may have differed by degrees on the 
issue of Europe or nuclear defence but they were not ‘an ideologically distinct group within the 
Labour right’.30 Yet what did unite them was the feeling that control of the party was 
irretrievably in the hands of the left and that those who defected were accused of not remaining 
to help fight and reverse this.  Crewe and King noted the MP Ken Weetch saying, ‘When I was 
his PPS, Bill Rodgers used to tell me to play Labour politics long; I followed his advice even if 
he didn’t’.31This sentiment is something which continues to be evident thirty five years later as 
evidenced by some of the interviews taken place. Furthermore, there was the accusation put 
forward by those who remained that those who ‘broke from Labour had not been all that tightly 
bound to it in the first place’.32  As will be seen by comments by Dianne Hayter, Neil Kinnock 
and Frank Dobson, this was certainly a sentiment that was felt by some from different sections 
of the party. Crewe and King observe for some such as Roy Mason and Roy Hattersley, 
‘emotional attachments to the Labour party were simply too strong for them to contemplate 
leaving,’ although this thesis also notes that for those such as Giles Radice his original reasons 
for joining was philosophical, and that he had developed a bond with the party despite not 
coming from a Labour background himself.33  
Finally, Crewe and King conclude the first part of the book with an analysis of the ideology of 
the SDP (noting how Rodgers stated that the party was ‘very plainly, a left of centre party’),34 
culminating in the Warrington, Crosby and Glasgow Hillhead by-elections, the latter two of 
which were to see the return to Parliament of Shirley Williams and Roy Jenkins. 
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The book concludes with the contention that the very system that prevented the SDP making 
the electoral breakthrough in 1983, the First Past the Post System, allowed Labour the time 
to reform itself and that the reform was led by Kinnock of the soft left and not the right of the 
party. Moreover, Crewe and King suggests that those who founded the SDP ‘may rejoice in 
the fact that the beliefs of the new Labour Party under Tony Blair are far closer to their own 
beliefs than were the views of either the Conservatives or the Labour Party in the 1970s and 
1980s’.35  
Towards the end of the century, and only two years into Tony Blair’s premiership, the former 
Labour MP and SDP founder, David Marquand, produced a book of pen essays on major 
figures from the progressive left entitled The Progressive Dilemma: From Lloyd George to 
Blair which highlighted the philosophical evolution of revisionism. In the chapter, 'Roy Jenkins: 
The Progressive as Whig', Marquand described his old mentor’s ideology in similar terms to 
those of Bradley and Crewe and King: ‘he knew what he was against more precisely what he 
was for. By instinct, he was for a mixture of pluralistic liberalism and Keynesian social 
democracy’.36 Marquand also describes how Jenkins was ‘appalled by Owen’s renunciation 
of Keynes and flirtations with a sub-Thatcherite political economy’.37 Marquand also argues 
that Tony Crosland would not have joined the SDP if he had lived and that the party was ‘never 
a Croslandite party...Its purpose – never realised, of course – was to revise the revisionism of 
the 1950s, not to become a vehicle for it’.38 
Finally, Marquand argues that New Labour was a different phenomenon that ‘has abandoned 
not only socialism but social democracy – in any sense that paladins of the social-democratic 
tradition such as Bevin, Gaitskell or Crosland would have used the term, although he refutes 
charges of it being Thatcherite: ‘Underpinning the individualistic, mobile, competitive society 
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is a highly interventionist, indeed dirigiste workforce state, which would have warmed the 
cockles of Beatrice Webb’s heart’.39 Marquand’s contention that New Labour was not social 
democratic contradicts Radice’s belief that Tony Blair’s ‘rethinking (of) the party’s strategy in 
the light of circumstances was pure revisionism,’ and that it followed ‘...the Croslandite 
argument for defining socialism in terms of greater equality rather than of nationalisation’.40  
Similar to the Marquand work is the collection of essays on the relevance of Crosland’s 
revisionism in the age of New Labour edited by the former MP and journalist Dick Leonard, 
Crosland and New Labour41, as is Patrick Diamond’s New Labour’s Old Roots: Revisionist 
Thinkers in Labour’s History 1930-1997.42 
Leonard’s book contained essay from contributors within the Labour party such as Gordon 
Brown and Roy Hattersley, the historian Brian Brivati and the political commentator and polling 
expert Peter Kellner. The essays unifying theme was to ask what impact and relevance 
Crosland’s philosophy had on New Labour. Coming out in 1999, it was only two years into the 
Labour Government of Tony Blair but for Hattersley ‘had Crosland lived, he would have 
undoubtedly wanted to reassert the crucial necessity of economic redistribution. As it is, 
egalitarian socialism died with him’.43 As Hattersley was to attempt to revive Croslandite 
revisionism during his tenure as deputy leader, the comment could be construed as referring 
to the end of egalitarian socialism with the advent of enforced monetarism under James 
Callaghan but also a reference towards New Labour which Hattersley was to become 
increasingly critical towards. 
Patrick Diamond’s book New Labour’s Old Roots: Revisionist Thinkers in Labour’s History 
1930-1997 was published as Diamond was a special adviser to the Prime Minister’s Office 
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during the Blair Government (2004) and draws on papers written by R.H. Tawney, Hugh 
Dalton, Evan Durbin, Tony Crosland, Evan Luard, Roy Hattersley, Giles Radice and Gordon 
Brown. Each paper focuses on the revisionist area of equality and liberty and Radice’s essay 
in particular is compelling as it is contemporaneous with the Policy Review taking place and 
calls for a clear revisionist strategy and an end to ‘pragmatism, which is at one and the same 
time complacent, defensive and confused’.44  
Further excellent sources of Labour history are the works of Keith Laybourn,45 Henry Pelling,46 
Andrew Thorpe47, A. J. Davies48, Eric Shaw,49 the Centennial histories produced and edited 
by Brian Brivati and Richard Heffernan50 and Martin Pugh’s Speak for Britain!51, all of which 
provide overviews and examinations of the developments in the party from its inception  
During the reading of the changing social attitudes of the post-war period up to the 1980s, the 
works of Arthur Marwick52 and contemporary social histories by Andy Beckett53 and Alwyn W. 
Turner54 have been utilised, as has the excellent account by Stephen Brooke on the changing 
nature of sexual politics in British society, Sexual Politics: Sexuality, Family Planning, and the 
British Left from the 1880s to the Present Day.55 Two critical histories of the Policy Review 
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period appeared in the 1990s: Colin Hughes and Patrick Wintour’s Labour Rebuilt: The New 
Model Party56 is at turns sympathetic to the changes that were being proposed as part of the 
Policy Review before criticising the process for being a cosmetic exercise for winning electoral 
support. Gerald R. Taylor, Labour’s Renewal? The Policy Review and Beyond57 attacks the 
Policy Review from a left-wing perspective and also derides the implantation of changes for 
the purposes of political expediency. 
Labour has also been well served by a number of political science texts which have provided 
critical perspective, many of which approach their examination of the party’s development from 
a left-wing standpoint. Geoffrey Foote’s The Labour Party’s Political Thought: A History 
provides an analysis of Labour’s development that is highly critical of Labour’s revisionist wing 
in stunting the development of industrial democracy.58 David Coates’ collection of essays from 
Socialist Register, Paving the Third Way: The Critique of Parliamentary Socialism – A Socialist 
Register Anthology provides critical chapters on Labourism, the role of socialism in Labour 
and how, as Coates contends ‘the limits of Old Labour paved the way for the limits of New 
Labour’. 5960 Coates also assisted with the book produced by Leo Pannitch and Colin Leys’ in 
2001, The End of Parliamentary Socialism: From New Left to New Labour, which features a 
highly critical analysis of the Kinnock years under the chapter Disempowering Activism.61 
Leys’ seminal work, Politics in Britain: From Labourism to Thatcherism observes that the 
election of Kinnock and Hattersley was based on the promise ‘to unite the party on a pragmatic 
basis and appeal effectively to the social-democratic values which a substantial majority of the 
electorate still appeared to support’.62 
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There have been a number of political autobiographies and biographies concerning the 
protagonists that appear in this thesis. James Callaghan’s biographer Kenneth O. Morgan 
provides a sympathetic though not uncritical account of the difficulties Callaghan faced 
between 1979 and 1980, writing that Callaghan fought for moderate policy at conference: ‘in 
hopeless circumstances, he did his best to fight, more consistently so than Denis Healey and 
others on the centre-right, while Owen and others were to jump ship altogether in disillusion 
or bitterness’.63 Surprisingly, Callaghan’s own memoirs do not really touch on this period, with 
only a three page Postscript in which he states his resentment at accusations of ‘betrayal’ by 
the left of the party (the quotation marks are Callaghan’s) and how Michael Foot faced a 
difficult period made all the harder by the defections. Considering his painful experiences 
leading Labour after 1979, it is perhaps surprising for Callaghan to be so reticent. Callaghan 
states that ‘this is a memoir, not a history, and some things must remain untouched’,64 and 
perhaps his wish was to not re-open still relatively fresh and bitter divisions at a time of a 
general election (as the original publication came out in 1987), but it is surprising that 
Callaghan did not wish to examine this final period of his leadership in order to provide more 
of a defence to his critics on both the Left and the Right. 
The man that Callaghan strongly wished to succeed him, Denis Healey, produced an 
entertaining memoir, The Time of My Life and his account of the battle inside Labour does not 
withhold any self-criticism. The chapter, ‘Labour in Travail’, begins with Healey stating that 
Callaghan told him he was staying on in order to prepare Healey for the right opportunity to 
take over, but noted that what happened eventually was ‘ten years of internal fighting which 
was quite as damaging to the Party as the decade of struggle with Bevanism after Attlee lost 
power’.65 Healey provides a strong revisionist defence against the left’s accusation that the 
party lost the election due to the Callaghan Government’s lack of socialism, whereas Healey 
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blames the Winter of Discontent of 1978-79.66 Healey recounts the battles of against Tony 
Benn and the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD) and provides an unflattering 
comparison of Benn to Sir Stafford Cripps, ‘also a political ninny of the most superior quality’.67  
Healey makes the contention that the Commission of Enquiry that was convened at Bishop’s 
Stortford on 15th June 1980 was the beginning of the crystallisation of a breakaway. The 
Commission of Enquiry voted to approve the submission of a new electoral college for electing 
the party leadership and also on the matter of the mandatory reselection of MPs. Despite the 
protestations of both Callaghan and Michael Foot, the motion was carried for submission to 
the next party conference, and Callaghan and Healey were to face the opprobrium of the 
‘Gang of Three’ for not providing more resistance to the proposals. ‘It was Bishop’s Stortford 
which caused the conception of the Social Democratic Party, although its birth took place, 
appropriately enough, nine months later.68 Healey states that the reason he did not join the 
Manifesto Group’s attack against Bishop’s Stortford was because it would have been an attack 
against Callaghan who was still very popular in the country. 
On the leadership battle of 1980, Healey offers the opinion that whilst he believed that most 
of the MPs that joined the SDP voted for him although he alludes to machinations on the part 
of certain MPs to engineer a Foot victory to justify their subsequent defection.69 Healey also 
acknowledges that his abrasive style could have also backfired against him.70 Yet Healey is 
more recognisably combative when it came to the Deputy Leadership battle and states that 
whilst it was not a position he wanted to take, he recognised the importance of having to stand 
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and also of having to win (Giles Radice was to note in his diary that it was this victory that 
saved the Labour Party).71 
Kenneth O. Morgan’s biography of Foot highlights the leader's speech at the Brighton 
Conference in which he said that the Labour Party was ‘a pluralist, tolerant body which strove 
to keep a balance between the different sections,’72 and notes how Foot was trying to keep 
both the Left and Right together during the internal conflict over the reform of the Electoral 
College and the re-selection of candidates.73 As with the Callaghan biography, Morgan notes 
the sense of betrayal that Owen, Rodgers and Williams felt towards Callaghan after the 
Bishop’s Stortford Commission of Enquiry even though he opposed the changes, and notes 
that Foot opposed them also. Morgan also notes the Crewe/King account of the votes of future 
SDP members for Foot in order to cause the split in the Labour Party, with Healey’s falling out 
with Rodgers and Owen a contributing factor (Morgan names three of the MPs said to have 
voted for Foot – Jeffrey Thomas, Tom Ellis and Neville Sanderson). Morgan also adds ‘one 
alleged oddity was that Harold Wilson told Healey that he voted for him on the first ballot, but 
for Foot on the second’.74 In the following chapter, Morgan accounts how Foot tried to keep 
members of the right within the Party by having a ‘distinctly Healeyite’ Shadow Cabinet, but 
how William Rodgers refused all shadow posts (and Morgan even refers to personal animosity 
between the two).75 This account is followed by the description of the Special Wembley 
Conference of 1981 to vote on the Electoral College, ‘a dreadful occasion in every respect, 
with vitriolic bitterness among many delegates towards the party right’.76 Despite Foot’s 
personal dislike of Owen and Rodgers (a feeling that was mutual), Morgan notes how he tried 
to persuade them to stay and devotes almost two pages to the way he tried to keep Shirley 
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Williams in the party to no avail and how eventually the breakaway ‘was a massive blow to 
Michael Foot. It coloured the whole of his period as leader’.77 
Foot’s successor as leader Neil Kinnock has yet to produce a memoir of his time in politics but 
he has been well served by two biographies by George Drower78 and Martin Westlake79. In 
his memoir, Who Goes Home? 80, Kinnock’s deputy Roy Hattersley produces an entertaining 
account of his parliamentary career. Hattersley is forthright, stating that whilst some MPs 
joined the SDP ‘out of a combination of conviction and despair...most dressed up self-interest 
to look like principle. By protecting themselves, they exposed Britain to a full decade of 
Thatcherism’.81 Hattersley states that there was one consolation that he could take and that 
was that by remaining he helped the revisionist cause to survive in the Labour Party by helping 
to found Labour Solidarity alongside right-wing MPs such as John Smith, Giles Radice and 
Ken Weetch. ‘Back in 1981, I was one of the people who stood their ground, argued against 
absurdity, organised (no matter how incompetently) on behalf of reason and, in consequence, 
saved the Labour Party’.82 Hattersley wrote prolifically in the 1980s and beyond and his work 
on the updating of revisionism, Choose Freedom, was to be significant in influencing the 
development of the production of the document A Statement of Democratic Socialist Aims and 
Values that preceded the commencement of the Policy Review. 
Each of the members of the Gang of Four produced memoirs and provided recollections of 
their part in the breakaway. Considered to be the most popular of the four in the country, 
Shirley Williams published her memoirs in 2009 and the two chapters in which she recounts 
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the breakaway convey the pain of her decision to leave Labour and begin with her losing her 
seat in 1979. Whilst out of Parliament, Williams was re-elected to the NEC recalls how at the 
time she placed those on the ‘soft’ Left as being in league with the ‘hard’ left who she accused 
of extra-parliamentary activity and offers a mea culpa in believing this at the time83 Williams 
also recounts how that initially she did not approve of the idea of the new political party (and 
dismissed the concept after the Dimbleby speech) but that her conversion to the idea came 
with a culmination of events rather than any one in particular. On the Labour Leadership 
elections, Williams says that whilst those on the right were disappointed with Healey’s tactics 
and attitude, the majority of them voted for him except for a few who, as has been noted, voted 
for Foot to exacerbate a split. Williams names one of these MPs as the late Neville 
Sanderson.84  
Williams also provides an insight into her belief at the time of what the new party should be 
and that it should be democratic socialist (a sentiment similar to Owen and Rodgers) and that 
Roy Jenkins was by this stage less inclined to this direction.85 Williams also contends that it 
was due to the ‘calming influence’ of William Whitelaw over Margaret Thatcher that prevented 
more liberal minded Conservatives joining the SDP rather than the one MP and few councillors 
that did eventually defect.86 Williams then provides an account of her battles for the seat of 
Crosby in 1981 and concludes that, whilst there would be more by-election victories to come, 
the election of Healey as Labour’s Deputy Leader was the turning point and that if Tony Benn 
had won, the defections to the SDP would have gathered pace.87  
Roy Jenkins’s memoirs provide a lengthy account of his time in politics and his time as Home 
Secretary and Chancellor, taking in his involvements in the battles between the Bevanites and 
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the Gaitskellites and his central role in the pro-European campaign in the 1975 Referendum. 
Jenkins recalls his Dimbleby Lecture and the call for a ‘radical centre’ in British politics to bring 
about a re-alignment and how his timing coincided with the disillusionment of the right within 
the Labour Party. Jenkins disputes that there was a particular reason for the breakaway, 
refuting ‘the conventional wisdom...that Healey’s defeat by Foot so dismayed the Social 
Democrats as to open the road to the SDP,’ saying that whilst this made the defections and 
by-elections easier, the right in the Labour Party had by 1980 ‘become so disenchanted by 
Healey that his defeat was rather a relief to them’.88 Jenkins’s account devotes time to his 
relations with the defectors, praising the Jenkinsites such as David Marquand and recounting 
his close friendship with Bill Rodgers and their shared battles over Europe.89 Jenkins 
acknowledges that the defection of Shirley Williams was ‘a great prize’, yet also contends that 
if Williams had remained within Labour, this would not have been a ‘trauma’ in the same way 
it would have been if Bill Rodgers had decided not to defect.90 As perhaps was to be expected, 
Jenkins provides a cool appraisal of David Owen, with whom he had a difficult relationship 
and notes that ‘the cause of centre politics...would have been better off without him,’ and that 
he was not crucial to the successful launch of the SDP.91 Jenkins then provides his memories 
of the Glasgow Hillhead By-Election in 1982 and his frustrations of Parliament as leader of the 
SDP and his subsequent resignation in 1983. 
Augmenting Jenkins’ own work was John Campbell’s biography, Roy Jenkins: A Well-
Rounded Life,92 which provides an excellent account of the life of Jenkins and his career within 
the Labour Party. The account of his tenure as Home Secretary during the ‘Liberal Hour’ of 
1967-68 is touched upon in the fourth chapter of this thesis as it examines Labour’s social 
liberal traditions. 
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At 822 pages, David Owen’s autobiography provides a highly detailed account of his time in 
politics, and it provides Owen’s view of why the breakaway took place, highlighting his 
frustration with ‘people who ought to have known better’ for their refusal to face up to the 
infiltration of Militant, and contends this that whilst he was willing to remain and struggle for 
the cause of the right within the Labour Party, it was this lack of desire to back his intervention 
in the debate on unilateral disarmament that made his decision to leave become much more 
certain.93 This was further confirmed after the decision to adopt the electoral college and 
Owen’s call for ‘one member, one vote’ was rejected.94 Owen also recalls how the meetings 
within the Manifesto Group became more fractious and acrimonious as the breakaway moved 
nearer (an account that was to be verified by Roy Hattersley).95 Perhaps more than the other 
‘Gang of Four’, Owen provides an explanation of his ideological standpoint, noting how in his 
book Face the Future he calls for less statism and a move away from the Webb’s ‘Fabian 
paternalism’ which was ‘an historical error bedevilling every Labour Government’.96 
Nevertheless, Owen also stated that he was determined for the SDP to be part of the Socialist 
International, ‘using continental social democracy as the start of a fresh political start in Britain,’ 
and that he himself was ‘determined to remain a redistributionist’.97 
William Rodgers’ autobiography, Fourth Amongst Equals, provides an excellent account of his 
growing up in Liverpool and his career in politics. Highlighting his role as the main organiser 
of the Gaistkellite ‘Campaign for Democratic Socialism’ and time as a Cabinet minister, 
Rodgers discusses how the Manifesto Group and the Campaign for Labour victory came into 
being as a response to left-wing activism.  Rodgers employs two chapters to recount the 
events of the breakaway, contending that Callaghan should have stepped down earlier in order 
for Healey to become leader as the former’s authority was slipping but then highlights his 
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frustration at Healey’s apparent lack of will to fight.98 Rodgers also states that the grouping 
between David Owen, Shirley Williams and himself had come about in Spring 1979 as a result 
of their opposition to the proposed constitutional changes.99 Rodgers is kind in his appraisal 
of Williams but notes how he had ‘doubts’ about Owen, writing in his diary, ‘What does David 
really stand for except himself?’100   
As with Williams, Rodgers recounts the publication of the letter to the Guardian and Daily 
Mirror by the ‘Gang of Three’ in response to the Bishop’s Stortford Commission of Enquiry and 
his response to the Jenkins Dimbleby Lecture. Rodgers was not able to say if the lecture 
changed minds in the Labour Party, but he recognised that it signalled Jenkins’ intention to 
return to British politics.101 Rodgers also provides his account of his speech at Abertilley on 
30th November in which he warned that the Labour Party had a year in which to ‘save itself’ 
and ‘remain a broad coalition of democratic socialists’ and that the consequence of a fight to 
the last with the ‘hard’ left would be that if they won, those who considered themselves 
moderate would leave.102 Rodgers also notes that at this point, both he and Shirley Williams, 
whilst now discussing in general terms a new political party, were still committed to remaining 
inside the Labour Party.103 
For Rodgers, it appears that the catalyst for the break came with the election of Foot as Leader 
and he notes that for some MPs it ‘conveniently settled things’.104 Rodgers also says that when 
Foot gave his shadow Defence portfolio to a member of CND this provided further ammunition 
but admits that if Foot had offered him a significant position, he would have found it difficult to 
leave, and would have remained to be ‘desperately miserable throughout Labour’s years of 
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failure’.105 Rodgers also writes of how his ‘impatience grew at the steady erosion of the will to 
fight’, and how whilst  Roy Hattersley, Merlyn Rees, Eric Varley and John Smith were of similar 
mindset to the defectors, they were not prepared to challenge the NEC or Unions.106 Rodgers 
acknowledges the bitter acrimony, most regularly towards Roy Hattersley, and provides an 
episode in which both he and Giles Radice were prevented from physically attacking each 
other after a final attempt by members of the Manifesto group to convince Rodgers to remain 
within Labour and how it was a further fifteen years until they were again on friendly terms.107 
Writing of the immediate aftermath of the Limehouse Declaration, Rodgers states that it was 
necessary for the new party to gain MPs from the Conservatives in order not to be seen as ‘a 
splinter of the Labour Party’ and acknowledges that whilst there were potential recruits at the 
height of Mrs. Thatcher’s unpopularity in 1981, the Falklands War finished this possibility.108  
Rodgers expresses the personal pain, how he was forced out from the Fabian Society (of 
which he was a General Secretary), lost contact with people in his constituency party that he 
had worked with for twenty years and culminated with his defeat at the General Election 1983. 
Giles Radice’s Friends and Rivals is an insight into the relationship between the three great 
figures on the post-war Labour Right, Roy Jenkins, Denis Healey and Tony Crosland.  Radice, 
a former Labour MP from the right of the party, offers a critical appraisal of three men he 
greatly admired, blaming Healey’s poor tactics up to and during the leadership election and 
as being a factor in the breakaway, which Crewe and King also ventured.109 However, Radice 
also portrays Healey’s narrow victory as Deputy Leader over Tony Benn as the turning point 
in the fortunes of the Labour Party and also the SDP. Radice suggests that a further thirty or 
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forty MPs may have left the Labour Party, and that this was the moment Healey actually saved 
the party itself.110 
Radice proffers the suggestion that for some of those on the right who had defected to the 
SDP it was ultimately a redundant exercise considering the eventual direction that the party 
was to undertake. He argued the Limehouse Declaration was ‘an unexceptional revisionist 
document,’ that would appeal to ‘nearly all German Social Democrats, most Labour right-
wingers of the time and indeed the vast majority of Tony Blair’s New Labour Party’.111 Radice 
also offers the opinion that had Healey and Jenkins (and also Crosland) been able to work 
together in the 1970s, ‘it could have made a crucial difference, not only to their own careers, 
but also to the Social Democratic position inside the Labour Party and to the fate of Labour 
itself,’ and that Hugh Gaitskell would ‘have been amazed to find two of his closest revisionist 
allies of the 1950s fighting the 1983 election in different parties’.112  
Radice’s own diaries are excellent sources of contemporary information as are the diaries of 
Tony Benn113114. These provide autobiographical information as it provides an insight to the 
thinking of the protagonists on or around the time certain events take place. Use of diary 
entries from these texts are used in this thesis. 
Dianne Hayter’s personal account of the organisation of the Labour Party centre-right against 
the hard left, Fightback!115, is an excellent account of the development and organisation of the 
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Labour Solidarity group and the collection of trade unions sympathetic to their cause (the St 
Ermin’s Group). Hayter suggests that there was no unifying ideological theme for those groups 
coalescing against those supporting Tony Benn or separately the Militant Tendency.  
The overalls theme of these texts is of Labour struggling to establish its identity against a 
backdrop of bitter internal division and for the right in particular attempting to regain what their 
purpose was in the face of advances by the far left and an ideologically strident Conservative 
Government. After being the dominant faction within Labour in the post-war period, and 
despite there not being much in the way of ideological difference, revisionists could no longer 
agree on whether the party was still capable of being an instrument of progressive change.  
Thesis Structure 
The first chapter of the thesis is an examination of the revisionists in the Labour Party and 
what it meant to be someone on the party’s revisionist wing (declared or perceived), what the 
philosophical and ideological commonalities were within this loose grouping and also where 
they differed. This chapter also explores Labour’s time in Government in the late 1960s when 
it ushered in the ‘Liberal Hour’ despite much of the legislation being at odds with some of the 
beliefs of working class communities it was set up to represent. It also examines how the 
development of post-war policy, particularly membership of the European Economic 
Community, saw the hardening of positions and attitudes within the party. It aims to 
demonstrate how there had been a history of groups within the Labour Party that had formed 
to stave off left-wing influence since the post-war period and how such groups – the Campaign 
for Democratic Socialism (CDS), Manifesto Group, Campaign for Labour Victory – were to 
provide the future members of the Social Democratic Party. It shows how the battles in the 
1950s, between the Gaitskellites and the Bevanites were to continue into the 1960s and ‘70s.  
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Prior to the 1979 election, the party had suffered resignations, particularly over Europe, which 
they had managed to contain, with notable shadow ministers such as Roy Jenkins and David 
Owen returning to the Cabinet once Labour had been returned to power. The 1970s was to 
see the first instances of candidates leaving the party to stand as moderate Social Democratic 
candidates, most notably Dick Taverne in 1974. Yet whilst these incidents of independent 
candidates were short-lived, they appeared to pave the way for a future platform for those 
MPs who were against the direction the party appeared to be taking. Both the first and second 
chapters aim to utilise some of the research documentation acquired at the People’s History 
Museum in central Manchester; in particular the papers of George (now Lord) Robertson, who 
was a leading organiser of the Manifesto Group of MPs. The documentation that has been 
examined so far contains contemporary pamphlets from the Manifesto, Campaign for Labour 
Victory and Solidarity groups and correspondence between Robertson and members of the 
Manifesto Group such as Giles Radice (who was to remain within the Labour Party as a 
founder and organiser of the Solidarity Group and as a member of the Shadow Cabinet) and 
those who were subsequently to leave, such as Bill Rodgers and John Wrigglesworth amongst 
others. 
The second chapter examines the political landscape after Margaret Thatcher’s success in 
the General Election and the intense pressure and criticism that was directed towards the 
centre right of the Parliamentary Labour Party. This chapter critically assesses the state of the 
Labour Party after the loss in 1979, how the right of the party began to split and that the origins 
of the SDP can be seen as crystallising quickly after 1979. The chapter develops Eric Shaw’s 
observation about the multiple crises that Labour faced during this period and what these 
were. The first was a crisis of confidence of those on the right of the party in the leadership of 
the party to provide effective direction. The second was a crisis of legitimacy, as the argument 
concerning the introduction of a more representative system over matters of policy making 
and leadership election led to competing visions to address Labour’s democratic deficit. Finally 
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there was the crisis of faith as the establishment of the Electoral College, the election of 
Michael Foot as leader and the shift to the left further eroded the faith that those on Labour’s 
right may still have had. For some, departure was the only real alternative to remaining in a 
party that had been their ideological home for decades.  
Chapter Three focuses on the period between 1981 and 1983 and examines why some on 
the Labour Party’s right determined to stay within the party whilst others felt it necessary to 
leave it to join the Social Democrats. It also examines how those who remained in the Labour 
Party understood the reasons behind the SDP’s formation and how this influenced their 
thinking. It assesses what they considered to be the differences between their interpretations 
of social democracy and those of the Social Democrats, and focuses on the main differences 
between those who stayed and those who left. In doing so it will employ interviews with Giles 
Radice, Dianne Hayter and Austin Mitchell, as well as local activists in Oldham and 
Cambridge. The chapter also looks at the emergence of a slowly developing reaction against 
the Bennite Hard Left by the supporters of Michael Foot and how the Tribunite group assisted 
with the stemming of further defections of MPs from the Labour right by abstaining on the vote 
for the Deputy Leadership elections, paving the way for the eventual establishment of a 
coalition of soft left and revisionist social democrats under the leadership of Neil Kinnock and 
Roy Hattersley.  
Chapter Four is an analysis of Labour’s social liberalism in the 1980s in relation to the pursuit 
of greater rights for gay and lesbian people and the area of video censorship from the 
perspective of the Labour Party itself. It is an overview of the gradualist, reforming aspects of 
Labour’s social policies during a decade of opposition to the economic excess and moral 
Puritanism that were the dominant forces of the governing Conservative Party. The purpose 
is to show that, in spite of pressure to buckle and tack away from nostrums that were seemingly 
unpopular from a political perspective, Labour in the 1980s was able to demonstrate a strong 
sense of social liberalism that had long existed within the wider movement and was part of the 
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social democratic tradition and presenting the classic dilemma faced by the Labour Party in 
how it could appeal to both the perceived liberal-minded middle classes and the more socially 
conservative working class which it was set up to serve. It also shows how the ideas and 
attitudes with some of those on the right who remained in the Labour Party were not always 
that different from those who left and how the SDP’s programme on social matters could 
sometimes reflect that of the party it splintered from. 
The fifth and final chapter analyses and reflects on the slow rebuilding process which was to 
take place after the disaster of the 1983 General Election. It also looks at how Labour was to 
find continued difficulties in dealing with the establishment of the Social Democrats as one of 
the main political parties, a process which was to advance Labour’s move from its left-wing 
policies to a more centrist position. The chapter notes the election of Neil Kinnock as Labour 
leader and how, during the backdrop of a dominant Conservative Government and the crises 
of the Militant expulsions and the Miners’ Strike, he attempted to establish the party not only 
as a credible opposition but as a potential Government in waiting. The chapter then analyses 
the defeat at the 1987 General Election and the subsequent setting up of the Policy Review 
which was to see significant changes in Labour’s previous stances on European Community 
membership and nuclear deterrence, two policies which had been a cause of the schism 
between the right and the left of the party since the 1950s. The chapter concludes with the 
emphatic victory of Neil Kinnock over Tony Benn when the latter challenged for the Labour 
leadership, a move that was to see the far left increasingly marginalised within the party for 
almost thirty years. 
The conclusion will then examine how New Labour’s pretence to revisionism was undermined 
by its period in office which was to see less of a liberal Social Democratic administration than 
a more liberal corporatism that saw increasing centralisation, this despite it committing itself 
to the devolving of power to three nations. This will place the SDP’s formation within the wider 
history of the Labour Party. It also questions whether social democratic revisionism is still 
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relevant with the election of the former Bennite Jeremy Corbyn and his platform of left-wing 
populism. 
The Crisis of Labour Revisionism and its roots 
The schism that took place with the creation of the Social Democratic Party can be directly led 
back to the loss of power in 1951 and the protracted and damaging battles that took place 
throughout the decade. The bitter struggle for influence and policy direction between the 
supporters of Hugh Gaitskell on the right and Aneurin Bevan on the left had been seemingly 
resolved or at least neutralised by the onset of the 1960s and the advent of Government. Yet 
Government only masked the resentments and enmity that seemingly remained below the 
surface and it was to take another defeat in 1970 to reveal that the divisions still remained, 
exacerbated and amplified by a growing militancy on both wings of the party. As with 1964, 
the narrow victories of February and October 1974 temporarily masked these divisions and 
they were to erupt with occasional ferocity, acting as markers for the greater schism to come. 
The defeat of 1979 and the breakaway crisis of 1981 was the ultimate outcome of a serious 
failure of the Labour right to define and defend its position in the face of a resurgent left wing 
and a more ideologically strident and free market Conservative Party.  
There is a need to examine the history of the breakaway of the Social Democratic Party and 
its impact on the Labour Party over thirty-five years later, to detail how the revisionists 
eventually triumphed within the Labour Party and yet are now experiencing the loss of power 
as their predecessors had in 1979. It also examines how the Labour Party is currently enduring 
a turn of the cycle and witnessing a resumption of hostilities between right and left, with the 
latter now clearly in the ascendency. Despite the advances of the left (and with the benefit of 
hindsight) the threat to the hegemony of revisionism within the Labour party may not have 
been ultimately at risk in the early 1980s yet for many on the Labour right it felt as though their 
faction no longer had a place within the movement and was unwelcome in the ‘broad church’ 
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of differing variations of socialist thought that Labour had long professed to be. Labour 
ultimately survived the breakaway and formation of the SDP and the ‘broad church’ continued 
to allow different members of the congregation. The lessons and experiences of this period 
help to explain the current state and potential future of the social democratic tradition in the 
party during the present day.  
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  Chapter One 
The ideology of Labour Revisionism 1970-79 
 
It is democracy rather than socialism that has plagued Labour throughout its singularly 
unfraternal history. 
Kenneth O. Morgan116 
Introduction  
To understand the events that led up to and followed the General Election defeat of the Labour 
Government in 1979 it is necessary to first examine the circumstances the party found itself 
in prior to the defeat. In this chapter there is an examination of the various ideological strains 
within the party, how the theory of a British social democratic tradition had developed, what it 
meant to be someone on the Labour Party’s revisionist wing (declared or perceived), what the 
philosophical and ideological commonalities were within this loose grouping and also where 
they differed. It also examines how the development of post-war policy, particularly 
membership of the European Economic Community, saw the hardening of positions and 
attitudes within the party.  
This chapter will also examine the reactions within the Labour Party to the defeat suffered at 
the 1979 General Election and consider how this can be viewed in relation to the schism that 
was to occur in early 1981.  The challenge for the traditional right of the Labour Party was that 
it was faced with an increasing number of strident voices questioning its very purpose. From 
the Campaign for Labour Victory and Manifesto groups to those now outside of the Labour 
movement - the members of the right-wing Social Democratic Association (SDA) and the 
former Labour MP David Marquand - all had begun to openly question whether Labour was 
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capable of delivering on the aims of ‘traditional welfare-state social democracy’.  What was 
now being called for was a sense of leadership for the Social Democratic right and the 
development of the conception of an alternative project that could operate from outside the 
Labour Party. 
For the soft left the coming years were to be a quixotic period with greater advances in 
achieving their dominance of the party with the election of Michael Foot as leader. Yet this 
victory was to be tinged with the knowledge that without the right’s counterbalance the 
prospect of being in a position to execute their cherished aims would remain remote. For the 
hard left, Tony Benn was to see the success of his constitutional aims reach their zenith and 
yet both he and his supporters were ultimately to be denied at a time of potentially their 
greatest triumph.  
This chapter is also an examination of failure: failure of a Labour Party returned to opposition 
but unable to quickly regroup and effectively challenge a Conservative Government that 
struggled in the early stages of its tenure. It was a party hamstrung by its own divisions and 
its inability to renew the established coexistence of the differing strands that threaded together 
to enable Labour to operate as a coherent whole. It was also a failure of the Labour Right to 
maintain unity in the face of left-wing dominance, with many left-wing MPs and activists 
resentful towards those that they felt responsible for Labour’s failure in Government. Such 
anger and resentment was to cripple the party from almost the moment it lost power in May 
1979. The fallout of May 1979 was to see the party split and the defectors offer dynamism in 
comparison to a Labour Party which had been condemned for its ineffectiveness and rigidity.    
The Ideology of Labour Revisionism 
In common with other modern British political parties, Labour has often struggled to define 
exactly what its philosophy actually is. Anthony Crosland’s quote, in which he refers to 
Labour’s origins being formed on no ‘body of doctrine at all, and has always preserved a 
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marked anti-doctrinal and anti-theoretical bias,’117 could also be applied to the main British 
political parties, certainly prior to the late 1960s and the emergence of more ideologically 
inclined groups within the Conservative and Labour movements.  
Tony Benn described the Labour Party as a broad church of differing socialist views held 
together by the concept of redistribution of national wealth and resources in order to reduce 
inequality and to provide a more harmonious society.  Benn further suggested that the Labour 
Party was not a socialist party but had socialists within it which perhaps underlines the 
reluctance to ascribe a particular ideology to the disparate elements within the movement that 
the party represents.118 Yet in saying this, Benn contradicts the statement of declaration that 
the party makes even to this day – that the party is a democratic socialist organisation.  
The way in which the Labour Party evolved was as organic as the way the British Conservative 
and Unionist Party developed and changed over the course of the last century. This was in 
spite of a constitution which contained specific elements of socialist ideology, notably Clause 
IV which was itself the source of controversy for the Labour Party’s in the twentieth century.  
Labour had been a loose coalition of associations and groups since its inception as the Labour 
Representation Committee (LRC) in 1900, an amalgamation of (but not restricted to) trade 
unions, Fabians, the original Scottish Labour Party, the Independent Labour Party  and 
Christian Socialists. This was the first organised grouping of left-wing groups in the British 
Isles and from the beginning it faced the same internal strains as those encountered by the 
established parties of the Conservatives and Liberals. Coalescing around the idea of 
organising parliamentary representation of an increasingly radical and unionised working-
class, the LRC was almost from the very beginning faced with how it would achieve the aim 
of improving the working and living conditions for those it represented. George Shepherd, in 
his essay ‘Labour’s Early Days’ makes the wry observation; ‘There were amongst the 
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Committee Liberal-Labour men, Marxist doctrinaires, permeaters and political independence 
men. That such a committee actually got down to writing out an agenda is one of the most 
surprising things in the Labour Party's history’.119 
The Labour Government of 1945 to 1951 led by Clement Attlee is widely regarded as one of 
the most important Governments of the Twentieth Century and is held in mythical regard by 
party members even to the present day of New Labour and the ‘Third Way’. The first post-war 
Labour Government, which commanded a huge majority and had experienced ministers from 
the years of wartime Coalition, was clearly ideological when it had applied socialist policies 
such as the nationalisation of the major industries and the introduction of the Welfare State 
and the National Health Service. The Attlee Government had transformed Britain in such a 
radically different way in a short space of time, and in the midst of a bankrupt and war-ravaged 
economy.  Yet, as far as socialism was concerned, for some this simply was what Labour did 
when it was in power and the pragmatic approach of Herbert Morrison and Ernest Bevin, the 
‘Labourist’ sensibilities adopted by right-wing Labour leaders and union leaders, held sway.  
By the time of the 1950 General Election there was uncertainty within the party as to how to 
proceed in the wake of the monumental changes that had already been introduced. In the 
event, the Labour manifesto was effectively for the preservation of what had been 
implemented with references to further nationalisation kept to a minimum and was a manifesto 
of management rather than radicalism. This would seem in retrospect to be perfectly sensible. 
Labour has never been wedded to a particular strand of socialist theory because seemingly 
hardwired into the British psyche is an in-built anathema to intellectual theorising and dogma. 
The Attlee Government introduced the basis of a mixed economy in the midst of economic 
conditions that were still geared to the war effort and utilised what it had learned in Government 
to great effect. Five years later it was now taking a more measured approach particularly in 
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the face of public antipathy to the austerity of the post-war economy and no appetite for further 
nationalisation. 
The lionisation of the Attlee Government has been seen as the reason for the subsequent 
failures of subsequent Labour Governments or the failure for the party to appeal sufficiently to 
the electorate. For Maurice Glasman, as part of his Blue Labour critique of the reliance of the 
party to implement policy through state, Government under Attlee ‘became the exclusive 
instrument of societal transformation,’120 and as such provided the blueprint for the ineffective 
Labour Governments to follow: 
The legacy was a strategy that was either based upon being more technocratic, 
modernising and efficient than our capitalist rivals or to mine a reserve of resentment.  It 
was not based on organising but mobilisation, on administration rather than participation, 
on entitlement rather than responsibility, on money rather than power, on policies rather 
than an institutional politics.  It was not a good thing.121 
This criticism of the overly bureaucratic nature of Labour’s post-war nationalisation 
programmes is of course not new. Panitch and Leys quote the then left-wing MP Brian 
Sedgemore at the Labour Conference of 1971 who said that Labour had been hamstrung by 
the statism implemented as a result of ‘the mistakes of 1945 when, almost by accident, 
Clement Attlee’s Government modelled the nationalised industries on Herbert Morrison’s 
water boards’. 122123 It could be seen as the epitome of what was British Socialism, what was 
to be labelled derisorily by Ralph Miliband two decades later as ‘Labourism’, or as corporatism 
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by Tony Benn in Arguments for Socialism.124 In future years the approach to planning and 
economy would come in for criticism from the left of the party, yet the first theoretical critique 
would come from the right. 
In his 1956 book The Future of Socialism, Tony Crosland described revisionism as a strand 
of thought in which the traditional Socialist ideals of nationalisation and planning do not in 
themselves solve the problems of inequality and that there should be more emphasis on 
individual liberty and wealth creation. Crosland followed in the direct footsteps of a near-
contemporary, Evan Durbin, who in 1940 wrote The Politics of Democratic Socialism which 
held that gradual societal change would require the cooperation of the middle classes as well 
as the trade union movement, as the numbers of the former had risen in the 1930s. Yet Durbin, 
as Foote notes, did not envisage a change to the requirement of a centrally controlled, planned 
economy and this is where Durbin and Crosland diverged.125 In the late 1930s Douglas Jay 
(later to be a leading figure on the Labour right) was to write The Socialist Case in which he 
made the case for the state control of transport and energy but that small businesses should 
continue to remain free from Government.  
Crosland had been contributing to the New Fabian Essays since the late 1940s and had been 
setting out the outline of the revisionist case which he was to amplify with The Future of 
Socialism. For Crosland, the post-war settlement of full-employment, public ownership of the 
main utilities and the Welfare State and its acceptance by the Conservatives showed that the 
battle for improving the lot of the working-classes had been won but it was now necessary to 
ensure that this was enhanced by the development of greater equality. Crosland’s analysis, 
completed in the economic boom of the 1950s, stated that the mixed economy of a controlled 
capitalism allied to state intervention where necessary (primarily in the areas of health and 
education) meant that there was no longer a need for nationalisation and that there should be 
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a different role for Government.  Equality in society as opposed to the class war of the pre-
war period was the hallmark of Crosland’s analysis, with greater emphasis on individual 
freedom. As the working-classes became more affluent it was necessary for Labour to 
evaluate whether it should solely remain a party of the working-classes or become a mass 
movement representing all sections of society. For Crosland, remaining purely a party of the 
working-classes would consign to ineffective irrelevance.  
Crosland’s ideas and philosophy was to make him emblematic and iconic figure for the 
Revisionist right, even though he could be difficult – David Marquand, who recalled upon first 
meeting Crosland that he ‘took an instant dislike to him’ had become a convert by the time he 
was to become an MP in 1964 on account of reading The Future of Socialism: ‘Gaitskell was 
dead, and the revisionists needed a champion. George Brown was too unreliable, and Roy 
Jenkins too remote. Crosland seemed to be the man. More than any of the other Gaitskellites, 
he cared about ideas.’126 Marquand was amongst many young MPs who were to be readily 
influenced by Crosland and was to be joined by others such as Roy Hattersley and David 
Owen who were in due course elected to Parliament in 1966.  
For Marquand ‘Croslandite revisionism is best understood as a historic compromise between 
British parliamentary socialism and a more inchoate “progressive tradition” going back way of 
Keynes and Beveridge, to the New Liberalism of the early century’. Now that socialism had 
tamed capitalism thanks to Labour, ‘the real end of socialism was equality; and to that the 
traditional socialist means of public ownership was no longer essential, or even relevant’.127 
This provided the theoretical framework for those on the right to base their support of Gaitskell 
although beyond this there were to be areas of division here also. 
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With the election defeat of 1959, the Labour right set up a group in 1960 as a more organised 
response to the left and as a means of protecting the position of the leadership of Gaitskell 
and also to promote the ideas of the moderate centre and right. This group, Campaign for 
Democratic Socialism (CDS), was established and organised to attract those MPs and 
grassroots who were opposed to the unilateralism of the CND supporting left, and also for a 
more moderate economic policy that was less reliant on the process of nationalisation and 
state intervention, publicly supporting the attempts of Gaitskell to re-position the party away 
from the more overtly left-wing programme as established prior to the 1959 election.   
Just as Bevan had caused confusion and a sense of betrayal for his conversion to 
multilateralism, Gaitskell was to provide turmoil for his supporters on two occasions at 
Conference. At the Party Conference in 1960, Gaitksell set about trying to remove Clause IV. 
This attempt at what Gaitskell saw as modernising the Labour Party had its supporters on the 
right such as Douglas Jay as a means of removing what was seen as an out-dated millstone 
which committed the party to nationalisation. The move was soundly defeated by Conference 
and moreover it was rejected by those within the trades unions who had been up until this 
point supportive of Gaitskell, who as Shaw notes, felt it was ‘needlessly provocative on 
tradition and the Party’s own sense of past’.128  
Gaitskell was to further alarm his supporters on the right and in the CDS when he made a 
vituperative attack on those who wished Britain to join the fledgling European Economic 
Community (EEC) during his 1962 Conference Speech. This was supported by those on the 
right who also opposed membership such as Douglas Jay and supported Gaistkell’s reasons 
for the danger that membership posed to Britain’s relationship with Commonwealth countries. 
For those who supported Gaitskell but were in favour of membership this came as a profound 
disappointment. William Rodgers, soon to be leading light within the CDS, gave his maiden 
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speech in June 1962 and laid down notice of his future voting intentions within the Commons 
when he came out in support of Macmillan’s application.129 This notice of rebellion underlined 
just how Europe was to be a cause of friction and eventually schism within the revisionist 
ranks, as was to be seen when Labour was to lose power in 1970. 
The Wilson Governments – Corporatism with a Liberal Face 
The 1964-1970 Governments led by Gaitskell’s successor Harold Wilson were to become a 
bête noir for both the Social Democrats and the left because they were to be seen as the 
benchmark for corporatism. Eric Hobsbawm was to write ‘at no time did the Wilson 
Governments have a programme worth the name, and hence they could hardly betray it.’130 
The opinion that the Government would continue to prevent real socialist change was a 
recurring criticism of the left.  
The period of Wilson’s Government was to coincide with the radicalism of student political 
protest and growing industrial militancy. An increase in the numbers of more radical members 
of Constituency Labour Parties (CLP), what Pannitch refers to as ‘the New Activists’ saw an 
increasingly articulate and strategically aware left. 131 An abortive attempt at joining the EEC, 
an attempt at changing industrial relations which was to alienate union leaders and the trauma 
of devaluation in 1967 was to tarnish Wilson as leading a Government that was only in power 
for power’s sake, ‘the radical potential of the Attlee generation within the party had been 
lost’.132 
Yet this criticism was to neglect the fact that during his period in Government, Wilson, whilst 
being something of a social conservative, was to preside over a period of unprecedented 
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societal change which it was able to channel and adapt to with a combination of the 
introduction of legislation and adroit management by the normally socially conservative 
Wilson. Labour’s post-war social liberalism was a step-change rather than a full-blooded revolt 
against the Fabian tradition as espoused by the Webbs which had dominated much of the 
party’s thinking. The long fallow period of the 1950s was to see Labour pushed further away 
from returning to power with three successive election defeats and yet was also to see  
younger figures from the Labour right such as Anthony Crosland and Roy Jenkins producing 
books containing critiques on Labour positions on economic policy and also on social attitudes. 
In  The Future of Socialism Crosland had railed against ‘socially-imposed restrictions on the 
individuals private life and liberty,’ and highlighted laws prohibiting or outlawing licensing times 
for public houses, divorce and abortion legislation, homosexuality, censorship in the arts and 
equal rights for women. These, said Crosland, were ‘intolerable, and should be highly 
offensive to socialists, in whose blood there should always run a trace of the anarchist and the 
libertarian’.133 
Similarly in his 1959 book The Labour Case, Roy Jenkins was to make the case for reform of 
the same areas mentioned by Crosland and later described the chapter, ‘Is Britain Civilised?’ 
as his “‘unauthorised programme’ for the Home Office.”134John Campbell, in his biography of 
Jenkins, notes that he had been ahead of Crosland in pushing for the decriminalisation of 
homosexuality and the abolition of capital punishment and strongly opposed to censorship.135It 
would be in a little over seven years from the publication of The Labour Case that an 
opportunity to implement the ‘unauthorised programme’ presented itself. Both Jenkins’ and 
Crosland’s social liberalism were to have influence on a later generation of Labour politicians 
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from across its spectrum, including the future leader of the Greater London Council, Ken 
Livingstone.136 
The changes which were to take place at a rapid pace in the 1960s had their origins in the 
1950s and beyond and nor were they the sole preserve of those on the left of the political 
spectrum. The Wolfenden Report of 1957 had put forward the recommendation to relax the 
laws on the criminalisation of homosexuality. By the turn of the 1960s, there was a growing 
movement within some of the Conservative Party towards supporting the abolition of capital 
punishment, including Rab Butler and Henry Brooke.137 The ushering in of the so-called 
‘permissive society’ may not have been the direct result of legislation and was the result of 
society changing at a far more rapid rate than a Britain emerging from a stolid 1950s was 
prepared for. Yet as the long wait for a return to Government was achieved in 1964, Labour 
faced a number of private members bills which challenged the pervading social norms. The 
most significant socially liberal legislation of the post-war era was to be guided through the 
House of Commons by Roy Jenkins during his tenure as Home Secretary, the so-called 
‘Liberal Hour’.138 Between 1966 and 1970 Britain was to see the repeals of the laws against 
homosexuality and abortion being illegal, the abolition of hanging and the relaxation of divorce 
law.  
Whilst Harold Wilson had ‘strong, egalitarian feelings’ with regards to race relations he was 
otherwise uninterested in other areas and ‘cautious’ in the area of abortion due to fear of 
upsetting Catholic constituents, understandable in the light of Barbara Castle’s experience in 
the 1950s.139 Yet in spite of such caution Wilson permitted the room for such change to take 
place, as Ben Pimlott says he was ‘happy to accept and encourage, a liberal reform 
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programme that had the backing of the Labour Party intelligentsia’.140  There was some 
hostility within Labour including on the front benches – in Jenkins’s estimation, three or four 
ministers were opposed to both the Medical Termination and Sexual Offences Bills, with a 
substantial number in favour ‘and another larger group wished the issues would go away’. 
141The Foreign Secretary George Brown felt he was attuned to the working-classes and said 
that the reforms were to lead to ‘a totally disorganized, indecent and unpleasant society’.142 
Brown was aware of the views of many in the constituencies throughout the country as a result 
of his years of general election campaigning and there were many within Labour who were 
aware of the limitations of expecting their natural constituents to be accepting of such 
legislation. As Barbara Castle had noted with her narrow election victory in 1955, the 
combination of local and religious politics had almost cost her dear. However, the fear of 
grassroots did not completely act as an inhibitor to an MP in support of the liberalising 
legislation, an example being David Owen’s experience in Plymouth of his stance being at 
odds with that of his constituency party.143   
When Labour lost in 1970, it was not the role in which it played in ushering the liberal reforms 
that sat uneasily with some of its own electoral base but the problems of industrial action and 
a faltering economy which were the primary reasons for the defeat. The loss of 1970 may have 
seen the advent of a right-wing Conservative Government which had made a manifesto 
commitment to such populist measures as restricting immigration (something which chimed 
with the working-class demographic to which Labour still claimed to represent) yet there was 
no explicit commitment to rescind the reforms that Labour had introduced. For Labour, their 
manifesto spoke of ‘a better society for all the people of Britain: a strong, just and 
compassionate society, one where the handling of complex problems may be a source of pride 
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to ourselves and an example to the world’.144 Aside of a commitment to further the remit of the 
Race Relations Board there were no explicit commitments to further liberal reform.  
The unexpected election victory of the Conservatives in 1970 was to herald attempts to 
introduce trade union and industrial policy that would in less than a decade become more 
familiar under the guise of Thatcherism, but at this stage meant the first effort to make break 
from the post-war ‘Butskellism’ of the mixed economy and the use of state intervention. This 
move to the right had been mocked by Wilson by his labelling of the Conservatives of being 
‘Selsdon Man’, saying that the so-called right-wing radicalism was nothing of the sort but was 
simply a throwback to a more regressive age. Yet something had clearly chimed with the 
British electorate and after six years of Government Labour was again in opposition. When 
Labour was out of office the clamour for calls for a review of Government policies were 
immediately heard. All sides of the party wanted to find an explanation as to why the election 
was lost and as has been noted periods of retrospection and analysis were being undertaken, 
but as Thorpe notes, it was the right’s association with failed policies of the 1960’s Government 
that meant that it struggled to find support amongst the increasingly radical CLP and trade 
union sections.145 As it could rightly claim to have been ignored in the 1960’s, ‘the persecuted 
true brethren, endlessly defeated by the superior guile and cunning of the Right’,146 the left 
could not be associated with such failures and began to say it had the answers.   
The left began to stake their claims that they knew and understood the problems and failures 
of the Wilson Government. One of the first was from a man who had in cabinet been 
considered as a centrist but was now making a claim as a being a representative of the more 
radical left. In the 1960’s, Tony Benn was seen as part of the Centre, pro-NATO and pro-
accession to the EEC, with his opposition to nuclear weapons and association with the CND 
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the only possible link to a leftwards slant. Now Benn was attacking the Wilson Government’s 
policy and strategy which he had hitherto previously endorsed. Benn’s main thrust was that 
the Conservatives had been elected on a radical right-wing programme of trades union reform 
and privatisation, areas that were not alien to their grassroots or instincts. It was therefore only 
natural for Labour, said Benn, that if the Conservatives had won due to a radical programme, 
and if the post-war consensus had been broken by the Tories move to the right, to counter 
this new challenge it would be necessary for Labour to succeed only by becoming radical 
themselves. What had lost the election for Labour was that support had given way to 
disillusionment due to the Labour leadership’s betrayal of its socialist roots.147 The criticism 
from Benn clearly suggested a like for like switch to radical policy was required, particularly in 
the area of the party’s organisation. As already mentioned, there had been a marked militancy 
within the constituency associations and this was where Benn was to later ascribe his power-
base. Benn’s analysis was not, as Morgan notes, in keeping with Bevanite criticism of the 
Labour right. Although Benn shared little with more traditional left-wingers such as Michael 
Foot and Barbara Castle, they had a common belief that only a more radical programme akin 
to the 1945 Attlee Government could revive the party’s fortunes. This included in the economic 
field further nationalisation and in foreign affairs an opposition to membership of the European 
Economic Community. At this point, Benn was still considered to be pro-market unlike Foot 
and Castle, but Benn’s re-positioning towards the radical left was to precede his move to 
becoming anti-European. 
It was to be throughout the 1970s that those who considered themselves to be revisionists 
suffered a crisis of faith to the extent that serious schisms began to emerge within the party, 
what Geoffrey Foote termed ‘a bottled mood of doubt’.148 The perceived failures of the Wilson 
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Governments of 1964-70 were therefore not restricted to those on the left who were felt it to 
be too timid a Government and a missed opportunity for genuine socialism to be introduced.  
For the right, the party’s loss in 1970, as they saw it, was not because they had not been 
leftwing enough, but because the Government had failed to address Britain’s economic 
problems and had been unable to control union militancy. Anthony Crosland, writing in a 
Fabian Pamphlet published at the beginning of 1971 titled A Social Democratic Britain, 
suggested that there was little wrong with the basics of the party’s policies in Government and 
that the failures of the previous Government’s policies was ‘due partly to slow growth and 
partly to hostile public attitudes’.149 The perceived failure to deal with trade union militancy was 
seen as a deciding factor for the British electorate and this underlined how the unions were 
now being perceived, no longer as the bastions of the Labourist right, happy to support a 
moderate right-wing Labour Party as long as it looked after the attentions of the workers they 
represented but a more left-wing and ideologically inclined faction.  
A subsequent Fabian document, Social Democracy: Beyond Revisionism by John Gyford and 
Stephen Haseler was seen as a mild critique of the Benn analysis. It stated that the revisionist 
policy of judging public ownership ‘in terms of its practical contribution rather than its 
ideological merits’ and a focus on the need to tackle inequality and poverty had been put 
forward during the time of Gaitskell and implemented during the Wilson Government. The 
problem was whilst it had widened educational participation and had moved resources from 
the private to the public sectors, doing so at a time of low economic growth may have been 
‘too radical a policy for the majority of the electorate to accept’.150 The changes in society has 
seen more industrial militancy and the decline of the traditional working-class communities 
had been replaced by ‘a more open ended and conceivably more aggressive instrumentalism 
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as the worker seeks to assert his own material and social claims within an affluent society’.151 
They acknowledged the calls from Benn for more direct participation but said this should come 
from the Social Democratic wing of the party, that it should stem from the grassroots of the 
movement and that such policies had been a hallmark of Gaitskell (albeit not always in terms 
that endeared him to either the left in terms of his approval of nuclear weapons or to his own 
supporters when it came to Europe). Unlike Gaitskell who had wanted to maintain the links to 
the unions, there were now some who were questioning this connection in the face of a 
growing industrial militancy. Writing much later, Denis Healey said that Labour had ‘failed to 
adapt its thinking to the profound social changes it had itself initiated through the Attlee 
Government after the war’, and that due to a rise in living standards people had voted Tory 
because they ‘felt they had something to conserve’. Healey added that ‘the trade unions were 
now emerging as an obstacle both to the election of a Labour Government and to its success 
once it was in power’.152 
Despite the centre-right continuing to hold onto the more important and significant portfolios 
within the Shadow Cabinet, the left’s resurgence was beginning to be enforced through the 
National Executive Committee (NEC), which in turn was to be influenced by the increase in 
political activity by union members and constituency activists.  The emergence of a more 
radical and militant membership had begun to be noticed in the late 1960s. There had been a 
continued leftward shift in the Trades Union leadership, albeit towards the moderate, Bevanite 
left in the case of the two biggest unions, the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) 
and the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU), yet these were increasingly critical voices. 
Within the CLPs throughout the country a new brand of left-wing militancy began to exert their 
influence. This militancy took hold, suggests Patrick Seyd, due to Wilson’s ‘pragmatic 
approach to political issues and the parliamentary left’s initial reluctance to become 
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organisationally involved in constituency campaigning’.153 This in turn had created a political 
vacuum and this allowed groups such as the emerging Militant Tendency to fill the void. 
Labour’s leftward move was to be confirmed by the 1973 Party Conference, with ‘Labour’s 
Programme 1973’ contained the policy of re-negotiation of the Treaty of Rome and then putting 
the decision to a referendum. The programme was presented to Conference and was adopted 
as the party manifesto by a margin of five to one.154 
Europe 
Europe was the main policy schism for Labour in the 1970s. The party had suffered 
resignations over both the decision to vote against the terms of entry to the European 
Economic Community and the issue of holding a referendum on membership of the EEC. 
These decisions had led to the temporary departure of notable shadow ministers such as Roy 
Jenkins and David Owen. These events had led to a sense of despondency to some on the 
Labour Right, with David Marquand commenting almost twenty years later: 
We were engaged in a life and death political struggle for survival within the party and 
thought it would eventually come around to being in favour of Europe and then we might 
be able to exert some influence in it, but for the moment it was a question of hanging on. 
But, I promise you, the sense of isolation we all had was tremendous’.155  
Europe was to also see the schism between members of the revisionist right who saw 
themselves as Croslandites. Crosland, as with Healey, was ambivalent about the issue of 
Europe and did not agree with the importance the matter held with those such as Hattersley, 
Owen, Bill Rodgers and David Marquand. Marquand was to recall that for Crosland whilst still 
pro-European ‘it was certainly not as important as housing finance. It was certainly not worth 
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a split in the Labour Party and we should stop being so childish about it’.156Marquand, having 
been told this with David Owen in attendance, felt deserted and betrayed and that as a 
consequence many of his supporters became affiliated with Roy Jenkins. It could be argued 
that this act by Crosland helped to form the genesis of support for the SDP in the future yet 
other MPs such as Roy Hattersley would continue to support him despite this temporary 
difference over Europe. 
It was also during this period that Labour was to see an MP leaving the party to stand as a 
Social Democratic candidate. In late 1972 Dick Taverne, previously Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury, had been effectively deselected by his local constituency party in Lincoln which 
opposed his pro-European opinions. As a result, Taverne stood as an Independent 
Democratic Labour candidate in the ensuing by-election of 1st March 1973 and won with a 
majority of over 13,000. The victory prompted Taverne to form the Campaign for Social 
Democracy as an umbrella group for similarly minded Labour pro-European moderates who 
were opposed to the direction the Labour Party was taking, both at a national and constituency 
party level. Taverne’s nascent movement lasted for as long as he remained the MP for Lincoln 
and, after narrowly holding onto the seat during the February 1974 General Election he was 
to lose to the Labour candidate at the election held in October of the same year. Yet whilst 
these incidents of independent candidates were short-lived, they appeared to pave the way 
for a future platform for those MPs who were against the direction the party was seen to be 
taking and a marker had been left. Taverne had made it clear that it was not just the problems 
faced at constituency level but also at a national one as well. Not only the NEC but the unions, 
the one-time bastions of the right, were now becoming more militant and intransigent. ‘On all 
too many issues, the hands may be the hands of Harold Wilson but the voice is the voice of 
Hugh Scanlon,’ declared Taverne in 1972.157  
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In 1974 Labour was to see itself returned to power at the first time of asking after experiencing 
defeat four years previously. As industrial unrest began to bite into the economy and the 
energy shortages began to bite, culminating in the imposition of a three-day working week, an 
increasingly beleaguered Edward Heath asked for the dissolution of Parliament in order to 
hold a General Election, which was then scheduled for February 28 1974. The problem for the 
party was if the nature of its programme would be too radical for the electorate. The problem 
for Jenkins and other pro-Europeans was that since 1971 the opposition to Europe, even if it 
was described as opposition to the terms Heath had argued for, was now the majority opinion 
with some support amongst those on the party right. 
The decision to take a more anti-European line had appeared to be in keeping with the mood 
of the electorate, as the general public viewed the Community in a poor light. An association 
with the rise in inflation was made with membership of the EEC.  During the NEC meeting of 
May 1973 to discuss policy, Michael Foot had sided with those on the right who opposed the 
radical plan to nationalise the twenty-five largest companies, the reasoning being that this 
particular idea might not appeal with the voters and that this may prevent the outcome that he 
wanted which was a Labour Government committed to holding a referendum to pull out of the 
EEC.158 
The success of Labour in the February 1974 Election was a victory as unlikely as Heath’s had 
been in 1970 albeit short of an overall majority. Moreover, their share of the vote had dropped 
to 37.2%, six percent down in comparison with 1970.159 Factors that may have contributed to 
the success may have included Roy Jenkins returning in October 1973 to the role of shadow 
Home Secretary, demonstrating a moderate faction within the Labour shadow Cabinet.160 The 
Labour leadership, although having to work with a radical manifesto, emphasised the need for 
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more conciliation rather than confrontation. Despite the restriction of a minority Government, 
a legislative programme that was expected to struggle through Parliament was put forward. 
Wilson’s Government had passed through many of the manifesto commitments, although with 
the lack of an overall majority, parts of the legislative programme had to be passed with 
support of the Liberals, or watered down during readings in the House of Lords. On twenty 
occasions the Government had been defeated over amendments to bills.161 It was only a 
matter of time until the position of the Government became open to a vote of confidence, so 
the call for a new election was both hoped and expected. At the October 10 1974 Election the 
increased majority that was craved by Wilson was to be achieved, albeit with a majority of 
three.  
For those opposed to the EEC, the recent negotiations by Callaghan, which were now being 
used to sell Britain’s membership had been a waste of time. The leading revisionist and 
veteran anti-Marketeer Douglas Jay said that ‘re-negotiation has changed almost nothing, and 
almost every Member knows in his heart this is true’.162 When the matter of continuing 
membership was put to the House of Commons in a free vote, the motion to remain within the 
EEC was passed by 396 votes to 172, with 145 of the votes opposed coming from the Labour 
benches and 33 abstentions.163 
Later that month, the Special Conference of 26 April 1975 was to see Wilson make a final 
attempt to win the Party as a whole to accept the new terms that had been negotiated by 
Callaghan. In the middle of his speech, Wilson appealed for unity and said that he hoped that 
‘We shall emerge united on all our continuing socialist beliefs’.164 
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The Special Conference had also shown that the grassroots and union members were as 
divided as the PLP had been, and that the arguments for and against were essentially the 
same.  A common thread amongst anti-Marketeers was that the EEC was a capitalist club, 
although Clive Jenkins of the ASTMS attacked the Common Market as ‘a joke in terms of 
effectiveness’.165 Pro-Marketeers union men spoke of the economic benefits, such as Bernard 
Bagnari of APEX, whereas Tom Jackson of the Post Office Workers spoke of the EEC as 
more than about food and economics, but about stability and peace.166 Fred Pickles of the 
Dewsbury CLP was to raise an important issue that was to prove pertinent as the referendum 
got under way. Opposing the NEC recommendation to vote ‘No’, Pickles said that within his 
own party, as Constituency Secretary, he was pro-Market, whereas the CLP Chairman was 
anti-Market. 167 This was a microcosm of the Party nationally, and it confirmed the fact Labour 
was split.    
However, the mood of the electorate with regards the EEC had changed, as the question 
which was due to be put to them asked whether Britain should remain inside the Community. 
When the question had been with regards joining the Common Market, the opinion had been 
heavily against. Shirley Williams had noted that for a long period the opinion polls had shown 
opposition to Europe in the range of two to one against.168 The viewpoint now appeared to be 
moving in favour of remaining inside.  
As for the referendum, Cabinet ministers remained as split of its effects as they had been over 
its being held in the first place. The anti-European Peter Shore felt that the actions of Wilson 
in allowing ministers to eschew Cabinet responsibility were a positive action, saying that ‘there 
would have been resignations. The opponents of our membership would have found 
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themselves on the backbenches. In the event it was surprisingly easy. Everyone had a feeling 
of respect for each other’.169 
Yet the criticism of Wilson remained to be felt from those pro-Europeans on the Right, with 
Roy Jenkins continuing to remain unequivocal in his dismay at the period of the referendum. 
Although naturally pleased with the outcome of the Referendum, Jenkins could not help but 
see the damage made by the decision to allow the dissenting voices have their say (including 
presumably his own).  Although the appearance at the time of the aftermath of the referendum 
was one of unity, Jenkins was to write nearly twenty years later that ‘the handling of the 
European question by the leadership throughout the 1970’s did more to cause the party’s 
disasters of the 1980’s than did any other issue’.170  For Jenkins, the roots of the SDP grew 
out of the poisoned debates over Europe. 
Tim Bale writes that it was the decision of Wilson to allow the ‘agreement to differ’ that was to 
give those who were to leave Labour for the Social Democrats the further incentive to leave a 
party that was only temporarily united.171 Ben Pimlott similarly suggests that Wilson’s actions 
may well have sown the seeds of the building discontent that was to conclude with the breaking 
away and formation of the SDP and the sharp shift to the left.172 Colin Pilkington observed that 
the decision by Wilson to suspend cabinet responsibility in order to allow the opposing groups 
to fight the referendum without party considerations was only meant to be a temporary 
measure. The problem was that ‘the significance of conventions within an unwritten 
constitution is that, if they are ignored once they can be ignored again if it is seen expedient 
to do so’. In other words, a minister’s silence could no longer be counted on as being 
sacrosanct.173 Yet these are perfectly acceptable views with the benefit of forty years’ worth 
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of hindsight. To view his period in office through the prism of the period, to hold together a 
party that was now trying to balance an increasingly disenchanted right-wing and a radical left 
wing was a difficult enough undertaking to achieve -  to do this alongside the first national 
referendum was even more of an impressive undertaking.  
Callaghan and the end of Keynesianism 
Despite keeping Labour together Wilson’s legacy to his successor, James Callaghan, was a 
poisoned one. Callaghan’s administration may not have faced the European dilemma as his 
predecessor had yet he was to face the problems of industrial militancy just as the left was to 
focus its attacks on the moderate nature of his Government. If it had lost the battle over 
European membership, the left could still have enforced pressure on a Government that no 
longer had a majority in the House of Commons. For them, the left had certainly not been 
silenced by the referendum and in spite of the referendum had not been routed. In the eyes 
of those on the Centre and Right the issues of militant CLP members bringing pressure to 
bear on the PLP remained.  
With Wilson stepping down as Prime Minister, the ensuing leadership election lasted from 25 
March until 5 April, requiring three ballots to determine the eventual successor. From the 
outset, the right failed to coalesce around a favoured candidate and fielded four of the six 
candidates that stood: Crosland, Jenkins, Healey and Callaghan. Michael Foot stood for the 
traditional Bevanite left with Tony Benn representing what was to become known as the Hard 
Left. Crosland finished last and was eliminated whilst Benn withdrew from the campaign. 
Taking Crosland’s and Healey’s votes from the PLP into account, and making the assumption 
that the same MPs would have voted for him as the sole candidate of the old Gaitskellite Right, 
Jenkins would have finished ahead of Callaghan and Foot and would have entered the second 
ballot in a commanding position. Whilst this would have seen the establishment of a supremely 
Social Democratic cabinet Jenkins would have faced the same problems as the man who was 
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to eventually succeed Wilson, namely finely balancing a party and indeed a Cabinet that was 
increasingly splintering. 
In the event Jenkins also withdrew his candidacy with Foot, Callaghan and Healey going into 
the next round before Healey was eventually eliminated. With the representative of the 
traditional Right in Callaghan and the Soft Left in Foot, the party opted for Callaghan by a 
victory margin of 39 votes.  If the Labour Right could have coalesced around a single candidate 
from the beginning such as Callaghan or Jenkins, then the margin of eventual victory could 
have been more convincing and send out a signal as to the continued direction for Labour. 
Instead the result provided the stark and visceral impression of a divided party.   
On the announcement of his victory it was noticeable that one of the first appeals that 
Callaghan made was for unity and furthermore for the abolition of the Tribune and Manifesto 
groupings on the left and right respectively. Callaghan abhorred factionalism not just from a 
pragmatic perspective borne out of leading a minority Government but because he was 
instinctively devoted to the Labour Party, which he had been a member of since he was a 
youth. What was also notable was that Callaghan said what mattered to him was becoming 
party leader rather than prime minister. For Callaghan, whilst this was the pinnacle and being 
the patriotic-minded man that he was, being leader of the party he loved and worked for all his 
life was what was most important – and for Callaghan it had to be a united Labour Party.174 
After the years of in-fighting and public disputes that had disfigured the Wilson era, 
Callaghan’s initial period in office was a startling contrast of near-amicable calm. As a 
candidate from the right of party in the form of Callaghan, who had burnished credentials due 
to his recent role as Foreign Secretary and the designated ‘Keeper of the Flat Cap’ due to his 
effective vetoing of the ‘In Place of Strife’ bill in the late 1960s, the party had selected a leader 
that could bridge the growing divide between right and left.  
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One of the more surprising promotions was the placing of Tony Crosland as Foreign Secretary. 
With Healey at the Treasury, Callaghan had in place formidable ‘heavyweights’ from the right 
of the party in the two most senior cabinet posts yet was weakened by the self-removal of 
consideration for a post other than Foreign Secretary by Roy Jenkins and in due course was 
to leave British politics subsequently becoming President of the European Commission. A 
significant voice from the Social Democratic wing of the party was thus removed.  
The departure of Jenkins came at a time of perceived weakness of the revisionist cause within 
the Labour Party. Despite having written Socialism Now in 1974, Crosland had lost support 
on the right of the party due to his perceived ambivalence to the issue of Europe. Moreover, 
there was the suggestion that Crosland had effectively abandoned the cause of social 
liberalism as he became more self-identified with the working-classes and their ‘values’. 
Anecdotes were recalled of Crosland disregarding ‘questions, particularly libertarian ones and 
those relating to foreign policy, he brushed aside in this way, concentrating on the “gut” 
issues’.175 Another recalled how Crosland and Jenkins supporters were perceived to have 
differences over ‘the race question as they did on many libertarian issues’.176 It is somewhat 
surprising to hear Crosland, who in 1956 had argued for greater social liberalism now 
apparently decrying race relations supporters apparently saying ‘you people in NW1 make me 
sick with your libertarian values’.177 For the observer of this exchange, to be a Jenkins 
supporter was to follow someone who ‘was regarded as namby-pampy soft liberal who was 
out of touch with the real world, who wanted pornography, homosexuality and race equality,’ 
whereas ‘Croslanders felt they had a much closer link with working-class values’.178 In crude 
terms, to be a Croslandite revisionist therefore was to be someone who understood the 
working-classes, to be a Jenkinsite was to be a metropolitan liberal. 
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Marquand also noted that the economic difficulties the Labour Government meant that 
Crosland’s aims were not being realised ‘in short, no growth, no redistribution – and no 
redistribution, no revisionism.’179 The IMF crisis of 1977 was to have a profound effect on the 
Labour Government and on the revisionists in particular. The introduction of counter-
inflationary measures and the approval of swingeing cuts in return for loans from the 
International Monetary Fund was humiliating for Callaghan and for Crosland a source of 
desolation. Pannitch and Leys, having previously noted with derision Crosland’s insistence 
that revisionism was still relevant in the 1970s, now noted how he was in a strange alliance 
with Tony Benn and Peter Shore on opposing the demands being set by the IMF and being 
pushed by Callaghan and Healey.180 Crosland’s insistence that the figures being touted by the 
Treasury as being flawed were not heeded and the falling in with cabinet responsibility must 
have been a huge blow. For Crosland, this was the post-war Consensus and the role of Social 
Democratic revisionists such as himself being abandoned in favour of Monetarism. As 
Marquand notes, ‘he could see that the expenditure cuts demanded by the IMF and favoured 
by the Treasury made a mockery of all that he stood for’.181 This meant that Crosland was at 
odds with his contemporary and fellow revisionist Denis Healey who was in turn supported by 
Callaghan. As Giles Radice noted Crosland was supported by Roy Hattersley ‘to the end’ but 
in the end conceded.182In due course, the economic situation was to improve and interest 
rates and inflation began to fall. Yet as Radice also noted, ‘the IMF crisis also brought into 
doubt key elements of the post-war consensus – the Keynesian assumption that priority should 
be given to full employment and the welfare commitment to high levels of public spending’.183 
This was akin to the trauma of the collapse of the MacDonald Government - what was the 
purpose of the Social Democrats if the theory of growth and Keynesian economy were being 
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discredited and a Labour Government introducing cuts in public spending in the areas of 
welfare and education?  
Crosland’s premature death on 19 February 1977 was to rob the Labour Party of someone 
who could think critically and with intellectual force but also provided the philosophical 
grounding for the Labour right. If he had survived it is possible and likely that he would have 
swapped positions with Healey in the light of an improving economy but in any event the hole 
that Crosland left in terms of body of work and capacity for critical thinking was considerable. 
On 23 March, Callaghan’s Government survived a motion of no confidence thanks to the 
support of the Liberals and the Irish nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party. This was 
to see Labour exist for the next 18 months on a hand-to-mouth basis. With the advent of the 
Lib-Lab Pact Callaghan was extended the time and room in which to manoeuvre. It also 
brought together some on the right of the party into regular contact with the Liberals which 
was to be remembered in the years to follow. In the short-term is also allowed Callaghan the 
time to decide if an early election was to be called. By the end of 1978, the recriminations over 
Callaghan’s decision not to go to the polls in October were beginning to be overshadowed by 
the industrial action that was gathering pace. From a period of relative calm within the country 
after the turbulence of the IMF crisis and a small but significant lead in the opinion polls, Labour 
was to be battered by events it could not control but were held responsible for, in much the 
same way as suffered by Heath five years earlier. Appeals to the unions for wage restraint, 
the underpinning factor of the Social Contract, went unheeded and the year ended in the early 
turbulence of the ‘Winter of Discontent’. As the Social Contract, which had been so delicately 
and painstakingly maintained by Wilson, began to unravel and strike action became 
widespread as a result of pay freezes introduced to stabilise the economy. This sequence of 
events, coupled with humiliating IMF crisis further damaged the Callaghan Government in the 
eyes of the electorate. 
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Defeat and Blame 
Unlike in 1970 the opinion polling and private mood of many within Labour meant that the 
defeat of 1979 had been expected. Tony Benn, writing in his diaries on 20 April, said, ‘my 
solemn assessment now is that Mrs Thatcher will win this Election with an overall majority’.184 
Whilst some within the party had been fully expecting to lose this was not to say that the defeat 
was to be any more acceptable. Giles Radice, whilst generally supportive, blamed Callaghan, 
Healey and Foot for the defeat in 1979 for prevaricating in going to the polls in 1978185. Austin 
Mitchell similarly thought that had Callaghan gone to the polls in 1978 Labour would have won 
as the largest party – ‘if Jim had hung on and put the election back as many in retrospect think 
we would have finished ahead of the Tories, certainly’.186 The rationale for a Labour 
Government to be elected on account of the relationship with the trade union movement was 
seemingly rendered as redundant and a fallacy, ultimately destroyed by the events of the 
subsequent industrial action across the country. The old certainties of Labour being able to 
rely on its core vote had been steadily challenged since 1970 and the impact of the loss of the 
aspirational working-class vote was being keenly felt.  
The Conservatives had managed to win a significant number of working-class voters from 
Labour. This was particularly galling for those both within and outside the party who had 
pushed for similar policies which were to subsequently prove popular with the electorate. 
There had been those who had been supportive of the idea of the sale of council houses to 
tenants, with Bernard Donaghue noting that Harold Wilson had been particularly supportive 
back in 1976, only for the idea to be beached on the sands of opposition from within the party. 
Those opposed to the sale came from both sides of the party, notably from the then 
Environment Secretary Tony Crosland. The former Political Editor of the Guardian, Francis 
Boyd, noted that such appeals to aspiration and security after a period of tumult were very 
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attractive. For Boyd ‘it is the psychological effect that matters. If the electors feel that things 
would be easier under the Tories they may, even though normally Labour voters, vote Tory’.187 
It was perhaps an obvious observation to make but it was nevertheless pertinent and borne 
out by the Conservative victory which was to follow. As the Guardian leader was to note, ‘it is 
hard to resist the conclusion that the have-nots, the have-littles and the have-problems bent 
only slightly to the wind of change whilst the have-plentys and the want-mores were eager to 
clip along with the Conservatives’.188  
Boyd had observed that the ‘febrile economy of the country’ had forced the country to ‘face 
the future’. The choice for the electorate for which of the two main parties would be best suited 
to bringing stability was also affected by the emergence of ‘various groups…that the familiar 
party battle for mastery through control of the House of Commons means nothing to the 
electors’.’ For Boyd these groups consisted of the younger voters for whom ‘politicians speak 
without a cutting edge’, and the older voters for whom ‘the promise land…seems always to be 
receding’.189  
What was now seemingly expected was that with the onset of defeat the Labour Party would 
quickly fall into a series of internal battles and recriminations as was the tradition set in the 
1930s and 1950s. External commentators were quick to note this inevitability even as the last 
of the votes were being counted 
It is now inevitable that within a very short time the two wings of the Labour Party will 
begin the preliminary manoeuvring for a leadership contest with the Left arguing that 
defeat is traceable to orthodox monetarist economic policies, to expenditure cuts 
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enforced by the International Monetary Fund, and to genuine failure to tackle 
unemployment.190 
It did not require anyone from outside the party to observe that the arguments as to why the 
defeat occurred would begin in earnest. Giles Radice, speaking at the Special Parliamentary 
Labour Party meeting of 16 May 1979, said that the defeat was the party’s worst since 1931 
and this had been caused by the continued loss of skilled workers voting for the party since 
1970, which constituted some half a million voters. Radice’s assertion that Labour had to 
recognise the rapid move to a more technological age where the areas of heavy industry were 
becoming increasingly obsolete was one that had obvious resonance on the areas where such 
industries were mainly based, industries which were highly unionised and contained the 
largest numbers of members. Labour had to be seen to be the party that was a modernising 
force, much as it was in the 1960s. At that time though, it was seen as stolid and conservative 
in the face of industrial change. 
Radice, whilst not offering any specific solutions, said that the party had to ‘listen, learn and 
discuss’ and ‘show that we are a radical party. We must recognise the impact of new 
technology, the facelessness of bureaucracy in both public and private sectors’. Radice also 
added a further caveat, minding the party that it must not ‘quarrel amongst ourselves but must 
capture the hearts of 2 million people’.191  
Yet the appeal for a period of enquiry in an atmosphere of collegiate consensus would not be 
heeded for very long. For Healey, there was to be no such pandering to introspection or 
acceptance that the right was to blame for the failures of the 1974-79 Government. As can be 
expected, Healey in his memoirs was to provide a strongly revisionist and characteristically 
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combative defence against the left’s accusation that the party lost the election due to the 
Callaghan Government’s lack of socialism. For Healey, the apportioning of blame for the 
defeat is laid squarely on the unions for their failure to adhere to wage restraint and the ‘Winter 
of Discontent’ of 1978-79.192 Tony Benn noted that this was the feeling of the leadership in 
general when he recorded Callaghan as saying on 9 May 1979: ‘We lost the Election because 
people didn’t get their dustbins emptied, because commuters were angry about train 
disruptions and because of too much union power. That’s all there is to it’.193 Austin Mitchell 
was even stronger, accusing the unions of breaking the agreed policy on wage restraint and 
stating that they had ‘behaved stupidly and betrayed us’.194 If viewed from a Bennite 
perspective, this underlined the managerialist tendency that had underpinned the thinking of 
the last Labour administration, boiled down to base practicalities and the abandonment of 
policies agreed by Conference. For others, such as Robert Mellish who was to underline the 
point forcibly, it was a statement of the electoral reality that had been delivered onto the Labour 
Movement. 
In due course, Benn informed the press that he had decided not to stand for the shadow 
cabinet. When asked by Callaghan the following day as to why, Benn said that he wanted to 
be able to debate policy and the matter of party democracy. ‘If the Government were a bit 
more responsive to Conference, Conference wouldn’t pass such extreme resolutions,’195 Benn 
noted an argument that he was to have with Michael Foot on 13 May, again on the issue of 
party democracy, which Foot retorted would be ‘a recipe for the keeping the Party in the 
wilderness for twenty years,’ and surmised that Foot was waiting to become leader until Peter 
Shore was available. Benn also offered the opinion, ‘When you get the so-called left of the 
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Party so far to the right, then does that mean that there is no support in the country for radical 
views?’196  
For the time being, Benn kept his counsel. In due course, Ian Aitken’s expectation of the 
Labour Left’s attack on the failure of the Callaghan Government in adhering to monetarism 
and expenditure cuts was quick to come to pass. One of the first examples came on 6 June 
1979 from the Militant-aligned President of the Bakers Union Terry O’Neill, who attacked the 
Labour leadership at his Union’s annual conference. 197  He said ‘"We have seen a so-called 
Labour Government try to restrict people on ridiculously low wages to 6 per cent rises."’198  
Yet at first the anticipated advance of the Left did not seem to make much progress as was 
underlined by the elections to the shadow cabinet in June 1979. Denis Healey finished top of 
the polling with 153 votes and the majority of the roster was completed by those from the 
Labour right. 129. Only three members of the Tribune group were elected, John Silkin, Stan 
Orme and Albert Booth. For John Desborough of the Daily Mirror, Healey was the clear 
favourite to succeed Callaghan, but added the caveat that, ‘Mr. Healey is 61 and the longer 
Mr. Callaghan stays, the longer will be the odds against Mr. Healey’. 199 
Callaghan was expected to stand down at one point but had been re-elected unanimously by 
the PLP on 9 May 1979, so the prospect of this occurring was not immediately evident. Whilst 
elected via acclimation, it seemed that some had wished for Callaghan to step down quickly 
in order to pave the way for Healey. Radice, having previously felt that the leadership was to 
blame for not going to the polls in 1978 when the party was faring better reflected that 
Callaghan should have stepped down after he lost in 1979.200 As it was, Callaghan was to stay 
on for another year in order to bring some stability to the party after the defeat. There was 
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certainly a feeling of a need for stability for a Parliamentary Labour Party demoralised after 
the election defeat. Clive Soley, recently elected as MP for Hammersmith North, remembered 
remarking publicly that ‘sitting in the (House of Commons) Tea Room with Labour MPs was 
like sitting in a Battle of Britain crew room after a particular bad sortie because they would all 
be talking about who didn’t come back’.201 
In June 1979, two figures on the Left of the party were to state how they saw the future 
direction of Labour. For Eric Heffer, Labour had to ‘become more than an electoral machine 
at electoral time…we must be a party deeply-rooted among people in which they turn to when 
they are in trouble’.202 For Ron Hayward Labour had lost ‘all those sections of society which 
we used to claim as our own,’ to which he referred to as council house tenants, trade unionists 
and the young.203 Both analyses would not have been discounted by those on the Right even 
if the policies of the two groups were so opposite.   
On 21 July 1979, Callaghan’s deputy, Michael Foot, gave a speech at the Durham Miners 96th 
Annual Gala, in which he made a plea for unity and in doing so evoked historical memory of a 
previous attempt to change the party after election defeat: 
It would be tragic and unforgiveable if at such a moment we turned aside from this 
supreme task to tear ourselves in pieces if we supposed what is needed is a 
constitutional wrangle within the Labour Party. That was the great folly which Hugh 
Gaitskell committed after the electoral defeat of 1959. I trust we can escape a repetition 
of such a dangerous diversion today.204 
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The previous discussion with Benn on the matter of party democracy had clearly made an 
impact. That this had been floated on a number of occasions by Benn was widely known. But 
now, with the absence of power, it was clear that the opportunity for an attempt to bring in any 
changes was opening up. In quick succession by July 1979 leading figures on the right, soft 
left and hard left spoke out on the matter of constitutional changes within the party, although 
on 25 July, Callaghan received a letter from the Manifesto group of MPs which strongly set 
out their opposition to the suggested changes.  
On 18 September 1979 Tony Benn wrote in his diary: ‘Undoubtedly the right in the Labour 
Party are considering a breakaway, which is what Jim hinted at when he talked about the 
disaffiliating. I don’t rule out the possibility that we might lose a chunk of the right, but they 
wouldn’t have a future’.205  
Benn’s nonchalance at a possible breakaway could have been at the thought that such an 
event may not occur. For the previous thirty years Labour had endured excoriating battles yet 
had still managed to remain united in body if not in spirit. Benn’s oft-mentioned description of 
the party being a broad church of opinion had to include the Social Democrats who were now 
the target of vitriol by his supporters. For the right of the party, the changes that they were so 
opposed to, the mandatory re-selection of MPs and the drafting and control of the manifesto 
to be decided by the NEC, were presented and passed at the fractious Conference discussed 
in the previous chapter.  For some of those on the right, the desire to remain in such a church, 
broad or otherwise, was beginning to pall. Such sentiments were to be enhanced by the 
proposition of a commission of inquiry into the party’s defeat, an inquiry many on the right felt 
would be anathema. 
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The Road to Bishop’s Stortford 
The original request for a Commission of Enquiry was originally mooted by trade union leaders 
shortly after the election defeat in order to debate the party structure, its democracy and its 
increasingly precarious finances. For Jon Bloomfield, writing in Marxism Today, the call for an 
enquiry (or inquiry, as Bloomfield referred to it) was of genuine intent but a mechanism to be 
sought to be used for other purposes by the party leadership: ‘Whatever the genuine union 
concern about the party's depleted organisation and finances (which there is), objectively the 
commission was a device by which Callaghan, supported by Michael Foot, sought to stall the 
Left's advance and halt the reforms’.206 There is probably some truth in this observation, as 
for Callaghan the opportunity to stymie any major changes to the party’s internal organisation 
was one that he would have gratefully taken. This was certainly the view taken by the National 
Executive and their decision to block an enquiry by fourteen votes to twelve at a fractious 
meeting which took place on 25 July 1979. This led to Dave Basnett of the General and 
Municipal Workers Union to denounce the decision as ‘a deliberate affront to the foremost 
supporters of the Labour Party…the executive (sic) will have to re-think its attitude - and very 
quickly’.207 
Callaghan’s strong bond with the Labour Party was such that he would not have wanted to 
see anything implemented that would upset the delicate balances that existed within the party. 
Even after the traumas of the Winter of Discontent, Callaghan was hopeful that an enquiry 
called for by the general secretaries was to be a means of ensuring that unity within the 
movement could be re-established and the status quo maintained. Yet for someone as astute 
as Callaghan was for understanding the political weather, it was to be a great misjudgement.  
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On reading the official publication of the Commission of Enquiry when it eventually came out 
its unassuming and dry tone, reading almost as a set of financial accounts, itemised down to 
the levies to be paid by members belied the rancour that its compilation caused. Yet the 
meeting of the party leadership and the ensuing fallout that followed highlighted how the 
findings transcended the more prosaic areas of party finance. The strength and influence of 
the PLP was being directly challenged as a consequence of Conference and was to be 
confirmed by the findings of the enquiry. The ability to be the sole body which elects the party 
leadership was being removed from PLP. For some this was the chance to correct an historical 
oversight of the Hardie era, for others it would be the cementing of the control of the CLPs and 
the National Executive over decision making.  
There were already suggestions for the party to unite ahead of the enquiry taking place, 
reflecting the obvious divisions which already existed but were in danger of widening further 
once it had completed. Roy Hattersley gave a speech to a rally in Cambridge on 20 October 
1979 in which whilst acknowledging the need for changes to Labour’s constitution, stated that 
the party could not ‘afford winners and losers’ and that ‘if either side in these essential 
arguments looks for total victory the Labour Party will by the end of the year be weaker, not 
stronger, than when the year began’.208 Calling for accommodation of ‘the vanquished,’ 
Hattersley said that he hoped that the determination that he felt in keeping Labour united would 
be something ‘we could all pledge ourselves to’209, but again such entreaties were to be 
ignored. This was perhaps to be expected when Hattersley himself had, at the same rally, 
made the suggestion that Tony Benn should have resigned as a Minister during the last 
Government. Even if his contention that ‘if the old policies seemed right at the time we applied 
them, six months is far too short a period for serious review of deeply held convictions’210 was 
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one which could be applied across the party, such rhetoric was not helpful in reducing the 
increasingly febrile atmosphere. 
The debate on the actual composition of the members of the Commission was in itself a 
controversial issue. Bloomfield again noted that ‘The wrangle over the composition of the 
Commission created the impression that what was at stake was primarily a factional inner-
party battle not a dispute over democratic reform’.211 It was to be both of these things. At the 
NEC meeting of 24 October the vote was acrimoniously passed that the composition of the 
Commission would be five general secretaries of the Trade Unions, five representatives of the 
NEC and the party Leader, Deputy Leader and Norman Atkinson and Alex Kitson in their roles 
as Party Treasurer and Vice-Chairman respectively.212 For Benn, this was ‘a great victory’ in 
that it represented a ‘left-balance…potentially 10-4 in our favour,’213 which signalled the worst 
fears of those on the right who saw the Commission as a means of reinforcing the grip that 
the left was steadily increasing. 
On 31 October 1979 the PLP met to discuss the organisation of the Enquiry and its terms of 
reference. The minutes of the meeting show that the discussion was to split down familiar lines 
– those on the right of the party supported further representation of the PLP, with those on the 
left feeling the representation was already set by members of the PLP being members of the 
NEC. Yet as can be seen from the minutes many of those MPs present felt that a compromise 
motion could be reached but similarly there was to be a solidifying of positions held by those 
who maintained that their positions were paramount. On this issue, therefore, the Centre Right 
and the Bennite Left became entrenched.  
The Chair of the meeting, Fred Willey, noted that the motion being put forward by the 
Parliamentary Committee was that a request would be made to the NEC to discuss further MP 
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representation on the Enquiry other than those attending as members of the NEC. Observing 
that that Labour was ‘a troika of the Labour Party, the Trade Unions and the Parliamentary 
Labour Party,’ Willey said it was important that representations were made ‘from all three of 
these historic parts of the Movement’.214 Willey added that the Parliamentary Committee 
believed that ‘strong representation’ from the PLP ‘would avoid future disputes and 
confrontation’.215 
An MP who submitted a counter amendment, Norman Buchan, MP for West Renfrewshire, 
submitted a counter amendment saying that it was the Constituency Parties, the Trade Unions 
and the Co-operative Party that were the founders of the Labour Movement and that ‘it was 
only in the context of the recent arguments over parliamentary democracy that the PLP had 
emerged as a separate entity’.216 Adding that although he deplored the treatment the PLP had 
received at the recent Conference, he offered that a split in the party could come about by 
accident ‘as well as design’. Buchan added that he had also been told that the Enquiry 
Committee was unrepresentative as it was skewed heavily in favour of the PLP and did not 
contain anyone from the CLPs and that this in itself was unrepresentative. As such, if all parts 
of the Party were not represented, Buchan ‘saw no reason why the PLP should necessarily 
be’.217 This was an explicit challenge to the perceived unchallenged hegemony that the 
Parliamentary Labour Party exerted, something which Buchan had suggested had been a 
relatively recent development.  
Supporting this amendment whilst attempting to strike a more ameliorative note, Frank Hooley 
said that he took the ‘unfashionable’ view that various parts of the Labour Party worked 
                                                          
214 Minutes of a Special Parliamentary Labour Party Meeting held on Wednesday 31 October 1979 at 11.30 am in 
Committee Room 14, p.2, National  Archive Papers, accessed 17 April 2015 
215 Minutes of a Special Parliamentary Labour Party Meeting held on Wednesday 31 October 1979 at 11.30 am in 
Committee Room 14, p.2, National  Archive Papers, accessed 17 April 2015 
216 Minutes of a Special Parliamentary Labour Party Meeting held on Wednesday 31 October 1979 at 11.30 am in 
Committee Room 14, p.2, National  Archive Papers, accessed 17 April 2015 
217 Minutes of a Special Parliamentary Labour Party Meeting held on Wednesday 31 October 1979 at 11.30 am in 
Committee Room 14, p.2, National  Archive Papers, accessed 17 April 2015 
73 
 
together, what he referred to as ‘intra-penetration’218. Hooley said that those on the 
Parliamentary committee were against those who had been chosen and that it was difficult to 
appease everyone as ‘some wanted a hand-picked Manifesto Group, others a hand-picked 
Tribune Group’219. Hooley added that the NEC was elected by the whole party movement and 
that the ‘Enquiry was not one into the PLP but into the Party by the Party’.220 
Alex Lyons of the Tribunite Left proffered the opinion on that he ‘preferred the idea of One 
Party’ and according to the minutes ‘urged colleagues to avoid a "Gaitskellite" collision and 
reminded them that the power of the Party lay with the activists’.221 This direct reference to the 
widely-viewed mistake that Gaitskell had made in trying to remove Clause IV in 1960 was also 
an attack on the perceived intransigence of the Right towards the moves to greater party 
democracy. Lyons gave the cautionary rejoinder that neither MPs nor Trade Unions could 
reverse the decisions which had been made at Conference, otherwise activists would seek 
even more power.222 This seemed to encapsulate the guarded approach of the Soft Left, being 
not necessarily supportive of those on the Right but also wary of the support that the CLPD 
had within the grassroots. 
One of the leading members of the Social Democratic right, Robert McLennan, struck an 
antagonistic note saying that ‘the Party was split on this issue and it would be self-deceiving 
to see it otherwise’.223 Using the rhetoric used by Roy Hattersley in his Cambridge speech, 
(speaking in terms of ‘vanquished and victors’), McLennan adopted a line of attack utilised by 
David Owen in his previous speeches and said that the role of the PLP in the Party was an 
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issue and that this was underlined by Clause IV (1): ‘to organise and maintain in Parliament 
and in the country a Political Labour Party’.224 McLennan said it would be constitutionally 
improper of the NEC to set up an Enquiry without paying attention to Clause IV. It was also 
‘nationally important’ because MPs were not only answerable to the NEC and to Conference, 
but also ‘to the people who vote for them’.225 If the NEC really wanted to widen the membership 
as it had been pushing for, McLennan queried, did it have ‘the breadth of vision to do so’?226 
Ramping the rhetoric even further, McLennan had added that this had become a ‘make or 
break issue’.227 
Robert Mellish was to adopt the Callaghan line of debunking criticism and asking ‘colleagues 
to nail the lie that the last Labour Government was a disaster’, said that that he had been in 
the Labour Party all his life, ‘since the age of 14’.228 This was also a rebuke to a more recent 
statement made by Stan Thorne at the PLP meeting of 23 October in which he had contended 
that if the decisions of Conference had been adhered to by the last Government then the 
Conservatives would have been defeated – in other words, continuing the assertion that the 
Callaghan Government was insufficiently socialist.229 Mellish was to warn his fellow MPs to 
‘watch what you were doing’, observing that when Labour had fought over policy in the past it 
had been relevant to the issues in the country at the time and that ‘this had strengthened 
them’.230 At this point the party was not arguing about matters which were of concern to the 
electorate and as such were ‘in danger, like the Liberals, of destroying themselves by internal 
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feuding’.231 The matters the Enquiry had to concern itself with, Mellish said, were the areas of 
party finance and membership as it ‘had never been so bad’, adding that for many parts of the 
South of England were now ‘Tory to a man’’.232 
Jack Ashley, who also came from the right of the party, ironically observed that Labour ‘was 
always asking the country to practise good industrial relations and yet the conflict in the PLP 
was an example of bad industrial relations’. Ashley said that the Party Conference had made 
three major errors in that they had failed to recognise that the PLP was the only alternative 
Government and that ‘if they damaged and humiliated the PLP they did the same to the 
Movement as a whole’.233 The second point was that when activists at Conference denigrated 
MPs ‘when they had not long before spent several weeks campaigning for them’ was seen as 
hypocritical by the electorate. Finally, Ashley said that members tended to believe that whilst 
they were in opposition they could win the next election by default because of the expectation 
of Conservative failure. Ashley gloomily concluded that ‘a new spirit of co-operation was 
needed within the Party or the present bitterness would last for many years’.234 
As could be expected, Eric Heffer took a typically combative view in opposing the motion and 
said that ‘the mass media’ had presented a view of the NEC trying to create an ‘Eastern 
European state, riding roughshod over the Party’, adding that this was a ‘downright lie’.235 
Heffer said  that ‘it was not a clash between left and right’ and correctly noted that the Enquiry 
had been proposed by Trade Union leaders, tartly observing that if it had not been for the NEC 
there would have been no PLP representation at all. Heffer said that the task of the Enquiry 
was similar to that put forward by Mellish: to put the finances on a sound footing, to enquire 
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into who made the biggest contribution to party funds (which Heffer said was the CLPs and 
not the Trade Unions); and to look into the disparity between membership figures - why, for 
instance, did his constituency party have 10,000 members and some only 150?236  
Callaghan characteristically tried to conclude the proceedings by once again appealing for 
conciliation and unity. Callaghan said that Heffer was right to point out that the Enquiry's main 
tasks would be to examine finance and membership. Callaghan added that problems had 
arisen because of what was termed ‘a confusion’ about the function of both the PLP and the 
NEC. Callaghan added that during his time in Government he had found going to the NEC 
‘”purgatory”’, accusing the NEC of not carrying out ‘its proper function which was that of the 
organisation of the Party’. Callaghan then observed that everyone within the party was an 
activist as far as he was concerned and said that his issue was about the question of the 
matter of the choosing of a candidate and that the issue of entryism was a very real one, noting 
that it allowed what he referred to as the ‘bedsitter brigade’ to be in a position to select or reject 
a candidate.237 
Callaghan finished his summing up by saying that as Leader neither side, Left or Right, could 
win a General Election without the other. He would recommend that asking the PLP to support 
the Parliamentary Committee motion as it ‘sought a broader representation of the people of 
the country.’ Callaghan said he believed ‘that socialism was still about justice and equality and 
that was what he joined the party for and what he remained in it for’. 238 Tony Benn was to 
write in his diary that he felt that Callaghan had spoken ‘passionately’ and noted approvingly 
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that the latter had seen himself as ‘peacemaker’.239 That the main motion was carried was a 
minor victory for Callaghan and the Right but this was to be of temporary respite.  
However, this was not an end to an already protracted process just to decide upon the 
composition of the Commission’s membership. On 27 January 1980, the General Secretary 
of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers, Sir John Boyd, was in danger of being 
forced to withdraw as one of the five Union representatives due to a recent operation having 
taken place. The decision to replace him with the left-wing Deputy Secretary of the TGWU, 
Alex Kitson, was a bone of contention yet the report of the rumoured boycott of the 
Commission was dismissed as the plans of ‘middle-class right-wing intellectuals who are a 
mirror image of the Looney Left,’ by otherwise sympathetic right-wing backbench MPs.240 
The task that Callaghan faced was compounded by the fact that both the left and the right 
were attacking and counter-attacking and the fault-lines were ever more widening. On 9 June 
1980, David Owen, William Rodgers and Shirley Williams sent an open letter to The Times on 
the issue of Europe, directly rebuking the decision of Conference to commit to leaving the 
Common Market. As Crewe and King noted, Rodgers was reluctant to use Europe as a means 
to decry the party’s left-wing policy stances as it may otherwise alienate those on the right of 
the party who were either agnostic on the matter of membership or otherwise opposed. 241 
Crewe and King do not provide examples of those who were anti-Market but this could include 
senior shadow cabinet member Peter Shore, whereas those who were agnostic included 
Callaghan himself and Healey. In any event, such considerations were lost on Shore, who 
replied sharply to the pro-Marketeers that they were ‘foolish’.242 
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The Commission of Inquiry was a painfully protracted affair that was to culminate in a 
particularly fraught and acrimonious convening of the Commission members at Bishop’s 
Stortford on the weekend of 14 June 1980. Callaghan and the Committee members held talks 
on the findings based on the evidence submitted and it quickly descended into heated 
argument. Joyce Gould, who alongside Party Chairman Ron Hayward was one of the 
designated Secretariat of the Commission, recalled the rancour of the meetings that took 
place: 
It was a disaster…it was very hard for us as officials trying to conduct something against 
this terrible, terrible background of dissent and people being rude to each other…it was 
an example of the distrust that everyone had of each other. 243 
The Commission of Enquiry voted to approve the submission of a new electoral college for 
electing the party leadership and also on the matter of the mandatory reselection of MPs. 
Despite the protestations of both Callaghan and Michael Foot, the motion was carried for 
submission to the next party conference. On 5 July 1980, Callaghan made a strongly worded 
attack on the findings of the Commission in relation to the two most contentious issues. Yet in 
spite of such comments, both Callaghan and Healey were to face the opprobrium of Owen, 
Williams and Rodgers for not providing more resistance to the proposals. Bishop’s Stortford 
was to sharpen the profiles of the dissenting voices of the Enquiry and by the time of the next 
Party Conference, the so-called ‘Gang of Three’ were to become ever more visible in the public 
domain.  
For Healey, it was a bitter experience and one that the party was to suffer badly from as a 
result, making the contention that the Commission of Enquiry was the beginning of the 
crystallisation of the future breakaway. ‘It was Bishop’s Stortford which caused the conception 
of the Social Democratic Party, although its birth took place, appropriately enough, nine 
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months later’.244 Healey states that the reason he did not join the Manifesto Group’s attack 
against Bishop’s Stortford was because it would have been an attack against Callaghan who 
was still very popular in the country. 
Callaghan continued to be the lightning rod for resentment by both sides of the party. The 
sense felt by Owen, Rodgers and Williams was one of betrayal towards Callaghan after 
Bishop’s Stortford in spite of the changes and had tried to convince them to be implemented. 
Surprisingly, Callaghan’s own memoirs do not really touch on this period, with only a three 
page Postscript in which he states his resentment at accusations of ‘betrayal’ by the left of the 
party (the quotation marks are Callaghan’s). Considering his painful experiences leading 
Labour after 1979, it is perhaps surprising for Callaghan to be so reticent.245 Callaghan states 
that ‘this is a memoir, not a history, and some things must remain untouched’246 and perhaps 
his wish was to not re-open still relatively fresh and bitter divisions at a time of a general 
election (as the original publication came out in 1987), but it is surprising that Callaghan did 
not wish to examine this final period of his leadership in order to provide more of a defence to 
his critics on both the left and the right.  
The perceived failure of Callaghan with the Commission of Enquiry was to present the ‘Gang 
of Three’ with another opportunity to highlight their increasing unease with the left-ward 
trajectory of the party.  Their increasingly strident bellicosity was returned in kind via the press. 
On 2 August 1980, the Daily Mirror published a rebuke from the now former Party Chairman 
Frank Allaun who called on the three to resign. For Allaun the three were making a direct 
challenge to Labour which should not be countenanced and that ‘in attacking the National 
Executive the three Right-wingers are attacking the party’.247 For Joan Lestor it was a simple 
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matter and advised that those people who ‘find themselves totally out of keeping with the 
majority view in the Labour Party then they must work hard to change or leave’.248 
On 4 October, after the announcement of Callaghan’s standing down as party leader and the 
election of his successor under the existing rules, David Owen gave a speech in which he 
denounced the ‘shambles’ of the Commission of Inquiry. Decrying the abandonment of the 
election of the leadership by the PLP and the non-adoption of one-member-one-vote, Owen 
said that the ‘Bishop’s Stortford compromise over an electoral college was a tragic error. It 
conceded a principle, a legitimate, proven democratic Parliamentary procedure, for a “mess 
of pottage.”’249 
Despair and Defection 
As the first year of the new decade came to an end the right of the party was now effectively 
split. By January 1981 the Limehouse Declaration would see the now ‘gang of four’ taking the 
coldly-proffered advice of those such as Joan Lestor and Eric Heffer and leave the Labour 
Party and establish the Council for Social Democracy. Although it had been long in the 
gestating when the announcement came there was both shock and dismay that the course of 
events had culminated in this way.  
For those who were on the left, this declaration was a further confirmation that their previous 
aim to change what they saw as an atrophied and archaic system of Labour’s functions and 
processes. Benn and his supporters had been explicit in their reasoning for the need for a 
change to what they viewed as party democracy as the current mechanisms did nothing 
except to preserve failing MPs who were comfortably ensconced in comfortable 
constituencies. Such structures were no longer fit for purpose and had atrophied the party’s 
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ability to represent the activists in the Constituencies. Ironically, both the Bennite supporters 
and those in the nascent Council for Social Democracy would have been able to have found 
common cause at the fudged alternative that was the new Electoral College, a painfully 
labyrinthine compromise that in the main satisfied nobody. Neil Kinnock was to state publicly 
that he was ‘not satisfied with the results of Wembley. The formula adopted combines the 
minimum stability with the maximum opportunity for slander and misrepresentation from 
outside’.250 
The Gang of Four and Benn could also find common ground on the assessment of the 
Governments of the 1960s and 1970s upon which they and their supporters had cast 
judgement and found them wanting. Those who had been in the Governments of Wilson and 
Callaghan had been stung by the attacks that had been levelled against them, for the 
perceived hypocrisy if not the criticism from those who had sat alongside them in cabinet. Yet 
this no longer mattered now that those on the right were now operating from outside of the 
Labour Party whilst now its left wing was seemingly in the ascendant. The opportunity was 
presenting itself to ensure that their stated aims of protocols such as mandatory reselection 
were to be enacted. For Jon Bloomfield this was a heady prospect: 
The structure of Labour's constitution has been dented. For the first time in over six 
decades the division of labour and responsibility enshrined in the Webbs' constitution 
has been undermined. Mandatory reselection will give those who run the party more 
leverage over their MPs. The electoral college opens up the possibility of collective class 
involvement in the parliamentary process.251 
Such requirements were not only necessary but overdue. One such supporter of such 
measures was the recently defeated MP Audrey Wise, who whilst defending the rank and file 
MPs who had supported the fight against the IMF cuts in the last administration, was scathing 
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about the Governments of Wilson and Callaghan and highlighted what she saw as the primary 
reason for their failure: 
Labour Governments haven’t simply failed, Labour Governments have refused to try to 
use parliament. Labour Governments have refused to carry out Clause 4 of the Labour 
Party constitution. But it was compulsory that they did that; they did that, brothers and 
sisters, because we allowed them to get away with it. 252 
With this parting criticism the reasoning for the campaign for the change in the party 
constitution was neatly encapsulated. 
Conclusion 
The 1970s was to see the revisionist wing of the Labour Party suffer from a crisis of confidence 
which was in stark contrast to the heady days of the 1950s and 1960s when the philosophies 
of Jay, Crosland and Jenkins provided a theoretical framework for governance for the party’s 
right-wing. Inflation, a stagnating economy and the increase in trade union militancy had seen 
the social democratic project not only stymied but halted altogether. Revisionism was 
seemingly spent.  
The death of Tony Crosland, not long after the IMF loan crisis debate had seen the harsh 
restricting of redistributionist policies, removed from the party one of the great post-war 
thinkers. Yet up to his passing some members of the Labour right had already expressed their 
disillusionment at his obstinacy in refusal to countenance revisions to his work The Future of 
Socialism and his apparent disregard for the social liberalism that he had once championed 
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in the 1950s and 1960s. Crosland’s legacy was to be see his brand of revisionism revived a 
decade later but by then the schism had taken place.  
Roy Jenkins for his part had made a temporary departure from British politics having become 
increasingly disillusioned with Labour and its continued drift to the left. The Dimbleby Lecture 
in 1979 not only put down a marker on the need for a ‘radical centre’, it also galvanised many 
on the right who felt that they could no longer look to those such as Denis Healey for 
ideological leadership. The project which envisaged a party that was not ideologically extreme 
yet committed to social justice appealed and appalled many on the Labour right in equal 
measure. Whilst some such as David Owen did not hold Jenkins in as high regard as some 
others, the increasingly leftward drift was to prove too much of a temptation for those such as 
himself, William Rodgers and Shirley Williams with the possibility of leaving the Labour Party. 
With defeat at the General Election of 1979, Denis Healey was now being considered the main 
contender to succeed James Callaghan yet doubts had already surfaced from some on the 
right as to whether he would be able to provide the intellectual leadership required in the 
absence of his contemporaries Crosland and Jenkins. The problem for Healey was his 
association with the abandonment of redistributive policies following the IMF crisis which had 
proven to be just abhorrent to those on the left but anathematic to the revisionists on the right 
as well.  
For James Callaghan it was now simply a matter of trying to hold the party together long 
enough to allow the succession of Healey to take place. Unfortunately for the Labour right, 
there were to be those amongst their number determined to see this did not happen in order 
to precipitate a crisis that would cripple the Labour Party into the late 1980s. 
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Chapter Two  
                                                 The origins of the SDP 
 
 Undoubtedly the right in the Labour Party are considering a breakaway, which is what 
Jim hinted at when he talked about the disaffiliating. I don’t rule out the possibility that 
we might lose a chunk of the right, but they wouldn’t have a future. 
 Tony Benn253 
 
The fall of the Callaghan Government on a vote of no confidence ultimately triggered a 
constitutional debate within the Labour Party which rapidly transformed into an existential 
crisis. Within eighteen months of the defeat in May, the party was to see the departure of three 
of the most well-known former Ministers and a split that surpassed the disaffiliation of the 
Independent Labour Party in 1932. The break, ostensibly over policy and the ongoing issue of 
membership of the European Economic Community, was decided because of a new electoral 
college and the denuding of the power of the Parliamentary Labour Party, and the belief that 
any reversal or introduction of policies would be impossible to achieve. 
Whilst to some on the outside, the catalyst for the ensuing break may seem to have been over 
a matter of organisation, the issue was to take on totemic significance. It was not just the 
fracturing of the Labour Party that was taking place but a revolt against the atrophied 
certainties of where power and influence lay within the party. The long-established supremacy 
of the Parliamentary Labour Party in matters of electing the leadership, of deciding the 
contents of the manifesto, and of pursuing these objectives should Government be reached, 
were to be effectively challenged. Nor could the party leadership rely on the Trade Unions who 
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were facing their own internal conflicts and were also questioning the capability of the PLP to 
guide the party effectively. The question was one of how this power, the party’s democratic 
deficit, was to be addressed and redistributed. As John Cartwright was to note, ‘the great 
battles of the late fifties and early sixties were about policies. Today’s struggle is for control. It 
will decide what sort of party Labour is going to be.’254  
There were increasingly concerned and strident voices from the centre right of the Labour 
Party questioning its very purpose. From the Campaign for Labour Victory and Manifesto 
groups to those now outside of the Labour movement - the members of the right-wing Social 
Democratic Association (SDA) and the former Labour MP David Marquand - some were 
beginning to openly question whether Labour was capable of delivering on the aims of 
‘traditional welfare-state social democracy.’255 What was being called for was leadership for 
the Social Democratic right and the concept of an alternative project to provide this was 
beginning to manifest itself. 
Unfortunately for James Callaghan, by May 1979 the party that he led was now out of office 
and unpopular even within parts of the electorate which had previously been its natural base. 
The landscape that now stretched bleakly ahead of Callaghan provided no clear room for 
manoeuvre. To be leader of the Labour Party was a Sisyphean undertaking even during more 
benevolent times. In the period following the defeat to Thatcher though it was especially 
arduous, and the Conservative victory of 1979 was to unleash the anger of those eager to 
express their view of where things had gone wrong. Callaghan’s task was difficult as it was 
without the stark, Manichean opinions of those who were now preparing to range against each 
other. Moreover, and sadly for Callaghan, those factions, with their entrenched positions firmly 
set, were to first assault the now seemingly discredited Labourism that he and his Government 
epitomised.  Both the so-called Hard Left and the Centre Right were soon to take the 
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Government of 1974-9 to task in brutal fashion and would in due course take radically differing 
approaches in their analysis.  
Eric Shaw stated that between 1981 and 1983 Labour faced multiple crises which constituted 
a ‘crisis of governance’ and a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ as the hard left set about constitutional 
changes to correct, as they saw it, the unbalanced nature of Labour’s system for electing the 
party leader.256 This chapter will critically assess the state of the Labour Party after the loss in 
1979. It will show that the right of the party began to split and that the origins of the SDP can 
be seen as crystallising quickly after 1979, with the growing schism between Labour 
revisionists who still adhered to the Croslandite tradition and those who now considered this 
tradition exhausted. To continue Shaw’s observation of the multiple crises, this chapter will 
examine what these were. Between the defeat of May 1979 and January 1981 the Labour 
Party faced three crises. The first was a crisis of confidence of those on the right of the party 
in the leadership of the party to provide effective direction. The second was a crisis of 
legitimacy, as the argument concerning the introduction of a more representative system over 
matters of policy making and leadership election led to competing visions to address Labour’s 
democratic deficit. Finally, there was the crisis of faith. The establishment of the Electoral 
College, the election of Michael Foot as leader and the shift to the left further eroded the faith 
that those on Labour’s right may still have had. For some, departure was the only real 
alternative to remaining in a party that had been their ideological home for decades. This 
chapter also draws upon oral history with interviews with such figures as the future Labour 
leader Neil Kinnock; the one-time member of the Bennite Campaign group of MPs Frank 
Dobson; Joyce Gould, assistant to the National Agent for the Labour Party under Harold 
Wilson and James Callaghan and former Director of Organisation under Neil Kinnock; and 
Bryan Davies, former Secretary to the Parliamentary Labour Party and Shadow Cabinet and 
MP for Oldham Central and Royton.  
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May 1979 – The Crisis of Confidence 
The Conservative victory in 1979 had a profound effect on the Labour Party, one that was to 
transcend the loss in 1959 or 1970 and not be matched for transformative effect until perhaps 
1992 and the bitterly-felt defeat of Neil Kinnock. Having governed for five years through one 
of the worst post-war economic slumps, without a majority to comfortably sustain it was an 
achievement in itself that it managed to survive as long as it did. Moreover, to oversee and 
survive the European Referendum in 1975 and still be a party that could, for the most part, 
remain intact was a testament to both the resilience of the wider Labour movement and the 
adroit political management of Harold Wilson. With the back-handed compliment that perhaps 
is to be expected from a former Gaitskellite, David Marquand mused that ‘no one could deny 
that weakness and insecurity are defects in a leader, but deviousness and lack of vision may 
have been a necessary condition of leading a party tormented by factionalism’.257 Wilson had 
managed to keep Labour together in the light of the shock of the 1970 election defeat, yet it is 
unlikely that even Wilson at the height of his powers could contain the bitterness and rancour 
that was to erupt with a vengeance following the 1979 defeat. This is not to say that his 
successor as party leader and Prime Minister, James Callaghan, was either unused or averse 
to the political subtleties to which Wilson was so adept – much to the chagrin of his detractors 
such as Marquand above. Callaghan’s ascent to the top place within the party was not on 
account of the sobriquet ‘Sunny Jim’’ that had been given to him. Callaghan had been an 
assiduous cultivator of alliances within the party and the unions, and this saw him recover from 
the setback of devaluation. Yet he could be more brutal than Wilson in his decision making, 
his willingness to take tough decisions such as scuppering the ‘In Place of Strife’ legislation 
and the removal from cabinet of Barbara Castle when he became leader are the two most 
famous examples. Yet unlike Wilson, Callaghan had a loyal following within the Labour PLP 
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and he was popular in the country, more so than the person who was now replacing him as 
prime minister, Margaret Thatcher.   
Right up until the day of the election, Callaghan was consistently considered the leader most 
capable to lead a Government considered necessary for that time. A leader column in the 
Guardian of 2 May 1979 commented 
The root questions when this campaign began were whether Mr Callaghan could restore 
an exhausted and dispirited party to credibility and confidence - and whether Mrs 
Thatcher, by the wisdom of her political philosophy and the detail of her alternatives, 
could offer something clearly better. And in the end we have only a steadily diminishing 
pining for "change and not much else". That is not enough. It reflects a lack of faith in 
the party of burning faith. And since there is scant faith; only a gritty determination to 
make the best of what we have by learning and unlearning and struggling, Mr Callaghan, 
a compassionate struggler, is not merely the man we deserve but also, in all probability, 
the man we need.258 
This leader comment reflected the sentiment of the time, the acceptance of the post-war 
Consensus and its established certainties. In order to be able to govern, one had to deal 
effectively – which meant constructively – with the trade unions, one of the main pillars of the 
Consensus Establishment. This was often felt to be best achieved by the election of a Labour 
Government and the failure of the Heath Government of 1970-74, which was consumed by 
industrial unrest, was the example provided. Labour was to be elected on the back of the 
ensuing election and promised that the vaunted ‘Social Contract’ would ensure industrial 
harmony as a result of arbitration and conciliation without the need of a threat of penal censure 
that had been introduced by Heath in 1971 (and attempted, lest we forget by Wilson in 1969). 
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That the Social Contract collapsed in the wake of union dispute and strike action was to prove 
to those disillusioned with the post-war consensus that compromise was not always possible 
but indeed at times not desirable. The increasing influence of the hard left in the 1970s was a 
reaction to such compromises and the election of the Thatcher Government was another. In 
due course, the breakaway of the Social Democrats was to be another reaction to the end of 
compromise. 
Callaghan’s reputation as the leader of the last ‘Old Labour’ Government is heavily coloured 
by the defeat he was to lead his party to and the management of day to day crises through an 
increasingly diminishing authority. Marquand’s observation that Callaghan was like Wilson, 
‘another adroit and guileful politician, with no interest in ideas and no discernible vision of the 
future’,259 is as apt as it is blunt. Callaghan’s appeal was that whilst he was identified as being 
on the right of the party, his trade union background and his social conservatism set him aside 
from those revisionists who championed more liberal causes and viewed such union loyalties 
as misplaced. Callaghan was the epitome of the Labourism as practised by Herbert Morrison, 
managerial and functional. Callaghan’s ability to find consensus and to chair his Cabinets as 
such symbolised his ability to find compromise. The tragedy for the Labour Party was that the 
defeat in 1979 starkly emphasised its later inability to find such a compromise. It may be 
somewhat uncomfortable and indeed dispiriting to even consider that a party should make 
compromises on beliefs that many would hold dearly and in many cases zealously, yet as the 
Conservatives had proven previously (and Labour was more than aware of) the success of a 
party either in opposition or in power was predicated by the unity it was able to demonstrate. 
The defence of these shibboleths on all sides was to become all the more toxic with the 
introduction of proposals to present changes to the constitution of the Labour Party. 
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Viewed through the prism of the stagnation of the 1970s, the Labour Governments of 1974-
79 can be seen as lumpen and non-ideological and simply trying to exist. This was 
symptomatic of the wider malaise affecting Western countries during this period. The politics 
of the consensus was appraised as the ideology of defeat. The hardening of attitudes of both 
the left and right of the British political landscape meant that the room for compromise was 
becoming increasingly unpopular and difficult to administer.  
Tony Benn’s diary entry for 18 September 1979 (which begins this chapter) betrays a 
nonchalance at a possible breakaway. It is possible that this was because even he was 
sceptical at the thought that such an event may not occur. For the previous thirty years Labour 
had endured excoriating battles yet had still managed to remain united in body if not in spirit. 
Benn’s oft mention description of the party being a broad church of opinion had to include the 
Social Democrats who were now the target of vitriol by his supporters.  
With this backdrop of public and private recrimination and speculation, Labour was set to meet 
for its annual party conference. Whilst some lament the recent changes in the sanitised, 
debate free stages that now take place annually (‘Party Conference is not a party conference 
anymore,’ to quote Joyce Gould260), this was a conference that was to become notorious for 
the content. Whilst conference had (and continues to have) separate sections for each area 
of the Labour movement, the sense of persecution felt by some of the members of the PLP 
was acute. The division between the PLP and the constituency delegates was both physically 
and emotionally stark, ‘MPs, corralled at one end of the hall in the political equivalent of an ice 
hockey sin-bin…persistently criticised, ridiculed and derided by the Bennites on the rostrum,’ 
according to a contemporary account in the Daily Mirror.261 ‘It was a shouters conference, a 
ranters conference’ recalled Neil Kinnock, ‘what George Orwell called the game of ‘fe-fi-fo-
fum, I smell the blood of a right-wing deviationist, which has been a favourite pastime of the 
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Labour Party.’ In Kinnock’s opinion it was a conference that saw a ‘substantial chunk of the 
Labour party departing from reality.’262 For Kinnock this was to be a revelatory experience for 
him and other Tribunites but who at this stage were cautious in their actions. 
The tone of the 1979 Party Conference at Brighton was encapsulated by the opening remarks 
made by the Party Chairman, Ron Hayward. In a speech which was shocking for an 
intemperance and hostility usually reserved for opposition parties, Hayward laid into Callaghan 
and the Government that he led – ‘I have come not to praise Callaghan but to bury him.’263 
For those on the hard left this was the opportunity to hold the Labour Government and the 
right which sustained it to public account. 
During his speech to Conference Tony Benn made a series of attacks on the Government that 
he had previously been a member of, and said that ‘"This is the moment of truth, not only for 
the party but for the nation...The British people need democratic socialism and the Labour 
movement now as they have never needed it before." Benn’s assertion that ‘Labour would 
have to take on the business and banking communities to restore full employment’264 
demonstrated the more strident rhetoric that was reflective of the Hard Left and the confidence 
and belief that Benn would be ultimately successful. 
Brighton was to see the first stages of the move of ultimate authority from the PLP. Whilst the 
first attempt at removing the election of party leader and deputy leader was defeated, it was 
Brighton that was to see the drafting of the manifesto passed to the NEC. The scale of the 
victory - 3,936,000 to 3,088,000 - was considerable and significant in that it was carried with 
trade union support. Fears on the left that the unions would revert to their traditional roles of 
protecting the hegemony of the PLP were to be unfounded, at least at this stage. Yet as the 
union support was not unanimous, the Bennites still had reason to be cautious.  
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In response to the withering attacks from the Chairman, Benn and increasingly angry 
delegates of both the PLP and CLPs, Callaghan was to make a defence of the previous 
Government whilst reminding Conference of Labour’s traditional radicalism and the potential 
dangers of atomising into factionalism: 
We are a party of change, and a party of change by its very nature requires common, 
concerted action, and such a party should consider very carefully before it fractionalises 
into 635 pieces. The central thrust that comes from common action, so the result may 
not be what the movers of these proposals think it may be.265 
Turning to the matter of the upcoming internal inquest into the party’s finances and 
organisation, Callaghan stated that he hoped that the findings of the Commission of Enquiry 
would help to discuss the roles of the PLP, the NEC and Conference. Callaghan made a sharp 
gesture to those on the left on the NEC who were pushing for changes already at the present 
Conference: ‘These questions are important but it is illogical, in my view, to take the decisions 
first and then ask a Commission of Enquiry to look into them afterwards.’266 
Callaghan also repeated the rhetorical question asked by Joan Ruddock (at the time the 
Labour candidate for Newbury prior to becoming an MP in 1987): why did Labour do well in 
Scotland yet won only 11 seats out of a possible 161 in the South of England? And what cost 
the party seats in the industrial Midlands when a Labour Government had tried to maintain 
industries such as British Leyland. Callaghan proffered the suggestion that it was ‘because 
there was no agreement about what the place of the low-paid worker should be against the 
place of skilled worker.’267 Callaghan also said that the Enquiry would also look into why so 
many women did not vote for Labour. Furthermore, he added that it was ‘profoundly disturbing’ 
that a poll taken a month before the General Election found that a majority viewed 
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Conservatives as having more concern for ordinary people than the Labour Party. Callaghan 
said that whilst those within the party may have had difficulty in understanding this finding, the 
reality was that it is was ‘what other people perceive about us. That is the problem.’268 
This emphasis on the new political landscape was exactly what Callaghan was attempting to 
get across, that the certainties that Labour had been holding onto were no longer to be trusted. 
Within England in particular but not restricted to it, the Conservatives had successfully 
attracted a significant number of Labour’s natural electoral base, the skilled and unskilled 
working classes. Just as in the 1920s and 30s when Baldwin cultivated the professional middle 
classes of Middle England, the post-Heath Conservatives had set about trying to eschew the 
image of privilege that had been synonymous with the party. This had only been partially 
successful and was stymied by the 1974 defeat, yet by 1979 the Conservatives had managed 
to successfully corner a significant number of working class voters. The so-called party of the 
elite had appealed to the aspirational nature of the blue-collar and manual working section of 
society that had been the bedrock of Labour’s support since its inception and had made 
significant advances in capturing them. 
For Callaghan this was something the Labour Party had to acknowledge, stating that it was 
‘the first time in the history of politics in this country that I have known such a result.’269 
Appealing to the party for unity, Callaghan called on the Conference to ‘examine ourselves, 
everybody, and see what reasons we give for these things. After all, everybody wants a Labour 
Government to succeed; we are all united in that, so let us avoid a lot of internal party-bashing 
among each other and let us have a bit of Tory-bashing for a change.’270 
As Kinnock noted, this conference drove Callaghan ‘to despair’271 with the NEC meetings that 
took place ahead of the mooted Commission of Enquiry. Kinnock noted that Callaghan was 
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threatening to resign and others such as Foot and Healey urged him to stay on for the sake 
of party unity.272 Kinnock himself recalled he said ‘for Christ’s sake, Jim, don’t do that, you’ll 
make a catastrophic situation worse,’ and that he went home from the Conference ‘very 
miserable indeed’.273 What was telling in Kinnock’s recollection was that he urged Callaghan 
not resign and to ‘not to let them force you into that kind of submission.'274 Any hopes that 
Callaghan may have held for conciliation between the disputing groups were to be dashed 
almost immediately.  
In a private letter to group members, the Campaign for Labour Victory’s Organising Secretary 
laid bare the concerns that were held by some on the Social Democratic right and the role of 
the CLV. Commenting on the lack of leadership, Alex McGiven wrote that ‘Most Social 
Democrats do not have a coherent sense of ideological direction anymore,’ and that ‘they go 
off in all sort of directions.’ McGiven added that whilst this was perhaps a positive development 
and ‘may, to a degree, be a valuable social democratic tradition’, he cautioned that, ‘different 
ideas within that tradition must have some coherent ideological structure and leadership. That, 
at the moment, just does not exist.’275  
McGiven followed this with the fear of many CLV supporters in the CLPs ‘for the first time in 
their lives talking of the break-up of the Party’ and that these were ‘not’ (emphasis is 
McGiven’s) right wing fanatics of the SDA type.’276 This acknowledgement that such 
sentiments were no longer the preserve of those who supported the Social Democratic 
Alliance of Stephen Hasler and others was to serve warning that positions were hardening 
further. 
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In reply, Bill Rodgers advised McGiven to organise and that whilst he was ready to support a 
group in a similar way as he had done in the 1960s with the CDS and the 1970s with Manifesto, 
it required further help from others within the party: ‘My general conclusion is that CLV must 
take more initiative itself and generate its own momentum.’277 It was also a tacit 
acknowledgement that in order to succeed that the Right had to mobilise in the same way that 
the Left had been able to achieve with some success through the auspices of the Campaign 
for Labour Party Democracy. Callaghan’s exhortation to the PLP to in 1976 to disband the 
Manifesto and Tribune groups had not only been ignored but had seen an extension of the 
factionalism for which he had railed against. 
Labour was also in danger of engineering the leadership succession and thus repeating history 
when Wilson held on until 1976 to ensure Callaghan’s election. This time it was to be 
Callaghan holding out to provide succession to the shadow Chancellor, Denis Healey. 
According to Healy, Callaghan told him he was staying on in order to prepare Healey the right 
opportunity to take over, but noted that what happened eventually was ‘ten years of internal 
fighting which was quite as damaging to the Party as the decade of struggle with Bevanism 
after Attlee lost power.’278  
On 22 November 1979, whilst the man who had one time been tipped to be a future Labour 
leader appeared on BBC Television in order to give the annual Dimbleby Lecture. Entitled 
‘Home Thoughts from Abroad’, Roy Jenkins’ speech made clear and public the feelings that 
he had held for some time whilst within the Labour Party and by extension felt by those 
supporters closest to him. In his memoirs Jenkins recalls his Dimbleby Lecture perfectly 
chimed with the disillusionment of some of the right within the Labour Party and the ostracising 
many felt at the increasing advances of the hard left. For Jenkins what was required was an 
end to the adversarial nature of British politics which had become increasingly partisan and 
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ideologically extreme. Legislation on matters such on employment law had been implemented 
and rescinded as Governments changed and as a result this exacerbated tensions within 
society and were also harmful for the economy. Jenkins also made a call for a change to the 
electoral system to that of proportional representation which made his stance closer to that 
long held by the Liberal Party.  
Jenkins’s call for an end for ideological politics was somewhat contradictory when he made 
claims for a ‘radical centre’ which by its very nature suggests the need for some ideological 
underpinning. For David Marquand Jenkins appeared to be advocating something that was 
consistent with his liberal view of society and belief in the benign role of the state in economic 
terms: ‘he knew what he was against more precisely what he was for. By instinct, he was for 
a mixture of pluralistic liberalism and Keynesian social democracy.’279  
The reaction to the lecture within and without the party was instant and mixed as could be 
expected. For those on the right of the party, it wasn’t completely welcome. Shirley Williams, 
in speech to the Hertford and Stevenage Constituency Labour Party, said that ‘the Liberals 
aren’t a serious alternative’.280 For Bill Rodgers the Dimbleby Lecture signalled Jenkins’ 
intention to return to British politics and that it was clear that this did not necessarily involve a 
return to the party that he only notionally left in 1976.281  
Yet whilst he was sceptical of Jenkins’ motives it did provide him with a pretext to warn his 
party of its continuing move leftwards. In his speech at Abertilley on 30 November 1979, 
Rodgers warned that the Labour Party had a year in which to ‘save itself’ and ‘remain a broad 
coalition of democratic socialists’ and that the consequence of a fight to the last with the ‘hard’ 
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left would be that if they won, those who considered themselves moderate would leave.282 For 
Rodgers, tribally and emotionally wedded to the Labour Party since his teens, this was meant 
as a sincere yet stark analysis of the political situation facing the party, and it was meant to 
have the necessary impact of alerting the right of the need to mobilise. In private, and as 
Rodgers has since recorded, both he and Shirley Williams, whilst now discussing in general 
terms a new political party, were still committed to remaining inside the Labour Party.283  
The left were naturally scathing. For Benn, Jenkins’s lecture merely confirmed his view that 
such a ‘radical centre’ party had always been in existence: 
Of course, there had always been a centre party in British politics in the twentieth 
century; it is made up of Butskellites, including Macmillan, Callaghan, Wilson and Heath 
at one stage. It is that grouping that has presided over our decline. This is clearly what 
Roy wants to see happen.284  
This observation of Benn’s was in keeping of his analysis for the reasons for Britain’s post-
war decline in general and Labour’s dependence on social democracy in particular. The purity 
of the neo-liberal analysis as envisaged and then being introduced by Mrs Thatcher could only 
be countered by the adoption of a similarly uncompromising approach by the left. Benn’s ideal 
of Democratic Socialism was to be outlined more clearly in the publication of his writings in 
late 1979 and edited by the Campaign member, Chris Mullin. In Arguments for Socialism, 
Benn outlined what he saw as the failures of the post-1945 Consensus and the acceptance of 
the decline of the United Kingdom as an economic power. In this analysis Benn was taking 
the same jaundiced view of the now defunct consensus as the leader of the Conservatives 
and those on the British neo-liberal right, yet such a sense at the failings of the Consensus 
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and the restrictions of Labourite corporatism were also beginning to be expressed by those 
on the Social Democratic right.  
The Crisis of Legitimacy  
The anticipated introduction of a new electoral college for the election of leader and deputy 
leader was to see the Campaign for Labour Victory mobilising calling for support of alternative 
system of ‘One Member, One Vote’. To this end, David Owen, rapidly identified as the focal 
point of the campaign for OMOV, made a speech in which he not only touched upon the idea 
of a more participative party democracy but opened up the front on what he saw as the core 
values of the Social Democracy that he believed in:  ‘We will need to bring industrial 
democracy to life in Britain. We will need to reverse the corporatism of the past. We will need 
to decentralise Government and develop genuine participation.’285  
Owen was increasingly raising his profile as one of the more identified members of the Labour 
right who were objecting to the reversal of long-held policy positions. As Labour delegates met 
in Blackpool ahead of the Party Conference, David Owen made a speech which took exception 
to the rejection of membership of the European Economic Community but also took aim at the 
very notion of ‘right and left’ within the Labour Party. At the fringe debate at the Labour 
Committee for Europe on 28 September, Owen asked how opposition to European 
membership could be construed as a preserve of what he construed as ‘the so-called left’, 
particularly as many of their European counterparts were backers for both the EEC and NATO. 
This criticism was aimed to highlight the parochial and mildly nationalistic attitudes of those 
within the Labour Party who viewed the EEC and NATO with a suspicion borne out of an 
emotional patriotism. Benn, Foot and Shore, all from differing factions but veterans of the 1975 
No Campaign against continued EEC membership, could evoke the sanctity of British 
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Parliamentary sovereignty and its primacy over external bodies, for Owen this flew in the face 
of the notion of Labour being an internationalist movement. 
It is now when the Community is unpopular that we socialists who believe in our membership 
must have the courage to stand firm in our convictions that it remains in the national interest 
for Britain to stay within the Community.286 
If the Brighton Conference of 1980 was a deeply dispiriting time for the Labour right it was to 
provide Michael Foot with the opportunity to continue his latter-day role as the wise elder 
guardian of the party. Foot’s speech at the Brighton Conference, in which he said that the 
Labour Party was ‘a tolerant, tolerant body which strove to keep a balance between the 
different sections,’287 was in essence no different from any given by Callaghan or in sentiment 
to the broad church analysis.  
Callaghan, demonstrating again his understanding of the wider public feeling outside of the 
self-sealed bubble of the Conference provided a reminder from Attlee as a forlorn warning to 
the delegates: 
Self-criticism is a healthy thing as long as it does not lead to a paralysis of the will. But 
there is a danger that a party may be so concerned about its own health that it becomes 
a political valetudinarian incapable of taking an active part in affairs. It may discuss its 
own internal conditions to such an extent that it disgusts all those with whom it comes in 
contact.288         
Trying one final attempt at a valediction of the last Government, Callaghan asserted that 
Labour had much to be proud of. ‘Comrades, we have won great battles. There is no need for 
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us to be ashamed of what the Labour Movement and Labour Governments have done in 
recent years.’289 
Callaghan added a caveat to this comment as both a call for unity and also a warning to those 
contemplating other actions. ‘Only the Labour Party can fulfil it. Nobody here, I think, talks any 
nonsense about centre parties or the rest of it. It’s as dead as a dodo. Mere fluff.’290  
Brighton was significant for the policy reversals that were inflicted on the right of the party. The 
first was the adoption of mandatory reselection of MPs in which sitting members would face a 
selection process each Parliament. The second motion was the end of the PLP’s sole 
responsibility for electing the party leader, at least in the long term. Whilst the principle and 
practice of the PLP being the only body that elected leader was removed, what was to be put 
in place was thrown into doubt. The result was a temporary fudge which infuriated more than 
it placated. Dianne Hayter added that the whole pretence of debate and the influence of the 
Constituency delegates was ‘complete nonsense’ and that as the CLP only controlled 10% of 
the vote at Conference with the Trade Unions controlling 90%.291 
The final motion was carried with much less ambiguity. The vote passing the motion for 
withdrawal from the European Economic Community, five years after Wilson had completed 
taking the party through the tortuous procession to the first UK-wide referendum. This was 
anathema to those who were in favour of membership and not just those on the right but those 
‘Schizophrenics like me who were Bevanites but pro-Europe.’292 
Within a month of Conference having taken place, Callaghan stepped down as party leader. 
As leader Callaghan offered much more that went beyond what was undoubtedly his astute 
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chairmanship of a divided Cabinet and an equally fractious party at a time of acute economic 
downturn. Whilst Ian Bradley noted in a Times article on 16 October 1980 that Callaghan’s 
critics thought ‘the Labour Party had not developed intellectually under his leadership and that 
there had not been enough long-term planning,’ this was to miss the point.293 Callaghan was 
the perfect leader for Labour Party during the IMF crisis precisely because his long held non-
involvement in the party’s factionalism. It allowed him to be a strangely neutral leader yet one 
whose long association with Labour assured him of the benefit of trust. Yet once power was 
lost, Callaghan was seen as emblematic of the Labourist tradition at its most atrophied, the 
embodiment of a dull corporatism that was as reactionary as it was unimaginative.  
Callaghan was seen as a block on progress even by those whom may have otherwise have 
felt loyalty towards. Callaghan had stayed on in the hope that the conditions would be suitable 
for the election of his successor which he assumed to be Healey. This delay was not wholly 
appreciated by some of those on the right such as Radice who partly placed the blame for the 
poisonous atmosphere of the period on Callaghan’s shoulders. However, there were many on 
both the right and the left who had been grateful for the decision of Callaghan’s to remain, 
even if it did ensure the delay of the introduction of the new Electoral College. Thus it was 
that, in what Callaghan must have surely hoped was to be his parting gift to Labour, the party 
was to meet on 10 November 1980 to elect the new leader under the existing rules – the PLP 
were to be the electors.  
The Crisis of Faith – Healey and the Victory of Foot 
Whilst the election for leader was to take place within the Commons and for the last time be 
the sole preserve of the Parliamentary Labour Party, the pressure on MPs from their 
constituency parties was still being keenly felt. As was perhaps fitting for the general tenor of 
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the period, the election of Callaghan’s successor was parts tragedy (for the right) and farce 
(for the party as a whole).  
The announcement of Callaghan’s resignation immediately sparked speculation that Tony 
Benn would be minded to stand as he had done in 1976. Benn, writing in his diaries, was quite 
bullish at the prospect, noting that he led the polling of CLP Chairmen.294 Benn was advised 
by Eric Heffer that, if Michael Foot was not to stand, then he should consider standing and 
that he would run as his deputy, which gives an indication of the high confidence felt within 
the CLPD at this time.295  In due course the candidates were announced although Benn was 
not one of them. Benn had decided to heed the counsel provided by those sympathetic to him 
with many saying that to stand in an election of just the PLP would run counter to the aims of 
the CLPD.296  
Denis Healey was deemed the clear favourite. Whilst the bête noir of the left, Healey was 
comfortably the most popular choice within the wider public and not just out of the candidates 
standing, being the preferred choice of any politician in the country at the time. Yet Healey 
was to commence what can be only described as a series of non-campaigning, neither 
cultivating the necessary support within the PLP or outside within the movement in general. 
Healey saw Labour’s role and his own views in a memorial lecture in which he described the 
necessary incrementalism of parliamentary socialism by quoting the Marxist philosopher 
Lesjek Kolakowski: 
Democratic socialism requires, in addition to commitment to a number of basic values, 
hard knowledge and rational calculation…it is an obstinate will to erode by inches the 
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conditions which produce avoidable suffering, oppression, hunger, wars, racial and 
national hatred, insatiable greed and vindictive envy.297 
Healey had, like Crosland, been a Gaitskellite after being a Communist whilst at Oxford, and 
like Gaitskell and Crosland had an ambivalent approach to Europe. As Giles Radice noted, 
‘throughout his political career, Denis Healey had always been “agnostic”, when not downright 
sceptical, about European initiatives’ adding that he had been opposed to the European Coal 
and Steel Community, membership of the Common Market when Macmillan made an 
application on behalf of the United Kingdom until finally accepting membership by voting to 
stay in during the 1975 Referendum.298Such a viewpoint was to make Healey even less of a 
proposition to those disaffected Croslandites who had transferred the allegiances to Jenkins. 
Matters were not helped by Healey’s resistance to the networking which was necessary to 
gain support at Westminster but which had not necessarily hindered his ascent through the 
Labour ranks. Whilst Healey was on the centre right, he obstinately avoided association with 
any particular group, as Giles Radice observed, Healey was ‘a loner who did not join groups 
or cabals or even bother to set one up of his own.’299  
Healey’s approach, which equally baffled those who were campaigning for him, was no less 
surprising when one considers his showing in 1976 in the election to replace Wilson. Whilst 
Healey obstinately continued that campaign until he was automatically eliminated, Healey 
should have observed the consequences of the lack of wider support in the party which had 
resulted in Tony Crosland finishing bottom of the count.  
The count when it took place on 10 November took many by surprise. After the early 
eliminations of Shore and Silkin, the final count of the votes had Foot winning by ten votes: 
139 MPs had voted for the current Deputy Leader as opposed to 129 for Healey. Ian Aitken 
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noted that there was ‘incredulous cheering from Mr Foot’s supporters’ and almost immediately 
Healey announced his intention to stand for the Deputy Leadership post.300  
Healey’s defeat was a significant development. For the first time since the 1930s, a party 
leader had not come from the right of the party (Wilson notwithstanding). With the defeat of 
his candidacy, Healey was the last of the Gaitskellites to be denied a chance of leading the 
party. With Crosland gone and Jenkins no longer within the party, Healey was the only chance 
that the old CDS members within the Manifesto group had of one of their own becoming 
leader.301 
In retrospect, Healey also acknowledges that his style could have also backfired against him, 
noting that one of his campaigners, Roy Hattersley, had ‘justly complained of my insensitivity 
towards my supporters.’302 That the defeat was in part engineered by members of that group 
was equally significant. Crewe and King, Shirley Williams and Healey himself have contended 
that members of the right voted for Foot in order to create the catalyst for any defections to 
take place. This was politics being played out in its basest form, in essence an act of self-
flagellation in order to facilitate an exit out of the Labour Party. Healey certainly believed that 
whilst most of the MPs that were subsequently to join the SDP voted for him, some needed 
an excuse: ‘several voted for Michael Foot in order to justify their later defection; their few 
votes alone were sufficient to explain my defeat’.303 This was also an explanation supported 
by Crewe and King in their later account of the SDP.  
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Bill Rodgers wondered if Healey could have won but stated that it was Healey’s ‘failure to take 
risks and fight was a grave misjudgement.’304  Other supporters such as Giles Radice noted 
that, for most of 1980, Healey ‘kept his head down and his mouth shut’, and that this did not 
help his cause in winning round otherwise sympathetic MPs.305 
Hattersley, who had been doing much of the background work for Healey’s non-campaign 
gave a savage indictment on those who chose not to vote for Healey: 
By electing Michael, the PLP sacrificed its claim to being the best judge of who was most likely 
to lead Labour into Government. It also inaugurated three years of opposition which were so 
bizarre that, even at the time, most of us knew that the Party was coming perilously close to 
extinction.306 
Jenkins disputes that there was a particular reason for the breakaway, refuting ‘the 
conventional wisdom...that Healey’s defeat by Foot so dismayed the Social Democrats as to 
open the road to the SDP’. Whilst this made the defections and by-elections easier, the right 
in the Labour Party had by 1980 ‘become so disenchanted by Healey that his defeat was 
rather a relief to them.’307 Disenchantment with Healey was certainly as a factor as had been 
noted above and in an interview with the Times in 1983, Owen admitted that he may have 
stayed within Labour had Healey been victorious and yet: 
I think the fact that Denis Healey did not stand up and fight, which is what he ought to 
have done, demonstrates how much the rot had set in. Good people were just getting 
used to compromising on essentials that they had lost sight of reality.308 
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There is some agreement, though, that had Healey won, the situation could have been 
considerably different. Dennis Outwin, for example, wrote with some confidence that if Healey 
had won, ‘the SDP would almost certainly have never been formed,’ and that Labour could 
have won in 1983.309 Giles Radice was similarly convinced that a Healey victory would have 
prevented the SDP split.  
Roy Hattersley was more guarded, believing that whilst Healey might not have carried the 
party to victory in 1983, ‘we would have been beaten, not annihilated, and during the following 
five years he would have led a convincing recovery.’310  
Crewe and King provide a more sober judgement, suggesting that Healey would not have 
been successful, being more akin to Callaghan and therefore would have only delayed the 
defections. Crew and King state that as a consequence only a leader from the left was 
successfully capable of leading Labour in the early 1980s. Kinnock, who thought of Healey as 
‘irreverence on legs’ thought there was nothing right-wing about Healey nor others such as 
Hattersley. ‘There was nothing right-wing about Denis. But they were associated in the way in 
which these pretty inadequate definitions have developed more by commentators than 
participants.’311 For Kinnock, only Foot was capable of leading the Labour Party at that 
juncture to prevent the cracks in the party becoming even bigger. 
When presented with this theory, Dianne Hayter was forthright in rejection the hypothesis and 
was strong in her belief that Healey would have been the correct choice: ‘I don’t think we 
needed a leader from the left, we needed a leader. Michael Foot, bless him, may have been 
many things but he wasn’t a leader.’312  
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Clive Soley similarly thought that Healey would have been the better leader but acknowledged 
the position Labour found itself in: 
 I think if Denis had led the party our chances of reviving in the public fortunes would have 
gone up but the divisions deep in the party probably would have got deeper. We were in 
this impossible position where the public wanted Denis and the Party wanted Michael, 
or better still Tony Benn, actually, Michael was a bridge to walk over.313 
Soley’s view was that Healey may have improved the party’s fortunes but that the process 
would have been ‘bloody and pretty bruising but it was just possible that the party might have 
recovered and pulled itself together.’314 
Bryan Davies demurred on the possibility of Healey succeeding, noting that Healey was 
hamstrung by his previously poor showing at the last leadership election of 1976, having held 
two ‘the two worst portfolios for winning friends in the Labour Party’ as Defence Secretary and 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. For Davies, whilst Healey was a powerful speaker and had 
proven himself during the IMF crisis, he doubted if he was ever the ‘right-wing saviour of the 
Labour Party’, lacking in the ability to talk to other MPs who were not working on ‘the issues 
that he was involved in,’ and whilst he was a great Parliamentary performer he was also ‘heavy 
handed and not a binder up of wounds’, although he did praise Healey for his party loyalty.315   
In his history of the Labour Party, Martin Pugh suggested that the election of Healey may have 
resulted in precipitating a left-wing schism.316 With the Left as strong as it was in the CLPs, if 
any such schism was to have taken place, it would have been difficult to see it coming from 
anywhere other than those who may have supported Benn but even then such a decision 
would have been predicated on the behaviour of Benn himself. It could be safe to surmise that 
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in the event of a Left-wing breakaway those such as Stuart Holland or Dennis Skinner would 
have remained in the Labour Party. This is in part because Benn himself would have been 
unlikely to leave in the event of a Healey victory as the new Electoral College was set in such 
a way that he would have had an opportunity to make a challenge under the new rules the 
following year. Benn had to be dissuaded from standing for the leadership by many of those 
on the Left and whilst he was willing to take their counsel on this occasion, he was not to be 
so reticent the following year. If Healey had won in November 1980, it may be assumed that 
a Benn leadership challenge would have followed in 1981 although this would be against a 
backdrop of a party that had not lost some of its MPs to the nascent SDP but still with a 
grassroots strongly favouring the Left. Thus whilst Benn may have dismissed a BBC report 
that he would stand against Foot as ‘pure black propaganda,’317 the situation which would 
have presented itself to him would have been an opportunity for Benn to make a challenge, 
something which Benn had contemplated a year previously when the suggestion was put to 
him by Arthur Scargill even before the Electoral College had come into being.318 A Healey 
victory may well, as Clive Soley suggested, have been a bloody period of the party’s history 
but it may have also countered the concerns of Owen that ‘the rot’ which he was to later refer 
to had been contained or was in the process of being dealt with.  
Peter Jenkins was to opine before the contest that if Healey was to win the leadership that in 
due course Foot would have given in ‘to temptation that some of his friends fear he may 
eventually succumb.’319 Whilst suggesting that Healey would by that point be secure in his 
position due to support by trade unions ‘reluctant to trigger a civil war,’ the potential for another 
imminent challenge would be expected. Yet with Foot having to be effectively cajoled into 
running for the leadership, it is perhaps questionable to suppose that he would run again 
having lost twice in succession.  
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The issue for some voting for Foot was survival and a quieter time in their constituencies, 
certainly one that hold up to more inspection and a theory that Hattersley proffered too:  
The crucial fact of Michael Foot’s victory was the belief that, if he became leader, the 
constituency parties would calm down. Members of Parliament, about to take part in a 
secret ballot, were instructed under pain of deselection to show their ballot papers to 
constituency activists – just to ensure their cross had not been put against the name of 
the man who capitulated to the IMF.320  
Foot certainly provided in his victory speech the wish to run an inclusive opposition and called 
for unity within the party. As Aitken again noted, ‘his words were clearly designed to achieve 
the maximum party unity, and he extended that to the increasingly embarrassing question of 
party democracy and the drive for a new formula under which party leaders are to be 
elected.’321   
Whilst in his victory speech Foot quoted Bevan in stating ‘never underestimate the passion for 
unity in the Labour Party,’322 upon his election as leader he set about attempting to construct 
a shadow cabinet which was as reflective of the party as was possible but in doing so executed 
a number of tactically damaging decisions. Certainly making Healey both Deputy (ahead of 
the anticipated election) and shadow Foreign Secretary was testament to Foot trying to ensure 
a more balanced approach. Yet for those such as Rodgers, it appears that the catalyst for his 
break came with the election of Foot, Bishop’s Stortford notwithstanding. For Rodgers, the 
election of Foot ‘conveniently settled things.’323 Previously the Shadow Defence Secretary, 
Rodgers was to write that when Foot gave his shadow Defence portfolio to a member of CND, 
Brynmor John, this merely underlined the contempt that he felt that he and others on the right 
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were held (and Morgan even refers to personal animosity between the two men).324 Rodgers 
admits that if Foot had offered him a significant position, he would have found it difficult later 
to leave the party, and would have remained to be ‘desperately miserable throughout Labour’s 
years of failure.’325 Yet as consequence Rodgers was to refuse all shadow posts, including 
Health and Northern Ireland and his self-imposed removal from the shadow cabinet ensured 
that he was replaced by Tony Benn (as a consequence of Benn having the next highest 
number of votes).  
David Owen had previously declined to stand for the shadow cabinet and on 20 November 
1980 wrote to Ron Hayward announcing his decision not to see election to the Labour 
Parliamentary Committee. Citing ‘profound differences over a range of policies, particularly 
stemming from the 1980 Labour Conference,’ Owen stated that he did not hold any personal 
feelings of animosity towards Foot and added that he believed ‘that British politics has been 
invigorated by Tony Benn’s readiness to stand up for his views.’326 Owen added that the 
Conference’s policy decisions on Europe and unilateralism meant that he could not make his 
opposition to them known from the frontbenches ‘in order, as I hope, to reverse the decisions 
of the Party.’ Owen concluded with the warning that ‘the next election is far from being won. 
We will not oust Mrs Thatcher and the Conservatives if we swing to the other extreme and not 
even a false unity will guarantee election victory’.327 
For Benn, this was ‘a great mistake’, noting that ‘The thing David will learn is that if you have 
no grass-root support – and he has none – going on to the back benches means you will 
simply sink into insignificance.’328 In this regard Benn was speaking from a position of 
knowledge, safe in the realisation that his support was based primarily in the constituencies 
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and that whilst he may have decided at the present time to not stand for the Shadow Cabinet, 
he was able to do so with from a position of relative strength. Benn was simply biding his time 
whereas Owen was now marking his and contemplation on leaving the Labour Party was 
hardening into something more determined.  
For all his attempts at trying to hold the party together, Foot was to see the schism reach 
critical mass as a result of the Special Wembley Conference of 24 January 1981 to vote on 
the Electoral College. What Morgan referred to as ‘a dreadful occasion in every respect, with 
vitriolic bitterness among many delegates towards the party right,’329 was also to see an 
unedifying fudge. The USDAW union motion defeated the alternative motion of the GMWU: 
the former’s proposal would see the Unions holding 40 per cent of the college with the PLP 
and CLPs holding 30 per cent each. For the GMWU the proposed share was to be 50 percent 
for the PLP and 25 per cent for the Unions and CLPs.   
For the right, this was a catastrophic blow. For those such as Owen this was the tipping point 
and underlined his growing frustration with ‘people who ought to have known better’ for their 
refusal to face up to the infiltration of Militant330 and whilst he was willing to remain and struggle 
for the cause of the right within the Labour Party, it was this lack of desire to fight and to back 
his intervention in the debate on unilateral disarmament that made his decision to leave 
becoming more certain.  
Within twenty-four hours of the Wembley Conference decision, the Council for Social 
Democracy was being announced. By the beginning of 1981, Labour was in complete disarray. 
Within three months of Michael Foot becoming leader, elected by some for the hope for ‘a 
quiet life’, the Council for Social Democracy was born. The party was not only riven by 
factionalism but the possibility of defection of a significant number of its MPs.  
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Those on the right who were now actively considering a departure could see a clear way out 
and had a reasoned explanation for their leaving a party that, for many such as Rodgers, had 
been a  part of their lives since their childhood. For them, the party was not ‘theirs’ anymore, 
it had ceased to be a coherent organisation and certainly not a Government in waiting. The 
hated Tribunites now had one if their own as leader of the party who been a leading figure 
within the Bevanites, something which must have stuck in the craw of one-time Gaitskellites, 
even more so than when Wilson became leader. The move towards an anti-European policy 
and the adoption of unilateral nuclear disarmament were obvious and significant tilts at the 
right’s shibboleths but the adoption of a fudged electoral college which provided an inbuilt 
majority for their opponents made the overcoming of these seemingly remote. Whereas in the 
past the right had suffered defeat over defence policy and Europe, whilst the PLP remained 
the driving force of the party such decisions could be reversed and overturned, as had 
happened during the time of Gaitskell. Now, with the introduction of a new Electoral College, 
such a prospect was not only uncertain but the ascendancy of policy being controlled by 
unions and CLPs dominated by a coalition of ultra-left factions was seemingly assured for 
perpetuity, regardless of Foot’s comments that this would undoubtedly be challenged in the 
future.  
The right had seemingly lost the ability to argue its case. Those such as Bill Rodgers had 
finally lost faith in thinking that a solution was possible and the situation retrievable. Rodgers 
was to write of how his ‘impatience grew at the steady erosion of the will to fight’, and how 
whilst Roy Hattersley, Merlyn Rees, Eric Varley and John Smith were of similar mindset to the 
defectors, they were not prepared to challenge the NEC or Unions.331  
Meanwhile, the left were seemingly continuing to be in the ascendant for the same reasons 
mentioned. The soft left as epitomised by the new party leader Michael Foot did not take such 
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advances as a sign that their time had finally arrived. Instead there was a certain resignation 
and belief that this could be the high-water mark. Foot, attempting to be as conciliatory as 
leader of the Labour Party as he was as Leader of the House, was fully aware that the party 
could little afford to lose the right wing, not just in terms of the talent and personalities of those 
concerned but for the knowledge that their defections would reduce the party to a monotone 
entity. The former Bevanite knew from past experience that Labour had always been a party 
of competing and contradictory factions, as much held together with emotional impulses as 
with economic theory. Whilst Tony Benn had made similar observations of Labour’s ‘broad 
church’ development, no such reservations were being expressed on the need for keeping the 
right within the party. 
This ‘broad church’ which had been referenced was beginning to come apart. Referring again 
to the Jenkins opinion piece prior to the leadership election he had noted that ‘differences of 
interest and ideology’ had become ‘so sharp and cut so deep that it is scarcely conceivable 
that they can be accommodated within new constitutional arrangements.’332 Warning that 
‘sectional interests of the trade unions and the ideological zealotry of the constituency parties,’ 
eroding the independence of the PLP, Jenkins said that it was only Healey who could prevent 
a split from occurring as ‘it is not the Left who will split the party – it never has and it never will; 
it is the Right who will do so and it is in Parliament that the split will take place.’333 It would be 
Healey’s victory the following year that was to prevent an even greater schism than the one 
that Labour was currently enduring and it would be the Soft Left and union machinations which 
were to come to the aid of those on the Right who were struggling to convince others to remain.  
It would now be left to the remaining members of the right of the PLP to recover their ground. 
Manifesto and the CLV were effectively dead, the means of pursuing the goals of social 
democratic ideals within the Labour Party would have to be pursued via another vehicle but 
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the first act would be to steady the nerves of those who still remained at the time. The Unions, 
who had contributed to the crisis of the Electoral College were now about to set in motion the 
network required to shore up the support of the traditional right. Marxism Today was to observe 
that: 
Fear of the constitutional headway made by the Left and fear of the effect of a breakaway on 
the party's electoral fortunes could well galvanise them in a way which all Wilson's and 
Callaghan's 'fixing' failed to do. Thus the irony may well be that the short term effect of the 
'Gang of Four's' defection will be to strengthen Labour's Centre-Right.334 
For the time being, for those on the right who observed the Council of Social Democracy with 
increasing alarm, such a prospect seemed remote. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Labour’s Right in Crisis 1981 - 1983 
  
 Following the defeat in the general election, we should have picked ourselves up and 
sorted ourselves out. Instead we stayed on the floor, kicking hell out of each other, 
while Thatcher walked all over us.’ 
 John Golding335 
 
The General Election defeat of 1979 was to see Labour’s Right thrown into disarray and the 
defection of a significant number of those who identified as Social Democrats was to further 
sow further seeds of doubt and despair. Whilst still nominally the largest chapter of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party, many of those who identified on the right of the party found 
themselves under increasing pressure. For some it was from their own CLPs who held strongly 
opposing opinions on policy; for others it was trying to justify their own reasoning for staying 
with Labour to those who were had begun to make the difficult break with the party. Whilst the 
breakaway of the Social Democrats was to be an existential crisis which had caused genuine 
anguish for some of those who were to leave, for those who chose to stay in the Labour Party 
it was a matter of tribal loyalty and in some cases the intellectually correct decision. 
This chapter will focus on the period between 1981 and 1983 and examine why some on the 
Labour Party’s right determined to stay within the party whilst others felt it necessary to leave 
it to join the Social Democrats. It also examines how those who remained in the Labour Party 
understood the reasons behind the SDP’s formation and how this influenced their thinking. It 
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examines what they considered were the differences between their interpretations of social 
democracy, and how the Social Democrats interpreted it. What were the main differences 
between those who stayed and those who left? In doing so it will draw upon interviews with 
Giles Radice, Dianne Hayter and Austin Mitchell, as well as local activists in Oldham and 
Cambridge, with Oldham West being the seat of a Tony Benn supporter and where the 
concerns at the time were of Militant Tendency involvement and Cambridge a seat that was 
not only a marginal but one in which the newly formed Social Democrats hoped to make 
advances in.  
The chapter will also critically assess the emergence of a slowly developing reaction against 
the Bennite Hard Left by the supporters of Michael Foot and show how the Tribunite group 
assisted with the stemming of further defections of MPs from the Labour right by abstaining 
on the vote for the Deputy Leadership elections, paving the way for the eventual establishment 
of a coalition of soft left and revisionist social democrats under the leadership of Neil Kinnock 
and Roy Hattersley.  
The elections at Warrington, Crosby and Glasgow Hillhead are also examined. The SDP 
gained the latter marginal and returned its leader Roy Jenkins to the Commons after a six year 
absence on 25 March 1982. He was a man who many on the Labour right had once supported 
as a future leader yet was now heading the advance that threatened their movement. The 
victory at Hillhead was to be the highpoint of the SDP, if not the Alliance, as shown by the later 
reverse at Darlington on 24 March 1983, a reverse which for Labour gave false hope in thinking 
that such seats would remain in their hands yet for the SDP a portent of the limits of their 
electoral reach and how difficult it would be extending their appeal into traditional Labour 
heartlands. 
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Foot and the Social Democrats 
Michael Foot’s opinion of the right of the Labour Party may have been shaped from his 
experiences of the 1950s battles between the Bevanites and Gaitskellites but his time in 
Government had provided him with a closer working relationship with those for whom their 
policy positions were at odds with his own. Foot’s adherence and sentimental attachment to 
both Parliament and the Labour Party placed him in a similar bracket as his predecessor 
James Callaghan but it was this sentiment which made his sincere entreaties to some, if not 
all, of those who were to leave the party all the more understandable.  
Foot’s opinion of some of the main leaders of the breakaway was one of contempt, with one 
notable exception. Foot’s attempt to persuade Shirley Williams from leaving Labour were, as 
Morgan has noted, borne of a genuine admiration of her abilities as a Minister and also on a 
more sentimental basis in that she was the daughter of Vera Brittain.336 A former minister who 
was popular with the public and one who was seen as a capable administrator was someone 
whom Foot saw as an asset. Yet the developments of the last eighteen months were not to 
convince Williams of Foot’s assurances that there would always be a place for those on the 
wing of the party that Williams resided, nor was the lack of action on the part of Healey, the 
one man on the Right where hopes had once been pinned. On 2 March 1981, nine members 
of Labour’s representation in the Lords resigned the whip, stating their opposition to 
unilateralism, the proposal to leave the EEC and the Electoral College.337 This was in addition 
to the MPs who had already left the party shortly after Limehouse. A month later, any thoughts 
of conciliation were given little consideration as Foot attacked the SDP during his Ebbw Vale 
speech of 11 April, accusing the new party of dishonesty, mocking it for keeping its intentions 
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secret until it ‘made a deal with David Steel, once they’ve discovered what policy will prove 
most popular with the public opinion pollsters.’338 
The dilemma for Foot was to attempt to forge an effective understanding between those on 
the Right and Left of the party in such a way as to not be seen as in thrall to one particular 
side. Unlike Wilson, who had been a Bevanite who had gradually moved to a more Labourist 
position or Callaghan who had been of the centre for most of his political career, Foot had 
been a radical from the outset. Whilst an extremely effective conciliator during his period in 
Government and in particular as Leader of the House, Foot’s positions were such that were 
he to move in one particular direction he would be vilified. He was equally a prisoner of both 
and his leadership paralysed as a consequence, ‘hated by the left, hated by the right…and he 
tried to sit in the middle,’ as noted by one of his own supporters. 339 
Joyce Gould, who organised the party conferences in her role as National Agent, took the view 
that despite the ‘nonsense’ of the Electoral College and the issues of Europe and unilateralism, 
she was convinced that the breakaway was long gestating and that both Williams and Owen 
were organising the breakaway and operating ‘a party within a party,’ in much the same way 
as Militant.340  
Frank Dobson, at that time a Benn supporter, said that whilst ‘for all I know they may have 
been plotting for years’, he was ‘unaware of any suggestion of anybody wanting to breakaway 
after the 1979 General Election,’ although the ‘outward signs were looking a bit fragmentary,’ 
and added his belief to the belief of certain Right-wing MPs voting for Foot over Healey as a 
means of triggering the split.341 Dobson was particularly scathing in thinking that the reason 
why the break had not taken place sooner was due to those concerned ‘being quite keen to 
holding on to their ministerial cars and ministerial salaries so the chances of them breaking 
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away whilst we were in Government were pretty small.’342 Dobson viewed them as ‘not on the 
Right of the party, they were sort of inside Right, there were a lot more Right-wing people who 
stayed within the Labour Party. There was an element of sort of fashionista, I think, about the 
SDP.’343 
Neil Kinnock was similarly dismissive of those who left to form the SDP as a result of ‘partly 
arrogance, partly delusion, partly frustration, partly laziness. And I say laziness because it 
would take a hell of a lot more to stay and fight their corner and make their argument than to 
cut loose.’344 He went further: 
…they didn’t really have the spirit, the determination, in the end the affection for and 
belief in the Labour Party to do that and took refuge in the view that this isn’t the Labour 
Party I joined. It’s never the bloody Labour Party you joined! That’s called history, time 
moves on! The problem with the bloody party in many ways is that it was the Labour 
Party that you joined, it hadn’t moved enough.345 
This was a potent criticism even thirty years after the events of the breakaway, especially as 
those such as Rodgers had been involved in the party since an early age. Kinnock’s feeling 
was that even after such a period that the desire to leave could only be as a result of a shallow 
attachment by those concerned, especially as those who came from the same wing of the 
party such as Roy Hattersley chose to stay. Kinnock’s observation on the ‘history’ of the 
Labour Party was also telling as it suggests that Labour was not built upon a single idea or 
dogma, the party  being as much a party of Hattersley as Benn, underling Kinnock’s 
understanding of ‘a pragmatic view’.  
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For Gould, the policy standpoints of those who were to form and leave the SDP were 
indistinguishable from the Liberals. Gould noted that the defection of John Cartwright was 
particularly hurtful due to their personal friendship and that even one of her brothers joined the 
SDP.  Yet despite the bitterness that was felt towards those who left, there was sympathy in 
that the Right felt that progress could not be made, particularly on the matter of the NEC’s 
perceived failure of dealing with the issue of entryism. This was a charge that Gould makes 
towards the Soft Left (which as a self-identified ‘Bevanite’ she could be considered a member 
of) and that it took some time to accept that the matter had to be addressed, although adding 
that the defections actually made the expulsion of Militant all the more difficult as their 
defection had left the Right ‘decimated.’346 
Attempts at amelioration were made by some on the Left to those who were thinking of 
defecting to the new party. Writing in the Labour Solidarity newsletter of March 1981, the 
Tribune member Frank Field defined the debate as ‘between those who believe in an outward 
looking democracy which tries to involve more and more people, and those who wish to 
impose a limited party democracy’.  This was a debate that was required and worth having. It 
was also important that ‘we on the Left…have to show by our actions, and not just by our talk, 
that tolerance is one of the major characteristics.’347 
The immediate impact of the Social Democrats was not to be felt until the middle of the year 
and prior to the first engagement with the new party, Labour and Foot’s first electoral test since 
the trauma of two years previously was a deceptively positive one. In early May of 1981, 
Labour performed relatively well at the local Government elections and the outcome was one 
in which he and the party could take some comfort from. Labour was to regain control of county 
authorities that it had lost in 1977 in the North and the West Midlands and in the case of 
Lancashire overturned a majority of 70 into a Labour administration with a majority of 8. Yet 
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such considerable victories were undermined by the poor performance in the South and East, 
with the Conservatives vote holding up.348 Moreover the Social Democrats had yet to put 
forward any candidates for local elections 
The victory for Labour in the elections for the Greater London Council was to see it take control 
for the first time in 1977 and prior to the election Foot had said that a victory in London would 
be ‘a great prelude to a Labour victory throughout the country.’349 On an average swing of 11 
percent across the capital, Labour was returned with a majority of eight. This was affected by 
the loss of the seat in Norwood of the leader of Lambeth Council, Ted Knight, who saw a swing 
against him of 2.1% to the Conservatives. Although this was in part due to a combination of 
factors, including the unpopularity of the rate rises that had been implemented in Lambeth, it 
was also due to the standing of Stephen Haseler of the recently expelled Social Democratic 
Alliance who split the centre-left vote.350 
Labour’s performance outlined the fragility of their support in the aftermath of the SDP’s 
formation. It had performed well in the local Government elections and yet Labour was now 
having to face the prospect of coming up against those who until five months previously had 
been in the same party. For the first time since the by-election of 1973 and the independent 
Democratic Labour candidacy of Dick Taverne in Lincoln, Labour was to face off against one 
of their former MPs. 
Warrington 
Foot was to be presented with the first of three by-election challenges that year which were to 
give an indicator of the damage the SDP’s formation had wreaked upon their former 
colleagues. On 16 July 1981, Labour was forced to defend the seat of Warrington as the 
incumbent Thomas Williams stepped down in order to become a High Court Judge. This by-
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election, in a Labour stronghold in the industrial North-West of England, should have been 
both a much needed morale boost for Labour two years after the General Election defeat and 
an indicator of the unpopularity felt towards the Conservative Government. The outcome was 
to briefly underline the latter unpopularity of the Thatcher administration but it also cast a 
damning verdict on Labour itself. Roy Jenkins, the nominal leader of the Social Democrats (as 
no leader was officially in place at this time) used Warrington as the first attempt of providing 
an electoral test for the party, accepting the gauntlet that Foot had thrown down that those 
such as David Owen were to only undertake at the general election of 1983.  
If there was an expectation of victory, then it must have been tempered by the realisation that 
this was an election that could have been avoided, with the revelation that Thomas Williams 
had suggested being moved to the Lords, a proposal apparently rejected by Foot.351 If true 
then it could be interpreted as a tactical misjudgement by the Labour leader even if it 
underlined his antipathy to the upper chamber. This did, however, present Labour with an 
opportunity to crush the defectors’ project before it could gain further traction. If, as John 
Campbell noted, ‘politics is all about elections’352 then Warrington was the opportunity that 
presented Labour with a potential fillip or possible disaster in equal measure.  
Campbell describes the campaign conducted by Labour as one of ‘personal ridicule and 
abuse,’353 with personal attacks made on Jenkins by the left-winger and member of the Labour 
NEC, Doug Hoyle, with the latter referring to the former as a ‘Euro-fanatic’354. Whilst certainly 
unedifying it was in keeping with the tactical response that was put into place by the party in 
its efforts to effectively nullify the new party’s prospects. Prior to Warrington, the Labour Party 
Research Department had produced an information paper the appendix of which was entitled 
‘The Gang Show’ which set out both the background to the SDP and the perceived prospects 
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of the party, placing it in the context of other breakaways which had taken place previously. 
The paper quoted Neil Kinnock’s summation of the Social Democrats as ‘the malleable 
Common Market, NATO worshipping, Trade Union bashing, PSBR saving, permanent PR 
Coalition that every multinational boss, judge and general has longed for!’355 Labour’s 
campaign made strong and persistent mention of the pro-Europeanism of the SDP in general 
and Jenkins in particular, with Peter Shore making reference to ‘sick, overriding passion for 
the Common Market,’ and in the process attacking those still in Labour who still wished for 
Britain to remain in the EEC. 356 Labour’s campaign was also hit by the personal intervention 
of the retiring candidate’s son, David Williams, attacking the candidacy of Hoyle and his 
‘extreme Left-wing policies. They are totally against those which my father supported for 20 
years.’357 This in turn prompted the Cheshire Trade Union Action Committee which was 
supporting Hoyle to refer to Jenkins as ‘that pompous plutocrat, 358 who is now showing his 
true anti-working class views.’359 
The result at Warrington was a pyrrhic victory for Labour. In a seat it was expected to win a 
comfortable margin of victory would have been so expected as to be un-newsworthy and any 
attention would have focused on the failure of the SDP to make any headway. What occurred 
was the outcome Labour feared the most short of defeat itself, with Jenkins reducing a majority 
of 10,000 to 1,759 and taking 42 per cent of the vote.360 As Jenkins was to note himself, it was 
‘the lowest Labour vote in this constituency for fifty years,’361 a considerable achievement for 
a party which, Liberal Party organisation notwithstanding, had no local presence and a 
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candidate who had been out of Parliament for five years. Whilst it was to be a victory for 
Labour, the very fact that a party that had not been in existence six months earlier was to 
come within touching distance of victory underlined the predicament Labour and Foot were 
now facing. The editorial in the Daily Express, not one for demonstrating a sympathetic view 
towards Labour, said that the party and Foot in particular faced ‘the serious possibility that his 
Party might soon vanish from the scene as a party of Government…and that and to a large 
extent they are due to his own failure as a leader,’ adding that faced with a Conservative 
Government that was deeply unpopular due to massive unemployment, Labour ‘should be 
making hay. Instead it can barely hold on to what was one of the safest seats in the country.’362 
Foot was damaged by Warrington. The defeat of Jenkins had only served to burnish the 
credentials of Jenkins whom they had tried to paint as an elitist and the possibility of the SDP 
making headway in traditional Labour areas. Labour saw one in five of its voters in 1979 shift 
to the SDP and prompted Peter Jenkins to observe that the party had ‘lost touch with its mass 
support. Its leaders command little confidence or respect,’ adding that it ‘seems to be in the 
throes of an internal revolution which has developed its own momentum, unsusceptible to 
such rude reminders as Warrington.’363   
The ‘throes’ of which Jenkins referred to were to become convulsions, made all the more 
debilitating with the feverish speculation and recriminations that was to take place over the 
Summer months and culminate at the next Party Conference. 
Benn and the Deputy leadership Campaign  
In the immediate aftermath of the Warrington by-election, the fortunes of Labour had appeared 
to have stabilised. A Gallup poll from 20th August 1981 showed that Labour were on 38.5 
percent, ten percent ahead of the Conservatives and double that showing for the Social 
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Democrats on 19 percent.364 Whilst it was not as considerable as the lead that had been in 
evidence at the end of February, Labour was still leading the Government by a significant 
margin and whilst bruised by the encounter at Warrington they had managed to hold on to the 
seat. The hope that further defections may have been stymied was high, in spite of the 
newspapers continuing to impress the advances made by SDP in local elections such as the 
victories in Lambeth, Cleveland and Hemel Hempstead.365  
In the face of a relatively stable period, Foot’s attempts at limiting the loss of any further MPs 
from the Right of the party were to be made all the more difficult by the determination of Tony 
Benn to press ahead with his plan to run for the Deputy leadership. Speculation on whether 
Benn would make the decision to stand had been running throughout the year. It was this 
speculation which was to bring the widening rift within the Labour Left out into the open. As 
has already been commented upon, the decision to elect Denis Healey as Labour’s Deputy 
Leader had been viewed as the moment that halted the advance of Tony Benn’s ambitions. 
For Giles Radice and others it was to be viewed with no small amount of emotion and 
appreciable hyperbole that this ‘saved’ the Labour Party in that it held up a possible exodus 
of MPs from the Right of the party to join the Social Democrats. Prior to the Warrington by-
election, Radice had written an article in which he had rebutted Michael Meacher’s justification 
for Benn’s candidacy, declaring that Benn had ‘become a divisive figure within the Labour 
movement…his refusal to consult all except his closest associates and his complete inability 
to compromise have alienated him from most of the Parliamentary Labour Party including 
many within the Tribune group.’366 Such sentiments could have been expected from a member 
of the Right but they were to be echoed in due course by others on the Left. 
The rhetoric utilised by some of Benn’s supporters in the wider Labour Movement was to 
exacerbate divisions on the Left. In August 1981 Arthur Scargill had called upon all those who 
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saw themselves as being on the Labour Left to vote for Benn for Deputy and to do otherwise 
would be seen as support for the party’s Right-wing. This prompted a Left-wing MEP, Janey 
Buchanan, to strongly criticise Scargill and demand Benn rein in such supporters: 
Once honest dissent is attacked and its attackers left unchallenged, there is no holding back 
the forces of reaction. Reactionary ideas hiding behind a Left label are and should be terrifying 
to any Socialist.367  
An interview with Maurice and David Kogan after the 1981 Party Conference had seen Audrey 
Wise call on those who were sympathetic to the Social Democrats to leave and again attacked 
the Wilson and Callaghan administrations: ‘the sooner they go the better because the trouble 
with these people is that they are very much identified with the last Labour Government and 
previous Labour Governments who betrayed the working people of this country.’368 Such 
antagonism was not shared by another member of the left, Nigel Stanley369, whom the Kogans 
recorded as saying that other than Owen and Williams he had no wish for anyone to leave, 
observing that democracy meant that ‘sometimes people win and sometimes people lose and 
that goes for all different parts of the party,’ then offering the hopeful assertion that ‘in five 
years’ time everything will have settled down and there will essentially be a working 
relationship between the different trends in the party as has happened in the French Socialist 
Party.’370 The Kogans also noted that Stanley hoped that ‘the right should not now be driven 
away’ just as the left were not forced to when they had ‘persistently lost.’371 
Criticism of Benn’s motives for running and those issuing threats to those who were thinking 
of abstaining were to help to harden the views of those already sceptical if not opposed to 
Benn’s decision to stand. Christopher Hitchens noted that those such as Buchan mentioned 
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above saw their criticisms as being of the ‘near-adulation of Mr Benn among young activists’ 
as ‘Stalinism’ adding that there were some others within the Tribune Group including Eric 
Heffer who resented Benn as a ‘Johnny come-lately’ and others still who had come to view 
Benn as a potential electoral liability.372 
Neil Kinnock was to receive opprobrium from Benn supporters for his lack of support for the 
latter’s endeavours. In one reply to a letter received in September 1981, Kinnock accused 
Benn’s campaign of being a distraction and giving credence to Healey: 
Denis Healey is not (the emphasis is Kinnock’s) a significant power in the Labour Party 
and the only thing which has made him important and given him a chance to wound if 
not defeat our policies is this foolish deputy leadership election. 
I am sorry that we cannot agree but frankly the only way in which I can demonstrate the 
strength of my feeling that perpetual conflict is damaging any possibility of winning an 
election and therefore of implementing our policies is by abstention.373 
Benn’s persistence in running for the Deputy leadership was to be the catalyst for the eventual 
painful break that was to emerge in the Tribune Group of MPs. Whilst his defeat was, in 
retrospect, seen a huge achievement for some of his supporters as they did not even envisage 
the margin to be so narrow, it was also a crushing disappointment. It would be another thirty-
four years until someone from the hard left would transcend the result that was achieved in 
1981. Whilst Benn had managed to achieve eighty per cent of the CLP votes, forty percent of 
the union ballots and a third of the PLP vote374, the defeat was marked by the machinations 
of those whom had once allied themselves with Benn. That the so-called soft Left supporters 
of Kinnock, et al, abstained was to be viewed as the biggest perceived act of treachery. Neil 
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Kinnock was to receive a large number of letters from Benn supporters denouncing his 
decision to abstain. One letter dated 3rd October 1981 addressed to ‘Comrade Kinnock’, said 
that it was ‘pleased to tell you that you have been awarded the 1981 Ramsay MacDonald 
Prize for loyalty in the services of socialism. Last year’s winner was S. Williams.’375 One 
undated letter made the same comparison to the one-time Labour prime minister and said that 
he would not join Labour ‘WHILE IT IS LED BY PINK TORIES AND LIBERALS’, adding ‘God 
being good will someday forgive you your treachery the ordinary people of this country never 
will.’376 Another correspondent demanded that all of Labour’s policies would be implemented 
‘if we unite around Tony Benn’ and ‘no Jims or Harolds will do deals to renege yet again 
(emphasis is the letter writer’s).’ The writer then took aim at Kinnock for joining with ‘Silkin, 
Healey even Heffer’ for not getting behind Benn, accusing them of being ‘”stab in the backers” 
and careerists’, before finally suggesting that ‘they can all join the S.D.P’s (sic) if they like Mr 
Healey’s brand of socialism, it may even appeal to you boyo.’377 
In one reply to such a letter, dated 19 October 1981, Kinnock stated that ‘Labour Party policies 
belong to the Labour Movement, they are too important to rely on the mere cult of personality,’ 
adding that his loyalties were to ‘the Labour Movement and to Michael Foot who I strongly 
campaigned for in the Leadership Campaign and, it is my opinion, it is Michael Foot who 
“needs all the support he can get.”’378 In another letter also dated from 19th October, Kinnock 
again makes reference to the adulation afforded to Tony Benn saying ‘it was precisely the “St 
Peter”, “Judas”, “Christ” attitudes which were (and are) prevalent in certain sections of the 
                                                          
375 Cambridge, Churchill College Archives, Kinnock papers, KNNK 2/1/6, Letter from Anthony Easthope to Neil 
Kinnock, undated 
376 Cambridge, Churchill College Archives, Kinnock papers, KNNK 2/1/6, Letter from Stephen Calraw to Neil 
Kinnock, undated 
377 Cambridge, Churchill College Archives, Kinnock papers, KNNK 2/1/6, Letter from Neil Kinnock to Dennis 
Lanner, 19 October 1981 
378 Cambridge, Churchill College Archives, Kinnock papers, KNNK 2/1/6, Letter from Neil Kinnock to John Millar, 
19 October 1981 
129 
 
Party and which place undue and destructive emphasis on personality rather than policies that 
I was (and am) so firmly against.’379 
The campaign for the deputy leadership would ultimately lead to some of Benn’s supporters 
to become disillusioned. Frank Dobson was to reflect thirty-three years later that supporting 
Benn was ‘the only thing in my political life that I’m ashamed of,’ adding that ‘Benn was never 
as fundamentally committed as Michael Foot was,’ seeing Benn as ‘superficial.’380 
For Foot the outcome was one that he welcomed. Peter Jenkins, writing in The Guardian at 
the time, proffered the opinion that the victory of Healey had ushered in ‘an embryonic coalition 
between the soft-Left Tribunites and the Centre-Right Solidarity faction.’381382 Jenkins offered 
the caveat that such a coalition was at best fragile and if borne of expediency for the present 
time it was a necessary requirement, forged on a common readiness to ‘Democratise the 
electoral college, and the unions, in so far as that can be done.’383 What the defeat of Benn 
had returned was the equilibrium that had been unsettled with the defections of the Social 
Democrats, even if that balance was currently composed in the favour of the soft-Left over the 
traditional Right. If the balance was still in danger of being upset by the tensions caused by 
the policies on unilateralism and EEC membership then for the present time at least such a 
pause in hostilities mean that Labour could take stock. Unfortunately what the party was 
presented with over the next two months was to be chastening. 
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The Right Reacts 
Labour had experienced bitterness and animosity within the different factions Parliamentary 
Party as opposition chafed against the tenuous bonds that held it together. The tumultuous 
events that led to the Limehouse Declaration was to see old friendships and collaborations fall 
apart, at times almost boiling over into physical violence. The Labour Right had marshalled 
together its members since the early 1960s with the Campaign for Democratic Socialism and 
latterly with the Manifesto Group as means of initially ensuring that their policies were adopted 
by the party before latterly acting as a protective buffer for the Callaghan Government and as 
a bulwark against the rising power of the Left. Now as the Council for Social Democracy was 
being announced, the resentment that had been building boiled over. Any animosity towards 
the SDP was to be expected by those of the Left yet it was to be strongest when expressed 
by those whom only relatively recently were close colleagues of MPs that had recently 
defected. There was contempt - for Denis Healey, the SDP was wedded to a ‘fantasy…of a 
society administered by men of competence and goodwill – a sort of irreversible Butskellism 
based on the rejection of career politicians and of bureaucrats.’384 There were also those who 
sympathised with those who were suffering difficulties with their constituency parties. 
Dianne Hayter recalled the feelings and anger that was experienced at party meetings. During 
this period Hayter was with the Fabians and remembered the ‘contempt for the electorate’ and 
‘bitterness towards people like me’ in party meetings from far left activists which had stopped 
people from attending party meetings and use of invective such as ‘traitors’ in relation to 
members of the former Government.385 Hayter found the defections of Shirley Williams - ‘born 
into this movement’ - and William Rodgers - ‘in it from a youngster, CDS since the time of 
Labour’ – as proof of the pressures that they must have felt and was convinced that they were 
‘psychologically still Labour.’386 Hayter, unlike Hattersley, ‘would open my arms willingly to 
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them’ if they were allowed to return and also noted that ‘a number of people who I’m not going 
to name who have said to me and particularly after reading the book (Fightback!) had I knew 
then what I know, that the unions were beginning to do it, then I might not have gone.’387 
Hayter recalled the sadness of the loss of association with those whom until recently had been 
friends such as John Cartwright and John Grant and in particular when Colin Beaver and John 
Roper left to join the SDP. Roper who had been treasurer of the Fabians and Beaver who had 
been something of a mentor of Hayter’s both also had partners who worked within the Fabians 
and when the defections took place it was particularly painful, ‘than being screamed at by a 
group of people I didn’t respect.’388 
The failure of the right of the PLP and the unions to connect was due to ‘MPs being completely 
spineless’ according to Hayter, only organising in Parliament and ignorant of the unions who 
were looking for political leadership.389 For Hayter, ‘a good General Secretary would have 
reached out to the unions but both Ron Hayward and Jim Mortimer were the wrong people to 
do it’390 due to being ‘in hock to the NEC’391 that was dominated by the left. As a result there 
was a sense that the union leaders had to step in and help which led to the gathering of the 
St Ermin’s Group. For Hayter the union leaders ‘had the data’ showing that their members 
were not voting Labour and this moved them to organise matters and provide support for 
groups to come such as Labour Solidarity.  
There was also a brief period of concern that the Fabians could be cultivated by the SDP and 
as Dianne Hayter recalled for ‘a couple of days it was horrendous’ as two of her staff members 
left and Dick Leonard, who had defected, had appealed for SDP members to be allowed to 
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remain in the Fabians. In due course things ‘steadied very quickly,’ and the Fabians voted to 
deny SDP members to remain, prompting the latter to form the short-lived Tawney Society.392 
Recollecting events from over thirty years previously, Giles Radice said that as far as he was 
concerned there was never any prospect of leaving Labour for the SDP, only the alternative 
of leaving politics altogether: 
They were older than me (Williams and Rodgers), I was not attracted by their idea of 
moving out, leaving the Labour Party. I think it was partly because I was sentimental 
about the Labour Party, I joined it…it was a big move for me to join it in the first place I 
wasn’t hereditary. I thought it could be won round, it would take a long time – they 
didn’t.393  
Radice added it was a sentimental, ‘tribal loyalty but it was a tribal loyalty to a tribe that I wasn’t 
born into, it was an intellectual commitment.’394 Kinnock, added Radice, would have felt it was 
his tribe from a young age but for him it became one that he felt he belonged to. 
Radice said when the defections were underway it was ‘dreadful seeing them leaving’, and 
that in the meantime he was being attacked by ‘Trots’ calling him a ‘traitor’ and expected to 
leave, ‘deliberately targeted by the Rank and File Mobilising Committee’ for deselection but 
had managed to hold on, saying that some of the members ‘loved me taking on the Trots!’ and 
‘dismantling their intellectual argument.’395 
Austin Mitchell, at the time of the interview still MP for Great Grimsby, disregarded the threat 
of Militant, considering them to be ‘a nuisance,’396 but acknowledged that the mood at the two 
conferences at Wembley coupled with the Mitchell put forward the suggestion that William 
                                                          
392 Interview with Dianne Hayter, 24 October 2014 
393 Interview with Giles Radice, 28 November 2012 
394 Interview with Giles Radice, 28 November 2012 
395 Interview with Giles Radice, 28 November 2012 
396 Interview with Austin Mitchell, 4 November 2014 
133 
 
Rodgers was the most hesitant to leave and was more concerned about defence than the 
others were about Europe. For Mitchell he was as unforgiving towards the SDP, even though 
he found some of the policies attractive barring the ones on Europe and proportional 
representation, and this resentment was still evident thirty years later: 
 It certainly damaged us, I couldn’t forgive them. Because…all its faults with the Labour 
Party, its right to combat trade union dominance in the Labour Party, a kind of machine 
politics we get up to, but on the other hand it is the only instrument for social advance 
and the only instrument that could change society and to destroy it as they wanted to…to 
think of leaving it and wrecking it was unforgivable.397 
Mitchell thought that whilst the defection strengthened the left initially, it did not weaken the 
social liberal element within the party, stating that he did not think it had changed all.398  
Following on from this, Mitchell, still considering himself as a Gaitskellite in 2014, also thought 
that the reason why his predecessor as MP for Great Grimsby Anthony Crosland would have 
remained within the party had he have lived was down to a deep loyalty, similar to that 
expressed by Giles Radice. This assumption of Mitchell’s in relation to Crosland was as given 
by David Marquand: 
His (Crosland’s) loyalty to it was not, as party loyalty so often is, a superficial matter of 
convenience, or habit or personal ties. It sprang from the deepest recesses of his 
complex character. For him, breaking from the Labour Party was unthinkable.399 
Mitchell believed that had Crosland stayed it would have been due to a loyalty to the Labour 
Party but also due to his agnosticism on the matter of Europe which was one of the primary 
issues for those who defected. Mitchell also suggested the same would have been true of 
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High Gaitskell.400 Loyalty was the driving factor for Mitchell, pointing to Roy Hattersley who 
was more pro-European and a multilateralist yet had remained to the party. 
Paul McHugh, who was to became a Labour activist in the early 1980s in the constituency of 
Cambridge, recounted his involvement in a local by-election at the end of 1981 in the Romsey 
ward and said it was ‘an eye-opener’ as Labour had an ‘iron grip since 1918’ and the election 
was therefore ‘symbolic’.401 McHugh recalled that the weather for the by-election was very 
poor and that there were canvassers and activists for the SDP many of whom were in cars 
and able to take the elderly voters to the polling booths. Labour lost the by-election and as a 
consequence McHugh decided to join the party, feeling that what ‘the Labour Party does not 
want to do is lose the middle classes, it’s a progressive alliance, it doesn’t want to lost the 
progressive middle classes.’402  
McHugh recalled the atmosphere of his first branch meeting and that there was ‘a strong 
antipathy towards the SDP’ amongst those gathered 
The Branch activists were people who had been confronted with the SDP and the 
possibility of joining and had decided not to do so, so they were pretty hostile. Not 
personally hostile but there was a strong feeling that it was a dead end and it wasn’t the 
way to go. And I think people were much of a muchness, what I’d call Hattersleyite social 
democrats…imbued in a belief in public service, in the power of the state to make things 
better for people, and you might say a sense of a bit of noblesse oblige, a feeling that 
you ought to look after those who were less well off than yourself.403 
For McHugh the Cambridge Labour Party ‘wasn’t badly split’ but he said that people had left, 
recalling a letter from a former member from the right of the party called Paddy Geoghan who 
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denounced the Labour Party as ‘middle-class and homosexual loving.’404 McHugh’s 
recollection of the members who would have classed themselves as either being the more 
progressively liberal members of Cambridge Labour and more traditional working class trade 
unionists was ‘split evenly’ and that the social liberals did not feel alienated as a consequence 
of the SDP defecting. 
Entryism from Militant was also not at the time a concern according to McHugh and aside from 
Cambridge undergraduates selling the Militant newspaper – ‘the Trots weren’t an issue.’405 
McHugh had ‘absolutely no sympathy to the Gang of Four’ particularly as Healey and 
Hattersley remained in the party.406 When asked if the victory of Healey over Benn saved the 
party as per the opinions of those such as Giles Radice, McHugh said that that with the benefit 
of hindsight that ‘Radice is probably right’ although not feeling any particular concern at the 
time.407 
In Oldham West, later to be Oldham West and Royton, which was the seat of Michael Meacher 
and a member of the left-wing Campaign Group of MPs, three activist members recalled that 
unlike Cambridge the issue that concerned them was infiltration of ‘the trots’ rather than the 
SDP having any impact.408 Jeremy Sutcliffe had been councillor for Werneth Ward for three 
years between 1971 and 1974 and latterly CLP Secretary for Oldham West until 1984. John 
Battye was councillor for Failsworth East ward during this period later to be leader of Oldham 
Metropolitan Council. Steve Garry had been an activist since the early 1980s, something that 
all three men continued to be during the time of the interview in November 2015. None of 
those interviewed would necessarily classify themselves from the right of the party, with Battye 
and Garry likely to identify from the soft left, but what was evident was that all three had been 
activists in support of a Bennite candidate in Michael Meacher yet had concerns over Militant 
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infiltration. For Jeremy Sutcliffe, recalling events in 1983 ‘I was CLP Secretary and (it was) 
picked up that there would be a hit by Militant on me in the normally quiet ward of Warneth…I 
survived it but the pressure was there from the Trots but it was never as apparent or 
problematical in Oldham West as the fairly well-organised group that was in Oldham East.’409 
John Battye said that there was a strong sense of the SDP as being ‘turncoats’ and ‘traitors’ 
and that if had not been for Shirley Williams ‘would have collapsed,’410 giving that as a reason 
for the new party not gaining as many members in the North-West. For Battye Healey was a 
popular choice even though as Jeremy Sutcliffe added Oldham West was disposed to Tony 
Benn because of the links through Michael Meacher.411 Battye said that there was a sense of 
injustice at the way Healey had lost the leadership saying people thought ‘we can’t let Denis 
go through that again.’412 Sutcliffe added that there remained antipathy towards the SDP 
because ‘the first past post system showed that to split the left-wing vote was wrong. 413 It was 
fatal.’414 
 Labour Solidarity 
In the immediate aftermath of the Limehouse Declaration of January 1981, the Labour right 
had to set about reorganising those remaining MPs into a cohesive and unified unit in the face 
of a triumphant left which was now seemingly all powerful within the leadership, the NEC and 
the CLPs. The man most closely associated with organisation on the Labour right, William 
Rodgers, had not only left for the SDP but had been one of its founding fathers.  Rodgers had 
been one of if not the organisational driving force behind centre-right groupings since the time 
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of the CDS in the 1960s and the Campaign for Labour Victory and the Manifesto Group of 
MPs in the 1970s.415 
The result was Labour Solidarity which was to be jointly led by Roy Hattersley and Peter Shore. 
Mitchell, who was Treasurer, observed that as they set the group up the purpose of Labour 
Solidarity was two-fold: to defeat Militant and to stop further defections to the SDP.416 Dianne 
Hayter stated that Shore’s involvement was ‘very important’ as the group needed someone 
who was anti-European (and that Shore was ‘having a very difficult time in Tower Hamlets’), 
although it was not the matter of Europe that was the issue but merely survival.417 
When recollecting later in 1981 on those returning defectors at the start of the 1990s, Roy 
Hattersley was to say that he ‘thought less about the remote possibility of a reunion with the 
SDP than about the urgent necessity of hanging on to those moderate Labour supporters who, 
true to the spirit of 1961, were prepared to stay and fight for the party they love.’418 For 
Hattersley his aim was to convince those of his colleagues who were minded to leave for the 
new Social Democrats that ‘the cause of sensible socialism was not lost forever. And it was to 
demonstrate that reason remained, as well as to fight the internal battles against mindless 
extremism.’419 The consequence of this was the founding of Labour Solidarity, a new group of 
MPs, peers and councillors which from the beginning were not wholly recruited from the 
Labour right.  
Jeremy Sutcliffe and John Battye recalled that although Roy Hattersley came and attended a 
social event for Labour Solidarity in Oldham, Michael Meacher as one of the local MPs and 
Campaign member was not critical of its taking place.420 
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What was ultimately crucial was that whilst some of the more Labour right-wing trade union 
leaders such as Frank Chappell of the E.E.P.T.U. (Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications 
and Plumbing Union) may have been initially supportive of the Council of Social Democracy, 
as Lewis Minkin notes it was to be Conservative legislation which confirmed the unions’ 
hostility to the SDP.421 This was borne out particularly when Bill Rodgers trumped even 
Norman Tebbitt with a stern demand for trade union members to “contract in” rather than 
“contract out”. That certainly represented a far cry from the views of the GMWU sponsored 
candidate who had first fought and won Stockton-on-Tees twenty years earlier.422 
Hayter recalled that she had been worried about MPs defecting from the Labour Party but 
never the trade unions disaffiliating and joining the SDP, even if they were sympathetic to the 
ideals. Frank Chappell, as already mentioned, fell into this category but  
having got the Communists out and got us back into the mainstream he wasn’t going 
anywhere, he was a working class lad, actually. And somehow I knew that, I was worried about 
MPs but I never worried about a union. And of course it helped that they did set up the St 
Ermin’s Group straight away that really helped solidify that. I don’t think any of the smaller 
unions thought about it, this was our party.423 
The SDPs failure to cultivate either those MPs who may have been sympathetic to a de-
coupling of the union link (such as Radice) or the unions themselves meant that whilst they 
were able to set themselves as different from Labour as a consequence it further underlined 
that the accusation that they were rootless and elitist. Labour’s attacks on the SDP were to 
provide the right with the opportunity to lead on an issue knowing that it would have the left in 
support. Denis Healey made a speech in West Bromwich (referred to as ‘a vintage burst of 
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abuse’424 by The Guardian’s Michael White) in which he referred to the SDP as ‘a Mark II Tory 
Party after a year of “frantic opportunism”, in which they had adopted then dropped policies 
the moment they looked like they were losing votes.’425 Similarly, Roy Hattersley said that the 
‘decision to support what he called blatantly anti-union legislation revealed the two most “ugly 
aspects” of the SDP – opportunism and conservatism aimed at picking up a few suburban 
votes.’426 
It would be a welcome opportunity for the Labour right to turn their fire for once on their former 
colleagues yet the following month would see the SDP return it with a vengeance. 
Hillhead and its aftermath 
The by-election for Glasgow Hillhead was one which was a genuine three-way marginal: at 
the 1979 General Election, the Conservative candidate Sir Thomas Galbraith held the seat 
with just over two thousand votes with Labour finishing second. Galbraith had recently died 
and had held the seat for thirty-three years and Glasgow Hillhead was the last remaining 
Conservative constituency in the city.427 As Ian Aitken in The Guardian observed the SDP vote 
in Scotland was not as strong as it was in England, even if the Labour vote had dropped to 
forty percent there in late December 1981 from fifty-two earlier that same year.428 It therefore 
took some persuading for Roy Jenkins to stand in the by-election, made all the more difficult 
with the continuing disagreements between the SDP and the Liberals over the selection of 
candidates.429 
Jenkins decision to stand in Hillhead was therefore a considerable gamble: lose and he would 
have suffered two successive defeats and the likely scenario of handing the leadership to 
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David Owen. Jenkins was to be boosted by the defection of two Labour members to the SDP 
who had both been prospective candidates previously at Hillhead, David Welsh who stood in 
February and October 1974 and Vincent Cable who had stood in 1970 and had been a 
councillor on Glasgow Council.430 
Labour’s candidate was a Benn supporter, David Wiseman, who nonetheless said that he 
hoped ‘Mr Benn and Mr Healey would come to support him,’ during the campaign. Wiseman’s 
selection came during what was termed ‘fierce infighting between the pro-Benn Labour Co-
Ordinating Committee and Centrists allied with traditional left-wingers.’431 Despite the turmoil 
in which Wiseman’s selection was made, he nevertheless found himself the initial favourite, 
with the Labour vote holding at around 35 percent, three percent ahead of the Alliance.432 
Jenkins standing as an outsider, a Welshman standing in a Scottish seat, was tipped to play 
against him at the outset. At the same West Bromwich speech in which he attacked the SDP’s 
stance on Conservative anti-union legislation, Denis Healey had mocked Jenkins as ‘”a 
fastidious Rob Roy” who had moved into Hillhead with no policies, a few ancient Scottish 
words “and a truckload of one gallon bottles of an Italian wine called Valpollicella.”’433 
Though they were yet to know it, Glasgow Hillhead would be the highpoint of the SDP’s 
successes prior to the General Election that was to be called a year later. Whilst 
acknowledging that the party had experienced difficulties at Glasgow Hillhead and noting that 
since ‘the euphoria of last summer and autumn, and the near hysterical level of support around 
Crosby, the Alliance has fallen back,’434 Peter Etheridge of the Guardian surmised that Jenkins 
and the SDP could well benefit from ‘a new burst of popularity, making Mitcham look extremely 
winnable and Beaconsfield, where the scope for tactical voting will be far greater than at 
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Hillhead, look at least like an outside chance.’435 Yet as Crewe and King were to observe, 
there were to be seven subsequent by-elections in the 1979 Parliament but out of those none 
were to be won by an Alliance candidate.436 Whilst under the unified banner of the Alliance 
Jenkins, soon to be elected leader of the SDP, found that whilst the SDP or Liberal candidate 
would perform well in by-elections at Gower, Glasgow Queen’s Park, Beaconsfield, Mitcham 
and Morden, Coatbridge and Aidrie and, as will be examined, at Peckham and Birmingham 
Northfield, there were to be no victories. The next success, whilst under the Alliance banner, 
would be won by a Liberal candidate. It had seemed that the momentum had stalled and in 
the face of an increasingly confident Conservative Government burnished by the victory in the 
Falklands and a Labour Party which had managed to hold three of the by-elections listed 
above and win another from the Tories meant that for the Alliance the heady days of the SDP’s 
founding of a year earlier, or indeed the shocks caused at Warrington and Crosby, appeared 
a warm yet distant memory. Yet in the short-term the SDP could afford to take comfort with 
another notable victory and the return of Jenkins to the Commons. Prior to the Local 
Government elections of 6 May, the SDP were keen to play down their chances of success. 
With success at Hillhead and following on from the Local Government elections in May, the 
SDP was to see the number of MPs rise to 30 with the defection of George Cunningham from 
Labour, his move seeing all three MPs for Islington now representing the Social Democrats.437  
Whatever misgivings Jenkins and others within the SDP and Alliance may have had despite 
the by-election victory, the inquest of the result began in bitter earnest within Labour. Peter 
Etheridge was to observe that Labour was in a perilous position, noting that even though it 
was opposing a government that had overseen a rise in unemployment and a drop in living 
standards, Labour’s internal divisions meant that it was unable to capitalise. Furthermore, 
Labour’s vote share had continued to fall as it had down in Warrington, Croydon and Crosby, 
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meaning that ‘even with so much potentially running for it, the Labour Party is winning even 
less support now than when Mrs Thatcher turned them out of office.’438 To finish third in such 
a seat raised the alarming prospect of Labour doing badly in its heartland seats in any 
subsequent general election. Condemnation of the electoral performance came quickly from 
those on the Labour frontbenches, with the outcome of Jenkins’ victory at seeing Healey, 
Shore and Hattersley strongly criticising the left, which in turn was bitterly rejected by some 
on the left at a meeting of the PLP on 1 April 1982.439 
For Labour the defeat at Hillhead was a bitter pill to swallow and particularly so for the right. 
Those who were already facing pressures within their CLPs saw colleagues in the PLP joining 
the SDP as already noted in the Islington constituencies.  
Shortly after Hillhead Labour was to be affected by the decision of Bruce Douglas-Mann to 
step down as a Labour MP for Merton, Mitcham and Morden in order to reclaim the seat for 
the SDP. The decision to do so was not one universally shared by his other former Labour 
colleagues who had been challenged to resign their seats by Michael Foot and others within 
the party, William Rodgers recalled the ‘irritation’ on Douglas-Mann’s insistence on resigning 
his seat.440 The ensuing by-election backfired on Douglas-Mann as he lost to the Conservative 
candidate Angela Rumbold. Whatever satisfaction that Labour may have felt was at the result 
was compounded by them finishing in third place, the fourth time since the SDP was founded 
the year before.  
There would be a further five by-elections from the result at Merton, Mitcham and Morton all 
of which would be held by Labour candidates, on three occasions the SDP candidate finished 
second. The Alliance may not have been achieving the victories that it had been anticipating 
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yet the second placings unnerved Labour. One of these by-elections took place at Southwark 
Peckham. 
The SDP campaign for Southwark Peckham made much of the perceived extreme choice that 
was being presented by Labour with one slogan attesting ‘You’ve got the choice between a 
Bennite candidate and the Alliance.’441 The Labour candidate, Harriet Harman, was from the 
left of the party and was a human rights advocate and member of National Council for Civil 
Liberties. 
The SDP’s candidate at Southwark Peckham was Dick Taverne, the original Democratic 
Labour candidate that had briefly won the seat from Labour back in 1974 after being 
deselected on the matter of Europe. Taverne was again facing off against his former party 
which had by now adopted the policy of withdrawal from the EEC. In the event the result of 
the by-election on 21 August 1982 was to see Taverne lose to Harman by just under four 
thousand votes, a drop of almost six thousand from the result in 1979.442 The SDP’s share of 
the vote (as part of the Alliance) went up by twenty five percent. The surge in favour for the 
Social Democrats was an indicator that they could make inroads into Labour seats and their 
tactics of emphasising a Labour candidate’s left-wing credentials was to become evident at 
the next by-election that was due to take place in neighbouring Bermondsey and Southwark. 
The Labour right also saw the pressures faced by their allies within the union movement at 
the TUC Conference that took place in Brighton on 8 September 1982.  As Labour gathered 
for the Party Conference taking place at Blackpool, whilst the mood was still rancorous on the 
fringes there was an increasing desire for many on the soft left and the right to cooperate. The 
newly-elected Labour General Secretary-designate, Jim Mortimer, had made a speech only a 
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month previously in which he had called on the party to unite in order to take on the 
Conservatives, adding that ‘we are a broad party and I hope that we keep it that way.’443 
On 27 September 1982, Labour Solidarity held a fringe event which included a keynote 
address by the shadow Chancellor Peter Shore. Shore, for a while considered to be of the soft 
left had found himself moving further to the right, his opposition to the European Economic 
Community being one of the few remaining policy areas that could still appeal to the anti-
Markeeters on the left (although as mentioned in Chapter One, opposition to the Common 
Market was not simply a left versus right issue). As Edward Pearce observed by this stage 
‘Shore had left most of his unilateralist credentials behind, and the nationalist chauvinist strain 
was now the dominant one.’444 
Those in attendance at the event included members of the Shadow Cabinet such as Roy 
Hattersley and Roy Mason. Shore used the event to deliver a speech to denounce both Militant 
and the SDP in turn. His attack on Militant was uncompromising: 
They have deceived many who are gullible. Including a number of young people. Most of them 
can be reclaimed, but the old and cynical villains, the godfathers of Militant, are beyond 
redemption.445 
Attacks such as these may have fortified Labour Solidarity members of Parliament that had 
been facing difficulties in their constituency parties and there signs that the right had begun to 
stabilise. Yet for those on the Labour right, 1982 ended with advances and reverses in equal 
measure. Birmingham Northfield had seen a narrow win for one of their candidates and was 
to be Labour’s only by-election gain of the 1979-1983 Parliament. The victory at Hillhead was 
a particularly bitter experience for those on the Labour right now seeing the man many had 
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once seen as a future leader actively campaigning against the party they had chosen to stay 
a part of. Moreover, there was to be another by-election to take place next door to the 
constituency of Southwark Peckham. As will be noted in more detail in the next chapter, the 
outcome of the by-election defeat at Bermondsey was to not only shake Labour so close to 
the General Election and reinvigorate the Alliance parties but raise questions over Labour’s 
commitment to social liberalism, a cause that had been led so prominently and notably by 
Jenkins himself only two decades previously.  
The Forward March of the SDP Halted: Darlington 
The reaction after the defeat at Bermondsey was to again raise pressure on Foot’s leadership 
of the party. Giles Radice noted in his diary that losing was ‘quite an achievement in a 
previously safe Labour seat, mostly due to Michael Foot,’ yet also observed that a story in The 
Times of 25 February in which the Shadow Cabinet were now in favour of a Healey leadership 
with Neil Kinnock as his deputy would ensure that Foot would remain in place.446 The touting 
of Healey and Kinnock as leader and deputy respectively, a so-called ‘balanced ticket’ must 
have appealed in the face of polling that not only had Labour falling considerably behind the 
Conservatives but falling to third place behind the Alliance: a MORI poll that appeared on the 
weekend of 26 February 1982 had the Conservatives on thirty-nine percent, the Alliance on 
thirty-four percent and Labour on twenty-six percent.447 Golding described the situation as 
‘intense. Having seen 11,000 votes disappear, Labour MPs made hurried calculations on the 
backs of envelopes. Few of them would have a job in three or four months’ time, if the 
Bermondsey result was repeated in a general election.’448 
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However, whatever misgivings Healey may have held privately (confiding previously to Radice 
that ‘nobody believes him in as a PM’ and asking ‘can you really see him negotiating with 
Andropov?’)449, he was to maintain his support for Foot and that in any event nothing could be 
done until the outcome of the upcoming by-election at Darlington was known.450 Austin Mitchell 
was to recall that he was preparing ‘to approach the leader and tell him that he had no clothes,’ 
but subsequently ‘screwed up the nerve.’451 For Mitchell there was ‘no magic circle like the 
Tory Party of old when Salisbury, Devonshire and the chief whip might have taken the leader 
by the arm and say “Enough is enough.”’452 For Mitchell such an undertaking could only be 
undertaken within Labour by the trade unions but was in any event unlikely: ‘David Basnett 
agonised, Clive Jenkins was loyal, Moss Evans waffled and Terry Duffy and the EEPTU 
protected Michael.’453When the announcement was made that the union leaders were to meet 
with their shadow cabinet colleagues in the ‘”summit conference of the left”’, it was necessary 
for Basnett to put out a disclaimer stating that ‘”our line is: we are loyal to the leader and will 
continue to be as long as he wants the job. I think we all ought to shut up and get on with 
winning the next election.”’454 
Darlington unlike Bermondsey had not been held with a large Labour majority prior to the 
death of the sitting MP Edward Fletcher, the 1052 vote margin dwarfed by the one defended 
and ultimately overturned by the Alliance. Darlington had also experienced internal 
disagreements between the left and the right just as the local Labour Party had at Glasgow 
Hillhead and elsewhere and in that respect it was no different from such divisions that had 
been highly damaging to the party. 
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In the event, the win at Darlington on Thursday 24 March 1983 was to see Ossie O’Brien 
returned and increasing the Labour majority. O’Brien may have been a left-wing unilateralist 
opposed to the Common Market yet he received support during the campaign from Foot, 
Healey and James Callaghan whilst Tony Benn was asked not to participate.455 What was 
even more satisfying for Labour was that the SDP candidate was pushed into third place. 
Labour voters had remained loyal to the party on this occasion. As The Times’ Julian Haviland 
observed, ‘When the analysis is finished, the Darlington electors are likely to be remembered 
for what they have not done. They allowed Labour to hold the seat, the most marginal it has 
had to defend in this parliament. They did not bury Mr Foot.’456 Within less than a month Labour 
had closed the gap on the Conservatives to four and a half points and had pushed the Alliance 
into third place according to a Gallup of 11 April 1983.457 For Giles Radice, an MP for a 
neighbouring North-Eastern constituency, there was irony in that the result had effect of 
relieving the pressure on the leader. Foot had been ‘saved by the Darlington by-election and 
by northern moderates,’ yet for Radice Foot’s survival meant that ‘the trouble with the revival 
of the old bibliophile is that, though it may please the party activists, it won’t wash with the 
voters. I think that Denis is right and that Maggie may be tempted by a June election if the 
May local elections turn out well.’458 For the Labour right their survival now depended on 
hoping that Darlington was to a pointer to a better than expected defeat.  
Coming third at Darlington, on a record turnout of eighty percent,459 was as Julian Haviland 
noted a ‘humiliation’ for the SDP when contrasted with the result in Bermondsey, adding that 
‘the SDP leaders’ favourite claim – that Labour is in terminal decline and that Social 
Democracy it it’s destined successor – will be heard with less conviction.’460 As stated 
previously, it was another seat that the SDP had not taken from Labour with the Liberal Simon 
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Hughes winning at Bermondsey and Roy Jenkins and Shirley Williams winning in 
constituencies previously held by Conservatives. The result in Darlington meant that any 
hopes that those SDP MPs in the North East may have harboured in holding onto their seats 
was now in some doubt. William Rodgers was to recollect that he ‘was more sensitive to the 
outcome because I had been closely involved in the campaign, which would have a spin-off 
effect in Stockton.’461 For Rodgers an SDP would have been ‘a marvellous springboard for the 
general election’, and may have resulted in the closing of the gap on Labour in the national 
poll ‘leaving us morally in second place behind Mrs Thatcher and the Conservatives. I might 
even have won Stockton.’462 
Writing thirty years after Darlington, Shirley Williams said the result was ‘a huge 
disappointment’ adding that ‘the Liberal Party went into the general election of 1983 with 
considerable scepticism about the political skills of its junior partner,’463 a sentiment similarly 
observed by Roy Jenkins.464 It was this sense of being in the shadow of the more established 
party of the Alliance which was to cause the schism five years later when the discussions of 
merger between the Liberals and the SDP were to see David Owen refusing to participate. 
Owen’s own views on the campaign which were to come later revealed his barely concealed 
contempt for his both his Liberal counterparts and also the current leader of the SDP, referring 
to Tony Scott as ‘”a flabby centrist” (code for Jenkinsite) and “a typical left-wing Liberal 
community politician” (and a unilateralist to boot) who should never have been selected.’465For 
Owen, his opinion on the Darlington result chimed with that of Radice in that it kept Foot in 
place, that a defeat would have seen Healey as leader and a rise in Labour’s popularity. As it 
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was it stopped ‘any possible SDP/Liberal Alliance bandwagon,’466 a sentiment similarly shared 
by Jenkins.467 
The polling of the Conservative candidate Michael Fallon was welcomed by his party despite 
his losing, a result which Owen wrote later should have been ‘properly recorded as a 
Conservative victory’.468 As Ronald Faux of The Times noted it was ‘a considerable 
achievement to come second in a seat Labour had held for twenty years in the north-east, 
where there was severe unemployment.’469 This would be a brief setback for the 
Conservatives as they were to take the seat less than three months later. 
The General Election of 1983 
Following on from the victory at Darlington and the loss at Bermondsey, Foot was under 
mounting pressure concerning whether he was able to lead the party into the expected general 
election. Yet at such a late stage there was no serious danger of Foot being replaced and the 
party went into the election if not completely united then certainly more stable although few 
had any doubts as to the possible outcome: 
It is now clear that Labour faces a disaster of landslide proportions in which many of my friends 
and colleagues will be swept away – Labour may even poll fewer votes than the Alliance. The 
election campaign has exposed our weaknesses – the incredulity of Michael Foot, the 
unpopularity of our defence policy and the distrust which three years of frivolous infighting has 
built up for us.470 
In the end Labour were to be returned with 209 seats, its worst election showing in fifty years. 
The Conservatives victories saw them amass a majority of 144 seats and make inroads in the 
                                                          
466 David Owen, Time to Declare (London: Michael Joseph, 1991), p.568 
467 Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, p.573 
468 Owen, Time to Declare, p.568 
469 Ronald Faux, ‘Alliance bandwagon is derailed’, The Times, 26 March 1983, p.2 
470 Radice, Diaries 1980-2001, p.87 
150 
 
North. Giles Radice noted that ‘we have done badly in Wales and not particularly well in 
Scotland’ adding that the party had been ‘almost wiped out’ in the South, East Anglia and the 
East Midlands.471 The election saw Labour’s vote drop even in their heartlands: Jeremy 
Sutcliffe recalled that 1983 was ‘the only time I was worried’ as the count came in for Michael 
Meacher’s normally safe seat.472 
The only consolation for Labour was that they had managed to avoid the ignominy of finishing 
third behind the Alliance and to see many of the SDP defectors lose their seats. Roy Jenkins 
was to be returned narrowly in Glasgow Hillhead at a rancorous count which saw his majority 
cut to 344 votes. David Owen was re-elected in Plymouth Devonport with a better than 
expected majority than had been anticipated (‘a very good result for “Dr Death”’, noted 
Radice)473. The defeat of Shirley Williams and William Rodgers was to be symptomatic of the 
defeat that the SDP was to endure.  
As could be expected, when the results began to come in hurried inquests began in earnest. 
When asked for his opinion as to what he thought of Ken Livingstone’s call for extra-
parliamentary activism as a consequence of the defeat, Healey’s response was 
characteristically forthright: ‘Claptrap.’474 In response, Livingstone said that Labour had lost as 
a consequence of not having fought on a more radical manifesto and that the spending 
requirements as set out by Peter Shore would have necessitated higher public debt.  
Outside the United Kingdom, Labour’s performance was to cause comment in the Soviet 
Union. On the morning after the General Election, Soviet news agency Tass accused the 
Labour right for the defeat saying ‘Even at the height of the election campaign a number of 
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(Labour) right-wing figures considered it possible to come out against some important 
provisions of the manifesto agreed and published by the party.’475 
The defeat of 1983 was cataclysmic for Labour, narrowly avoiding dropping into third place 
and a Conservative Government returned with a transformative majority. Whilst there were 
some recriminations towards Foot from some quarters for the defeat, they were mainly levelled 
at Tony Benn who, despite having lost his seat, was keen to state that the result still showed 
a strong support for the socialism that he had been espousing. Yet it was a clearly shaken 
Benn who was leaving the Commons (albeit temporarily), only two years after almost reaching 
the zenith of his career in the Labour party. 
As humiliating as the defeat in 1983 was for Labour, it had managed to remain the official 
opposition party in British politics albeit only just in terms of the national vote and the vagaries 
of the electoral system. Two years earlier it had been in an existential battle for survival and 
the Social Democrats were experiencing a meteoric rise in the polls. Yet the popularity in the 
opinion polls was to only translate so far in terms of electoral success and only two of the 
original Gang of Four were returned to Parliament at the head of a severely reduced group of 
SDP MPs, one that was now outnumbered by its Liberal partners in the Alliance. The SDP 
advance had been blunted by a combination of economic recovery, residual loyalty to the party 
that they had left and the Falklands War, seen by some as much a saviour to the electoral 
fortunes of Labour as it had been for Margaret Thatcher.476 
Austin Mitchell thought that the effect of the SDP had damaged Labour severely and ‘Mrs 
Thatcher’s reign would have been shorter and less damaging had the SDP not defected, so 
their net achievement was negative and it seems to me they’re not entitled to the praise they 
give themselves. They screwed up the Labour Party.’477 
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Dianne Hayter felt that there was no need for the SDP in order for Labour ‘as a necessary 
condition but I did think we had to get rid of the left, that was non-negotiable they were not 
part of the family.’478 Hayter then added that if it had been Healey then the result may have 
been different: 
Maybe we needed a Mrs Thatcher, maybe you know we need to get thrashed at an 
election before realising what we had to do. It was certainly getting thrashed at an 
election that persuaded Neil we had to go further, so it may have been that more than 
the originally twelve then later other MPs leaving that did it. The electorate probably did 
it for us.479 
Labour had been beaten badly and for Michael Foot a painful yet for him necessary 
undertaking as leader was coming to a close. That his party had narrowly avoided being 
overtaken by an alliance of former MPs who three years earlier had shared the same benches 
as him in the Commons was a source of great pain. Whilst his election as leader was to act 
as the trigger for the formation of the SDP to take place, his tenure had also seen further steps 
in the moves against the Militant Tendency, another issue that had caused concern not just 
for the Labour right but for the soft left also, small steps though they may have been for those 
on the right of the party. This had been significant in that it marked a leader from the left 
signalling that accommodation of Militant was no longer to be tolerated, a decision that was to 
be taken further by Foot’s successor. Yet for now it was the climax to Foot’s time as leadership 
and as devastating as the result had been for Labour it was still in existence. That achievement 
was as much Foot’s as it was any one on the soft left or right of the party. 
At the start of 1981 no one on the Labour right genuinely felt that matters were going to 
improve in the immediate future, if at all. Yet by the time of the General Election in 1983, the 
Labour right had managed to stabilise themselves and mount what was at first a rear-guard 
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action and later go on the offensive against both the far left and the SDP. The effect of the 
defections had been demoralising yet the election of Denis Healey had also been galvanising. 
When Healey had dismissively spoken to Mike Hancock that he ‘had nowhere else to go’, the 
latter was to prove him wrong. Yet for those who remained they genuinely did have nowhere 
else to go. Labour was their party, in the case of Giles Radice an ideological commitment 
which had become an emotional one as well. Roy Hattersley recalled that at the time of the 
Deputy Leadership election he was determined that he would not leave either: 
I was forty-six. I had been a Cabinet minister for almost four years and I was a senior 
member of the Opposition front bench. My seat was safe and I should have been full of 
hope for the future. But I had only one clear idea about what lay ahead. If the ship sank, 
I would go down with it.480 
This was the success of the Labour right and the ultimate failure of the Social Democrats. 
There still remained the similarities in support for Common Market membership, of the nuclear 
deterrence yet the differences continued to be whether Labour was the party to provide these 
and the kind of redistributionist policies that had been associated with the revisionist tradition. 
The SDP’s attempt to first curry favour with the trade unions only to later turn against them 
and support the Employment Law legislation of Norman Tebbitt ensured that those on the 
Labour right could continue to rely on the support of sympathetic trade union leaders. There 
would be a new generation of MPs due to commence their careers in Parliament and many of 
them would soon come to be identified as rising stars of the right such as Tony Blair and 
Gordon Brown.  
For the Labour right, the defeat had resulted in a number of their MPs out of Parliament but 
such losses were salved by the defeat of Benn and some of his supporters within the PLP. It 
was to be the start of the right’s protracted return to increasing their influence within the 
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Parliamentary Party. Yet it would not be until another eight years and two more election 
defeats until an MP from the right would be elected leader. Until then the balance of power 
with regards to the leadership remained with the soft left.  
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Chapter Four 
Labour and the Liberal Tradition in the 1980s 
 
This chapter analyses Labour’s social liberalism in the 1980s through case studies of the 
pursuit of greater rights for gay and lesbian people and the issue of video censorship.   Both 
embodied  the gradualist, reforming aspects of Labour’s social policies during a decade of 
opposition to the economic excess and moral Puritanism were the dominant forces of the 
governing Conservative Party.  They also demonstrate the way in which Crosland's anti-
Puritanism (as expressed in The Future of Socialism) continued as a key theme. The purpose 
is to show that, in spite of pressure to buckle and tack away from nostrums that were seemingly 
unpopular from a political perspective, Labour in the 1980s was able to demonstrate a strong 
sense of social liberalism that had long existed within the wider movement. It covers a time in 
which the defence and improvement of the Lesbian and Gay community could be used as a 
political stick with which to beat Labour with increasing alacrity and venom. It is not an 
uncritical analysis and, as will become evident, it does highlight how Labour was prone to 
stumbling instead of being more assured in the steps it wished to take in pursuit of a more 
socially liberal country. Such missteps were taken as internal battles raged within the party or 
as a result of poor decision making. In spite of this, during one of its darkest periods of its 
history Labour was able to show that it was at times able to project a pronounced commitment 
to minority rights and matters of personal freedom and liberty. 
 Yet it also highlights how a party which in the 1950s and 60s had facilitated a relaxation of 
censorship laws in Britain was to participate in the great ‘Video Nasties’ furore and did little in 
the way of providing constructive criticism of the legislation when it was presented. It presents 
the classic dilemma faced by the Labour Party: how can it appeal to both the perceived liberal-
minded middle classes and the more socially conservative working class which it was set up 
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to serve? Despite the upheaval that was taking place within the Labour Party it was to 
demonstrate that in the area of social liberalism it could still be a reforming force. Social 
liberalism was not the preserve of either the metropolitan Social Democrats or the hard-line 
‘Looney Left’ but a popular cause within the party as a whole. Labour was to maintain a 
commitment to protection and promotion of the rights of minorities and communities at a time 
when not only such sentiments were not in vogue but viewed with downright hostility, 
particularly in the eyes of the tabloid newspapers. In spite of the divisions and the battles that 
the party was enduring and then in the process of repairing, Labour had common cause in the 
pursuit of equality and in this was continuing the tradition of social liberalism that had been 
prevalent since its inception. 
With the advent of the Thatcher Government came a statement of intent to radically change 
the face of Britain, economically and socially. In spite of being someone who had voted for the 
decriminalisation of homosexuality and abortion, Thatcher's Government of the 1980s was to 
use private members bills in much the same way as the Labour Government did in the 1960s 
to put in place socially conservative legislation. Rejection of the permissive society and the 
adoption of more austere ‘Victorian values’ were an essential element of the New Right’s 
politics and it was to find backing and succour amongst the right-wing print media and also 
the long-standing moral watchdog Mary Whitehouse. The advent of the 1980s was to see a 
concerted effort in unleashing market liberalism whilst simultaneously reducing the social 
liberalism that had been so transformative over the previous two decades. It is of course one 
of the ironies of modern conservatism that the economic libertarianism being espoused by the 
Thatcher Government – no state involvement in economic affairs and the reduction of state 
intervention in industry – was accompanied by interference in the affairs of its citizens either 
by direct legislation or the absence of it in order to benefit those who needed it the most.  
As already noted in Chapter One, Labour’s socially liberal credentials were burnished in the 
1960s administration of Harold Wilson and were closely associated with Roy Jenkins. The 
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reforms which were ushered in during Jenkins’ tenure such as the 1967 Sexual Offences Act 
were to see him be retrospectively evaluated by ‘the most influential Home Secretary of the 
Twentieth Century.’481 Jenkins had made the case for the liberalisation of many of the acts 
which were to come to pass in the mid-1960s a decade earlier as had Anthony Crosland in 
his book ‘The Future of Socialism.’482’483 Both Jenkins and Crosland’s social liberalism were 
to have influence on a later generation of Labour politicians from across its spectrum, including 
the future leader of the Greater London Council, Ken Livingstone.484 Frank Dobson contended 
that whilst it would be churlish to take too much away from Jenkins, the groundwork had also 
been put in by others such as Barbara Castle and Lena Jeger and that nothing would have 
happened without the consent of Harold Wilson. With respect to Dobson, the claim to the 
ownership of the socially liberal tradition of the Labour Party can be considered to be a shared 
one, although Dobson’s frustration was aimed mainly at what he saw as ‘partly a product of 
the infantilism of a great deal of political commentary which has got to attribute each topic to 
a particular individual whereas very little in politics or life is like that.’485 The roads taken in the 
1950s by Jenkins, Crosland, Jeger, Abse et al led to their destination in the 1960s. It was a 
natural culmination of individual endeavours and an over-arching achievement that was only 
possible due to the time allowed by Wilson’s Government, even if this was not necessarily the 
sought for achievement of some of the party leadership such as George Brown486 and James 
Callaghan487, with even David Owen,488 Leo Abse489490 and Jenkins himself viewing being gay 
as an affliction, with the latter saying it was ‘a very real disability for those who suffer it.’491 In 
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spite of this ‘benevolent condescension’492 what had happened was that matters such as 
homosexuality, if not completely accepted, were being brought out of the dark. For the Daily 
Mirror, the move put Britain ‘in step with the liberal approach adopted by the Dutch fifty-six 
year ago.’493 To quote Brooke again, ‘it was Parliament that changed the framework of sexual 
life in Britain,’ and it was a Labour Government which facilitated it, even if in the face of 
suspicion from its own supporters, with the Conservative MP Sir Cyril Osborne saying that 
Labour would suffer for putting ‘buggery in front of steel nationalisation.’ 494495496 Whilst Pugh 
further contends that Labour as a party ‘was far from happy about the “permissive society”’497 
74% of its MPs had voted for the legislation.498  
The Sexual Discrimination Act of 1975 was to see the establishment of the Equal Opportunities 
Commission to assist with the outlawing of discrimination on the grounds of gender or marital 
status. However, whilst decriminalisation had helped to remove the aberration that 
homosexuals were criminals, the age of consent for gay men was older than it was for 
heterosexuals. The slow pace of change to full equality had led to the formation of the Gay 
Liberation Front in 1970, which in 1975 tried to exert pressure on Parliament through the 
Campaign for Homosexual Reform to enact the equalisation of the age of consent (and to 
enact decriminalisation in Northern Ireland and Scotland where homosexuality was still 
illegal)499. This resulted in the formation of the Gay Labour Caucus in the same year, later to 
become the Labour Campaign for Lesbian and Gay Rights.500 If Britain was changing 
tentatively in some respects and faster in others, this was reflected in the Labour Party. As 
Hattersley attested, ‘if the Wilson Government had done nothing else, its existence would have 
                                                          
492 Stephen Brooke, Sexual Politics, p.180 
493 Brian McConell, ‘A Charter for the Outsiders’, Daily Mirror, 5 July 1967, p.7 
494 Dominic Sandbrook, White Heat, p.341 
495 Stephen Brooke, Sexual Politics, p.183 
496 ’57 votes carry the Sex Bill,’ Daily Express, 12 February 1966, p.5 
497 Martin Pugh, Speak for Britain, p.336 
498 Stephen Brooke, Sexual Politics, p.181 
499 ‘Gay Libs seek law reform’, The Guardian, 3 July 1975, p.6 
500 LGBT Labour – History, http://www.lgbtlabour.org.uk/history, [accessed 20th November 2016] 
159 
 
been justified by the opportunity it provided for Parliament to create a more enlightened 
society.’501  
It was this society which was now being challenged by the Conservative Government over a 
decade later and it was being indirectly aided by a bitterly divided Labour Party. The eventual 
return of the Labour Party as an effective opposition and ultimately as a viable alternative 
Government was to be a painful and protracted process. Whilst the loss of Social Democrats 
was to see Labour losing members known for their socially liberal reforming instincts, the 
commitment of the party to pursuing an agenda of equality was not weakened even though 
the SDP was now led by the man most commonly associated with the great reforms of the 
1960s in Jenkins. Austin Mitchell observed that the loss of the Social Democrats did not affect 
the social liberal sentiment of the Labour Party at all and that the only thing that it helped to 
emphasise for him was the need to defeat the more militant Left and govern from the centre.  
Paradoxically, for a party which included a large number of self-identified social liberals, those 
voters who identified with the Social Democrats were not necessarily inclined to be socially 
liberal, Ivor Crewe and Anthony King noting that on capital punishment and censorship such 
supporters were sometimes closer to the Conservatives, so whilst the SDP may have wished 
to govern from the ‘radical centre’, this was not a position that some of their voters naturally 
assumed.502For their part, the Social Democrats had suggested in the first draft of their 
constitution that there would be ‘concern for the individual regardless of gender, race, colour, 
sexual orientation or religion’ (italics are Crewe and King’s) with ‘sexual orientation’ removed 
by a vote of 147-116 for fear of tabloid newspaper reaction.503 
The pursuit of racial and sexual equality in the 1980s, which Labour had legislated to improve 
in the previous two decades was continued with added zeal in 1983 under Michael Foot and 
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again in 1987 under Neil Kinnock, there was specific commitment to improving gender and 
racial equality, gay rights and a more humane approach to immigration control. In March 1982 
the NEC published ‘The Rights of Gay Men and Women’ which raised the issue of 
discrimination in employment and, as Purton observed, whilst it was only a discussion paper 
received the immediate opprobrium of the pro-Conservative press (and was ultimately not to 
be adopted as official policy when put forward to the 1982 Conference).504505 This commitment 
was emphasised in the collection of essays from members of the shadow cabinet, Renewal: 
Labour’s Britain in the 1980s, with the following from Peter Archer who saw such support as 
intrinsic to Labour’s values: ‘The socialist is descended from a long line who claimed the right 
to be different.’506 
However, despite such fulsome declarations, the truth was that at times Labour could find 
itself paralysed by events. This was evident with the confusion over supporting the candidacy 
of Peter Tatchell in the Bermondsey by-election.  
The selection of Tatchell on 7 November 1981 had been a bone of contention and the local 
party had chosen to select him ahead of the preferred right-wing candidate supported by the 
current MP Robert Mellish. Mellish had decided to retire at the end of the 1979 Parliament but 
the selection of Tatchell prompted Mellish to threaten to resign his seat prematurely. For John 
Golding, Mellish’s motives were clear: despite being as ‘Chief Whip, Mellish had been very 
tolerant of opinion and not very ideological at all’, Mellish’s decision stemmed from Tatchell’s 
‘party to excluding some old-timers from standing as councillors again.’ For Mellish this was 
not fair payment for loyalty both to him and Labour and as a consequence he set about 
undermining Tatchell’s candidacy.507  Golding noted that Mellish ‘knew that at a general 
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election Tatchell would be swept into the House of Commons. A by-election, however, would 
not be so certain,’ adding that ‘Foot knew, too, that the Social Democrats could win well in 
Bermondsey.’508  
Mellish provided information showing that Tatchell had provided an article for the left-wing 
newspaper London Labour Briefing in which he appeared to countenance extra-parliamentary 
activism, including one accusatory phrase which must have particularly rankled with Foot: ‘we 
now seem stuck in a rut of legalism and obsessive parliamentarianism.’509In the Commons on 
3 December 1981, the former Labour junior minister, now SDP MP, James Wellbeloved, 
raised the article in London Labour Briefing prompting Foot to declare that was not an 
endorsed member of the party ‘and as far as I’m concerned never will be.’510Tony Benn stated 
in his diaries that he believed Foot had mistaken Tatchell for Tariq Ali and that ‘the witch hunt 
has begun.’511Foot was compelled to agree with Eric Heffer’s suggestion that the candidacy 
be discussed at the next NEC meeting yet stated that he only objected as ‘parliamentary 
democracy is at stake and if I had said nothing the SDP would have made the 
running,’512underling Golding’s point that there was genuine concern at the possibility of them 
winning the seat. 
As a consequence, Tatchell’s case was to be referred and NEC and on 7 December 1981 the 
meeting of the Organisation Committee met to discuss Tatchell’s candidacy which was 
eventually rejected by twelve votes to seven. Golding recalled that the discussion regarding 
the case was ‘chaotic’ adding that ‘the hard left were bitter and the soft left supporters of Foot 
were confused. Some thought Foot had made a mistake, but Kinnock to his credit argued that 
we were really deciding the direction of the Labour Party’513 That Kinnock supported Foot was 
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no surprise but in doing so placed him and others on the soft left of the party in a loose alliance 
with the right. Heffer had said that he regretted that the response that Foot had made to ‘an 
SDP traitor’ had done great harm to the party.514 Foot’s decision also prompted Frank Allaun 
to say ‘I am a Foot man and I don’t want to humiliate you, Michael, but you have made the 
most serious mistake of your life, and your only alternative now is to get Bob Mellish to stay 
on. I believe Tatchell’s candidacy is worthy of support.’515Allaun had expressed his admiration 
for Tatchell over his anti-war stance during the Vietnam conflict and also his campaigning for 
homosexual rights. That Tatchell himself was gay was brought up as another issue for not 
selecting Tatchell but neither Golding nor Benn noted who this was in their accounts.’516 
Over a week later the NEC on 16 December and voted narrowly fifteen votes to fourteen to 
again disallow Tatchell’s candidacy. Yet as a result of Robert Mellish supporting former Labour 
councillors who had been barred from standing again running as independents, this played 
into the hands of Benn who had continued to support Tatchell’s candidacy. The issue would 
not settle and it would result in further meetings at the PLP and the NEC agreeing on 10 
January 1983 to support the Bermondsey CLPs reselection of Tatchell. The outcome was 
welcomed by Benn particularly as he saw John Golding as the only person opposing the 
decision, ‘a straw in the wind that may be the end of that sort of right wing domination.’517Foot’s 
reasoning for backing Tatchell this time was that the latter had assured the former of his 
allegiance to parliamentary democracy and in a letter to Tatchell had added that ‘If an election 
had been held at that time, I was sure that such an article could have been used to damage 
the party as a whole throughout the country.’ 518 For John Golding, his concerns that Tatchell 
would not be able to win the seat due to being ‘a known homosexual as well as a wild leftie’519 
was based on recent experience. Saying that he ‘still bore the scars of the backlash’ as a 
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result of his support of a Government grant for the ‘Gay Switchboard’ in Luton during his time 
in the Department of Employment, he had noted hostility to the ‘tolerant attitude of Ken 
Livingstone at the GLC.’520 Admitting that he had employed his ‘usual brutal lack of sensitivity’ 
he had tried to convince the NEC that ‘there would be no way that the bigoted cockneys of 
Bermondsey would vote for Tatchell.’521Whilst this was may have been a swingeing 
generalisation, the campaign itself when it unfolded was to demonstrate how homophobic 
tactics were to be employed by former members of the Bermondsey Labour Party.  
The horrific and unedifying campaigning that took place on the part of an independent 
candidate, John O’Grady, was made all the more embarrassing in that he was a former Labour 
Party Council Leader who had received support from the seat’s previous MP, Robert Mellish. 
Tatchell’s (and Labour’s) campaign was further undermined by the references to his 
campaigning for gay rights and the use of SDP-Liberal Alliance literature which referenced 
their candidate, Simon Hughes, as ‘the straight choice.’522Outright homophobia was included 
in election pamphlets distributed throughout the constituency, including one which asked 
‘Which Queen would you vote for?’523 
Whilst Labour was in the midst of the darkest moments of the aftermath of the SDP split and 
the internal battle for supremacy between the left and right, what was striking was the 
confusion and reservation for the Labour leadership to step in and defend their candidate. 
Foot had initially denounced the candidature of Tatchell but subsequently offered lukewarm 
endorsement. This was mainly due to Foot’s anathema to extra-parliamentary campaigning 
which as noted previously had been championed in an article in London Labour Briefing (and 
later reprinted in the Guardian)’.524 When asked about this twenty years later by Roy 
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Hattersley, Foot was to remark that: ‘it had been put to me that he was the sort of person who 
opposes Parliament itself. And I had my duties to the party which I wanted to keep in one 
piece. A few days later he came to see me and it became clear that he had a real concern for 
the party as well as himself.’525Tatchell himself was to publicly disavow any links to radical 
leftism such as espoused by Tariq Ali, asserting that his ‘source of political inspiration is Alfred 
Salter and George Lansbury.’526 
Although this may be viewed through the prism of the internal battles against Militant (of which 
Tatchell, whilst not a member, was viewed as from the radical left527), the reluctance of the 
party leadership for Tatchell’s sexuality to be a matter of public knowledge underlined the 
gradualist approach that the party still had towards the matter of gay rights. Tatchell was to 
tell Hattersley that during the campaign he ‘clearly believed that the Labour high-command 
expected that, when asked if he was gay, he should categorically refuse to discuss the 
subject.’528 This was perhaps in reaction to what James Curran referred to as the tabloid press’ 
attempt to ‘discredit him by whipping up atavistic prejudices against him as a deviant.’529 As  
Tatchell had yet to come out publicly as homosexual, the tabloid press resorted to what Turner 
notes was ‘innuendo to avoid libel actions, while leaving readers in no doubt about their 
subtext.’530 As Brooke observed, Tatchell himself made a point of trying to separate his own 
sexuality from his support for gay rights and in doing so earned criticism from rights activists 
to go along with the commentary of the tabloids.531Brooke further highlights the cruel irony that 
whilst Tatchell tried to emphasise the local nature of the election his sexuality was raised by 
others when he tried to keep the matter private and how post-election Labour were to make a 
more avowed commitment to gay rights.532 
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Foot’s performance at this by-election showed that he was, for all of his undoubted 
compassion, unsuited for a role that required a great deal of nuance and subtlety. Whilst he 
never once condemned or commented on the matter of Tatchell’s sexuality, his handling of 
the affair allowed it to fester and in the face of a relentlessly hostile campaign (not least on the 
part of the Liberals), Labour and Tatchell were to lose the Bermondsey by-election on 24h 
February 1983 by 10,000 votes. Tatchell did not return to fight the regain the seat at the 
General Election later that year. 
Labour’s experience at Bermondsey, with a former Labour councillor attacking the candidate’s 
sexuality, was chastening and perhaps sadly not surprising. Attitudes in Britain were still 
entrenched enough to view homosexuality as still something of an aberration and within 
Labour this too was evident. Even the man who had championed the decriminalisation of 
homosexuality, Leo Abse, could write less than twenty years after his bill had been passed 
that as a result of an increase in one parent families, ‘homosexuality and bisexuality is likely 
to increase as more boys are brought up with no male roles in which to identify.’533 Abse further 
suggested that ‘the youngster could lose his way and grow up uncertain in his identity,’ as a 
consequence of ‘the triumphant liberation of women from their domestic thraldom’ causing the 
roles of parents to become ‘smudged.’534  
Whilst Tatchell’s sexuality may have been considered a reason for voters to choose an 
alternative candidate, this did not deter Labour from making a clear commitment to sexual 
equality in their manifesto: ‘We are concerned that homosexuals are unfairly treated. We will 
take steps to ensure that they are not unfairly discriminated against.’535This was the first time 
that such a commitment had been specifically made in relation to the gay and lesbian 
community, something which was absent from the manifesto of the SDP-Liberal Alliance, the 
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former party now led by the former Labour Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins. Indeed, a former 
Labour turned SDP MP James Wellbeloved was to describe the Labour-run Greater London 
Council’s budgetary spending as ‘lunatic antics…its desire to dish out lavish subsidies to 
organisations ranging from gay rights to supporters of the IRA bombers.’536Such sentiments 
and dubious couplings were to be an indicator of how matters would be played out in the rest 
of the Eighties.  
Neil Kinnock became Labour leader after the election defeat in 1983 and in conjunction with 
his new Deputy Roy Hattersley attempted to extricate Labour from the debacle of landslide 
which had been wrought by the Conservatives. Over the next four years, Kinnock would set 
about leading the efforts of re-establishing opposition the increasingly strident Thatcher 
administration, now unbound and buttressed by a large majority. Whilst Kinnock’s energies 
would be used to tackle the matter of Militant and the consequences of the Miner’s Strike, 
Kinnock’s enthusiasm was at times mercilessly mocked by unsympathetic newspaper 
columnists, with the satirical programme ‘Spitting Image’ suggesting that the primary reason 
for commitment to apparently niche subjects was as a means of winning votes. Kinnock’s 
attitude to gay rights has been questioned due to a comment made after the Bermondsey by-
election in which he was asked if the treatment of Peter Tatchell had amounted to a witch-
hunt, to which the ill-chosen reply was ‘I’m not in favour of witch hunts, but I do not mistake 
bloody witches for fairies!’537538Ill-judged and crass that the comment was, Kinnock was in time 
to disprove that he was not sympathetic to the cause of gay rights. 
As had been the case of his predecessors, Kinnock was forced to struggle to provide 
leadership to a party in need of a unified identity, one which was to appeal to a sceptical voting 
public. Between 1983 and 1987, Kinnock under Labour contended with attacks both inside 
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Westminster and in the press that it was overly concerned with minority issues. On 9 
December 1983, Jo Richardson, a supporter of Tony Benn, presented a Sex Equality Bill 
which attempted to outlaw discrimination in the workplace on the basis of sexuality.539The bill 
was defeated 198 votes to 119, with Kinnock leading his party alongside supporters ranging 
across the Labour Party from new MPs such as Tony Blair and Jeremy Corbyn, to veterans 
like Denis Healey and Michael Foot.540 Some of the attitudes expressed showed how difficult 
it would have been to get it passed, with the Conservative MP Ivan Lawrence declaring: 
‘Clauses 3 and 92 on homosexuality will incur the fury of many of our constituents who do not 
want their children to be taught by people who parade their homosexuality and think that it is 
a matter for exhibition and pride. How many Members want their children to be taught by a 
member of the Paedophile Information Exchange?’541 
In spite of these attacks, it did not prevent Labour MPs from defending the efforts of councils 
and in turn gay rights. During a debate on 5 December 1986, Tony Banks, MP for Newnham 
North-West asked ‘why when a local council tried to do something about discrimination against 
gay and lesbians was there an enormous reaction from Conservative MPs?’542 This prompted 
the Shadow Local Government spokesman, Jack Straw to suggest that whilst the 
Conservative Party was attacking those councils who were helping to promote equality, some 
of its members were themselves gay and that ‘they deserve the same tolerance as Labour 
councillors trying to help gay and lesbian people,’ a suggestion which provoked a furious 
response from the Government benches.543Straw’s reaction was a contrast to the reference 
made by Ken Livingstone when Straw chaired the Further and Higher Education Committee 
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of the GLC and stopped the funding of a social worker course on issues faced by gay people, 
a course condemned by Conservative members as ‘homosexuality on the rates.’544 
At the 1987 General Election, Labour again gave a commitment to improving gay rights to be 
made in Labour’s manifesto, albeit in general and somewhat diffident terms to ‘take steps to 
ensure that homosexuals are not  discriminated against.’545 In some way it was still a bold 
move and, as Purton noted, was as a consequence of the 1985 and 1986 Conferences which 
had supported the commitment to equality in the manifesto. This was in no small part due to 
the support given by Chris Smith, the first openly gay MP who had been elected in 1983 for 
the seat of Islington South and Finsbury and had come out in 1984. For Smith, gay and lesbian 
rights were a natural cause for Labour, declaring ‘some people might regard it as marginal to 
our concerns as a movement. It is not. It is central to our socialism. It is central because we 
believe in equality – the equal right of everyone to live their life.’546Smith’s re-election in 1987 
may have been a sign of a more tolerant approach by electors towards homosexuality but 
such sentiments were not necessarily held by the wider electorate and as Gay Times were to 
note twenty years later, ‘it would be another 13 years and three general elections before 
another openly gay person was elected.’547 
The decision to fight for gay rights may have been a cause for Labour losing votes and at one 
point Kinnock did ascribe it as a partial reason for the defeat in 1987. Pursuing equal rights for 
gay people may be seen as a contributing factor when the British Social Attitudes Survey in 
1983 showed 67% of respondents identifying as Labour voters viewed homosexuality as 
‘always or mostly wrong.’548 Whilst this single issue can hardly account for a second landslide 
defeat in 1987, by 1987 this figure had risen to 74%, so it was, to view it from a coldly political 
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perspective a risk to continue supporting such a measure.549This was also during a time when 
the fear surrounding the AIDS/HIV epidemic was reaching a crescendo and the association of 
the disease with the gay community only served to highlight the heightened suspicion that was 
levelled towards it.550 This was also coupled to the sense that gay men were receiving 
preferential treatment by local councils, including the hostility engendered in the tabloid press 
to the decision of Lambeth Council to designate homeless people with AIDS as a priority need 
for housing.551 
It may well be that Labour’s defeats in the 1980s were not just as a result of the continuing 
improving economic climate and the continued stigmatisation of Labour by the media. Add to 
this that the embers from the battles with Militant and the Miners' Strike continued to glow and 
memories of the Winter of Discontent still relatively recent, it still assigned to Labour a toxicity 
which still hung heavy, despite Kinnock’s arduous attempts to pull the party towards 
electability. Labour’s core constituency – white, working class, socially conservative voters - 
had been attracted to the Tory message in the late 1970s, particularly in Essex and South 
East, with voters turned off by talk of more nationalisation and policies such as the right to buy 
finding more favour. Whilst the Conservative message was less appealing in urban areas of 
London and in the Northern constituencies that contained Labour’s remaining strongholds, the 
pursuit of attainment and materialism was enormously popular. As Eric Shaw also noted, the 
Conservatives and their allies in Fleet Street had been successfully able to tar Labour with the 
‘loony left’ epithet providing an ‘invitation to voters to define themselves as white and 
respectable rather than as working class, to identify with the Conservatives as the party of 
whites and the upwardly mobile – and to reject Labour as the party of minorities and the 
failures.’552 The particular bête noir for both the Conservatives and their supporters in Fleet 
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Street was Ken Livingstone and the Greater London Council. Livingstone had pushed 
successfully since the mid-1970s to provide financial backing for support groups for gay 
people, sometimes in the teeth of fellow Labour councillor objections.553 Livingstone’s support 
in particular for the Gay Teenage Group which looked into the difficulties faced by gay people 
under the age of twenty-one (still the legal age of male gay consent at the time). As Livingstone 
noted this particular policy created ‘hysteria’ and led to furious denunciation from Conservative 
MPs and an attempted investigation into his private life by newspapers such as the Sun.554 
The critics of such policies viewed them as either at best misguided and at worst as simply 
cynical politics, with money spent on such causes in order to recruit a sizeable army of 
politically and racially - motivated mercenaries, hostile to the State that supports them.’555 
Livingstone had only himself to blame, according to the Times, having spent £5 million on 
areas such as the Gay Arts Sub Group Festival Babies against the Bomb, Lesbian Line 
Campaign against Racist Laws and the Gay London Police Monitoring Group556, which may 
have been noble in their intent but added to the perception that Labour councils were intent 
on spending local taxation on what were deemed niche areas. Polly Toynbee contended that 
the cause of gay and lesbian equality as put forward by Livingstone was actually counter-
productive, with gay people subsidised ‘on the rates particularly offensive. It gave the hounds 
of the moral right all the meat they needed for a successful red-blooded backlash.’557558This 
strong criticism whilst publicly rejected came to be reflected in Labour Party circles, as Brooke 
notes that following the Greenwich by-election (which Labour were to lose to the SDP), Patricia 
Hewitt was to comment that the ‘gays and lesbians issue is costing us dear.’559 This was 
perhaps borne out by voters such as Mrs Gwendoline Naden who said she had always voted 
Labour but was likely not to vote at all as ‘all these lesbians, gays, if that’s the way then fair 
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enough but we shouldn’t’ have to pay for it.’560It was perhaps with these sentiments in mind 
that even Frances Morrell, a noted Benn supporter and the leader of the Labour Independent 
Local Education Authority (ILEA) to call for a scaling back of the presentation of the gay and 
lesbian issue as ‘it makes Labour unpopular, and it causes us to lose elections,’ consequently 
‘damaging the interests of interest groups.’561 
Labour’s eventually more avowed commitment to gay rights was exemplified by the reaction 
of the party to the introduction of a piece of legislation which was to become synonymous with 
the battles faced by gay rights movements in the 1980s. In her speech to the Conservative 
Party Conference on 9 October 1987, Margaret Thatcher took aim at Labour and in particular 
to the councils which until a year previously had been part of the GLC saying ‘Children who 
need to be taught to respect traditional moral values are being taught that they have an 
inalienable right to be gay.’562 
Here was the throwing down of a moral gauntlet – traditional values as proffered by Thatcher 
did not encompass the allowance of a person’s sexuality to be discussed in Britain’s schools. 
From being a supporter of the Abse Bill in the 1960s, Thatcher was about to implement the 
most retrograde legislation in relation to gay rights in twenty years. 
The Section 28 amendment to the Local Government Act 1988 stipulated that local authorities 
could not ‘intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with the intention of 
promoting homosexuality’ nor ‘promote the teaching in any maintained school of the 
acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship.’563 Whilst Richard Viner was 
to later note that the measure was vague, this did not detract from the intent of the legislation 
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to specifically discriminate against gay people. If it was an obscure backwater codicil of a wider 
piece of legislation, why did it provoke the backlash which it did? Whilst such measures could 
be seen ‘as part of the “loony left” council issue,’ the reaction to it transcended that this was 
in reaction to the actions of certain Labour-controlled councils. 564 It was due to the 
discriminatory basis of the measure, ‘a symbol of the prejudice of the present parliament,’565 
and whilst it was ‘legal gobblygook’ its intent was ‘intimidatory’.566It did not matter that the great 
irony was that it did not prevent teachers from promoting positive gay and lesbian in the 
classroom (as sought by those such as the Conservative MP Jill Knight) but applied only to 
local authorities. It was that the very notion of legislation was designed to marginalise. 
Labour’s initial reaction to the legislation was at first to support it, despite the avowed 
declarations made in the manifesto of both the previous year and in 1983. In due course it 
was eventually to strongly oppose it, with the then Shadow Secretary of State for the 
Environment Jack Cunningham declaring that it raised ‘fundamental issues of personal liberty 
and civil rights’ and compared it to the discrimination faced by homosexuals with that faced by 
Jews and immigrants.567 The stumbling into opposition to this measure did not endear it to 
those who were being affected by the attitudes inherent in the legislation.  
That Labour continued to be equivocal on the issue of gay rights does undermine how it could 
be seen to adhering to social liberalism during the mid-1980s yet the party was in an invidious 
position. Whilst those such as Cunningham mentioned above criticised the introduction of 
Section 28, the party must have been aware that to take too strong a stand was to potentially 
alienate an electorate that had again rejected them comprehensively at the last general 
election. Polling had shown a degree of public antipathy to gay rights as mentioned previously 
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and this may explain the balancing act that the Labour leadership was trying to achieve. As 
Brooke noted it was ‘hard to see any other space for the espousal of gay rights at this time, 
particularly given the Kinnock leadership’s desire to move Labour to the centre.’568 
Nevertheless, Kinnock referred to the new legislation as a ‘vicious…pink star clause,’569 and 
consequently at the Conference in 1988 and backed by the leaders of the T&GWU and GMB 
unions, voted for the eventual repeal of Section 28.570 
Yet for all of this, reckless as it may seem from a purely political sense and pressed as it had 
been from the grassroots, Labour under Kinnock was to include the commitment to repealing 
Section 28 in the 1992 Manifesto. Labour was also committed, again in the face of initial 
reluctance, to setting a free vote on the issue of the equalisation of the age of consent.571It 
was not as full-throated a statement as that which appeared in the Liberal Democrat’s 
manifesto572 but it did provide a continued thread to Labour’s commitment equal rights at that 
did not exist in any other party agenda in the previous two elections.  
Prior to the first Thatcher Government of 1979-83 there were those within Government and 
certainly on the Conservative backbenches who desired nothing more than the reasserting of 
what they saw as morality in the heart of society which had been undermined as a 
consequence of the reforms which ushered in the ‘Permissive Society.’ Now that the 
Conservatives had been returned with an even bigger mandate than the one gained four year 
previously, such voices were to become increasingly strident. As well as the area of an 
individual’s personal life, there were those within the Conservatives who sought to regulate 
what was available for people to watch on their television screens, particularly with regards to 
the rapidly increasing home video market that was emerging in the 1980s. In the early 1960s, 
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the President of the British Board of Film Censors was the former Labour Home Secretary 
Herbert Morrison who was keen to state both his working-class origins and his disapproval of 
‘homosexuality, of loose living among teenage youth, and of whores and tarts, and his 
disapproval vented on films which featured these things.’573  Morrison’s opinions would have 
found support with many on the Conservative benches which were now pressing their 
Government for action in what people were able to watch in their homes.  
The unalloyed zeal of the more censorious Conservative MPs was often given tacit approval 
and this was particularly underscored with the Video Recordings Act of 1984. Introduced by 
the Conservative MP Graham Bright as a means of introducing regulation to the home video 
market (ironic in the light of the rapid deregulation that was taking place elsewhere), the act 
was as a result of a campaign strongly supported by the Daily Mail and by Mary Whitehouse’s 
National Viewers and Listeners Association (NVLA). The primary purpose of the proposed act 
was in order to ban or censor films considered of an offensive nature, the period of so-called 
‘video nasties’.  
Such acts can be seen as a reflective of the time in which they are introduced so when viewed 
as such the Video Recordings Act is an example of both an increasingly censorious age and 
of the use of effective media campaigning to direct Government policy. The sense of outrage 
as demonstrated by the tabloid media made this a cause celebre was intensely felt by MPs 
who were directly lobbied to support the legislation by constituents, the NVLA and pressure 
from newspapers and even television current affairs items (items on the BBC Newsnight and 
Nationwide programme could be seen to be less than impartial in the way the issue was to 
reported).574 The Daily Express viewed it clearly as society walking ‘the tightrope between 
good and evil,’ and that the country should ‘shake ourselves free of the cretinous “progressive” 
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dogma that if we burn video nasties today we shall be burning books tomorrow.’575 As far as 
certain tabloid newspapers were concerned, it was very much a moral crusade. 
In the face of legislation which set about deciding what people were able to watch in the privacy 
of the own homes, there was the need for a response which challenged such an act being 
introduced. The push against calls for Government intervention into areas of entertainment 
was again taken up by pressure groups outside of Parliament such as the National Council for 
Civil Liberties, which appeared to be at times a lonely and futile attempt to counter the march 
of the censorious which had utilised political process to further their own agenda. Unlike the 
movements of the 1970s which had gained footholds in the corridors of local power if not 
nationally, there was no defiant clarion call to support those who were ploughing a lone furrow 
in opposing the Act. This was the period in which Polly Toynbee was to write, ‘Common sense 
and the national opinion polls tell us that most people believe that repeated exposure to 
violence on television and in films is a bad thing. A generation brought up on a diet of violence 
is likely to produce more violent people.’576The article in which this was taken from was 
emblematic of much of the discourse which was taking place and adopted by those who saw 
themselves as Social Democrats just as it had been by those who identified as traditionalist 
Conservatives. Whilst the thrust of Toynbee’s argument is against the objectification and the 
depiction of violence against women and warns against accepting generalised findings against 
the effects of visual violence, it nonetheless is framed as justifying the introduction of a wider 
censorship.  
Would the Labour Party of the 1960s and 1970s have approved of such a measure so readily 
or indeed in some cases, so approvingly? This is perhaps an unfair question to pose as that 
for many MPs to be seen to be opposing the censorship or out-right banning of films deemed 
to be offensive would be politically suicidal. In the 1970s, Labour figures featured strongly in 
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cases where censorship was being pushed by conservative groups. Ken Livingstone, for 
instance, was vice-chair of the Film Viewing Board of the GLC which acted as a body to hear 
appeals by makers of films banned by the BBFC. Livingstone said that both he and the chair, 
Enid Wistrich, both ‘opposed censorship on principle,’ and set out trying to ‘justify ending film 
censorship for adults.’577Yet Livingstone’s views on censorship were to be ‘changed by 
feminism and by some disturbing films that celebrated sexual violence against women’578, and 
as a result his attitudes hardened and accepting of censorship in films which featured such 
content.  
In Parliament no such opposition appeared to exist. What can be verified is that no Labour, 
nor very few MPs or peers of all parties were to directly oppose the introduction of tighter home 
video regulation and censorship and as Alwyn Turner notes it was left to a Conservative, 
Matthew Parris, to suggest that the Act was at best misplaced.579580 Turner adds that ‘there 
had been a time when left-wing intellectuals would have opposed such moves, at least on the 
grounds that ‘censorship of art by the state is always to be regretted’, yet by the mid-1980s 
‘such figures were thin on the ground.’581 There was no challenging of attitudes which were 
patronising to the working class viewers which some of the concerns were directed towards, 
as highlighted by Julian Petley in reference to the Conservative MP Harry Greenaway claiming 
that videos ‘are often a higher priority in the homes of people who are not particularly articulate, 
and who do not read books or listen to music very much.’582 It was an argument at turns anti-
intellectual and snobbish. Moreover whilst the legislation which was to come to pass was 
sponsored by a Conservative, a previous attempt to bring about a similar bill came via the 
urging of a Labour MP, Gareth Wardell, who whilst supporting the introduction of the Bright 
                                                          
577 Livingstone, You Can’t Say That!, p.105 
578 . Livingstone, You Can’t Say That!,  p.107 
579 Turner, Rejoice! Rejoice! Britain in the 1980s, p.209, and  
580 Martin Barker, 'Nasty Politics or video nasties?', in Martin Barker, (Editor), The Video Nasties – Freedom and 
Censorship in the Media, (London: Pluto Press, 1984), p.37 
581 Turner, ‘Rejoice! Rejoice! Britain in the 1980s’, p.210 
582 Julian Petley, Us and Them, in Martin Barker and Julian Petley (Editors), Ill Effects – the Media/Violence 
(London: Routledge, 2004), p.179 
177 
 
legislation had previously castigated the Thatcher Government for inaction.583It was then, as 
indeed it is still, believed that there was a possibility of a violent act seen on screen would be 
replicated. Denis Howell, the former Labour Sports Minister said in the Commons that ‘when 
instances of it are shown on television there is an immediate increase in the amount of football 
hooliganism. Obviously, there is a direct relationship between the showing of such news items 
and the incidence of football hooliganism.’584These certainties were never challenged, the 
assumptions made on questionable research were not scrutinised by a member of the Labour 
benches nor was there any highlighting how censorship in this area could potentially impact 
on their movement. This latter point was made by Geoffrey Robertson who asked 
‘But (to take an entirely hypothetical example) will they be happy to open their Guardians in a 
year or so to read an angry article by Polly Toynbee about the collapse of  a GLC-funded 
feminist video-collective, whose award-winning educational films about rape (“human sexual 
activity”), wife battering (“acts of gross violence”), and child birth (“depiction of human genital 
organs”)  have been declared “unsuitable for showing in the home by the BBFC.”585 
Robertson’s analysis may be somewhat pungently on the nose yet the wider-point about the 
potentially invasive nature of cultural censorship was one which was not being highlighted by 
anyone on the Labour benches. This was a long-way from the reforming movements of the 
1960s, the pushing of envelopes and the broadening of minds, which for better or for worse 
had been facilitated by a Labour Government permitting such things to come to pass. What is 
particularly ironic is that the man who in 1955 had objected to the banning of ‘horror comics’ 
as ‘a thoroughly bad Bill,’586remained silent throughout the Bright Bill almost thirty years later. 
Roy Jenkins, as with many within Parliament, did not vote against this measure. Many 
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supported it. Neil Kinnock expressed support for the Bill and if there were to any MPs who had 
doubts as to the nature of the legislation were warned by those in the tabloids that they would 
‘be a very unpopular minority.’587  
Bright’s attempt to encourage similar legislation to be passed by the European Parliament in 
late November 1983 was not to be successful, despite his efforts in showing edited highlights 
of certain horror films that he presented to MPs seeming having the same effect on MEPs.588 
Similarly, attempts to add sexually explicit films at the committee stage of the Bill were 
defeated when Labour, SDP and six Conservative MPs defeated the measure by 11 votes to 
6.589 Nevertheless, the Bill was passed unopposed by Parliament and became law in 1984. 
Not that this was considered to be the end of the matter. On 5 December 1985, the 
backbencher Ivor Stanbrook asked Thatcher to agree with Norman Tebbit ‘that many social 
evils of our time derive from the permissive society promoted by liberal politicians in the 1960s 
and 1970s’ and asking the Government to ‘abandon their posture of neutrality on some issues’ 
which was endangering the ‘Christian way of life’. In reply Thatcher remarked that ‘the 
Government have supported private Members' Bills on issues such as controlling video 
nasties and indecent displays. I hope that we shall continue to take that attitude.’590 The ‘video 
nasties’ furore continued to be a useful prop for the Conservative Government and those in 
the media to ascribe as the cause of various societal ills591 and it did so with the assistance of 
the opposition benches. In Labour’s and Kinnock’s defence, the period in which this took place 
was otherwise dominated by two of the defining periods of the mid-1980s, namely the Miners’ 
Strike of 1984 and the continuing action against Militant. 
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Conclusion 
A government can sometimes be the directing force for societal and attitudinal change but 
invariably it is the agent of management and in a country such as Britain, such management 
has been a feature of Governments regardless of their political leanings. If Burke said that 
Governments needed to ensure that it maintained some change in order to ensure the status 
quo, from a Conservative perspective592, then perhaps a more fitting aphorism for 
progressives would be that of Alfred North Whitehead: ‘the art of progress is to preserve order 
amid change and preserve change amid order.’’593 In the 1960s it was good fortune for there 
to be a Labour Government in power during a period of considerable social transformation. In 
the 1980s the Thatcher Government not only put a brake to progress but set about reversing 
it. During the 1980s, despite a period of intense division, in spite of the ordure flung at it and 
its leadership by a vehemently hostile print media Labour for the most part maintained a 
commitment to social liberalism when it would have been so easy to abandon it. In terms of 
how important this was viewed or how popular this was with its core constituents, for many 
the causes were not high on the list of priorities. The manner in which Labour reached its 
eventual position on gay equality may have caused despair in those who wanted a more full-
throated approach yet in a country as naturally conservative as Britain it was perhaps the 
correct strategy to adopt.  
In the face of crushing defeat and existential crisis, Labour’s social liberalism was to survive 
the many problems that the party faced throughout the 1980s. The defection of the liberal-
minded Social Democrats in 1981 did not diminish the social liberal instinct within Labour and 
indeed it was to continue the fight of equality in an ever louder voice when it would have been 
easier to downplay it. During the 1980s Labour’s socially liberal commitment was maintained 
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and had the satisfaction of eventually seeing their policies implemented after years of painful 
infighting and a protracted period of humiliating opposition. It may depend on how someone 
may view the great societal upheaval since the 1960s but in defending causes in support of 
equality at a time when such issues were being marginalised, Labour lived up to the 
declaration made by Harold Wilson during the ushering in of a more tolerant society of which 
he himself was uncertain: ‘The Labour Party is a moral crusade or it is nothing.’594 
The period in which the debate on both the Video Recordings Act and Section 28 was to take 
place during a period of ideological readjustment within the Labour Party, one which was to 
be led by Neil Kinnock and buttressed by the social democratic forces within the party as 
epitomised by the deputy leader Roy Hattersley. The following chapter examines how that 
readjustment was to take place and how a party which had suffered electoral ignominy slowly 
began the process of adapting to a more social democratic set of aims and values, in the 
process isolating both the hard left within Labour and the Social Democrats. 
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Chapter Five 
Labour After 1983 
 
We have to learn the language afresh of the people who we wish to represent and 
who still need us. It is the language that has been changed by environment, by 
television, by acquisitive values. It won’t be done the Scargill way, or the 
Meacher/Benn way either. 
Philip Whitehead595 
 
This chapter critically assesses and reflects on the slow rebuilding process which was to take 
place after the disaster of the 1983 General Election. It also looks at how Labour was to find 
continued difficulties in dealing with the establishment of the Social Democrats as one of the 
main political parties which was to accelerate Labour’s move from its left-wing policies to a 
more centrist position. This was undertaken within a political landscape now completely 
dominated by the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher, emboldened and invigorated by a 
crushing majority which was to be maintained and sustained throughout the Eighties and 
beyond. 
Labour’s progression to the centre was undertaken by two of the emerging figures of the soft 
left and the Revisionist right. Figures such as Giles Radice represented the Revisionist right 
that advocated less state intervention, were actively pro-European and favoured 
multilateralism. On the soft left Robin Cook was to become a close Kinnock ally and like the 
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leader disposed to a more unilateralist stance when it came to nuclear defence. Yet Cook, as 
with Kinnock himself, was to make the transition to a more pragmatic stance on this and other 
policy issues such as on Europe and nationalisation, moves which were to enable them to 
reach a quicker understanding. 
Neil Kinnock’s election as leader and Roy Hattersley as deputy was to be reported as ‘the 
dream ticket’, taking into account their popularity within the party and the hope that such a 
pairing would ensure that no repeat of the bitterness of four years earlier was to be repeated. 
Kinnock’s and Hattersley’s efforts to try and rebuild Labour firstly as a credible opposition and 
then an alternative Government in waiting took place against a backdrop of the last great 
period of industrial unrest in the form of the Miners’ Strike of 1984 and the expulsion of 
members of the Militant Tendency.  
The chapter will examine how Kinnock was to achieve what was to be a social democratic 
settlement within the party as a consequence of the defeat in 1983 and again in 1987. This 
was to see Kinnock reach a rapprochement with the right of the party and bring the Labour 
Movement with them. It examines how the move to the political centre was to be accelerated 
with the third consecutive general election defeat in 1987, another heavy defeat which was to 
prompt a wide-ranging review of Labour’s policies. The Policy Review, involving all aspects of 
the Labour Movement and utilising the use of focus groups was to see the gradual 
abandonment of unilateralism and the adoption of a more pro-European stance, the two 
shibboleths that had caused the schism six years previously. Within less than a decade of the 
breakaway having taken place, the Social Democrats were to see the majority of their new 
party merge with the Liberals, with one its original founders refusing to do so.  
The Aftermath of the General Election of 1983 
As has been examined in Chapter Three, there had been expectation that Labour would suffer 
badly at the 1983 General Election. A triumphant Margaret Thatcher had seen her leadership 
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credentials burnished by victory in the Falklands War a year earlier. After three years of 
economic contraction and record levels of unemployment, growth had returned, inflation had 
fallen to 3.7 percent from nearly 22 percent in May 1980, and interest rates were due to fall 
below ten percent compared to the seventeen percent reached in the early months of the 
Thatcher Government. With a recovering economy and a military victory behind her, Margaret 
Thatcher was able to announce an election with a sense of confidence strengthened by a 
strong showing in the polls and a split opposition. The fear for Labour had been that not only 
was there the prospect of a heavy defeat but one made all the more devastating in the event 
of a strong showing by the Alliance. The prospect of finishing third in the popular vote had 
been a very real possibility and had only been narrowly avoided.  
The outcome of the Conservative’s victory was overwhelming; as Kenneth Morgan noted, the 
defeat transcended that of the calamity of 1931 and that fifty years earlier Labour’s share of 
the poll had been just under 31 percent.596 
For the far left, the defeat of Tony Benn at Bristol South East removed from Parliament their 
most powerful advocate of their cause. Although Benn was to return to the Commons within a 
year, this defeat was to stymie the left’s advance. Whilst there was to be an influx of MPs who 
were to join the Campaign group in due course, including one of the founders of London 
Labour Briefing Jeremy Corbyn, in losing Benn it had lost its most effective and charismatic 
representative.  
For the right, the defeat may have removed Foot from the leadership and Benn from 
Parliament and the new intake of MPs in 1983 saw those who were to quickly make a name 
for themselves on the Labour right such as Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Yet there was no 
sense of triumphalism. Giles Radice noted in his diary a week after the election that at a 
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meeting with George Robertson and Donald Dewar they discussed the likely election of Neil 
Kinnock as Labour leader: 
We also reflect that our point of view is in considerable retreat. The right in the PLP is 
weaker than it has ever been, while the breakaway faction (the SDP) has lost to the 
Liberals in the Alliance. Donald and I both say that with all seriousness that this may 
be our last parliament.597 
The analysis of Radice’s, that the Labour right’s grouping in the PLP had been weakened, 
may seem to be an exaggeration in hindsight, certainly considering that the centre-right still 
dominated the party. Yet from the outset there was only one real prospect for the Labour 
leadership and that person was to come from the soft left as had his predecessor.  
Kinnock and Hattersley 
The election of Neil Kinnock and Roy Hattersley as the so-called ‘dream ticket’ was to prove 
a popular decision yet such a team, balanced between soft left and right was not a unique 
phenomenon in the Labour Party nor was it a guarantor of success. Variations had been in 
place in the post-war period, with limited success with regards to helping provide party unity 
(this is if Wilson was still to be considered as from the soft left and acting as the counterpoint 
to George Brown place on the Labour right). 
Kinnock’s support from the Bennite Campaign group something he could not count upon. One 
area that had distinguished the hard and soft Left factions within Labour was the sense of 
betrayal and anger towards the previous Labour administration. Such a sentiment had been 
in evidence in the aftermath of the defeat of the 1970 Wilson Government but was renewed 
with an increased ferocity in 1979, particularly by Benn and his supporters. This stood them 
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apart from Michael Foot and his supporters such as Kinnock who, whilst critical towards the 
Government throughout much of the 1974-79 administration, was also careful not to criticise 
the leadership when Labour was returned to opposition following the Thatcher victory. As 
Martin Westlake observed, ‘whilst much of the left was reacting against Callaghan and Healey, 
he (Kinnock) was reacting against Thatcher and Joseph.’598 According to Westlake, Kinnock’s 
move away from the Hard Left began in the spring of 1979 shortly after the election defeat599 
and by 1980 had left the CLPD of which he had been a founder member.600  For Kinnock, the 
sense of betrayal that was felt by some was instead replaced by a scepticism as he came to 
terms with accepting the rationale that the reason the Wilson and Callaghan Governments 
had failed was as a result of circumstances.601 Unlike the apparent ideological purity that was 
being pursued by Benn, Kinnock saw his view as being a more pragmatic approach to 
socialism: 
I, and some people like me, maintained the Left argument, because of our view the 
Labour Party would be corroded, if not endangered, if that Bevanite, Tribunite 
convention wasn’t maintained. I’m not saying that as somebody holier than thou. Some 
people describe it as being guardians of the soul of the party, I think that’s stating it 
much too highly, and romantically. My view derived not from a soulful attitude but from 
a pragmatic view of the general shape of British politics and of the Labour Party.602 
The Left’s united front was already beginning to fragment just as it began to press home its 
advantage. Even before the election of Foot, the Tribune group was experiencing internal 
tensions which were to come to a head shortly after the formation of the SDP. Kinnock later 
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observed that he regretted some of the positions, or ‘conventions’ as he termed them that the 
Tribunite Left had taken, saying that the ‘anti-Europeanism was a mistake and that became 
apparent to me within two years of the Referendum.’603 His reservations therefore began to 
form at some point in 1977, and this was something which he ruefully looked back on as 
something he should have reconsidered earlier. Such reservations have been noted in the 
previous chapter with Kinnock’s support for Foot over Benn on issues such as the Bermondsey 
election and his readiness to work in tandem with those from the centre and right of the party. 
Kinnock’s decision to stand was unsurprising and from the outset he was the favourite to win 
the leadership. Martin Westlake observed that Kinnock had enhanced his profile within the 
Parliamentary Labour Party due to his defiance of Tony Benn following the aftermath of 
Bermondsey by-election when the latter attempted to obtain assurances from shadow cabinet 
members that they would denounce speculation on Michael Foot’s leadership.604 That such 
speculation clearly existed was not the point but Kinnock was cynical of Benn’s ostensibly 
helpful intervention to assist Foot and questioned Benn’s motives, observing that ‘loyalty to 
Michael and to the welfare of the party should, in any case, have been a long and resilient 
practice, not a belated beating of chests.’605 
Friends and colleagues of Kinnock’s wrote letters of support and in expectation of his victory, 
many of which touched upon the matter of Labour’s divisions, of a need to move away from 
the far left and a need for a return to a more inclusive and broad church approach. In a letter 
dated 11 June 1983, Roger Robinson wrote to Kinnock attacking the far left ‘who, like the 
Bourbons, learnt nothing, may continue to foist on the party their concept of a grey, 
humourless world, revolutionary in form and frightening to the ordinary person.’606 Those with 
such ideals, wrote Robinson, would not do anything to enable democratic socialists to provide 
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assistance to those who needed it and attacked the idea of extra-parliamentary activity as 
proffered by those such as Ken Livingstone (albeit not using the same rhetoric as expressed 
by Robinson): 
We have to examine our viewpoints on many issues and be an effective opposition in 
Parliament and without. Extra parliamentary action must never lead to bloodshed on 
the streets, nor violence, nor the anarchy some have already stated publicly they wish 
to see.607 
Robinson added that Labour had to ‘bring back humour and tolerance to our party – develop 
a broad base and end our policy to travel along entrenched, narrow and blinkered doctrine.’608  
Further advice on taking a moderate position was provided by Denis MacShane, later to be 
MP for Rotherham and Europe Minister under Tony Blair in the early 2000s. MacShane wrote 
to Kinnock on 17 June 1983, providing him with a memo on foreign affairs questions and 
advising Kinnock that he might find it useful as he ‘tried to steer a way between the mindless 
NATOism-cum-Europhilia of one element of the Movement and the utopian, mindless leftism 
of another element.’609 
The recently defeated MP for Derby North, Phillip Whitehead, wrote to Kinnock to observe that 
if he were to be elected leader: 
we face a daunting task. The Labour Party seems to have plunged itself immediately 
into a further consideration of the ever-interesting topic of itself, its rules and 
procedures, without an inquest into our defeat. Speaking for my bit of Middle England 
which we have held against the trend three times over until last week’s debacle, I think 
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we have got to take stock of the terrifying gap between the activists and those for whom 
they claim to speak. We though that the rhetorical excesses of Bennery would be 
forgotten once the suspended its own slanging for a while. They were not.610 
Whitehead went on advise that Labour had to ensure that it reconnected with its core working 
class supporters:  
As you know my own family by occupation as well as origin is working class – lorry 
drivers, railwaymen and so on. None of them voted Labour this time, except in the 
Derby North constituency where personal loyalty kept them in line. There were 4 million 
like them.611 
Kinnock’s continued support for policies championed by his mentor and predecessor Michael 
Foot such as opposition to the European Economic Community and a commitment to 
unilateralism continued to chime with CLPs throughout the country, although he was still asked 
to confirm that this was the case. In response to a questionnaire sent to Kinnock by the 
Hampstead and Highgate Labour Party, he confirmed support for EEC withdrawal and 
unilateralism though deferred to ‘party policy’ on matters such as a united Ireland and the 
expulsion of Militant. Kinnock also confirmed support for the continuation of the mandatory 
reselection of MPs but not to them being mandated by their CLPs, the continuation of the 
Greater London Council and the right for a women to choose in relation to abortion rights and 
the implementation of positive discrimination for women within the party.612 Yet in an article 
for Tribune, Kinnock tempered his support for Common Market withdrawal by declaring ‘there 
are other areas of policy, such as our relationship with the EEC, the chosen form of public 
ownership, the improvement of the Welfare State and the strengthening of our democracy that 
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will inevitably be subject to reappraisal.’613 This may not have presaged the Policy Review 
which was to come four years later but it did reflect that Kinnock understood that an evaluation 
of policy was necessary in light of the election defeat. 
The Times’s Clifford Longley had provided a supportive article on Roy Hattersley in the event 
that he would launch a bid for the leadership. Longley recorded that he could be effective 
against ‘what he considers to be disloyal elements on the Left’ whilst ‘also known to be highly 
scornful of those who left the Labour Party to found the Social Democrats,’ adding that his 
loyalty to Foot and his comment on policies that he disagrees with ‘saying it was important to 
be loyal to democratic decisions even if he personally regretted them.’614 
The centre-right union newspaper Forward Labour stated that it could not endorse either 
Hattersley or Peter Short for the leadership as both were presidents of the group and as such 
it would be a conflict of interest but did state that it supported the idea of the ‘balanced ticket 
and derided Michael Meacher’s opposition to such a notion.615 
The prospect of the Kinnock/Hattersley ticket suggested that the prospect of a united party 
was achievable. Kinnock was to win support from across the party spectrum as indeed was 
Roy Hattersley for the deputy leadership. The results of the Fabians ballot for example showed 
that Kinnock won outright with 765 votes to his nearest Hattersley on 395. Hattersley was to 
win the first round narrowly for the deputy leadership against Kinnock but with the latter’s 
second preference votes taken into account won by 1024 votes against the candidate who 
finished second, the Bennite MP for Oldham West Michael Meacher who won 317 votes.616 
Meacher’s defeat represented a significant reversal of Benn’s achievement in his bid for the 
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deputy leadership in 1981. This was not to say that the Campaign group was lacking in 
influence but in comparison to only two years previously Meacher’s result was a very poor 
return.  
The final result was to see Neil Kinnock elected on the third ballot with seventy one percent of 
the vote,617 with Roy Hattersley elected as Deputy with sixty seven percent to Michael 
Meacher’s twenty eight percent.618 The election of Kinnock and Hattersley represented a 
leader from the soft left faction of the Labour Party with a deputy representing the Croslandite 
revisionist tradition, both followers of men who had been on opposite sides of the divide during 
the Gaitskell-Bevan era. Gaitskell and Bevan had eventually come together as leader and 
deputy after a period of demoralising electoral defeats and internal party division, providing a 
neat parallel with Kinnock and Hattersley’s election. Both Kinnock and Hattersley would 
remain at the helm for almost a decade as the party painfully readjusted to a position where it 
could be seriously considered an alternative party of Government. In the present meantime 
however, the work of stabilising a party that had been severely beaten by the Conservatives 
and narrowly avoided finishing third in a general election to a party comprising of former 
colleagues began in earnest. 
The Miners’ Strike 
The decision of Arthur Scargill to send his members out on strike on 15 March 1984 in support 
of unofficial strikes occurring elsewhere in the country set off the longest period of  industrial 
action since the General Strike. Scargill’s decision not to hold a ballot of his membership and 
the outbreaks of violence were to provide valuable ammunition for the Conservative 
Government, keen to avenge and expunge the memory of Scargill’s last action in 1973 which 
had led to the calling of the 1974 General Election and the defeat of the Heath Government. 
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As Keith Laybourn notes, the support that Scargill received at the TUC Conference in 1984 
presented a problem for Kinnock, ‘a mixture of reaction and radicalism that threatened to blow 
off course his attempt to give the Labour Party an image of moderation.’619 Martin Westlake 
observed that for Kinnock ‘the miners’ strike…placed him in an impossible position and, 
however it ended, threatened to prove both highly damaging both to his leadership and his 
strategy for Labour’s electoral recovery.’620 For Kinnock there had to be a fine line to be 
trodden between support for the miners themselves and attacking the leadership of them. 
Westlake notes how Kinnock gave a speech at the Annual Durham Miner’s Gala in July 1984 
when Kinnock attacked Mrs. Thatcher’s response to the strike saying ‘People who don’t know 
this industry, people who don’t know miners and miners’ families and communities ask why 
you put up such a fight. The answer is a single phrase: There is no alternative.’621 The strike 
was also to provide Kinnock with an opportunity to move the party away from the perceived 
militancy of certain sections of the Labour Movement, with Scargill’s being one of the most 
obvious.  
The defeat of the Miners’ Strike in March 1985 was a pyrrhic victory for Kinnock. Whatever 
personal and political animosity that he felt towards Arthur Scargill was tempered by a 
sympathy for those taking industrial action over pit closures. At the Party Conference that took 
place in Bournemouth from 29 September until 4 October 1985, Scargill gave a speech 
pushing for a full reimbursement of the National Union of Mineworkers’ losses over the last 
year ‘only a third of delegates stood for Mr Scargill and some even booed him at the end of 
the debate when he insisted on pressing his union’s proposition to a vote.’622 The proposition 
passed but Kinnock was to use his leader’s speech as the opportunity to attack not only 
Scargill but also the matter of Militant. 
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Kinnock’s speech to the Party Conference on 1 October 1985 has passed into Labour folklore 
as ‘that speech’ yet it came under a period of intense pressure for Kinnock. For the first 
eighteen months of his leadership, any hopes of setting the agenda in taking on the 
Conservative Government had been affected by the matters of the Miner’s Strike and the 
issues of the control of Liverpool City Council by Militant members, most notably Derek Hatton. 
Kinnock would have felt even further pressure when on 30 September 1985 a poll of Labour 
activists was published in The Times which gave him a mixed opinion on how he was 
performing as leader, with further embarrassment caused by seventy eight percent of those 
asked saying large city corporations should be nationalised.623 Nevertheless, Kinnock was to 
attack Militant in turn with a ferocity which was warmly greeted by the majority of delegates 
who had felt ‘admiration mixed with astonishment. No Labour leader in modern times has 
dared rebuked any section of his party with such directness.’624  
As can be expected, the far left viewed the speech with contempt, emphasised during the 
speech by Eric Heffer walking off the Conference platform and out of the hall. Tony Benn 
accused Kinnock of releasing ‘the hatred of the Tory press against his own people in the 
middle of a struggle in the hope that he pick up the ex-Labour voters who supported Owen, 
knowing full well that real socialists and the rump of the working class have no alternative but 
to vote for him.’625 Hilary Wainwright was to be more guarded, arguing that ‘expulsion, 
suspension and disbandment may do short-term wonders for the image of the present Leader, 
but I doubt if it does much to strengthen the political culture and popular base of the party, the 
weakness of which was, after all, the cause of Militant’s strength.’626 
The effect had been galvanising. The Times’ Julian Haviland reported that ‘delegates from the 
trade union and constituency sections spilled out of the hall in delight, congratulating each 
                                                          
623 ‘Activists split on Kinnock’, The Times, 30 September 1985, p.4 
624 Julian Haviland, ‘Kinnock speech a masterpiece, say moderates’, The Times, 2 October 1985, p.1 
625 Tony Benn, The End of an Era: Diaries 1980-90 (London: Arrow Books, 1994), p.424 
626 Hilary Wainwright, Labour: A Tale of Two Parties (London: Chato and Windus Ltd, 1987), p.135 
193 
 
other that they had a leader.’627 Kinnock’s role in the attack on Militant was such that Giles 
Radice said that he ‘would be forever grateful for taking on the Trots.’628 Radice felt that it 
required someone from the left to take on Militant and his speech at the party conference at 
Bournemouth in 1985 was to provide a public denunciation of the far left which would have 
played well to those who had despaired at the tactics of those who had been accused of 
controlling local CLP meetings. The battle over the expulsion of Militant would proceed into a 
tortuous battle that lasted into the following year and those who were members of the 
organisation and MPs would remain in the party until the end of the decade. Yet whilst both 
events were to show Kinnock as a tough leader and someone willing to take on one of the 
most powerful trade unions and also a group that had gained infamy both inside and outside 
the party took up valuable time that could have been spent on preparing for elections and 
looking as though they were a viable alternative Government. Labour would make advances 
in the local elections in May 1986 but this would be a brief moment of celebration. 
Greenwich and the Local Elections of May 1987 
Labour’s prospects were to be tested by two sets of elections that were to take place in early 
1987. The first was a parliamentary by-election and the second the local Government 
elections. From being in a strong position in the opinion polls at the end of 1986 and having 
done well in the Local Elections that same year, Labour began 1987 with optimism and this 
was further heightened by tensions which had continued to play out between the SDP and the 
Liberals. 
The strains within the Alliance, which had been in evidence since its formation, had continued 
to plague both of the two parties particularly regarding the coordination and development of 
policy. As the Alliance was devised as a practical format to help provide a unified operation 
whilst maintaining the two parties separate identities, tensions had arisen on matters of 
                                                          
627 Julian Haviland, ‘Kinnock speech a masterpiece, say moderates’, The Times, 2 October 1985, p.1 
628 Interview with Giles Radice, 28 November 2012 
194 
 
organisation and selection of candidates for election, most notably in the immediate formation 
of the SDP and the question of which party should stand a candidate in the slew of by-elections 
that took place in the early Eighties. With such an unwieldy structure of cooperation in place 
and with cynics on in either party resistant to the potential to closer union, it was inevitable 
that policy disagreements would erupt. In 1986 David Steel had suffered an embarrassing 
reverse at the Liberal Assembly at Eastbourne when delegates rejected the principle of an 
independent nuclear deterrent by 652 votes to 625. The MP for Bermondsey, Simon Hughes, 
said that the decision to stand against the notion of Britain holding an independent nuclear 
capability was a long-standing Liberal policy and a reason for him to be in the party, saying 
that ‘many of us joined this party because of its aim and its goal, a non-nuclear Europe in a 
non-nuclear world. We have never voted to replace independent nuclear deterrent. The battle 
is for our future.’ It was a question of being ‘proud of all that we stand for,’ a sentiment echoed 
by delegate Frances Thirlway who asked the party rhetorically ‘have you really changed so 
much in two years?’629 
This setback was particularly embarrassing as SDP leader David Owen had been a proponent 
of an agreement to coordinate nuclear weapons policy with the French as a replacement for 
Polaris. There was the irony of the Social Democrats being at odds with its Alliance partners 
considering unilateralism had been a long-standing issue of dispute being a contributing factor 
to the formation of the SDP and this development was quickly exploited by both the 
Conservatives and Labour who were at pains to highlight the logistical difficulties the Alliance 
would face should it be in a position of power sharing.  
Unfortunately whatever satisfaction that Labour may have enjoyed with regards to the SDP’s 
travails were to be compounded by its own performance in the by-election at Greenwich. The 
calling of the election at Greenwich was caused by the untimely death of the Labour MP Guy 
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Barnett, who had held the seat since winning it via by election in 1971. Greenwich had been 
narrowly retained at the General Election four years earlier and was hoped to be held 
comfortably by Labour and thus providing a timely morale boost ahead of any anticipated 
general election. Labour also hoped to capitalise on the difficulties within the Alliance which 
had dropped back nationally in polling, fluctuating between the low twenties to mid-teens.630 
Such optimism was understandable following an opinion poll published on 11 January 1987 
which gave Labour a thirty-five point lead over the Conservatives on second place with twenty-
five percent and the Alliance in third place with fifteen percent.631 
Whilst support for Labour still appeared to be strong, there were ominous signs for the party 
coming from Greenwich that pointed to disaffection with the party amongst the local electorate. 
The former Labour – now SDP – MP for neighbouring Woolwich, John Cartwright, played on 
Labour’s defence policy and the fears that some of those who worked in the defence industry 
(which made up around two thousand people in both Woolwich and Greenwich): ‘in 1983, 
nothing did more to shake up the traditional working class vote than their perception of 
Labour’s defence policy.’632 The Labour candidate, Deidre Wood, was a Labour representative 
for the Inner London Education Authority and was seen as being a left-winger with an 
equivocal viewpoint with regards to membership of the NATO alliance: ‘I believe we have a 
good Labour Party policy and I support that policy. My personal views are at this point mixed. 
I’m quite happy that we stay in NATO.’633 The SDP had made no secret of their desire to see 
Wood as the Labour candidate, hoping that it would help to reinforce their campaign which 
emphasised the perceived ‘Loony Left’ nature of Wood’s political stances and as someone 
who had ‘consistently voted with the hard left on the Ilea and before that the Greater London 
Council.’634635 Hopes of tactical voting also helped to fuel the possibility that the SDP could 
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achieve a victory that according to opinion polls had seemed unlikely at the turn of the year,636 
to the extent that Shirley Williams was to tell the SDP’s Scottish Conference on 22 February 
1987 that they should not be afraid of Labour strongholds and that ‘in Greenwich we will take 
the castle.’637 
On 26 February 1987, the Social Democrats won the Greenwich by-election with Rosie Barnes 
winning with 18,287 votes, a majority of over six thousand over Labour’s Deidre Wood. As 
David McKie noted it was only the eighth time since 1945 that an opposition party lost one of 
its seats, describing the result as ‘abject,’638 and failing to match the vote it took in 1983.639 
Crewe and King noted it was the first time that the SDP had won a seat from Labour in its six 
years in existence, having previously been successful in previously Conservative held 
constituencies.640 Crewe and King saw the election outcome as ‘a real political event with real 
political consequences,’ as Neil Kinnock’s authority and Labour’s polling numbers being 
particularly hit.641On two occasions, 17 and 23 March Gallup had polls which put the Alliance 
in second place behind the Conservatives, raising hopes of a renewal of the SDP and Liberal 
fortunes and reversing the decline it had been suffering since the 1983 election. Crew and 
King’s assertion that Greenwich was a safe Labour seat is contentious by the fact that it was 
a three-way marginal as a consequence of the general election but the outcome was still a 
shock for Labour. Giles Radice was to note in his diaries, ‘The SDP candidate wins by 6,000 
votes – the Tory vote collapses to 11%. One could argue that Mrs Thatcher might now hold 
back from having an election but the real news is the Labour debacle.’642 It was to be the last 
highpoint for the SDP before its eventual merger with the Liberals in 1988 and the only Labour 
seat that was to be taken. The momentum that Labour had been gathering was halted, with 
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Radice ruefully remarking that it was ‘so depressing that we are now almost back where we 
were in 1983.’643  
The Local Government elections of 1987 were to also offer little comfort to Labour and 
presented a marked contrast to the polls of the previous year. In 1986 the Conservatives had 
suffered heavy losses of seven hundred seats, three quarters of them to Labour who in turn 
saw them gain control of seventeen councils. This was in conjunction with the Tories losing 
the Ryedale by-election to the Alliance and only narrowly holding the seat of West Derbyshire 
in another poll by only one hundred votes. Labour had been bullish about its prospects with 
Jack Straw mocking the Conservatives in The Guardian on 6 February 1987: ‘Manchester is 
bad mouthed daily by the Conservative press. Yet Labour cannot help winning seats and the 
Tories cannot help losing them.’644 However the outcome at Greenwich had changed such 
hopes; from being in front of the Conservatives with forty percent to the Tories thirty-eight 
percent on 28 January 1987, Labour were now fourteen points behind going into the May 
elections.645 The accompanying results for Labour were to be similarly chastening, losing 
council seats in Trafford (which it had hoped to win control of), lost seats in Dudley and 
Birmingham and struggled to keep hold of Wolverhampton City Council due to losses to the 
Conservatives. Labour also lost three seats in Manchester, rendering Jack Straw’s previous 
boast somewhat hollow.646 What comfort there was for Labour was provided by the holding of 
Liverpool with the Alliance failing to take control and the SDP and Liberals not performing as 
well as had been anticipated. Despite the Party’s General Secretary Larry Whitty professing 
the belief that ‘the momentum is in our direction’, the auguries presented by the local elections 
did not bode well for Labour should an election be announced. Three days later Margaret 
Thatcher announced a general election for 11 June. 
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The General Election of 1987 
Despite the shock of Greenwich and the poor showing in the local elections in May, Labour 
went into the election of 1987 with a degree of confidence not borne by the showing in opinion 
polling. After narrowly leading the Conservatives for much of the previous year, by May 1987 
Labour were 14 points behind on 30 percent.647 Yet in comparison to the haphazard and 
seemingly shambolic efforts of four years previously, the 1987 election campaign was to be 
effective in its presentation and execution. Having endured the difficulties of the Miners’ Strike 
and the trauma of the Militant expulsions, some within Labour went into the campaign with the 
expectations of some success: if not confident of outright victory then of at least rolling back 
much of the advances made by the Conservatives in 1983.  
In an article written in Marxism Today prior to the election, Eric Hobsbawm noted that Labour 
had ‘bounced back from the 1983 disaster with remarkable speed under Neil Kinnock’s new 
leadership,’ but offered that ‘the best Labour can hope for realistically in what, like it or not, 
has become a three-way system of British politics, is that it will come out of the election as the 
largest party, or the largest non-Tory party in parliament.’648 Hobsbawm also put forward the 
proposition of tactical voting with the Alliance but warned that both the Liberals and the SDPs 
were aiming to remove Labour as the main opposition: 
On the Alliance side (or rather on the SDP side, for the Liberals have been much more reticent 
in this respect), the argument is frankly that a Thatcher victory was a price well worth paying 
for the chance to ruin the Labour Party for good and come back after another five years of 
Thatcherism as the major, and hopefully the only, opposition force and alternative 
                                                          
647 Voting Intentions in Great Britain 1976-1987, via https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/voting-intentions-
great-britain-1976-1987  [accessed 11 June 2017] 
648 Eric Hobsbawm, ‘Snatching Victory From Defeat’, Marxism Today, May 1987, p.15, 
http://banmarchive.org.uk/collections/mt/index_frame.htm, [accessed 25 May 2014] 
199 
 
Government. (This, incidentally, is also the Thatcher scenario for the future of British 
politics.)649 
The result in 1987 was to demonstrate that those previous Labour voters which had moved to 
the Social Democrats in 1983 had now shifted their votes to the Conservatives, seemingly 
shedding any aversion that they may had previously felt about voting Tory. This movement 
was evident in the drop in the Alliance vote in some constituencies from second to third in 
some of the more traditional Labour heartlands as the North-East, North-West and Wales. 
Four years earlier the Labour vote had collapsed in the South as voters moved to the Alliance 
and as a consequence strengthened the Conservative share. Now it was the Tories who were 
benefiting, consolidating their grip and only losing twenty-one seats. The share of the vote 
saw the Conservatives on just over forty-two percent, only a fraction down on their 
performance in 1983, whilst Labour improved to just under thirty-one percent. The drop in the 
Alliance vote to twenty-two percent seemed to favour Labour nationally but did not translate 
as such in the constituencies. 
‘Aims and Values’ – Towards the Policy Review 
The defeat of June 1987 saw Kinnock and Hattersley remain as leader and deputy despite 
another heavy landslide victory for the Conservatives. Whilst the defeat was a bitter one to 
contemplate, Labour was able to take some positives from the outcome. Firstly, they had 
recovered from the polling position achieved in 1983 and attained almost thirty one percent of 
the vote, up over three percent from four years before.  
Secondly, they were to see their representation in Scotland increase as the expense of the 
Conservatives, the Alliance parties and the Scottish Nationalist Party. The results in Scotland 
bore particular enjoyment for Labour when they gained the seat of Glasgow Hillhead from the 
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former SDP leader Roy Jenkins, won by the left-wing and early Kinnock supporter George 
Galloway. 
Thirdly, results in London, whilst mixed, were to see the first black MPs in the House of 
Commons representing Labour, Diane Abbott in Hackney, Paul Boateng in Brent South and 
Bernie Grant for Tottenham. Yet this achievement was marred by the Conservatives achieving 
some notable successes in the capital, including winning the seat of Battersea from Alfred 
Dubs, Nick Raynsford in Fulham and Eric Deakins in Walthamstow. 
Labour were to lose six seats in total. The Labour right were to see Ken Weetch lose his seat 
in Ipswich, Weetch being an early supporter and contributor to Labour Solidarity. Meanwhile, 
as well as Abbott and Grant, the Campaign Group was to see its numbers bolstered by the 
election of Ken Livingstone in Brent East, the bête noir of the Conservative media and also 
the current Labour leadership. Meanwhile the Militant MPs Terry Fields in Liverpool 
Broadgreen, Dave Nellist in Coventry South and Pat Wall were re-elected in Bradford North. 
For all of Kinnock’s efforts on the NEC with the issue of Militant in Liverpool, the organisation 
continued to maintain a presence in the PLP. 
For Labour, defeat in 1987 also came against a backdrop of retreat and reappraisal of 
socialism globally and a continued domination of conservative parties in many Western states. 
As well as Thatcher’s Conservatives recording their third consecutive general election victory, 
in the United States Ronald Reagan was coming to the end of his second term in office. In 
West Germany Helmut Kohl had been returned as Chancellor in January 1987 for a second 
time and as with Margaret Thatcher with a slightly reduced majority – the Christian 
Democrats/Christian Socialist Union had lost 21 seats, exactly the same number as the 
Conservatives in June 1987.650 In Italy the Christian Democrats were to be returned to 
Government a week after Thatcher’s victory.   
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The defeats of both 1983 and 1987 were to be the catalysts for the radical re-positioning of 
Labour within the political landscape, 1987 more so than result of four years previously. As 
Labour strove to deal with how it could move to a more accommodating position in which to 
reach out to an electorate which had now rejected them on three consecutive occasions, the 
Conservatives were able to implement their manifesto with impunity, including in the areas of 
social policy. In 1983 the Conservatives had said that ‘dealing with crimes, civil disobedience, 
violent demonstrations and pornography are not matters for the police alone. It is teachers 
and parents - and television producers, too - who influence the moral standards of the next 
generation.’651 The connection between violent crime and what was seen on the screen was 
made clear and in due course was legislated against in the form of the 1983 Video Recordings 
Act, seemingly assuaging the concerns of the public and meeting demands of a media driven 
campaign which had built up in the early 1980s. For the Conservatives this was a clearly 
defined moral mission and one in which it had the full support of the parties in Parliament. 
By the mid-1980s, the reports of the arguments between central Government and local 
authorities had become a staple in tabloid newspapers. Stretching back to the 1970s, 
reference to ‘Loony Left’ councils had been made to highlight Labour councils which had been 
accused of using ratepayers’ taxes on minority matters. As has been seen in the previous 
chapter, the use of the issue of homosexuality as a weapon against Labour had been deployed 
in the Bermondsey by-election, with some of the invective being led by disgruntled former 
Labour members objecting to the selection of Peter Tatchell as the candidate. The matter of 
gay rights and Labour’s protracted policy development with respect to them had become an 
issue which been used as a point of attack by the Conservatives during the General Election. 
For some within Labour, the issue of gay rights could be dismissed as a niche issue of marginal 
interest. For Kinnock and the party leadership smarting from a series of bruising encounters 
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over the matters of Militant and the Miners’ Strike, such matters may have appeared peripheral 
and as Chapter Four demonstrated they had resulted in one of Labour’s significant battles 
with the Conservatives in the latter part of the 1980s.  
In response to the election defeat, the left-wing Labour Coordinating Committee (LCC) spoke 
of the need to reconnect with the working classes, sentiments the former MP Phillip Whitehead 
similarly expressed in 1983. The defeated Labour candidate for Putney and LCC executive 
committee member Peter Hain said that ‘every Tory since the early hours of Friday morning 
has talked about the inner city and we see this as the next stage of the Government’s attack 
on Labour’s working class base, which we must get to grips with.’652  
There was to be an inquest into the defeat which was to conclude that it had been a well-run 
campaign but one which had amounted to only a small advance on the nadir of 1983. Martin 
Westlake quoted the BBC Political Editor who remarked ‘”To the surprise of all, Labour has 
beaten the Tories on the quality of its advertising, the deployment of its personalities and on 
packaging and organisation.’653 It took Norman Tebbit to pungently remark as the results were 
coming in to touch upon an uncomfortable truth for Labour: ‘If as you hint and one or two other 
journalists have hinted they ran by far the best campaign, and I don’t necessarily accept that, 
but we win then they must have been a lousy product.’654 
The decision to put forward a review of all Labour policy was announced at the Party 
Conference on September 1987, based on an initial paper submitted by the Deputy General 
Secretary of the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE) Tom Sawyer entitled ‘An 
Approach to Policy Making.’655Yet from the outset the tensions were evident. As Westlake 
observed ‘1987 could never be year zero for Labour. The party could not suddenly deny its 
unique traditions and history; Kinnock could not now claim to have sprung fully formed from 
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the head of European Social Democracy.’656 The problem that Labour had to face up to was 
that ‘in effect, the Policy Review process was Labour’s coming to terms with Thatcherism.’657 
Three consecutive defeats could not have suggested otherwise.  
Prior to the commencement of the mooted review, the starting point of what the party was 
aspiring to achieve had to be determined. This was to manifest itself in the document ‘A 
Statement of Democratic Socialist Aims and Values,’ commenced by Roy Hattersley ‘at 
Kinnock’s behest’658 as a means of articulating a series of areas for discussion and how 
socialism would help to achieve these. Hughes and Wintour observed that Hattersley was 
seemingly frustrated by his own attempts, thinking that he was simply condensing what he 
had already set out in Choose Freedom, only to be assured by Kinnock that ‘was exactly what 
he wanted.’659660 This underlined how Kinnock and Hattersley’s approach to socialism was 
able to easily converge despite the former coming from a Bevanite tradition and Hattersley the 
Croslandite. ‘A Statement of Democratic Socialist Aims and Values’ was to be the testament 
setting out a new political settlement as envisaged by Kinnock and Hattersley, eschewing the 
ready suspicion of markets for a more open acceptance of them albeit with caveats. For 
Hughes and Wintour, Aims and Values was also a tactical device to ensure that a clear 
distinction could be made be made against both the SDP and the Bennites who many had 
been expecting to mount a leadership challenge: ‘a genuine attempt to enshrine an enduring 
statement of democratic socialist faith that could clearly be distinguished from David Owen’s 
version of social democracy on one side, and Soviet-style command economy socialism on 
the other.’661  
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Aims and Values was to go through a number of amendment exchanges between Kinnock 
and Hattersley prior to its presentation to the shadow Cabinet on 5 February 1988.662 Even 
after these amendments had taken place, both Kinnock and Hattersley were to find the paper 
criticised by a number of the shadow Cabinet who felt that the paper as too far in favour of the 
market, including Hattersley supporters as John Smith and Jack Cunningham to Kinnockites 
such as Robin Cook and Bryan Gould.663 As a result Kinnock and Hattersley agreed that the 
document should be considered by shadow Cabinet members and amendments received. 
Such amendments were thus put forward with comments on the replacing of sentences such 
as ‘…we believe, by using democratic institutions and collective and community 
activity…solidarity between people is the best guarantee of liberty and equality’, stating that 
‘the idea is okay but badly expressed’.664 This was crossed out and replaced with ‘But 
economic change will not in itself be able to build the society which socialists wish to create. 
We need a more equal distribution of power as well of wealth.’665 Also crossed out was the 
sentence which stated ‘In a world where wealth and security will increasingly depend upon 
human ingenuity and natural resources, the key instruments of social, economic and industrial 
change cannot be left to the chance operation of the market.’666 A note at the side of the 
crossed out section read ‘this is a near to total rejection of the market: the sort of wild swing 
that got us into previous trouble.’667 
Further draft amendments were received from those outside the shadow Cabinet with one 
document received from Ken Livingstone. Livingstone encapsulated his objections to the 
document in the introduction stating that it contained a ‘wrong conception of the relationship 
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between democracy and socialism, its wrong position on social/public ownership, and its 
inadequate international framework for policy.’668 In response to one of Livingstone’s 
amendments, a briefing paper notED 
He (Livingstone) argued that we should omit the phrase “mixed economy” which we want to 
retain as that is the reality; and wishes to substitute for it the phrase “the social ownership of 
the decisive sectors of the economy”. He fails to explain what that phrase means – and we 
have said in the previous paragraph that we want to extend social ownership in the economy, 
and we are committed to public ownership of the utilities.669 
The briefing note goes on to refute Livingstone’s amendment in which he called for the 
elimination of all nuclear weapons, asserting that ‘the international section of his proposals is 
clearly designed to put us on the spot on nuclear disarmament.’670 The comment then aims to 
couch the rejection in terms of efficacy asserting that ‘once we concede the necessity to make 
policy commitments in one area we must make that concession throughout the document and 
therefore fundamentally change it.’671  
A month after the shadow Cabinet meeting, Labour’s General Secretary Larry Whitty wrote to 
Kinnock on 17 March 1988 expressing that the lack of response from the PLP, the NEC and 
affiliated unions concerned him and expressed the frustration that ‘expressions of view…do 
not seem able to be transferred onto paper!’672 Whitty wrote that he had previously made his 
opinion of the draft of the Aims and Values document known, he confirmed again that he felt 
the document had to address three areas:  
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• That the very positive approach to the individual liberty passages was not sufficiently 
tempered with the need to emphasise collective activity and democratic action as a 
means of achieving and fulfilling individual liberty; 
• The need for a lengthier international section; 
• The need to strengthen the economic section and state the ‘market issue’ in terms 
more acceptable to the party.673 
Whitty went on to write that whilst he disagreed ‘with much of what Ken Livingstone’s draft is 
trying to do, there are also some very valid points in there which we should take seriously.’674 
Despite the involvement and contribution of Kinnock, ‘A Statement of Democratic Socialist 
Aims and Values’ was very much Hattersley’s (even though he had been reluctant in 
undertaking it). However, Hughes and Wintour’s criticism that Kinnock ‘barely used the 
document for its designed purpose’ is undermined by their following assertion that it was ‘a 
staging post on the way to delivering the Policy Review.’675 Hughes’ and Wintour’s attestation 
that Kinnock’s belief ‘that politics was not so much visionary utterance, as a matter of what 
you could win, today and tomorrow’676 also contradicted their previous observation that 
‘Kinnock’s belief in a politics of proficient caring was boiled down, it sat only a pigeon-step 
away from Hattersley’s more loftily articulated philosophies.’677 There is no doubt that a part 
of the production of ‘Aims and Values’ as a precursor to the Policy Review could be used as 
vantage point in which to finally take on the Hard Left decisively but it is perhaps overly cynical 
to suggest that Kinnock’s motives were less than genuine. Labour had suffered three 
consecutive defeats and thus it was imperative to understand why the party had lost just it had 
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been in the 1950s. It was not a soft option for Kinnock to set the party on to a programme of 
policy examination but repeated defeat necessitated action, hence his speech to the PLP on 
9 March 1988 in which he stated ‘the Party and its members have too often fallen back on 
sentimentality or gestures to give definition to our aims, or fallen victim to opportunism, or 
simply waited for experience of injustice or dissatisfaction to bring people back into the fold.’678 
This was the ‘realist left’ interfacing with the ‘pragmatic right’, and Kinnock (as he asserted 
almost thirty years later) always saw his politics as being pragmatic. Kinnockism, if there was 
such a thing, was therefore manifesting itself as less the soft leftism of his mentor Michael 
Foot and more a soft revisionism.  
For Roy Hattersley, whilst Aims and Means may have been the precursor to the Policy Review 
for which he was to view part of the consultation process, Labour Listens, with disdain, it 
nonetheless was an attempt for the ideas he had already set out in his book Choose Freedom 
which came out in 1987 and set out how he saw socialism. Choose Freedom was to see 
Hattersley stress that the pursuit of equality and the ensuring of personal freedoms were what 
defined socialism and that this was very much in the tradition of Croslandite revisionist social 
democracy. Hattersley took aim at the assertion put forward by Herbert Morrison that 
‘socialism is what the Labour Party happens to be doing at any one time’ stating that ‘as a 
description of a complex and comprehensive ideology, the most that can be said of that 
definition is that its pragmatic convenience almost compensates for its intellectual 
inadequacy.’679 
Hattersley’s theme for Choose Freedom was liberty and the freedom of people to have more 
responsibility and a more individualistic approach, very much in the Croslandite tradition, 
calling for more acknowledgment of the usefulness of the markets whilst cautioning against 
their introduction into areas of public provision such as health, social and education services 
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and calling for the public utilities to be ‘socially owned and remain as central corporations with 
a national plan for their overall performance.’680 Hattersley also maintained the Croslandite 
line of nationalisation not necessarily being the answer to the provision of equality, arguing 
that ‘if we believe that socialism is about an extension of freedom brought about by a more 
equal distribution of resources we have to encourage that extension in every part of society. 
State monopolies are not the most fertile ground for the diffusion of power.’681 
Hattersley was also conciliatory towards the trade unions, noting their support for 
shareholdings through employee stock-ownership plans (ESOPS) and calling for their support 
in ensuring the ‘extensions of personal rights and powers’ of the individual through collective 
action.682 
Hattersley was essentially arguing that Labour, not based on any one particular ideological 
strand as stated by Tawney (and quoted by Crosland at the start of this thesis) had to state its 
ideology in proud terms, noting that ‘the coalition of objectives’ that emerged during the Attlee 
era was needed again, ‘that combination of philosophy and pragmatism (which) creates a 
genuinely united Labour Party – an indispensable ingredient of victory.’683 It was about 
ideology allied to relevance, a need to recreate the Attlee era ‘coalition of objectives’ which 
had ‘enabled a united party to speak for a wide spectrum of national opinion’ and overcoming 
the phenomenon that had taken hold after the Wilson and Callaghan years, as ‘conservatism 
seemed novel and socialism a continuation of the status quo. An ideologically based party of 
the right made a pragmatic party of the left seem dull and unadventurous.’684 What was 
required to recreate ‘the coalition of objectives’ was ‘a fundamental change in our attitude 
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towards the party’s ideology – not in the ideology itself but in the clarity with which it is 
expressed.’685 
Hattersley, the more ideological of the partnership, in concert with Kinnock’s more apparently 
flexible approach, had now set the party on a course on a significant re-evaluation on what 
the party actually stood for. 
The Policy Review 
The Policy Review was set in seven discussion groups on areas including the economy, 
people at work, economic equality, consumers, civil liberties, foreign policy and the 
environment. This was to be augmented by Labour Listens, a series of meetings between the 
public and Labour politicians across the country. These meetings were not viewed with much 
enthusiasm by some of the shadow cabinet, with Roy Hattersley writing in his memoirs that 
Labour Listens was ‘an organised farce.’686 In Choose Freedom, Hattersley had warned that 
‘if we leave the ideas to be argued out in small groups at Fabian teas and New Statesman 
seminars, we will fail again into the abyss which engulfed us in 1945.’687 Westlake notes also 
that Bryan Gould, previously a strong advocate of a public consultation was ‘less ready to 
abandon Labour’s existing ideological commitments than some of the younger generation of 
modernisers such as Tony Blair and Jack Straw.’688 Sarah Benton for Marxism Today 
observed that there was further animosity from those in the Campaign group at the exercise: 
Naturally, there are many in the Labour Party who are not in sympathy with the project. 
“I can work under a red rose, I can even work under a pink rose, but I can't work under 
an ear-trumpet”, Tony Benn is reported as saying. Why magnify the voices of those 
duped by Thatcherism into wanting private shares? For the hard Left, there is no need 
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for a fundamental review because the fundamentals of socialism are beyond 
dispute.689 
In Benton’s article, Tom Sawyer stated that the aims of the exercise were ‘more modest than 
either detractors or visionaries anticipate’, with adding the hope that '”I didn't want the party to 
tear itself apart after three election defeats in a row,”' with Benton observing that ‘such self-
destruction was widely anticipated nine months ago’.690 
In a confidential memorandum to the Home Policy Committee in July 1987 drafted by Geoff 
Bish of the Policy Directorate, it outlined bluntly what was seen to be required ‘If we are to 
succeed in that election – if we are to succeed as a Government – our policies must be 
attractive and credible in terms of the realities and opportunities of the 1990s,’ adding that it 
must not look ‘backward to the missed opportunities of the seventies and eighties.’691 
Acknowledging that ‘unlike prior to 1983’ Labour had been undertaking updates to policy 
prepared between the NEC and the shadow Cabinet which had allowed the party ‘to present 
a united approach on all the main policy issues’, the memorandum stated that ‘what we did 
not attempt in these years, however, was as more fundamental and radical review of our main 
policies. The time is now ripe, we suggest, to set in hand just such a review – and to do so in 
each of the main policy areas.’692 Any proposed review, added the memorandum had to ‘be 
seen to address itself to the realities and problems of the 1990s’, particularly in the areas of 
international relations and the environment; ‘to relate to the real needs, demands and 
aspirations of ordinary people, as individuals, not to have ‘policies which do not look as though 
they have been dusted down or reworked from the Labour Programme of 1976 and 1982,’; 
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and ‘provide a clear expression of the core values of the party.’693 The Policy Review was to 
encompass three phases: Listening, initiating new policy work and finally the publication of the 
results of the Review itself.694 In an undated note that Kinnock had made during a meeting of 
the NEC (presumably the September meeting of the Home Policy Committee that Tom 
Sawyer’s paper was to be submitted), he had written that the concern was that any review 
‘could be presented as concession to Thatcherism. We look opportunistic.’695 
There was a developing theme on liberty and freedom being pursued in one of the Policy 
Review Groups which connected to Labour’s social liberal traditions. In an undated 
memorandum from the ‘Policy Review Group on Democracy for the Individual and the 
Community’, it stated that in order to ensure ‘equal access to the law to secure equal treatment’ 
to ensure equality in the eyes of employers regardless of gender, it also added that legislation 
would be needed to prevent discrimination against people with disabilities. It also stated that 
the issue of discrimination against gay and lesbian people had increased with the advent of 
Section 28 (see Chapter Four) and declared that: 
…there is no doubt that discrimination on the grounds of sexuality is increasing. Clause 
28 of the Local Government Act is the latest manifestation of this. It is an assault on 
civil liberties and freedom of expression. It must be repealed. Lesbians and gays must 
have the same freedom from discrimination and prejudice and the same freedoms to 
live their lives as other people.696 
Labour’s position on defence, nuclear weapons and the issue of unilateral disarmament was 
to be particularly contentious. The Britain and the World Policy Review Group had seen Gerald 
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Kaufman and Mike Gapes heading a party delegation to the headquarters of NATO where 
commitment to membership to the Atlantic Alliance was reaffirmed and how the US viewed 
the recent initiative to reduce nuclear stockpiles by Mikhail Gorbachev positively, but that the 
US wished for Britain to maintain its nuclear capability.697 On 1 January 1989, Peter Smith of 
the think tank Just Defence submitted papers on defence spending to Charles Clarke for 
passing to Kinnock adding that that they were also due to meet with the Britain in the World 
Policy Review Group. Smith noted that a speech that Mikhail Gorbachev had given to the 
United Nations had ‘moved the goal posts to some extent’ but that it ‘only served to underline 
the case we are making for a move towards a non-provocative defence strategy.’698 The 
changes in the international arena and the advent of Perestroika and Glasnost under 
Gorbachev’s leadership meant that Labour could now think in terms of modernising and 
reducing Britain’s nuclear capability gradually as part of a wider international framework.  
Such a change in policy was anticipated to be controversial, so much so that on 13 November 
1988, Malcolm Dando had submitted a paper titled ‘Well, Mr Kinnock, can we now turn to 
Labour’s new Defence Policy?’ which asked hypothetical questions Labour could be expected 
due the change in policy, stating that ‘there is a need for Labour to argue the case for 
disarmament loud and clear from now on, whatever the possible outcome of the policy review. 
Our own differences are about the means to achieve disarmament. Our differences with the 
present Government are over ends.’699 This would be followed in June 1989 with a background 
briefing document explaining the changes to the policy compiled by Mike Gapes of the Britain 
in the World PRG.700 The move to a change in defence policy was to prove objectionable to 
those who supported unilateralism. On 7 March 1989, Jeremy Corbyn as Secretary of the 
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Campaign group of MPs and the coordinator of the Campaign for Non-Alignment issued a 
press release calling NATO to be disbanded declaring that ‘opposition to NATO and its ever 
growing demands for new and more potent nuclear weapons and its control over national 
defence budgets is growing fast.’701 This demonstrated that Labour’s return to the policy area 
of multilateralism that had caused division since Gaitskell would continue to be controversial.  
Similarly, the Britain in the World Policy Review Group also proposed ‘a socialist vision of the 
European Community’702, supporting the enlargement of the EC, the European Political 
Cooperation mechanism coordinating Community foreign policy and support for the Single 
European Act provided scrutiny of policy making was made available for sovereign 
parliaments.703 This again was anathema for those who had opposed membership of the EEC 
and latterly the EC (opposition mainly to be found but not exclusively on the Hard Left).  
As has been noted in the introduction, Tribune had been particularly scathing towards the 
production of the Aims and Means document. Inevitably the proposals to scale back the 
emphasis on nationalisation and unilateralism in the Review led to some on the left to 
unsurprisingly protest at the proposals. Yet by the time of the publication of the draft Campaign 
Briefing document on 30 May 1989704, the draft Policy Review consultations were ready for 
public consumption. The following month, Neil Stewart wrote to Larry Whitty noting that whilst 
the launch of the Policy Review had gone well and ‘the first important hurdles in union 
conferences had been overcome,’ the concerns within the leadership that ‘the focus on 
defence means that other important changes in emphasis in the Review have not been fully 
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aired.’705 The eventual outcome of the Policy Review when it was finally completed was 
significant. The move away from established Labour nostrums as nationalisation (with the 
exception of the recently privatised utilities) and more contentious ideals such as unilateralism 
less than a decade since their adoption at conference had led to the breakaway of the Gang 
of Four and their supporters.  
Critics of the Review were not restricted to the Hard Left of the Labour Party. One commentator 
suggested that the proposed changes in the Policy Review would have a detrimental effect on 
Labour’s support in Scotland. Ian Bell suggested that ‘all the policies which are thought to 
have contributed to Labour’s poor public image are to be abandoned,’ and that given ‘the 
despair and that a decade of impotence has induced, you can see Labour’s point.’706 For Bell 
this decision was taken with a view towards winning support in England, something which had 
not been an issue in Scotland and as such suggested that Labour’s current policies were the 
reason for their popularity there over the other parties and particularly the Scottish Nationalists. 
For Bell this was a dangerous proposition: ‘What in essence is the difference between 
Kinnock’s attitude and Thatcher’s? One takes it for granted that Scots will vote against her; 
the other that Scots will vote for him. Both prefer to cultivate the English majority, whatever 
Scotland thinks.’707 
A.J. Davies criticises the Policy Review for timidity in not including any policy on electoral 
reform as championed by Charter 88, complaining that the surveys and opinion polling had 
made Labour ‘”safe” to the point of dullness, not normally the characteristic one would 
associate with an organisation which, after all, was intended to challenge the status quo.’708 
Hughes and Wintour, whilst acknowledging that ‘no other leading Labour figure could have so 
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systematically successful in persuading the party to change’, accused the review of lacking 
‘radical ambition.’709 Gerald R. Taylor was dismissive of the Policy Review and proffered that 
it had ‘exposed the pragmatic heart of the Labour Party…and showed the Review to be little 
more than an exercise in winning votes’ adding that ‘Labour’s very pragmatic history and 
philosophy which has  stimulated the mistrust of the electorate.’710 Radhika Desai dismissed 
the Review as far from becoming ‘a Gaitskellite Party’, Labour under Kinnock ‘still refused to 
challenge Labourism by providing a clear doctrinal basis for the party,’ adding that ‘unlike the 
revisionism of the 1950s, Kinnock’s Policy Review was not so much a restatement of socialism 
(however flawed), as a cynical image-building capitulation to a seemingly hegemonic 
Thatcherism’.711 
The Policy Review may have been derided by some but the underlining purpose was achieved 
it moved Labour towards a more revisionist social democratic platform, neither ‘”Thatcherite” 
or even an Owenite social democratic party’712 and as Martin J. Smith observed it was 
Thatcherism which ‘allowed Neil Kinnock the space to transform the party more successfully 
than any previous leader. Thatcherism was a reaction to a new set of circumstances in Britain 
and the world and the Policy Review is in some sense Labour’s reaction to the same 
changes.’713 Dianne Hayter observed that the Policy Review had called upon the help of 
members of Labour Solidarity in the process, with Gerald Kaufman helping on defence and 
George Robertson on Europe but also former Bennites in Margaret Beckett and Patricia Hewitt 
who were now firmly in the Kinnock camp,714 underling just how Kinnock’s coalition had 
expanded and gave some credence to Hattersley’s dictum that  the ‘coalition of objectives’ 
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enables ‘a united party to speak for a wide spectrum of national opinion’.715 The Policy Review 
had moved Labour unequivocally towards a revisionist platform, strongly redolent of 
Croslandite thinking which underscored Hattersley’s view of socialism. As Smith further 
observed ‘the Policy Review and revisionism share a certain scepticism towards 
nationalization and detailed planning in the economy.’716 Those on the revisionist wing of the 
party agreed, Giles Radice noting in his diary on 1 October 1989 at the Party Conference that 
‘we have abandoned unilateral nuclear disarmament, old-style nationalisation, high taxation 
and industrial relations practices based on expanding trade union immunities. Moderation and 
good sense a la John Smith have been the order of the day.’717 
Looking back on the Policy Review period, David Marquand was to be effusive in his praise of 
Kinnock’s efforts with a description which was appropriate for the political change that not only 
the party had undertaken but Kinnock himself: 
The Labour Party had, in short, become a normal European social democratic party, 
committed, as were its continental sister parties, to further European integration, 
continued membership of the Atlantic alliance and an open, market-orientated mixed 
economy, combining private enterprise and public power. Kinnock had turned out to be 
a more full-blooded – and successful – revisionist than Gaitskell had ever been.718  
Labour’s transition to the social democratic revisionist party that it was to become was as a 
consequence of a hard-headed assessment that the party needed to change in order to be of 
any effective use. The defections of the SDP certainly focused minds yet the initial success of 
the Social Democrats was to be less effective or sustainable than their founders had hoped. 
Instead it would eventually be Labour who reached a revisionist consensus within the party, 
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one which was prompted by the hard-headed realities of successive election defeats and the 
realisation that British society was changing. Electoral defeat was a much more effective 
corrective and by the time the Policy Review was initiated if wholehearted support was not 
forthcoming, understanding of a need to examine the party’s long-standing policies was 
accepted. Labour was not adopting Thatcherism, nor was it accepting of the benefits of 
unfettered markets but it was gradually acknowledging that it could no longer be seen to be 
completely opposed to aspects of the new economy which had seen share ownership popular 
with a more aspirant working class. A mixed economy and a commitment to the public 
ownership of the utilities was to become Labour’s proposition to an electorate increasingly 
receptive to the freedom to buy council house and buy a stake in companies such as British 
Telecom. This was very much a revisionist proposition, the freedom and liberty of the individual 
to share in the greater prosperity as a means of increasing equality.  
Labour also ensured that it was committed to equality in the areas of gender, race and 
sexuality, a direct challenge to the restrictive qualities of the Thatcher Government and a 
continuation of Labour’s re-asserted social liberalism. It was in the process of producing a 
platform which made it distinctive from both the Conservatives and the Liberals and SDP (in 
whichever form they were to take). Yet before the Policy Review was completed both Kinnock 
and Hattersley would face a challenge to their authority. 
The Defeat of the Far Left: The Leadership Election of 1988 
As the Policy Review was being assembled and put in to place, Kinnock and Hattersley were 
to face the challenge that had been expected from those on Hard Left but until early 1988 had 
kept their counsel. The instigation of the Policy Review had led some on the left to express 
their anger at Kinnock’s decision to countenance the abandonment of long-standing policies 
which had been established since 1980. Opposition to the changes in the Policy Review were 
again being touted as a cause of a new schism between the left and right of Labour. A split 
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had already begun to occur within the Labour Coordinating Committee with those proposing 
a statement condemning the moves proposed by the Policy Review including Peter Hain and 
the newly elected MPs Ken Livingstone and George Galloway. Those opposed to the 
statement condemning included David Blunkett. 719 
In his diary entry of 27 January 1988, Benn notes that having left a fractious meeting of the 
NEC that he thought that ‘what came out of today’s meeting was the detestation (led by 
Kinnock) of the left’, and later that day the Campaign group discussed the possibility of a 
candidate forward to challenge for the party leadership.720 The idea was not universally 
supported within the Socialist Campaign group, with Clare Short, Gavin Strang, Paul Boateng, 
Diane Abbott amongst others who were either against or doubtful of a contest. Those in favour 
included Eric Heffer, Dennis Skinner and Jeremy Corbyn. The motion was passed to submit 
two documents ‘Aims and Objectives’ and ‘Agenda for Labour’ as a means of ‘a concerted 
campaign for socialism…within the party’, with a leadership election as part of that 
campaign.721 Three days later, Benn issued a press release, denouncing ‘the consistent failure 
of the leadership to give support to those – like the miners, the printers and others – who have 
been campaigning, outside parliament, to defend their jobs and living standards,’ and ‘the 
almost total subordination of the NEC and party staff to the Leader’s office which now 
exercises its power in an increasingly authoritarian and intolerant manner often showing 
contempt for those who express dissent or even seek an open democratic debate on important 
issues.’722 
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Matters intensified when Kinnock wrote to The Guardian on 29 January 1988 deriding the 
possibility of a leadership contest and taking aim at Jeremy Corbyn for ‘a concerted campaign 
for socialism,’723 and asking  
since socialism or anything like it will not come from anything but the Labour Party and 
since I presume that even the Campaign Group of MPs understand that a Labour 
Government is therefore necessary to promote that aim, can they produce the name 
of any Tory, Social Democrat or Liberal voter who says “I would be more inclined to 
vote Labour if only you had a leadership contest.”724 
On 23 March 1988, Benn made his announcement that he would be challenging Neil Kinnock 
for the leadership. Benn’s decision prompted four MPs to leave the Campaign Group, Clare 
Short, Margaret Beckett, Joan Ruddock and Jo Richardson.725 
Neil Kinnock himself had again been under pressure due to the fall in the party’s standing in 
the polls, albeit only narrowly – forty two percent as opposed to forty four for the Conservatives. 
As Westlake also observed Kinnock also found himself facing criticism from the right in the 
form of the Deputy General Secretary of the GMB David Warburton who had written in Forward 
Labour ‘the distance between the leadership and the rest of the Movement is rather sad, even 
surprising. At worst it is demoralising.’726 
Yet Kinnock was to continue with his leadership defence, even when faced with the prospect 
of John Prescott challenging Roy Hattersley for the Deputy Leadership along with Eric Heffer. 
In an angry comment written against a note on an off-the-record briefing to three journalists 
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from the Daily Express, Kinnock had commented ‘I consider the act of standing with the 
division and distraction it will cause is an act of sabotage against the party.’727 
On 29 June 1988, Kinnock gave a speech to the Annual Conference of the National Union of 
Mineworkers denouncing those such as the union’s president, Arthur Scargill, as failing to 
grasp the required changes to Labour policy in the face to three consecutive election defeats, 
attacking ‘the left in their “wonderland” (who) were lagging behind Communist Russia, where 
“this very week in Moscow they are tearing up the orthodoxy of the command economy.’728 
On the 2 October 1988, the leadership results were announced and Benn’s defeat was total 
with Kinnock winning almost eighty-nine percent of the vote and Roy Hattersley being returned 
with almost sixty seven percent.729 Amongst the unions which had supported Kinnock was the 
National Union of Mineworkers.   
The victory was for Kinnock a valediction of the moves undertaken with the Policy Review, as 
Keith Laybourn noted, ‘Kinnock, and the Labour Party, were not going to driven off the 
rightward move towards social democracy.’730 Whilst Benn was philosophical on the morning 
after the defeat, a year afterwards his mood was different. Benn’s assessment of the outcome 
of the Policy Review had been despondent, noting in September 1989 ‘the NEC has 
abandoned socialist aspirations and any idea transforming society; it has accepted the main 
principles not only of capitalism but of Thatcherism,’ adding that ‘however we dress it up, we 
are going to keep the bomb.’  Benn then lamented that he: 
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didn’t want to join another Party or set one up. I don’t want the Labour Party to lose, 
but I want people to understand clearly what is really happening, otherwise they are 
going to waste their time, they’ll be cynical, frustrated and so on.731 
It would be almost thirty years before there was another challenge from the far left of the party 
for any position of the leadership. 
Conclusion 
The defeats of both 1983 and 1987 were to be the catalysts for the radical re-positioning of 
Labour within the political landscape, 1987 more so than result of four years previously. Since 
Kinnock’s election as party leader in 1983, Labour had striven to become relevant and 
appealing to an electorate which had significantly approved of the message presented by the 
Conservatives and the accompanying mandate that the voters had provided on two occasions. 
In 1987 the move to a more nuanced approach to the economy and a shift from the overtly 
socialist programme of 1983 may have seen Labour gain over two million votes yet it had 
again lost in a landslide defeat. The impact of these defeats was to lead to a Policy Review as 
an attempt to address how Labour could win back more voters including those it had lost 
previously and had not returned as well as those whom had never voted for them previously.  
By the end of 1988, Kinnock had secured his position as leader. The left had been 
comprehensively defeated if not consigned to the margins as was to come in later years. By 
the end of the decade, Labour had secured its European flank to the extent that it was no 
longer one of the excoriating issues that threatened its unity. Austin Mitchell remarked that he 
thought that ‘Kinnock actually did a great job in weaning the Labour Party from its more idiotic 
policies, it’s more unsaleable policies including withdrawal from Europe, nuclear disarmament 
as well and presenting us as a moderate reformed party, which we were by 1987.’732 In 1981, 
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Giles Radice had contended that with winning the Deputy Leadership election, Denis Healey 
had saved the Labour Party. Looking back almost thirty years later, and despite whatever 
differences they may have had during their political partnership, Roy Hattersley was to use 
the same tribute for Neil Kinnock.733 The Labour Party had re-emerged at the end of a decade 
in which it had started in existential turmoil yet finished it with a statement of Aims and Values 
which now encapsulated what the party was for and for the very most part united behind them. 
Labour could point to a commitment to a less interventionist yet still guided economic approach 
allied to a commitment to personal freedoms and equality, a socially democratic economy and 
a socially liberal society. 
Kinnock’s and Labour’s satisfaction at the move to a more centrist position was tempered by 
the continued realisation that power still seemed a distant prospect. Labour may have been 
making considerable progress in the opinion polls and the Policy Review was receiving 
positive attention. The battles over policy direction had seemingly been settled with the heavy 
defeat of Benn. Moreover, by the end of the decade and only eight years since its inception, 
the Alliance was now contending with the paroxysms of anxiety and anger which were 
resulting from the merger of the Liberals and the Social Democrats, a merger fiercely opposed 
by an isolated member of the original Gang of Four. Yet the heavy defeat in 1987 was only a 
year old and the Conservatives were still assured of unity and still securely in Government. 
For Labour it was still a case of work in progress and ultimately its greatest chance of return 
to Government was predicated on the Conservatives losing the confidence of the electorate. 
It would be another nine years and further introspection for such a chance to present itself.  
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Conclusion 
 
The breakway of the SDP represented a cathartic episode for the party as it allowed it to begin 
the process of re-discovering what its purpose actually was. It allowed the revisionists on the 
right who decided to remain, that they could continue as members of the party and in due 
course were to prove effective in re-establishing their influence within the party and stemming 
further defections. By the time of the 1983 General Elections the defections had stopped and 
new talent was emerging from the new intake of MPs, one of the few bright highlights from the 
carnage of the landslide that had taken place. From being demoralised and divided in the late 
1970s, Labour’s revisionists were to be much more vocal and confident by the end of the 
1980s. The defections to the SDP may have been the catalyst for change within Labour but 
the transformation was undertaken despite, not because of, the SDP’s creation. In the 1950s, 
Labour had debated what its purpose was and to train and find agreement on policies that 
appealed to the British electorate on the back of three successive election defeats, coming to 
accept that many of their working class supporters wanted more aspirational policies. 
Thatcherism’s electoral success ensured that Labour assessed what its purpose was in the 
same way, the corrective shock of defeat galvanising the party in reaching for a consensus on 
what was required. It called together the broad church within which the congregation of those 
democratic socialists/social democrats who had remained sat alongside soft leftists and later 
a number of disillusioned far leftists such as Frank Dobson. They now coalesced to guide the 
party to a reformist, revisionist path. 
The Crisis of Labour Revisionism 
The formation of the Social Democratic Party and the subsequent defection of right-wing 
Labour MPs to it was a defining moment in Labour’s history. It was an end and a beginning. It 
was a culmination of a long-running and festering dispute between certain sections of the party 
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which had lasted since the days of Hugh Gaitskell and Aneurin Bevin. The post-war period up 
to the 1960 had been a fertile time for the revisionist movement within the Labour Party, acting 
as a driving force of ideas and policies that attempted to move the movement away from the 
heavily statist Attlee era. Revisionist thinkers such as Douglas Jay and Anthony Crosland 
suggested a move away from nationalisation as a means of producing equality in society, with 
the latter producing the seminal post-war revisionist work in The Future of Socialism. 
Crosland’s work would dovetail with another rising member of the Labour right in Roy Jenkins, 
with both men writing that alongside the pursuit of equality in the areas of industry and 
economy that a more socially liberal Britain should be achieved, calling for the abolishing of 
capital punishment, the removal of iniquitous legislation on matters such as homosexuality 
and the relaxation of Victorian laws on censorship and gambling. Such policies were anathema 
towards the left wing supporters of Aneurin Bevan, already in conflict with those who coalesced 
around the Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell and for many revisionists the best hope of ensuring 
their policies would see implementation.  
Yet by the 1970s, revisionism was suffering from a crisis of confidence. Faith in the ideas of 
Crosland and indeed in the man himself had seen some on the revisionist right ally themselves 
more closely with Roy Jenkins as the keeper of the faith, particularly as both Crosland and 
Denis Healey expressed less than fulsome conviction towards Europe. This led to a schism 
within the ranks of Labour revisionists who had viewed Crosland as something of an icon, and 
the agnosticism towards Europe, which Crosland and Healey saw as being low down on the 
list of policy priorities, was a driving factor. The disaffected supporters found a ready 
replacement in the figure of an increasingly disenchanted Roy Jenkins and helped to foster a 
new grouping of Labour right wingers who were now referring to themselves as Social 
Democrats. That such disputes can occur due to an indelicate understanding of others’ 
concerns, as was Crosland’s case with MPs such as David Marquand and David Owen, is 
perhaps not surprising. The effects however, were seismic. Those who remained loyal to 
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Crosland, such as Roy Hattersley, had felt bitterness towards Jenkins saying he had become 
‘ideologically impatient with Roy Jenkins. I agreed, in virtually every detail, with his position on 
the Common Market…it was his views on domestic policy which had begun to worry me’.734 
For Hattersley, an argument on comprehensive education, the policy that Crosland had helped 
to usher in during the 1967 Wilson Government, had ended ‘with a sterile dispute about the 
rival merits of “more equality” and “less inequality”. Sterile arguments are normally expressions 
of deeply held feelings which are too painful to express openly. Roy and I were drifting apart 
and I, at least, found the parting painful’.735 The period of Jenkins’ resignation as Deputy 
Leader in 1972 was for Hattersley ‘the moment the old Labour coalition began to collapse. I 
did not realise it at the time, but once the envelope landed on the Chief Whip’s desk, the 
creation of a new Centre Party was inevitable’.736 
Discontent with the Labourism of the Harold Wilson Governments of the 1960s had not just 
been the preserve of the left wing Tribunite ranks of Michael Foot and an increasingly 
influential far left coalescing around Tony Benn. Criticism had also come from the Labour right 
and particularly for Wilson’s failure to deal with the matter of trade union legislation. In the 
following decade, a stagnating economy followed by the crises of the IMF bail-out and the 
Winter of Discontent during the James Callaghan administration had seen the abandonment 
of post-war Keynesianism and the enforced introduction of Monetarism. Crosland’s stubborn 
refusal to countenance an update to the ideas expressed in The Future of Socialism was to 
see a more strident form of revisionism appear on the fringes of the Labour right, such as 
those in the Social Democratic Association. This was also questioned by other MPs such as 
David Marquand and John Mackintosh. Mackintosh claimed that had Crosland and Hugh 
Gaitskell were still alive ‘they would have been the first to admit that their policies had not been 
fully successful. They would have struggled to rethink their case, to produce new programmes 
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and to restore an element of idealism to Left-wing politics in Britain’.737 As Geoffrey Foote 
observed, with MPs such as Mackintosh who were becoming increasingly critical of the trade 
unions, ‘the social democrat wing, as it was now called, was reaching a point where the 
revisionists could find no home in the Labour party’.738 
Crosland’s untimely death in 1977 and the self-removal from the Labour Government by Roy 
Jenkins to Brussels meant that for some on the right there was a lack of philosophical 
leadership. As Crewe and King observed  
the fact was that, after dominating the Labour Party intellectually for at least forty years, 
the right had run out of ideas. They still had ideals. They still values. They still had 
preferences. But they no longer had a programme and a theory of how the world 
worked.739 
After the 1979 election, Labour had to come to terms with the crushing defeat at the hands of 
a strident and populist Conservative Party led by Margaret Thatcher. The defeat, whilst not as 
excoriating in terms of loss of seats as the defeat of 1931 or 1959, was significant in what it 
represented. As with the Reagan Democrats in the United States, Labour lost support from an 
increasingly aspirational working class to the Conservatives. Some within Labour had spent 
the time in Government either under-estimating the determination of Thatcher and the forces 
that supported her, or presenting in lurid terminology what a Conservative Government would 
actually represent. Callaghan had noted with some prescience that there had been a ‘sea-
change’ in the mood of the British public and that the certainties that his party had previously 
been able to call upon could no longer be taken for granted, namely the continual support from 
working class communities. How best to respond to this new phenomenon was something the 
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revisionists were not able to immediately contend with as Labour once plunged into civil war 
and the Labour right was increasingly under attack from the Bennite left. 
The failure of the Labour right to remain united led to the eventual split and the formation of 
the Social Democrats. Roy Jenkins had spoken of Britain being ill-served by two parties 
operating on the extremes of politics and such sentiments were finding favour amongst some 
on the Labour right that had become increasingly convinced that the party was no longer 
representative of their views. The election of Michael Foot as leader over the favourite Denis 
Healey was the catalyst for the breakaway, as was the introduction of a unilateralist nuclear 
defence policy and a commitment to withdraw from the European Economic Community. With 
the announcement of the Council for Social Democracy, the Social Democratic Party was to 
eventually see twenty-eight Labour MPs defect. The Labour right was faced with an existential 
crisis on two fronts, temporarily incapable of leading a defence against those who had 
departed and the far left who wished to see them also go. 
The immediate impact of the breakaway of the SDP from the Labour Party was a protracted 
period of opposition and the domination of the Conservative Party for the last two decades of 
the Twentieth Century. The ‘sea-change’ referred to by James Callaghan to the ending of the 
post-war consensus signalled the impending implementation of free market economics allied 
to an implied if not wholly executed Victorian puritanism. The Social Democrats were a natural 
consequence of the two main parties seemingly vacating the centre areas of the political 
spectrum. The Social Democrats offered to provide an invigorated dynamic to a centre now 
only occupied by the Liberals, a pseudo-revisionist body which held some similarities in belief 
to the older party, free of the influence of the trade unions and a seemingly more democratic 
movement than the Labour one it had wrenched itself from.  
The SDP was to effectively reach its highest point as Denis Healey narrowly won the deputy 
leadership election against Tony Benn. Without this win, Labour may well have seen a 
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combination of MPs joining the new party or in the case of some such as Giles Radice leaving 
politics altogether. Healey’s victory cemented the belief of those on the right that had remained 
that their decision had been correct. As noted in Chapter Three, for many on the right there 
was simply no question of defecting. Austin Mitchell considered the SDP, whilst causing 
damage to Labour initially, as being ‘representative of flash in the pan politics’, observing that 
it was usually as a reaction against the two-party dominated system.740 For Mitchell, Dick 
Taverne was the first instance of such a phenomenon at the Lincoln by-election in 1974 (‘little 
man taking on the machine’741), followed by the SDP, ‘then Cleggmania and now as a fourth 
we have UKIP.’742 For Mitchell. the defections were part of ‘a self-correcting mechanism’, with 
those who were leaving doing so due to a combination of ‘ego, and ambition as well as 
ideology, they were just too impatient’.743 
For Paul McHugh the impact of the SDP on the party was greatly significant in electoral terms: 
the British left was appallingly damaged by the defection of the SDP and therefore 
greater empowerment of the Liberals when they found the Liberal Democrats, and it 
has taken us until now, in the mire of defeat, to see the Lib Dems really put back to 
where they were in the 1970s. I’m an old fashioned social democrat who would have 
much preferred the Labour Party to have carried on and win the 1983 General Election 
which I think it could have done if it had not split.744 
Yet Labour’s right-wing proved itself to be much more resilient that many of them realised at 
the time. Whilst the right had managed to caucus in groups such as Manifesto and Campaign 
for Labour Victory in the 1970s, the defections had seen those groups collapse. Despite this, 
and in the face of the SDP and the popularity of Tony Benn, revisionists such as Roy Hattersley 
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and Giles Radice were able to help form Labour Solidarity and involve those from the left such 
as Frank Field in their organisation and campaigning. With the support of the trade unions, the 
Labour right quietly re-asserted itself as a force within the party. Although the defections were 
a shock to the body politic, they ultimately acted as the reviving force that Labour’s revisionist 
wing required. The humiliating defeat of the 1983 General Election weakened the far left by 
removing temporarily Tony Benn from Parliament, and it showed the limitations of the Social 
Democrats’ electoral reach, with two of the ‘Gang of Four’ losing their seats and twenty-one 
others following suit. The SDP had been damaging to the Labour Party as they split the centre-
left vote, but they had not effectively broken the stranglehold of British politics being dominated 
by the Conservatives and Labour. What the Social Democrats had also initiated was the slow 
rebuilding process that Labour was to go through to reach a revisionist consensus which 
followed another heavy electoral defeat. 
Labour’s Social Liberalism in the Thatcher Era 
The election of Neil Kinnock and Roy Hattersley as his deputy was to herald a gradual process 
of rebuilding Labour after the humiliation of 1983. This process took place against the 
backdrop of the Miners’ Strike of 1984-5 and the lengthy and protracted expulsions of Militant 
members from the party and in opposition to a Conservative Government with a huge majority 
which allowed it to act with even greater freedom than it had during the previous 
administration. In the face of such challenges, it would have been somewhat understandable 
if Labour had quietly dropped matters in the area of social affairs which it may have gauged 
to have been unpopular or unimportant by voters. As was seen during the Policy Review focus 
group results, Labour was perceived to be blighted by the ‘Looney Left’ epithet which 
suggested too much consideration on the rights of ethnic minorities and gay rights. Yet Labour 
not only maintained this commitment throughout the 1980s, a time when subtlety and 
compassion in such matters were in short supply, particularly in the print media, it was to 
eventually enshrine as a manifesto pledge to repeal Section 28 of the Local Government Act 
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of 1988. Labour could have jettisoned such a commitment but it would not only have found 
itself at odds with its membership but also its own traditions. Support for homosexual rights 
had been a cause within Labour for many years and in the 1960s it was seen as the 
culmination of a long called for pledge by revisionists such as Crosland and Jenkins but also 
by others within the party on the left as well. When Labour was presented with a puritanical 
codicil found within local Government legislation, it had no choice but to oppose it if it was to 
maintain its social liberal tradition. That Labour did was a testament to the adherence to its 
social liberal tradition when it would have been an easier option to ignore it.  
The work that Labour undertook in the 1980s ensured that its social liberalism was taken 
forward into the era of New Labour. For all of the tough rhetoric on crime and a more socially 
moralising stance on issues on welfare and responsibility, the New Labour Government did 
adhere to a socially liberal programme which reversed some of the more retrograde policies 
that had been introduced during the Thatcher era, and it built on the work of previous Labour 
initiatives. The programme implemented by Tony Blair’s New Labour Governments, which 
included the eventual repealing of Section 28, was in no small part due to the party continuing 
the progressive social liberalism that had survived when it so easily could have been jettisoned 
in the pursuit of power and populism. Policies which had been derided as the crackpot ideas 
of a few London councils by a hostile tabloid media were in due course to become the 
accepted norm and provided a link from the Foot era to the Blair years. Indeed, so accepted 
were the notions of gay equality that it was to be a Conservative-led Government that was to 
introduce same-sex marriage onto the statute books.  
Yet unlike in 1992, when Labour clearly stated their intention to repeal Section 28, there was 
to be no mention of it in the 1997 manifesto. In 1994 there was acrimony directed to some 
Labour MPs who had abstained or voted against a bill proposed by the Conservative Edwina 
Currie equalising the age of consent, a measure which was supported by the now former 
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leader Neil Kinnock.745 Indeed, it was to be 2003 before the legislation was finally repealed 
and then by the mechanism of a free vote. As Simon Mackley observed, this prompted the 
Labour MP David Cairns to ruefully note that they ‘would not dream of allowing a free vote on 
issues of race discrimination or gender discrimination.’746 So whilst in theory and in part 
practice it was to be an agent of social liberalism, in this regard the move to repeal was a 
tentative approach: perhaps this was due in part to maintaining the adherence to ‘big tent’ 
politics and thus not wishing to push too fast too soon.  
This was not because it was simply wishing to keep occasional Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat voters on side, but rather Labour’s own working class supporters who were less 
socially liberal. This linked Blair’s leadership in some respect to Callaghan’s in that it showed 
an adherence in a more gradualist approach to achieving stated aims in the belief that this 
would ensure longer term acceptance. The irony also is that New Labour was seen as a 
Government that had come in to power with socially liberal aims which it promptly met, yet it 
came to be identified with the illiberal. It was damaged by the association with the Iraq War, 
the pursuit of 90 day detention of suspects without charge and the attempted introduction of 
identity cards. 
The legacy of the 1980s period was that it provided a social liberal basis for New Labour but 
one which was as problematic for the Blair Government as it was for the leadership of Neil 
Kinnock. In 1987, Kinnock was led to believe that supporting causes such as gay rights was 
a vote loser amongst the traditional working-class supporters. Thus in the 1990s and 2000s, 
was social liberalism ultimately to come at a cost of alienating the working classes who for so 
long supported the Labour Party? That was a fear in the 1980s based on polling of its support. 
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And in the present era, has the pursuit of equality and fairness by Labour been one of the 
drivers for the popularity of the UK Independence Party in traditionally strong Labour areas, 
reflecting of the natural social conservatism of the working classes and a rejection of 
metropolitan thinking? The socially conservative philosophy as proffered by the adherents of 
Blue Labour has been suggested as a means of combating the rise of the populist right. Yet 
the party continued to find itself pressured to abandon a commitment to equality to counter 
the accusations that it is too hidebound to political correctness.  
The problem with this proposition was, as Patrick Diamond and Michael Kenny wrote, that 
‘while its diagnosis of Labour's ills was powerful, Blue Labour's remedy may have offered the 
wrong kind of medicine. Many question the implications of romanticising the social relations of 
the past, against which women, ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians have rightly rebelled.’747 
Moreover, the suggestion that Labour support is still wedded en masse to the ideals of social 
conservatism are not borne out by polling in 2012 which found same sex relationships as 
always or mostly wrong down to 29%, reflecting a rapid decline in opposition to the LGBT 
community mid-1990s onwards.748 
Labour could certainly not take its core white working class support for granted, for as John 
Clarke noted, ‘Labour without its traditional voters is the SDP – and look what happened to 
them. As a rootless elitist party they evaporated like a thimbleful of sherry in the hard Tuscany 
sun.’749 As they did in the 1960s and again in the 1980s, Labour had always been at its most 
effective when it challenged the accepted norms even when it has seemed politically 
dangerous to do so. Indeed it would be more severely damaging to them were they to water 
down such commitments to accommodate those who may never vote for them, losing new 
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converts and long-standing supporters in the process. Frank Dobson proffered the assertion 
that the reason for voter mistrust is a direct result of parties saying one thing and then 
implementing another, that you may not win the vote but you may oddly win their trust, adding 
that ‘Consensus is something that is pushed through by people with a real commitment to 
something and it is gradually accepted.’750 
Labour Revisionism Renewed 
It took a member of the soft left, and one from the Revisionist right, to help push through the 
changes that were to become the Policy Review. Neil Kinnock’s pragmatic approach was 
augmented by Roy Hattersley’s unabashed ideology and underpinned the debate that the 
party was required to have by 1987. It was significant that by the latter part of the 1980s, the 
faction of the party which was appearing as unsupportive to debate on policy was the one 
which had attacked the leaderships of Wilson and Callaghan for exactly the same reason. The 
Campaign Group led by Tony Benn was unsurprisingly opposed to the re-assertion of a new 
revisionism by Kinnock and Hattersley, but unfortunately for the former, three election defeats 
had convinced the wider movement of the need to address whatever changes were required. 
By the culmination of the Policy Review, Labour had agreed on a series of policies which were 
supported by the wider membership, the PLP and the unions. The protracted battles over 
Europe and nuclear weapons, the great shibboleths of the previous thirty years were 
seemingly resolved with the commitment to the European Community and a multilateral 
nuclear policy forged in a changing international environment. As noted in Chapter Five, David 
Marquand was warmly approving of the outcome of the Policy Review and its production was 
to see Labour very much a revisionist movement once more.751 This was the ‘coalition of 
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objectives’ that Hattersley had spoken of in Choose Freedom, the combination of pragmatism 
and philosophy. The Policy Review was this understanding in practice. 
Labour ended the 1980s hopeful that its forward march had not only been renewed but was 
now heading towards eventual victory. This was anchored by the crushing victory Neil Kinnock 
achieved over Tony Benn in the leadership contest of 1988. Seven years previously Benn had 
come agonisingly close to winning the Deputy Leadership, and his defeat to a man who had 
been amongst others on the soft left that had abstained rather than support his candidacy 
must have been all the more painful as a consequence.  
The ultimate purpose of the Policy Review was to prepare the Labour Party for electoral 
success. That this was considered to be a cynical undertaking is somewhat confusing as the 
purpose of a political party is to attain power in to put its policies into place. If three defeats 
had not prompted the Policy Review then it would have been conceivable that Labour would 
have struggled to have maintained relevance. Whether the newly-formed Liberal Democrats 
could have capitalised on such an eventuality is uncertain seeing as the Alliance had failed to 
overtake Labour in the preceding period. What the Social Democrats and the Alliance had 
forced upon Labour was assistance in electoral defeat. Labour did not have to take 
philosophical direction from the SDP as it was able to consult with its own revisionist traditions. 
Under David Owen, the SDP had sought to be more aligned to the Conservative Party’s 
economic policy despite Owen’s protestations that the SDP remained a centre left party. 
Labour’s Policy Review may have moved the party to the political centre but with a 
commitment to the public ownership of the utilities amongst its economic strategies. This 
helped to ensure it remained a distinctive voice.  
The SDP failed to supplant Labour because it had not taken the right completely with them, 
leaving a left-wing rump. Instead the majority of centre-right and revisionist members remained 
within the party and, in due course, was to form an understanding with the soft left to reach a 
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new revisionist settlement. The SDP may have had philosophical pretensions to being more 
akin to the social democratic parties in continental Europe but in the end it failed due to Labour 
rediscovering revisionism after repeated electoral defeat. Ultimately the Social Democrats had 
imploded into bitter division, with David Owen leading the tiny remaining coterie of MPs who 
shared his opposition to the merger with the Liberals. After some unwieldy name changes, the 
new party settled on the Liberal Democrats under the leadership of the Liberal Paddy 
Ashdown. The new party struggled to break out of the teens in terms of polling and Labour 
seemingly began to benefit from its move to a more moderate position with the return of former 
members to the fold. Not everyone was so enamoured by this development: ‘There were two 
SDP peers who applied to come back to the Labour Party accepted their membership…there 
was a real resentment about the people coming back…these people had deserted the Labour 
Party. They had been disloyal and had deserted us and in some way were never to be 
forgiven.’752 Similar resentment was also felt by Paul McHugh: 
Again, I’m not very tolerant of the SDP or Lib Dem argument now that “well you know 
you chaps wouldn’t be where you are now if we hadn’t pulled out.” Indeed not, but we 
might have been in a better place, a Denis Healey Government through the 1980s 
wouldn’t have been a bad thing for Britain, certainly better than Margaret Thatcher 
Government.753 
From Policy Review to New Labour 
Labour’s defeat of April 1992 was devastating as the hope of being so close to victory had 
been high. Kinnock’s infamous speech at Sheffield may have been seen as premature 
triumphalism but Labour had every reason to be confident after thirteen years of opposition. 
Labour’s ideas had been well received, more so than they had been in 1987 and their 
operations had been further honed since the well-regarded campaign fought five years earlier. 
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Taken on that basis only, all of the progress that had been made since the Policy Review 
which had been set up in order to make Labour electable had effectively come to nothing. Yet 
the Review had been otherwise successful in establishing a credible platform upon which 
Labour could build. The electoral task in overturning the majority held by the Conservatives 
was always a huge undertaking to consider, and in coming close to doing so reflects on the 
work that the Policy Review produced. 
The defeat was an unprecedented failure for the Labour Party, a fourth consecutive reversal 
and one which had seen the Tories returned with the biggest share of the votes yet, albeit with 
a narrow majority of twenty one seats. The defeat was to see the resignation of Kinnock and 
Hattersley on the morning of the result. It was a bitter experience for Labour, yet the party did 
not resort to the civil war as took place in 1979. Instead there was a leadership election which 
saw the election of the centre-right shadow chancellor John Smith. Smith was the last 
remaining member of James Callaghan’s Government and was a noted member of the Labour 
right, yet the election was not a straight battle between the right and left. Bryan Gould differed 
from Smith on the position of Europe but otherwise he was seen as one of the modernising 
members of the previous Kinnock team who eschewed the case for nationalisation, placing 
him more in the mould of Peter Shore over ten years previously. Smith however was an 
extremely popular choice amongst the membership, the unions and the PLP. The result when 
it was announced was total – Smith won the election with ninety-one percent of the vote.754  
Tragedy was to strike Labour when John Smith died suddenly on 12 May 1994. The death of 
Smith removed from Labour an effective Parliamentarian and despite the oratorical skills of 
the previous two leaders before him, someone who had conducted his leadership with a 
forensic examination of the Government which had hit home. Presented as he may have been 
with good fortune such as the ERM debacle, Smith nonetheless had also shepherded Labour 
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through significant structural changes in the form of one member, one vote in the Electoral 
College, with MPs, trade unions and the CLPs given a third of the vote each. This act had as 
Keith Laybourn observed changed the party significantly: ‘the electorate for the Labour 
leadership contests now numbered millions, not a few hundred or thousand activists in smoke-
filled committee rooms.’755 Moreover, Smith, as the first Labour leader from the right since 
Callaghan, managed to ensure that the changes to conference voting was achieved by 
cultivating good relations with those on the left such as John Prescott. As with the hero of the 
Labour right Hugh Gaitskell, Smith’s untimely death provided another lost leader, never to see 
the ambition of leading their party into Government. It was also to see the loss of a strong 
member of the revisionist right. 
The leadership election of 1994 may not have provided Tony Blair with as emphatic a victory 
as the one enjoyed by John Smith, but his election nonetheless was significant as it was 
undertaken under the new system of one member, one vote. Blair gained 198 votes of the 
PLP compared with 65 for Beckett and 64 for Prescott. In the CLPs Blair won 100,000 votes, 
almost sixty thousand more than his nearest rival Prescott and amongst affiliates, Blair won 
almost double that of the man who finished second. With Blair’s election came the stated aim 
of governing from a position that was neither in the left or right, ‘the third way’ as espoused by 
the ‘New Democrats’ associated with President Bill Clinton in the United States.756 This was 
another year zero as far as the left were concerned as Blair’s leadership ushered in the era of 
New Labour. Keith Laybourn observed that it was Blair who was ‘the modernizer who has not 
had to look to the past,’ that unlike previous leaders he was not required ‘to assimilate the past 
culture of Labour, steeped in the trade union traditions and collectivism of the past.’757 On 29 
April 1995, Blair’s efforts to achieve what Gaitskell could not - the removal of Clause IV from 
the party constitution committing it to nationalisation  - was approved by the large majority of 
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the membership: ninety percent of the CLP voted in favour, as did almost fifty seven percent 
of the trade union vote.758  
If the SDP’s influence on Labour during the 1980s was electoral, what was it in regards to the 
New Labour project which was determined to present itself as above factionalism? There is 
the argument, such as that put forward by David Marquand, that New Labour was a different 
phenomenon entirely from the SDP, one that ‘abandoned not only socialism but social 
democracy – in any sense that paladins of the social-democratic tradition such as Bevin, 
Gaitskell or Crosland would have used the term,’759 although Marquand refutes charges of 
New Labour being Thatcherite: ‘Underpinning the individualistic, mobile, competitive society 
is a highly interventionist, indeed dirigiste workforce state, which would have warmed the 
cockles of Beatrice Webb’s heart.’760 Keith Laybourn contended that ‘”New Labour” has now 
rejected the old Keynesian social democracy of the “Old”, which had suggested that the state 
could intervene to promote growth and thus ensure economic growth and employment.’761 
This is at odds with New Labour supporters such as Giles Radice who stated that Tony Blair’s 
‘rethinking (of) the party’s strategy in the light of circumstances was pure revisionism,’ and that 
it followed ‘...the Croslandite argument for defining socialism in terms of greater equality rather 
than of nationalisation.’762  
For the activist Paul McHugh, New Labour was simply a different manifestation of the party 
that was essentially as Labourist as Harold Wilson’s or James Callaghan’s administrations: 
The most significant thing about New Labour was its determination to avoid being 
defeated, it was anything for winning really and I don’t think the SDP’s departure was 
an influence on that. The SDP departure made Labour a losing party for thirteen years, 
                                                          
758 Laybourn, A Century of Labour, p.151 
759 Marquand, The Progressive Dilemma, p.233 
760  Marquand, The Progressive Dilemma, p.235 
761 Laybourn, A Century of Labour, p.152  
762 Giles Radice, Friends and Rivals: Crosland, Jenkins and Healey (London: Little Brown, 2002), p.335 
239 
 
so that’s true but in terms of intellectual formation and policy, no. What New Labour 
was, was a determination not to put a foot out of place and to ensure victory almost at 
all costs and you know the Labour Party today is trying to understand where it’s going 
in reaction to that. 763  
New Labour as a radical reforming force became beached on the concept that any acceptance 
of ideas adopted by previous administrations would be an admission of failure and the pursuit 
of measures such as ID cards and the detention of prisoners sat uneasily with revisionism’s 
social liberal heritage. Martin Pugh contends that New Labour and Blair’s ideology in particular 
was an extension of Thatcherism coupled with a social moralism which was underscored by 
Blair’s emphasis on being tough on crime.764 It could also place Blair alongside David Owen’s 
tough paternalism, an eschewing of ‘soggy liberalism’ which Owen found anathema.765 A 
strong emphasis on social moralism in that all crime was wrong did not necessarily set Blair 
apart from previous Labour leaders, particularly not in the case of James Callaghan. 
New Labour was a revisionist movement, but perhaps it would not be one that Crosland would 
readily recognise nor accept beyond the pro-Europeanism and the pursuit of eradicating 
inequality through redistribution. New Labour worked when it operated as a Labourite 
administration, pursuing policies that crossed both socialist and social democratic areas. 
Independence of the Bank of England on the first day of the Blair Government was a radical 
step which was actually formulated by Ed Balls in his capacity as Gordon Brown’s chief 
economic adviser. The implementing of a one-off ‘Windfall Tax’ on privatised utility companies 
in order to fund the creation of Sure Start Centres was both populist and Croslandite in turn – 
taxation on large corporations in order to help deal with social inequalities. The problem for 
the administrations for both Blair and Brown’s administrations was that its reluctance to 
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consider aspects of the revisionist traditions meant that it was ignoring a part of its traditions 
which may have ultimately assisted them in their policy making.  
The Legacy of the Breakaway 
The defections of those who left Labour in order to form the SDP were motivated by a sense 
of no longer believing that Labour was the mechanism by which social change could be 
promoted. The defections were also motivated by ideology, with those departing being as 
doctrinaire as those on the left who they were opposed to. With the benefit of considerable 
hindsight, it can be argued that the defections in 1981 were an aberration and that the threat 
to moderate revisionism within the party was never truly at risk. In the context of Labour Party 
history, the defections of the SDP were the beginning of a revisionist corrective process in 
which the arguments that began in the 1950s, and which reached their zenith in the early 
1980s, were settled by the process of blood-letting which began with the Gang of Four and 
the expulsion of Militant. Under Neil Kinnock and then John Smith, the Labour Party began 
the protracted move to the political centre. And with the election of Tony Blair in 1994 it was 
suggested by those such as David Owen that the ultimate victory of the revisionists was 
complete, particularly with the return of some former SDP members. Yet by the second decade 
of the twenty-first century, the left of the Labour Party enacted a resurgence that would not 
have been thought possible or likely twenty years before. 
Following the General Election defeat in May 2010, the victory of Ed Miliband as Labour leader 
on 25 September was to see an attempt to return to a more social democratic ethos, a move 
which was welcomed by Roy Hattersley. Miliband’s shadow cabinet also saw tensions 
between his ‘more radical instincts’ and those of his shadow chancellor, Ed Balls, a man who 
proclaimed himself an unashamed Keynesian.766 Further criticism came from what was seen 
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as an uncertainty as to what Miliband’s leadership meant in terms of policy. Initially he 
embraced elements of the ‘Blue Labour’ philosophy as espoused by Jon Cruddas and Maurice 
Glasman, going so far as to provide the preface to the ebook The Labour tradition and the 
politics of paradox. The problem was that Miliband’s tenure was to see criticisms over what 
exactly his leadership represented. Was it ‘Blue Labour’ or was it a Social Democratic 
movement, as hoped by Roy Hattersley in 2011: 
Blue Labour has – in its extreme advocacy of localism – discounted the importance of 
ending the postcode lottery in health and social care and justified the acceptance of a 
sometime inadequate level of provision as the inevitable result of moving power away 
from central Government. In contrast, we believe that the central state has a crucial 
part to play in the creation of a better (as distinct from the ‘big’) society and that its 
defence is essential to the construction to Labour’s policy.767  
The Labour Party under Ed Miliband struggled to reach what its policy programme was to be, 
and it faced criticism from both former Blair-era ministers and also the left of the party. But in 
2011 Miliband found himself receiving praise from one of the original members of the ‘Gang 
of Four’, Lord David Owen. Whilst discounting the possibility of returning to the Labour Party, 
Owen (who sat in the Lords as an Independent Social Democrat) donated money to Labour’s 
campaign funds in March 2014.768 The possibility of Owen’s return was guardedly welcomed 
by some commentators: 
Labour is a social democratic party — or at least that is where it is returning under Ed 
Miliband, departing from the neoliberalism of the New Labour years — is it not the right 
place for social democrats to be? It is hard to argue that it isn’t. Left Futures’ policy 
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prescriptions may well be rather different from David Owen’s (as they are from David 
Miliband’s) but that does not mean that we cannot co-exist in the same party. It is surely 
right that Labour is a “broad church”, provided that we are prepared to work together, 
respect our differences and accept democratic decisions.769 
What was to be Ed Miliband’s most significant legacy – the pushing forward proposals for far 
reaching changes to the election processes within Labour – were adopted by the party. On 1 
March 2014 at a special party conference, Labour voted to accept Miliband’s proposal to 
eighty-six percent to fourteen percent to introduce a full version of one member, one vote for 
all members of the movement. The vote was accepted and grudgingly backed by the three 
main unions in Unite, Unison and the GMB, with Paul Kenny of the latter saying that further 
reforms would be resisted.’770 In undertaking this, Miliband had achieved what members of the 
SDP had attempted as members of Labour some thirty-four years earlier.  
The defeat of 2015 was a devastating result for a Labour Party that had at least hoped to be 
the largest party in Parliament. The result was the election of a long-time supporter of Tony 
Benn in Jeremy Corbyn. Corbyn’s standing within the party was not particularly high, his profile 
nationally even less so. Outside of the Benn Diaries, Corbyn’s name rarely appears in many 
histories of the Labour Party. Scraping on to the leadership ballot after being effectively lent 
the required MPs votes demonstrated how far the left, in particular the Bennite left with which 
Corbyn was associated, had fallen. In 2007 Corbyn’s fellow Campaign MP John McDonnell 
had failed to even get close to gaining the nominations to challenge Gordon Brown for the 
leadership. In 2010 Diane Abbott managed to get onto the ballot but was defeated in the first 
round of voting. Outside of Michael Meacher in the Blair Government, no Campaign MPs had 
cabinet experience. For all of his relative inexperience, Corbyn’s leadership bid was seen as 
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offering the party a genuine debate which for a time had seemed to be too narrow in its focus. 
It was an opportunity which was to see Corbyn elected resoundingly, signifying a considerable 
shift to the left by the party membership and affiliates.  
What are the prospects for revisionism within Labour in an era where populist and left-wing 
policies such as nationalisation of the railways and the scrapping of tuition fees are part of the 
manifesto? If Labour is to exist as the broad church as suggested by Tony Benn then it has to 
be accommodating to all factions and all strands of thought, be it of the more radical left, the 
soft left and the Social Democratic right. The problem is that for many in the party membership, 
revisionism is a reference to the past, to the era of Blair and Iraq and of electoral defeat in 
2015, even though some revisionists such as Roy Hattersley had issues with the New Labour 
period. Just as in 1979, the left see the cause of all of Labour’s travails as being caused by 
failures in government of the right, whilst the right think that the policies and solutions proffered 
by the left amount to nationalisation and control of the party apparatus. What chance is there 
of a rapprochement as the one reached in the 1980s between the Labour factions? Whilst the 
prospect for a revisionist revival in the near future must have seemed remote in 1979, what is 
the future of socialism in the Labour Party from a present day perspective? If Labour 
revisionism is to re-emerge and flourish and to provide a critical and progressive contribution 
to policy then it is perhaps fitting to conclude with the assessment of Tony Crosland by Giles 
Radice: 
Even if many of Crosland’s assumptions and policy prescriptions are no longer valid, 
his way of looking at things, especially the distinction between ends and means and 
his insistence that social democracy must be constantly revised, continues to be of 
relevance in the twenty-first century.771 
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For all of its great achievements and advances, as a vehicle for social change Labour has 
often found itself parked in a cul-de-sac arguing with itself about its future direction, and 
intensely examining why it was out of power. At these points, particularly in the 1980s, 
existential questions had been raised as to the efficacy and purpose of the Labour Party – 
what was it for and who did it represent? In 1981, Labour was to see a schism which resulted 
in the formation of the Social Democratic Party and a very real possibility that it would be 
overtaken as the main centre left party in British politics. By the end of the 1980s it seemed 
as though the great battles between the revisionist right and the left of the Labour Party had 
been resolved in favour of the former. For the Labour right in the present day, it would appear 
that the struggle continues. 
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Epilogue 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the history of the breakaway of the Social 
Democratic Party some thirty years after the events took place. It was undertaken in order to 
detail how the revisionists eventually reasserted their influence within the Labour Party in the 
latter part of the 1980s. The period required a new perspective on the events of the late 1970s 
and 1980s by means of interviews with some of the witnesses and in some cases main actors 
of the period as well as the utilisation of relevant archive material. The thesis can be placed 
amongst those texts that record a party struggling to establish its identity against a backdrop 
of bitter internal division, and the Labour right in particular attempting to regain what their 
purpose was in the face of advances by the far left and an ideologically strident Conservative 
Government.  
The Labour Party’s reaction to the breakaway and the impact that the Social Democrats 
formation had on Labour’s left and right wings was to see the gradual re-emergence of a 
modified revisionism. Not only did Labour have to come to terms with being out of power, 
having been soundly beaten by a new, ideologically aggressive Conservative Party, but it also 
had to deal with some of its leading figures leaving to establish a new party that took its name 
from a core part of Labour’s heritage and tradition. The discontent of the Social Democrats 
was not purely towards the leftward movement of the Labour party but as a result of their 
experience during the period of the Wilson and Callaghan governments which they had 
attacked for being statist or corporatist in nature. The Labour governments of the 1960s and 
1970s had failed to satisfy the emerging New Left or an increasingly embittered Social 
Democratic right. For the Social Democrats the issues of control, of party leadership and the 
direction of the party, was such that those who left felt the position was irretrievable.  
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This context means that the SDP’s formation was an even more important turning point in 
British political history. The emergence of the SDP did more than simply split the left; it also 
solidified the new consensus politics that the New Right’s victory ushered in after 1979. The 
SDP’s acceptance of certain aspects of Thatcherism such as monetarism gave this new 
philosophy a greater credibility which allowed it to embed itself into British politics more deeply 
and more quickly. This then meant that Labour was forced to define itself as much by its 
reaction to the new politics as by its own traditions and ideals. This was to lead to the road to 
the Policy Review with the long-term impact being the emergence of New Labour in the 1990s. 
This places the SDP’s formation within the wider history of reformism, revisionism and change 
in the Labour Party. 
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Appendix One 
Interview with John Battye, Steve Garry and Jeremy Sutcliffe, 18 November 2015 
PB So my first question is to ask for your recollections of the mood within the Party just 
before and after the 1979 General Election? 
JS Well, I don’t particularly think that the rise of the SDP and the parting of the SDP caused 
us any particular worries. I do know that in the build up to the 83 it was the only count 
where I’ve ever seen Michael (Meacher) worried and as much as anything else it had 
followed a boundary change. So these two Failsworth wards had just come in and it 
was obvious canvassing that it was a difference between people who knew and people 
who didn’t and the majority was down to about 1500, it was about the lowest we ever 
had but I don’t think we saw them as anything like a threat because essentially no 
major figure in the local Labour Party had gone over. The people we associated with it 
one just checking with John now had been a Labour councillor right at the beginning 
of the new authority but the other one who went that way was Frank Platt. They were 
part of a clique that had sort of lost its way at the end of the County Borough, lost 
control of the Labour Group towards the end of the County Borough and I’m fairly sure 
Freddy Baxter was actually the only one….  
JB Freddy Baxter, Ex-leader of the County Borough about 3 years before the County 
Borough was wound up, he was ousted by the Labour Group and one of the reasons 
he was ousted was a bit funny really because they had three Fridays running Granada 
had a half hour question and answer session live from the town hall. And Fred Baxter 
was the leader of the Labour group and Geoffrey Webb was the leader of the Tory 
group, Tony Adler was the single Liberal on the Council but Fred Baxter turned up in 
front of an invited audience in a white tuxedo jacket and a blue bow tie and you couldn’t 
248 
 
tell from the questions he was answering that there was any difference between him 
and Geoffrey Webb. So he was ousted after that but he did win a seat in the ’73 
election, which was the new 60 seat metropolitan authority and we think he won there 
was a double ward where there was six people elected for a period of 2,3 or 5 years 
and I think he just did one term but he was just a fella who was keen on standing orders 
and there was a young liberal actually who joined the Labour Party eventually who was 
called Peter Jepson and he had a bright red shirt on and Baxter jumped up and said 
to the Mayor who was Nelly Brierley ‘Madam Mayor, would you rule that councillor 
Jepson is inappropriately dressed’. So Nelly said ‘Councillor Baxter, I cannot determine 
the colour of shirts which members choose to wear’. 
JS  Jepson ended up as a left-wing Labour parliamentary candidate unsuccessful and in 
London. He was a total pillock in Oldham.  
JB  But our problem was Militant infiltrating equally started with a war called Waterhead 
where it was 60 odd people meeting and 30 on one side and 31 on the other and at 
the end they were throwing chairs at each other and the ward got suspended, and it 
was rough and that was probably the roughest one, I know they had it rough in St. 
Helens and Liverpool…but it may be a reason why people joined the SDP we didn’t 
have any labour councillors left the group. Fred Baxter, who I just mentioned stood a 
few years later for the SDP, he was the hospital secretary as well but he didn’t win, but 
we did have one or two SDP councillors who were ex-Labour party members. One of 
them was John Anchor. 
JS John Dillon was one of the few who got elected as SDP. Anchor was always elected 
as Liberal. 
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SG They all became Liberal Democrats when they merged in the Eighties. 
JB I think they were SDP but we didn’t have an SDP group on the Council. They were ex-
SDP who became Liberal Democrats. 
JS Well, I checked, I was recently the agent for Crompton (Ward) and so I was checking 
back just to see when the Liberals started to win it and that’s when I turned up that 
John Dillon was SDP first of all. 
JB Did he get in? 
JS Yeah. That’s how it started.  
JB They had an agreement with the SDP in this ward and the Liberals in that ward… 
PB So the Alliance was at work at local level? 
JB Oh yes. 
JS I think John’s right, we were looking over our shoulder at the Trots… 
SG Was it just Waterhead? 
JS No, it spread into ‘cause…David had trouble in St James (Ward) 
JB Michael Wood, who is now the Labour MP for Batley and Spen (note: Mike Wood was 
MP for Batley and Spen until 2015 when he stood down and was replaced by Jo Cox. 
Wood is a member of the Socialist Campaign Group), I think he was one of them, who 
250 
 
give a lot of grief out to people. It spread, and it spread into Saddleworth as well, funnily 
enough. 
JS That was the Oldham East side. But in those days in both constituencies we were very, 
very casual on people joining, ‘pay your money, here’s your card’. And at the time I 
was Secretary for Oldham West and I sensed what was happening in Oldham East 
and there was a slight rumour that they were trying to get council houses in Hollinwood, 
which was West. Well they didn’t, but it was a rumour. So being a bureaucrat I 
tightened up on the rules and insisted that any new members goes through the 
Constituency, so we got a bit more control on it. Which threw Ralph Semple. Ralph 
was one of the really old guard, the former leader of Chadderton (Urban District 
Council) and reckoned he had some clout as the new Borough came round. And he 
appointed a girl called Cath Potter as Secretary. And I said ‘sorry Ralph, she can’t be 
Secretary, she isn’t a member’.  
‘But, but, but…’ 
‘Those are the rules’,  
‘We haven’t done that?’  
‘We’re doing it that way now. Come to the AGM we can approve her membership and 
we become Secretary after that’. So that’s how we did it and she got in as Secretary. 
Nine months later Ralph realises she’s a trouble-maker.  
‘She’s moved into Coldhurst, can I sack her?’ 
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‘Sorry, Ralph, she’s your Secretary until next Annual meeting.’   
I had the problem and in 1983 it was the change over to the new constituency and I 
was the CLP Secretary and it was Jim Berry picked up that there would be a hit by 
Militant on me in the normally quiet Werneth ward meeting …I survived it but the 
pressure was there from the Trots but it was never as apparent or problematical in 
Oldham West as it that fairly well-organised group was in Oldham East and particularly 
Waterhead. 
JB At the ‘79 election the Labour Party did extremely well in Oldham, we were miles 
behind, we had to gain 14 seats to take control of the council, there were only 20 seats 
we won 13 gains and 4 holds. There were only three seats we didn’t win, I was one of 
the three but I got an enormous vote in Saddleworth because we were on a General 
Election turnout. But ’83 was far more difficult 
SG ’83 was awful…going be a bit like 2020… 
JB We are going through déjà vu as far as I’m concerned. You get the feel the stuffing 
has been knocked out of you, really. You go along with a group people you’ve known 
for 30, 40 or 50 years and you work and you go to meetings and you don’t fall out and 
you have a pint and that’s it. But now we’ve got a leadership who have been elected 
by people who are not activists. The Labour Party is nothing if it hasn’t got a 
groundswell of people who will come out and knock on doors, go to events and raise 
money, we can’t write a cheque like the Tory Party. You need people who are going to 
deliver. 
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JB In Manchester they had a lad called John Nicolson who made Hatton in Liverpool look 
like he was the most normal, middle of the road sort of bloke. He was a nasty piece of 
work, he organised the Police Monitoring Committee, he took over the Community 
Health Council. I don’t know what happened to him but he was a Socialist Worker. we 
had that in the social workers, the Socialist Workers had a fairly strong presence 
among some of the staff, particularly the social workers and we knew were they met 
up we had a plant in there having a pint see what they were doing. They were 
undermining us a lot. 
JS Again I’m thinking more about the hard left were far more of a problem than the SDP. 
My problem with was the NUT see. I did three years, 71-74 with the County Borough I 
was politically excluded because I worked for the new authority, I accepted the 
invitation to be Secretary to the NUT, one of the worst bloody decisions in my life in 
many ways but that was with rise of what they called the Rank and File (Mobilising 
Committee) which was again a Trot front. And I tried to living with them but couldn’t 
and they’d have their meetings on Thursday nights and I get a phone call with my 
instructions on Thursday night which I never followed but in terms of that similar 
pressure 1980 in the three years I was Secretary, vice-President and President it was 
a constant battle to get moderate members in to get rid of ridiculous resolutions.  
JB The Poll Tax was a real issue and it allowed the Socialist Worker Party and Anarchists 
to latch onto that and the real tragedy is like it is now that working tax credits and child 
credits that is the issue that’s hitting people. That’s what we’re in the bloody Labour 
Party for social justice, not to campaign for and against certain personalities. The 
Labour Party is bigger than personalities. That’s why we’re still in it. Just. 
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PB Those associated with Militant, they were quite well-ingrained in the 1970s, did they 
ever get involved with canvassing or did they…  
JS My rent-a-Trot in Werneth, I never saw him on the doorstep. 
JB There’s another one called Alan Creagh up in Shaw, his wife Margaret was Creagh 
and she was named in the book ‘Militant’. He’s still in the party, he never comes, he 
just go to meetings… 
JS He’d do one round. 
 To be fair to what happened with Corbyn it wasn’t just the new people, if we hadn’t had 
any new members he’d have still have been leader, because forty eight percent of the 
old pre-members voted for him on the first ballot so he’d gone through on the second 
ballot if they had been the only people having a vote. So while we sat back thinking 
that Corbyn’s going to win because of the new people, he didn’t. The other thing, it’s 
bizarre isn’t it, to be selected as a local authority candidate you got have people there 
who have had six months membership, to elect the bloody leader of the party you have 
to be a six hours membership and you’re in. It’s ridiculous, why didn’t they apply the 
same bloody rule? 
JB  Basically John they didn’t think it through. When that Special Conference was held 
nobody expected a leadership contest for after five years as Ed was going to win the 
election. It wasn’t thought through it wasn’t thought through. 
PB Speaking of leadership elections, how was the election of Michael Foot in 1980 greeted 
in the CLPs, was he a popular choice? 
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JB No. My personal opinion I don’t think he wasn’t a popular choice, there wasn’t a wave 
of new members. MPs voted for Foot and wanted an excuse to get out. Bill Rodgers 
was one. Shirley was another, David Owen. They reckon there were seven who 
nominated…like people who nominated for Corbyn then voted for whoever. 
JS Just thinking back to the SDP, I think that one of the things that it did locally was that 
because it was new and because it was fresh and it related to the freshness to how 
people saw Corbyn there was a freshness. It did attract people who hadn’t been 
politicised before. There was a candidate…who stood in the Parish elections in 
Saddleworth and he got nowhere and never did it again, stood in a multi-member seat 
and he was broken because he hadn’t got anywhere. 
JB  They don’t like traitors. They don’t like turncoats, 
JS They were never Labour. 
JB No, but people people though the SDP were turncoats. 
PB Was that the strong sense amongst activists, that the SDP were traitors? 
JB The only reason the Gang of Four was set up was because of Shirley Williams. If they 
couldn’t have got Shirley Williams on board the SDP would have collapsed, she was 
the face of the SDP which was acceptable. Not like ‘Woy’, no one had heard of Rodgers 
and Owen was up his own backside.  
JS The fate of the SDP and the Gang of Four is the warning light that you won’t see that 
again. I don’t think it would happen. 
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PB Reading the Labour Solidarity papers today, 
JB Hattersley’s? 
PB Yes, coming from the right of the party the attack against the SDP is as strong as it is 
against Militant, a middle class movement letting down working-class voters. And when 
they lost the Darlington by-election in 1982, saying that was proof that the SDP would 
never make any headway in the North. Do you think the SDP never had a chance as 
they were viewed as turncoats and as elite? 
JS Possibly. Roy’s lisp didn’t help. But the first past post system showed that to split the 
left-wing vote was wrong and fatal. 
PB With Denis Healey having to stand as Deputy Leader against Tony Benn, what was 
the feeling within the local parties for that particular battle, by this point CLPs had much 
more say in because of the Electoral College, was there more support for Healey? 
JB Yeah, I think people thought felt Healey had been badly let down by people who had 
voted for Foot even though they were Healey supporters, ‘we can’t let Denis go through 
that again.’ He was a political giant, no doubt about it. You know when he denied he 
said that Labour would squeeze the Tories until the pips squeaked’ I’m convinced he 
said it at the 73 Conference in Blackpool. I’m sure he did, we were on our feet cheering! 
I came home, ‘You should have heard Denis, he said he would squeeze them until the 
pips squeaked!’ 
JS In Oldham West we were more Bennite because of Michael (Meacher). 
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PB Michael stood didn’t he? 
JB He stood against Hattersley (for the Deputy Leadership in 1983). 
PB On the build up to 1983 with Foot as Leader and Healey as Deputy Leader, was it 
difficult sell here in Oldham to canvas for Labour? 
JS Yes, the majority went down to the lowest it had ever been (in Oldham West). 
JB In Saddleworth bit Saddleworth, Shaw and Littleborough, oh it was horrible. We got 
about 6000 votes, Geoffrey (Dickens, the sitting Conservative MP for Littleborough and 
Saddleworth in 1983) got 25,000. 
PB Was the Falklands factor an issue? 
JB Oh yeah. 
SG Yeah, definitely. 
JB Foot and Falklands. I would also add, Steve this is what brought you into Oldham West 
it was this business we just had a boundary change, Charles Morris (MP for 
Manchester Openshaw which Failsworth previously fell into before the seat was 
abolished) and he was fairly well regarded but lost his seat after a very tight reselection 
battle and it was selling a new face in Michael. I don’t think we particularly had the 
weight. Barry Wright was doing bugger all in Hollinwood which was one of our banker 
wards, and I had my really good busy team in Werneth and I said we were ready to 
help out and told if we stepped in Hollinwood they would do nothing on the day. There 
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was a little bit of inner awkwardness. The Committee room of mine which had been in 
Werneth but just gone back into Hollinwood after boundary changes went and my team 
there knocked up and canvassed on their own initiative. Because Barry Wright had 
been associated with Charlie. There was a little bit of inner awkwardness. 
SG I think in Failsworth at the time with knocking on doors and what have you there was 
resentment towards Michael. He was viewed as an extreme real left-winger. I 
remember one night every door that we knocked on they were having a go about Foot, 
he’d just been on the telly about something, ‘sorry lad, I’m not voting for Michael Foot, 
lad’ it was all about Michael Foot. 
PB Would you say that particularly in Oldham itself that its more soft left, centre but rather 
traditional, Labourist? 
JB Well in Oldham West about 60 odd percent of the membership now is Asian so you 
can’t call them soft left, it’s more tribal, its family. 
PB You just mentioned the Asian community, which has been there for fifty odd years, but 
as well as those members would you say that the Oldham constituencies they are more 
socially conservative than other Labour constituencies? 
JB Yeah, we don’t have a great number of young members, we don’t have as student 
population like in the centre of Manchester. We have an old Labour membership in 
Oldham in more ways than one. I’ve been a member of Labour for fifty-five years. We 
welcome young members but they don’t stay very long. 
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PB I mentioned before about Labour Solidarity do you remember any events being set up 
in support? 
JS Hattersley did a social do for Solidarity organised by Barry Wright. 
JB For all his left-wing views, Michael never pressed his views onto the membership. 
JS  When (John) Prescott won the Deputy Leadership (in 1994), Michael came in and said 
‘I’m sorry, I voted for John Prescott’ and the room burst into spontaneous applause 
and took him by surprise! 
PB Talking about the old battle with Militant, do you think that the problems Labour had 
between Militant on the one hand and the SDP on the other was part of a necessary 
purge that came about from the old battles of the 50s between the Bevanites and the 
Gaitskellites that finally came to a head or was it defeat that released all that pressure? 
JS I anticipated a big battle, not just here but nationally after 2010 and I think that the party 
was very disciplined, self-disciplined about the election and about the way it received 
Ed, particularly with the closeness with the David Miliband vote. And of course we’re 
not very good with breaking the consensus… 
JB Going back to the 80s, Thatcher did a lot of this like Cameron is doing now, driving 
down living conditions for the working populace and the Poll Tax brought out the very 
worst in people. That’s why we had the Liverpool situation and in Lambeth, with the 
Trots in London got to control everything with the Chief Executive in one…and we 
played into Thatcher’s hands and very cleverly divided us and brought the hard left out 
of the woodwork. 
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JS At the same time, all the Thatcher things like tax on health, people were sympathetic 
but if you weren’t actually affected by your treatment…where Thatcher made the 
mistake was the Poll Tax as it affect everybody. People made the mistake that the 
Bedroom Tax was the new Poll Tax, no, it wasn’t not everybody is hit. 
SG That explains the perception of Labour at the last election talking about the very poor 
and the very rich, we should be talking about those in the middle again. 
JS We put too many eggs in the NHS basket. At the Heywood and Middleton by-election 
we kept saying it’s the NHS when people were saying ‘but what about immigration?’ 
It’s an issue that affects everybody or enough issues that everyone who is affected 
and the lingering thing that there are more scroungers than genuine people on benefits. 
PB The reference to ‘the squeezed middle’ back in the early Eighties there was only a 
passing reference to the middle classes which the SPD tried to capitalise on... 
JS I wince when I hear someone at regional Labour conferences talking of the need for 
more ‘working-class candidates’. It isn’t there any anymore. If there was working class 
solidarity we’d have been in power since 1900. There’s a classification…there are 
seven definitions (of class) we should be speaking with all of them. 
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Appendix Two 
Interview with the Right Honourable the Lord Bryan Davies of Oldham PC,  
19 November 2014 
PB You had been an MP in 1974 and then in 1979 after the General Election you were the 
Parliamentary Secretary? 
BD Well, I lost my seat in 1979 and the post of Parliamentary Secretary was an admin post 
in Parliament for the Labour Party became vacant close to the election because the 
previous occupant had died. And so the National Executive set about appointing a 
replacement, a desperately divided National Executive, everyone sympathised with me 
going for the post knowing that I had been an MP. You had Jim Callaghan on one side 
and Dennis Skinner at his most forceful, challenging…Tony Benn, of course, was 
another. Callaghan was keen to get from me the assurance that I wouldn’t leave 
Westminster too soon in pursuit of a seat, and I didn’t, I stayed in the job. 
PB In September 1979 there was the Party Conference and it was quite a hostile 
conference. What was your recollections of the period at the time? 
BD Well, the most extravagant thing was a real radical leftist MP, Birmingham MP, he tore 
up the manifesto on the balcony and threw it down on the people below. It was a very 
ill-tempered conference full of recrimination and it was quite…and Jim stayed on for 
18 months I think probably he thought it would give some breathing space to the 
chance for the party to sort itself out. It didn’t really. Of course, Michael Foot won the 
election and it later came out that the reason Michael won was because key figures 
were on the point of defecting from the party voted for him because they thought the 
Labour Party would be a less difficult citadel to conquer if it was divided amongst 
themselves.  
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PB So there were people who were doing it deliberately? 
BD Oh yes. The conference that did it of course was 1981, the election of the leader. Tony 
Benn was pushing his reforms through. David Owen wanted one member, one vote. 
Roy Hattersley spoke on behalf of the middle ground which proposed the Electoral 
College. I had to talk to Roy because he was proposing the establishment motion. The 
other motions, David Owen and Tony Benn’s…but when I went to speak to Owen about 
it he said it was just an absolute stitch up arranging the meeting in such a way that 
their voices wouldn’t be heard adequately. I arranged a meeting and persuaded the 
leader Michael Foot. What you couldn’t have was three proposals to call people at a 
conference, they’ve got to be a motion and an amendment to be carried. David Owen 
thought this was absolutely outrageous and thought we were stacking the cards in 
favour of the existing establishment and what they wanted and tore into me. I had 
made it clear that we couldn’t run a party meeting divided into three votes, it’s got to 
be definitive to be the Parliamentary Party’s view to go to annual Conference. But he 
went up with such venom and I had worked with him in the Health Department and we 
got on so well, and I was absolutely shocked at the level of invective that he used, 
basically said it didn’t matter anyway because ‘we were on our way out’, he never 
identified who the ‘we’ were but that was before the Special Conference met in 
September, when the Parliamentary Party was dealing with this in October 79 and then 
three months later we entered this Special Conference when the new system was set 
up, one which of course, subsequently Tony Benn almost won on by a fraction of a 
percentage against Denis Healey for Deputy Leader. But as far as Tony Benn and the 
others were concerned, this Electoral College of sharing power with the trade unions 
would be the death of any possibility they would have of winning anything. But it was 
a tempestuous time and that was in my first two years of being in the job! 
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PB That was interesting that you said that David Owen had already said ‘we’re on our way 
out', why do think then, why do you think it didn’t happen earlier considering the fact 
that you had Dick Taverne back in the early 70s, why did you think they chose that 
particular time, was it a perfect opportunity for them? 
BD Well I think the Owens and the Shirley Williams of this world and Bill Rodgers, of 
course, took quite a bit of steer from Roy Jenkins who was outside the party and had 
already left the party, and was influencing and persuasive and I think Roy Jenkins 
indicated that the Labour Party had shifted so far to the left that Tony Benn was able 
to influence Conference and be left unchallenged.  
PB During that time as well there were various groups such as the Manifesto Group which 
was coming to an end… 
BD Well, it wasn’t coming to end…the key figures in the Manifesto Group, the MP for 
Newcastle-under-Lyme (John Golding), he was on the NEC for the 
Telecommunications Union, he made the longest speech in Parliament…and he fought 
Benn over the election manifesto for 1983 and it was always maintained that what in 
fact the Manifesto Group people did and those on the right of the Parliamentary Party, 
by then they had lost many defectors who had gone, always maintained that they 
deliberately let through many of the radical proposals on the grounds that Labour would 
bury itself and the SDP would get wings. Well, Labour was against the European 
Community and against nuclear weapons. Pretty radical. John Golding was a fixer and 
he always contended that he could have added votes to stop the worst drafts of the 
manifesto. It’s a bit exaggerated but…we fought the 1983 election on an extreme 
manifesto that we’ve ever produced and the SDP did rather well.   
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PB It has been contended that a leader from the left was only able to lead the party in the 
early Eighties, hence Foot’s victory, and that Healey would not have been successful 
at a general election as he was considered as a divisive figure and would have only 
delayed the defections. Do you think do you think that if Denis Healey had won, the 
situation would have been considerably different? 
BD Well, leaders make their mark of course, but of course an awful lot of middle ground 
was wary of voting for Denis because he was thought he’d been heavy handed and 
not a binder up of wounds and he’d taken them on head on, and of course Denis had 
a very poor parliamentary vote on leadership. His campaign organisers were obscure 
when he got about 40 odd votes and he said he would to continue to the last round…  
PB  That was in 76, wasn’t it? 
BD  Of course he only headed off Tony Benn for the Deputy Leadership. First of all, of 
course, he combined the worst two portfolios for winning friends in the Labour Party, 
he was Defence Minister for nearly a decade and Chancellor during the toughest times. 
You don’t become popular within the party with those two. Denis didn’t truckle for his 
votes, he wanted people to vote for him out of respect of his capacity capabilities. But 
he didn’t truckle. His campaign was poorly organised. So I don’t think Denis was ever 
going to be the right wing saviour in the party, the party would probably only take a left-
wing leader anyway. 
PB And yet Giles Radice said that Denis Healey became Deputy Leader ‘saved’ the 
Labour Party… 
BD It would have been so much worse. With Michael as Leader and Benn as Deputy 
Leader would have seen the SDP pick up a lot of MPs from the moderate right of the 
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party. Denis acted as ballast. He was immensely loyal to the party, Denis, for an 
outstanding figure, he often didn’t look as if he put himself first. Great credit to him. 
 
PB He wasn’t the most clubbable… 
BD Not at all, no he wasn’t, he often only wanted to talk often to people who understand 
issues who he was actually involved in, and in the Parliamentary Party small number 
of people could talk intelligently and with sense and when it came to the economy, of 
course, small number could talk at Denis’s level. 
PB It would have been someone Peter Shore or earlier Tony Crosland could have debated 
it forcibly on a level playing field? 
BD I’m not trying to be disparaging. We saw it with Denis Healey, we saw it with Nigel 
Lawson in the Tory Party and we certainly saw it with Gordon Brown during the Blair 
years, an outstanding figure who is really in charge of the economy whom the Prime 
Minister in a sense defers to and trusts him and expects him to deliver, and when they 
do deliver puts them in a strong position. And Healey had far the toughest economic 
circumstances to deal with but he got us through the IMF and out the other side and 
was a very powerful speaker on the economy.  
PB Do you think he was put in the wrong position by Callaghan at the time in 76, do you 
think he should have been Foreign Secretary and Crosland Chancellor? 
BD He’d have like that role! I think…Callaghan was a trade unionist and knew this was a 
tough line was needed with the trade unions over wages. I think Callaghan thought 
that Healey was tough enough for the job and would do the right thing rather than curry 
favour with the party. 
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PB With the move towards the centre in the 80s by the Labour Party, by Neil Kinnock 
starting to move it to a more centrist, soft left position, do you think that was part of the 
position of getting rid of the ultras on both sides, with Militant on the left and the SDP 
on the right, do you think it was part of the correcting process? 
BD The die was cast when Neil became leader in term of the SDP, they were the enemy, 
I had no problems with that. I think in Kinnock he recognised enemies to the left that 
Foot didn’t. Kinnock knew that there were enemies to the left who were entryists, that 
their doctrine was an alien force to the Labour Party and Kinnock knew we wouldn’t 
win an election while these people were burying themselves into the party, he took 
them on with that courageous speech at Conference, it was absolutely electric, it made 
my hair stand on end. I had been accosted by the glamour boy of Militant, Derek 
Hatton, who I didn’t know at a bar in Blackpool and he was extremely well dressed and 
wearing a gleaming black leather jacket worth about £600, and he sidled up to me and 
asked me what I thought the NEC was likely to do. I didn’t know who he was but I 
recognised a Liverpool accent so I thought it was Derek Hatton!  
PB Giles Radice suggested that the Limehouse Declaration when it came out was ‘an 
unexceptional revisionist document,’ which would have been perfectly fine within New 
Labour Party.’ Do you think that the New Labour was a by-product of the SDP, or do 
you think it was something different? 
BD I don’t think it was a by-product of the SDP. Blair came in from a different generation, 
a different generation of support. Blair won elections and carried out policies if they 
had been in which had they remained in Labour they wouldn’t have left. But they 
weren’t in the Labour Party, they were outside. Blair really was a residual legatee of all 
the leg-work that we had done in the Eighties. But, a great deal of his thinking and his 
style is quite reminiscent of the SDP and even the right-wing of the party before they 
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split. Roy Jenkins did regard Tony Blair with approval and nearly all those, Giles is a 
classic case, was of course the Education Spokesman during the dark years and was 
didn’t land anything when Blair did Government. 
PB When the defections took place it was quite obvious that the rancour was obvious to 
all, it was visceral towards those who left, not just on the left but on the right, like Roy 
Hattersley who were particularly bitter… 
BD Well, Hattersley considers himself quite a bit over from the right, he never kind of 
signed himself to the Croslandite agenda in that way, but of course he was severely 
critical of the left. Hattersley is quite a good bell-weather, he stays the course, he’s 
Deputy Leader and stayed the course with Kinnock. I think Crosland would have done 
that, he never had hesitation in calling himself a Democratic Socialist, you know, he 
always fought his battles with schools and higher education and set up the 
Polytechnics. Crosland wouldn’t hesitate in saying every socialist had a Democratic 
Socialist agenda, he wouldn’t have a problem with the wording, nor would Brown but 
Blair clearly did. Blair doesn’t have the intellect of Crosland or Hattersley. He has a 
wonderful winning personality but he isn’t an intellectual. 
PB He probably be loathed to admit it buy in many respects, he’s a Labourist, a Labourite, 
what Herbert Morrison would say ‘Socialism is what we do’. 
BD ‘It’s what I do’, Morrison would say we, Blair would say ‘I’. Crosland wouldn’t, he would 
write a very serious, seminal book. Of course, you have to say some of us had 
reservations about Tony, my greatest regret is not walking out on the Second Gulf War. 
Some of my colleagues did, I didn’t, I was only a whip in the Lords. I knew the Second 
Gulf War was a mistake. I remember the First Gulf War I breathed an enormous sigh 
of relief when Stormin’ Norman was not going on to Baghdad. Tony did that and 
subsequently looks to have any tethering in ideology at all, he doesn’t in fact have any 
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principle. He’s involved with the Great Powers in the Middle East, broker something 
between the countries, he’s an intelligent man but all this stuff now about selling his 
stuff to the Saudis. Brown devotes all his time to others. Brown would probably place 
himself to the left of Crosland but would admire Crosland.  
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Appendix Three 
Interview with the Right Honourable Frank Dobson MP, 4 November 2014 
 
PB As a new member of parliament at the time why are your own recollections of the 
movement in the movement at the time both before and after the nineteen seventy 
nine elections? 
FD  Well I don’t think there was any suggestion, I was unaware of any suggestion that 
anybody might want to break away from the Labour party at the time of the seventy 
nine general elections and then it went on I think, the party conference, for all I know 
they may have been plotting for years but the outward signs were that it was looking a 
bit fragmentary I think at the party conference when Jim Callaghan spoke denouncing 
the idea of an anti nuclear weapons policy although Jim would never have defected 
and there was the…it looks in the retrospect as if the would-be-defectors voted for 
Michael Foot rather than for Denis Healey although they would not have agreed with 
anything Michael Foot said or stood for but they wanted him to win. 
PB  So Denis Healey contends that he was the commission of enquiry that came about 
after the nineteen seventy nine conference they agreed to hold at Bishop Stortford the 
commission of enquiries that the parties were going to conduct its leadership 
campaign, leadership elections in the future and he contends that that was the 
crystallise for the SDP to break away but why do you reckon that they did, I mean they 
had all the opportunities earlier in the nineteen seventies previously to form the party 
why do you think that that particular? 
FD  Well a bit like I think a lot of willingness on the part of the Lib Dems in two thousand 
and ten to their willingness to go into coalition was cause they fancied ministerial cars 
and ministerial salaries, I don’t think most of the people who broke away would have 
269 
 
been, they were quite keen on hanging on to their ministerial cars and ministerial 
salaries so the chances of breaking away while we were in Government were pretty 
small, I would think. 
PB    There have been many accounts of heckling particularly in the 1979 Conference and 
in nineteen eighties special conferences as well, MPs were corralled and kept away 
from the rest of the delegates on the floor, what was it like as an MP yourself, even 
though you were sympathetic from a soft left perspective, what was it like being an MP 
at that time? Was it quite hostile from the constituency Labour party members or did 
you find it to be not too bad? 
FD  No I don’t think, I mean I’ve never liked Labour party conferences even when I was a 
delegate in the sixties so I’ve always found them exceedingly irritating and they sort of 
proceeded from sort of anarchy to mindless rowing with not much in between. So it 
wasn’t personally unpleasant. Eric Heffner denouncing his parliamentary colleagues 
from the back form but that was Eric Heffner. 
PB  But you can see you can’t for instance sympathise with those MPs who felt that this 
was what they were facing all the time in their own constituencies and things. 
FD  I probably exaggerated  
PB  So when Michael Foot became leader, it’s been contended that only a leader from the 
left of the party was able to lead as leader in the early nineteen eighties and that if 
Denis Healey had been in charge it would have been just has problematic. Do you 
contend that it needed a leader from the centre left or do you think that if Denis Healey 
had been in charge it would have prevented the brake up? 
FB  I, there is no way of proving it but my own feeling is although I have, still have a lot of 
time for Denis Healey I think Michael actually was capable of getting the party at least 
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a couple of steps down the road to rationality. Making Neil Kinnock’s election as leader 
possible and without Neil’s contribution as leader its very dubious there would have 
been much of a Labour party for any of us to lead. 
PB  So following on from that there was the deputy leader election and you supported Tony 
Benn?  
FD  It’s the only thing in my life that I’m ashamed of. It’s the only political thing in my life 
that I’m ashamed of. 
PB   Really? 
FD  Yes. 
PB  And looking back on it now do you wish you had voted for Healey instead? 
 FD  Yes, yes I think so it was wrong to vote for Tony Benn. 
PB   Do you think it would have been, again it’s all conjecture do you think if Benn had been 
elected and he very nearly was do you think if he had been elected as deputy leader 
do you think it would have had a severe effect on the Labour party? 
FD  Yes because he was never as fundamentally committed as Michael Foot was. A lot of 
Tony Benn’s things were, in my opinion, rather superficial. 
PB  So considering that as you’ve already touched the work that Neil Kinnock began then 
saw through in the nineteen eighties for the position of the labour party for a more soft 
left moderate position for the nineteen eighty seven and the nineteen ninety two 
election. 
FD  It wasn’t a particularly soft left position it was a sensible left position and that’s different. 
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PB  So would you say that again you would move it to a more moderate centre position? 
FD  No, no, we had some quite left wing policies under Neil Kinnock and indeed under 
John Smith but they appeared sensible and they chimed with the experiences and 
views of people of this country. 
PB  Do you think this was the SDP leaving, that this was part of a wider correcting of getting 
rid of the ultras if you will on both sides if you will the hard right and the hard left of the 
party? 
FD  But in some senses the SDP weren’t on the right of the party they were sort of inside 
right, there were a lot of right wing people who stayed with the Labour party. There 
was an element of sort of fashionista I think about the SDP.  
PB  That’s quite a leap some would say it’s metropolitan rather than something more 
national. 
FD  Yes I think so. And the only one oddly enough I think David Owen was in many ways 
more Labour than the rest of them. 
PB    Really? 
FD  That is not a very fashionable view. 
PB  Do you think there is any chance even now after all these years later, do you think any 
of them would ever, you know that David Owen has become an independent Social 
Democrat he has become more aligned with Labour again in the last couple of years 
or so, do you think there is any possibility or indeed be a welcome back for people 
such as Shirley Williams and Bill Rodgers. 
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FD  No I don’t think they would be interested in coming back and it wouldn’t do any good if 
they did, it wouldn’t mean anything and they would contribute nothing. 
PB  So it’s something that’s already way past? 
FD  Yes it’s been and gone that sort of stuff. 
PB  And with the SDP being set up and Roy Jenkins becoming the leader in the first 
instance was there a sense that the more moderate socially liberal element within the 
party been reduced because Roy Jenkins was associated with being a reformist home 
secretary of the nineteen sixties do you think that there was any sense in this? 
FD  No because it’s now fashionable because he went to the SDP for the creepy people 
who write for newspaper columns to attribute all those liberal things to Roy Jenkins. 
Most of them were originally put forward by people like my predecessor Lena Jaeger 
or Barbara Castle and the guy who was the strongest advocate for the abolishment of 
capital punishment. Those things were not initiated by Roy Jenkins and whether he 
had ever given much thought or effort to them is quite dubious until he became Home 
Secretary. And in any case yet again when he’s Home Secretary he could only do it 
because he had the wholehearted support of Harold Wilson who was the Prime 
Minister. If Harold Wilson had been against it, it wouldn’t have happened. So I 
absolutely refuse to, I’m not saying that Roy Jenkins did not make a substantial 
contribution to it but he didn’t initiate most of the efforts in various spheres and he 
couldn’t have done it without the support of the Prime Minister. 
It’s partly a product of the infantalism of a great deal of political comradeship which has to 
attribute everything to a set of individuals, you know each topic to a particular individual 
whereas very little in politics or life is like that. 
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PB  It is interesting also when you think that newspapers such as the Sun and the Mail in 
the 1980s took great pleasure in denouncing them as so called loony left measures 
when really places such as gay rights and equality, racial equality legislations would 
surely have been the natural preserve of the so called Social Liberals and the right of 
the party and yet these are now things considered to be second nature. 
FD  Well exactly and that is one of the reasons why I was so and remain so vehemently 
opposed to this crackpot millionaire Goldsmith’s proposal for you can recall MPs in 
20% of the electorate decide they want rid of them, and all those topics that you 
mentioned and that I’ve mentioned were initiated by people who at the time were the 
proponents of outlandish ideas which had become part of the consensus, consensus 
doesn’t arrive from consensus, it never has. Consensus is something that is pushed 
through by people with a real commitment on something and then its gradually 
accepted and there wasn’t a consensus in favour of a National Health Service at the 
end of the Second World War. 
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Appendix Four 
Interview with Eddie Dougall, 16th January 2016 
PB  So the first question I’ll ask is really one of political identity. How would you describe 
your politics, or if you will, vocation within the Labour Party 
ED  I would say I was on the Left of the party. It’s very sad the way Corbyn supporters and 
himself have been described as hard left which is not really the case. I’m on the left 
and I’m prepared to listen to reason, I’m prepared to listen to other people’s point of 
view. I have my own and occasionally change it when it’s pointed out that what I’m 
saying is not bore out by facts 
PB  And for the purposes of this can you just identify which constituency Labour Party we’ll 
be discussing  
ED  Bury St Edmunds, its Bury St Edmunds now but we were Central Suffolk, we started 
off when we moved here as Bury St Edmunds, then Central Suffolk and then it went 
back to Bury St Edmunds and we’re going to have some more changes 
PB  First off is to look at that period after May 1979 with the defeat of Labour. What I would 
like to ask first is your own personal recollections of the mood of the party at the time 
both locally and nationally 
ED  Well it certainly wasn’t good and the thought of Maggie Thatcher with her previous 
record of milk snatching and what have you but she was obviously further to the right 
than any recently previous Tory leaders and Prime Ministers. She wasn’t expected to 
win the Conservative Party Leadership and this is a little bit before 1979  it’s interesting 
for me anyway I was working for the BBC at the time and we were with 24 hours or 
Newsnight one of those type of programmes and the BBC had venerably chosen to 
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follow Willie Whitelaw round on the day of the election for leadership and we had quite 
a pleasant day going round with him, interviewing people around him and then word 
came through that Maggie actually won and there was Willie and the director and we 
weren’t with him at the time but the director Mavis had gone to have a look and there 
was poor old Willie sitting in his chair sobbing, head down, just oblivious of everything. 
He expected to win and most of the party I think wanted him to win but not the PCP. 
And then we shot off to Smiths Square where she gave her performances as the new 
leader, so I was really depressed with that and I didn’t have a lot of hope for the next 
election. It’s been always the case that the leader of the Labour Party apart from the 
current one and Michael Foot, the leader has always been to the right of the 
membership. The membership has always been to the left of all the leaders. Certainly 
the PLP has always been to the right of whoever is the leader and the membership, 
there’s a big difference between what the membership feels and the PLP feels and 
sadly I feel that the PLP, the people predominantly in there, they’re on the right of the 
party, they feel they’ve got given right to run the party and they do not like, they 
certainly hated Michael Foot and he was a very unfortunate chap, he had no support 
whatsoever from anything …part of the PLP and he was really pilloried, the way the 
press treated him was very bad and Miliband got the same treatment and Corbyn …but 
he’s so far hanging on. Going back to ’79 I didn’t expect James Callahan to win and 
he didn’t. From then on it was very depressing, even more so because our constituency 
party, Bury St Edmunds, went further to the right than I wanted it to go and the branch 
too wasn’t all that politically on the Left. Unfortunately the only source of enthusiasm, 
the only source of hope I had at that time was from the EU, where we had a venom 
EU of MEPS and they were what I thought the Labour Party should be doing. They 
were traditionally Labour minded so there wasn’t a lot of joy around to be a member of 
the Labour Party in those days. The meetings, in some way became a bit more well-
attended because of what we were facing from Maggie Thatcher  
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 PB  So more so than they were in the ‘70s 
ED  I think so, yes. To get people interested in politics it takes either great enthusiasm or 
great objections. Either of those can get people worked up and active 
PB  It was interesting when you said about your interest in the Euro MEPS. At the time one 
of the big arguments within the Labour Party was about the introduction of the then 
Common Market so it was interesting to hear that you viewed that area as being a 
beacon of hope 
ED  Yes, it was the only area of Labour political life that gave any hope for some people in 
one form of Parliament were still Labour to me, they’d held on to their main principles. 
It was what gave most people on the left of the party …that things weren’t as bad as 
they could have been. That there was still someone in a position of power who could 
hold the Labour banner  
PB  Why was it do you think those who left and became the gang of four, why do you think 
they chose to leave at that point if the argument had been going on since the ‘50s and 
the ‘60s 
ED  I think they chose their moment. Sadly some of those on the right of the Labour Party, 
and it’s the same today, are not too different from left leaning Tories, that could be a 
good thing or a bad thing but what depresses me now is that those on the right of the 
party see getting rid of Corbyn as the most urgent action, for instance a lot of them 
who have been trying to get rid of Corbyn didn’t vote against the working tax credits. 
They prefer to discomfort Corbyn, rather than save a lot of poor people a lot of anguish. 
Fortunately the dreadful House of Lords managed to put a Kaibosh on it…. 
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PB  And do you think, back in 1980-1981, that the reason for those who defected, those 
who were also to follow were doing it purely to undermine the leadership of Michael 
Foot? 
ED I think they wanted the Labour Party to be further to the right than a lot of the members 
wanted to go and they felt that this was a way of starting again and starting a party in 
which they would control the agenda, control their policies and their manifesto  
PB  Do you think with the period being as it was…… do you think it needed a leader from 
the left of the party at that time to successfully lead the Labour Party? 
ED  I thought so…unilateralism, which is used as a term of criticism. I would just prefer to 
say rather than unilateralism I would rather say beginning the process of demutifying 
Armed Forces and what other people do. It could only assist and encourage others to 
do the same but it may not, but I felt that getting rid of nuclear weapons, at that time 
the Cold War was hardly cold, at that time it was the most important issue. A leader 
who would campaign on that was what we needed and today its cropped up again and 
we are now starting to think as to whether Trident actually does serve a purpose and 
would it not be better if you’re not a pacifist, to have some of the money apart from the 
NHS, could be spent on the Armed Forces and actually have a successful, an efficient, 
competent and numerous enough and well-armed enough and prepared-enough 
Armed Forces and they would be …..that’s my kind of armament, I want an Armed 
Defence. I don’t want them to have the capability of going off to other countries and 
imposing our will, I don’t think that’s the way to do it. If we do that, why shouldn’t anyone 
else do that, a lot of people do that anyway. It shows every other country in the world 
that if you have power you can impose your will to some extent on some of the less 
powerful countries and I don’t think that’s the way to go about things 
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PB  Also in 1981 Dennis Healey was elected as Deputy Leader of the Labour Party. Do 
you think just as there was a need for a leader of the left of the party in the early ‘80s 
to make the running of the Party a viable going concern, do you think it was also 
necessary for someone from the right of the party to be Deputy because Tony Benn 
ran as we all know for the Deputy Leadership and became very close to actually 
winning if it wasn’t for decisions of some of those from the soft left such as Kinnock 
and some of the others and also some various trade unions who decided to support 
Benn and abstained. Do you think Healey’s election as Deputy Leader helped at the 
time? 
ED  It’s always seen as being politic to have two people, a leader and a deputy, from slightly 
different, or perhaps even greatly different strands of the party, like today. Whether 
that’s a good idea for a party, for progressing policies, I don’t know, but to keep the 
party together, I imagine that’s the reason why it’s always done 
PB  Because there was evidently areas where both Foot and Healey, even though they 
came from different traditions could find common ground and you’d like to think that 
within the party itself you can find common ground  
ED  And it’s also important, I think that the leader and Deputy have at least a very good 
personal relationship and given that you can come to an arrangement, a compromise 
and modify slightly either one’s position and stay friendly not start briefing against the 
other. If everything’s done in the spirit of good will, quite different political leanings of 
the Labour leader and deputy can make a good…… 
PB  An agreement to differ ….referendum of 1975 where members of the cabinet were 
allowed to campaign various side of the debate which was what Cameron’s proposing 
at the moment. Again political expediency is one of the main reasons for it. At the same 
time it did demonstrate that after that took place that people were able to come back 
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within the Cabinet and again co-exist quite easily alongside each other. There were 
obviously going to be debates and it’s peculiar in many respects that the formation of 
the SDP came about ….got through all this and yet you still were not actually able to 
maintain ….after all that had taken place 
ED  Well I suppose the people who left perhaps they were…, certainly Jenkins felt he 
should have been leader of the party and he saw himself as the top man in the move 
although David Owen would have disagreed with that. He probably felt rather bitter 
that he hadn’t got further in the Party and he was not going to progress under any 
leader to the left of him he thought and he was probably right. It’s always sad when 
efficient and competent men and women leave but sometimes it’s too divisive for them 
to stay and coming back to today again I think it’s fine to disagree with the leader, to 
attack the leader is something which is really stupid and shows they don’t have the 
right approach to politics or governing or hoping to govern if you are doing things which 
harm the Party and the old gang from the Right, the Tony Blair lot  during Miliband’s 
election campaign they were really, poisonously against him. I can’t see how anyone 
can be so against the leader of the Party during an election and stay a member of the 
Party. They have been very lenient with people like that and I think it was Tony Blair 
who said he would prefer a Cameron Government to one led by Corbyn and that’s 
outrageous 
PB  And also seems to work against everything that he was involved with because he was 
a budding MP and then an MP from the early ‘80s onwards 
PB  You mentioned before about the CLP in Bury St Edmunds moving further to the Right 
in 1979 
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ED  Come to think of it I’m not sure they did move further to the Right. They didn’t seem as 
radical for me, as they could have been or should have been but that sort of means 
moving slightly to the Right  
PB  Labourist rather than Social Democrat? It was interesting because when I was having 
the interviews with the Oldham CLP members they didn’t seem too concerned at the 
time from their recollections with the SDP, as far as they were concerned their battle 
was with the militant entryists, which I found quite interesting because I tended to see 
in more urban areas that militant was more of an issue, particularly in London and 
Liverpool, the noted case if you will. They only had a couple of people who left for the 
SDP in that particular area and if you think that Michael Meacher was one of the 
Oldham MPs and Brian Davis became one of the Labour MPs after Joe Barnett. Here 
in Bury St Edmunds were there any defections to the SDP and were there any 
concerns about militant entryists? 
ED  Militant didn’t encroach at all, it only drew attention and comment as to how it was 
happening elsewhere, not in Bury St Edmunds and defections to the SDP, I don’t recall 
there may have been some, it’s difficult to know unless you are perhaps the 
membership secretary you don’t know how many people left and even then you don’t 
know why they left. Most people leave without any explanation at all and resign, I don’t 
recall anyone. There was no mention of people leaving for any reason, some may have 
done I don’t know about it. It certainly didn’t impinge on any political activity or 
discussion 
PB  That’s interesting because the reason why some members defect to the SDP or step 
down, one name which springs to mind is Bob Mellish during the time of the 
Bermondsey election at the time when Peter Tatchell was running and the fact that 
they had a rather older established Labour machine there, right wing, quite a catholic 
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base as well. The concern there was about militant entryism and then you have places 
such as Cambridge for instance and that was SDP, that was quite a hot-bed of Social 
Democrat activism if you will so it’s interesting to see that not too far away from here 
that this is almost quite stable in terms of the fact that there were Party members of 
various strands were able to still maintain cordial relations and there was a common 
ground  
ED  As I say it didn’t impinge, the fact that the four left made hardly any impact whatsoever 
and it didn’t affect how we campaigned and until the mid ‘90s there had never been 
any realistic possibility of changing that and we lost since 97 by 368 votes…but we 
were always fighting a lost cause really in the attempts to have an MP, coming forward 
again to 1995 there was a period again in ’95, ’96,’97 where we ran the County, we 
ran Mid-Suffolk District Council, we ran St Edmundsbury Council, we ran Bury Town 
Council, Stowmarket Town Council and we had an MEP, in those days there was one 
MEP for an area and you voted for him. We had the lot, everything apart from the MP, 
so until then what happened, whether the SDP formed or not, it wasn’t going to affect 
our vote because they did have candidates, I don’t recall how many, They didn’t get 
any MPS…as far as I recall but regarding councillors but I don’t remember how many 
they got but whatever was happening it wasn’t going to alter the basic Tory solid 
Suffolk. Had we been a marginal then this would have been a very big thing.  
PB  In a seat where it would be considered to be a close two-way or possible three-way 
battle, I can imagine that it would become a cause of concern if defections took place 
and therefore it weakens the prospects of becoming a….and yet at the same time from 
what I could also hear it suggests in a way that because of the certainty of it because 
it’s quite a strong Conservative constituency that conversely it also provided a solidity 
of the Labour Party membership if you see what I mean  
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ED  Yes, it could have made us draw closer together. We did fight and certainly in the area 
covered by our Branch, at that point which was Gislingham and Walsham, at that point 
we contested every District Ward and every County division, everyone and we strayed 
over when some of the County divisions weren’t in our area if they didn’t have a 
candidate we would supply one and we canvassed in the whole lot, we were a very 
active Branch. We’ve never been as active as we were then in those days. Sadly, I 
think I said earlier, you need a disaster or a brilliant victory or something to enthuse 
people and we were facing a terrible time in those days  
PB  How a party reacts is based on if its facing success or its facing defeat and that can 
impinge on the membership and it seems that defeat can actually energise 
formerly…membership to come back and return  
ED  Yes, there’s so much to complain about and to object to 
PB  And so we can see Labour almost defined by the advent of Thatcherism in the early 
‘80s and how it reacted to Thatcherism in many respects 
ED  It could be and to some extent I’m sure that was the case. I don’t know how much but 
certainly the fact that she rode roughshod over conventions, party rules, the way things 
had been done, she wouldn’t have that. There was one really telling point which 
defined for me Thatcherism, that being the convention that the MP who would look 
after Police affairs, I’ve forgotten the name, there was one MP who was a sort of 
Cabinet Minister but not quite who looked after Police affairs, and the convention was 
that it would be that if the party in power was Tory then this man or woman would be 
Labour and vice versa and when she won she kept Elton Griffiths, our MP, on as the 
Police spokesman 
PB;  Quite right-wing, pro capital punishment…. 
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ED  Yes, and also someone who was so complacent because he was in a job for life, which 
it was, and he moved to America, and he was known in Parliament as the member for 
Orange County where he had a house. He was hardly ever in the Country but he just 
knew he was always going to win and Thatcher just defied that convention and she did 
the same to all kinds of things and that was noticeable for us  
PB  I just have a couple more questions and the first one is to talk about whether in your 
opinion, and I’ve touched on it before with the defections of the SDP and also later on 
the expulsion that took place of militants. Do you think that was part of a general 
corrective process for Labour to get itself back into some semblance of a broader 
church, whereupon it wasn’t being pulled apart by the polls? So that what was left once 
the expulsions took place and once the defections took place, was what Labour always 
has been, a rather broad coalition of ideas so you had those who were social 
democrats, the Croslands, the Hattersleys, people like that, you’ve got the soft left, the 
Kinnocks and the Foots and you have the more centre left, the Tony Benn’s who 
moved over there and the David Skinners. Do you think it was part of a corrective 
process and one which needed to take place perhaps? 
ED  I don’t know if it needed to take place or not. I think it would have been good had we 
been able to keep militant within the Party. Obviously it had to be observed and if it 
stepped out of line then something would have to be done. I didn’t enjoy listening and 
watching Neil Kinnock’s speech about what the militants were doing 
PB  1985 that was….. 
ED  Yes, he really sort of theatricalised that. There was a feeling within the PLP, as I said 
before was always and has always been to the right of membership feelings, that they 
didn’t like militant and some of the things they were doing weren’t following Labour 
Party rules. One of the problems is that Labour Party rules have been set over the 
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decades by basically the right of the party and they really don’t want to give up that 
right. There’s something I object to in the Parliamentary system and it’s in all parties 
that when you have the leader elected and the dust settles you find that there’s about 
a hundred people or so who have a political self-interest to vote with the party 
regardless of what they feel, now it’s a shame that that is such a large amount of people 
and I think more people with independence of mind, able to vote in the way they feel 
they want to vote would be a good thing and that would be good for all parties to have  
PB  Not changing the electoral system perhaps, but changing to more proportional 
representation….. 
ED  The only thing I have against any kind of proportional representation is that you can’t 
vote for one person, you vote for the party and in the Labour Party, I think it’s true to 
this day, that the list of people from whom would-be MPS could be chosen by the 
Constituents is selected by the hierarchy of the party. They decide who is a decent 
candidate or not. I would prefer the membership of a Constituency to make a 
horrendous mistake and choose the wrong man or woman and then they themselves, 
that constituency would live with the consequences, rather than have the choice limited 
to a group of people who won’t frighten the horses, who won’t step out of line too far, 
and basically the hierarchy of the party feels they can handle. I would prefer some 
really right-wing person elected, some really left-wing person elected if that’s what the 
Constituency party wants. If Democracy means anything that’s what should happen. 
There should be no over-arching authority to say no you can’t choose him. There’s 
been a number of cases where you’ve had a hard-working man or woman who’s been 
a Councillor, or a Secretary or any sort of a position in a Constituency and has worked 
there for years, lived there for years and knows an awful lot of people. That person can 
be overridden and someone parachuted in because they want someone – Tristam 
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Hunt was a case in point – it should be up to the Constituency to make their own 
decisions and stand or fall by that decision, individually, as a constituency  
PB  My final question and I think we’ve been speaking about this throughout the 
conversation, about common ground and between those who see themselves on the 
Left and those who see themselves on the Right. During the time when the CLP was 
there a lot of common ground or particular points of division at the time? 
ED  It’s difficult to recall now. There were always people on the left and people on the right 
in the Constituency and we would each try to get our own view accepted. Sometimes 
we succeeded and sometimes we failed. But in general we would never have done 
what is going on at the moment, and campaigned in effect against the Party in any way 
whatsoever. We saw loyalty as having to be earned rather than something which is 
automatic and is demanded. Loyalty is earned if it’s deserved and so whoever was 
putting forward and whatever the subject of the proposition or whatever was put 
forward, whatever that was it would be discussed and it should succeed on its merits. 
Whether it goes against Party policy is something else and I think Constituencies 
should have the autonomy to have their own policies. When it comes to elections then 
if it’s in the manifesto we have to stick to that because we’ve signed up to agree to do 
that but I think more autonomy for Constituencies would be a very good thing.  
PB  Would you say that because Labour was in Opposition at that time and with the 
particular nature of Thatcherism that was the binding force, the unifying force, when 
there were many in the Party who were diametrically opposed to each other. The glue 
that kept everyone together was the opposition to Thatcherism? 
ED  Yes, I think that’s true. I suppose, I mentioned earlier, I think it takes a disaster or a 
triumph to enthuse people and get people interested enough to come to meetings and 
put their point of view and argue vociferously for that view and then when the decision 
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is taken you accept that. And yes I think Thatcher did bring us together, rather and 
there were so many things that we disagreed with her about that there wasn’t too much 
time to argue amongst ourselves. 
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Appendix Five 
Interview with Baroness Joyce Gould of Potternewton, 10 December 2012 
 
JG  I would say for John Smith in particular, their loyalty to the Labour Party was the 
institute that mattered. 
PB  Was it a tribal thing? 
JG  Absolutely tribal had they gone it would have prompted a whole range of people going 
with them. We would have been left with a very left party if you think that the next stage 
what happened to the party the very reason these people gave they were very minor 
in their thinking, these people gave was the advent of the trots who were beginning to 
make inroads to the party then how would we have coped if we hadn’t have had those 
people it’s a very its theoretical but interesting I’m interested in that sort of thing. I think 
the liberals would not have survived unless they had done something right dramatic 
and you know in a sense what you have got now with the Lib Dems, you have a lump 
of the Labour Party and a lump of old liberals, the liberal party still exists. And there is 
a separate SDP. If it quite fascinating how that might have gelled out but anyway you 
tell me the first thing you have on your thing. 
PB  The first question I was going to ask was the same question I asked Lord Kinnock and 
Lord Radice about the ’79 conference not the Wembley Conference, where Ron 
Haywood made a scathing speech against Jim Callaghan.  
JG  You have got to put it in its context both Giles who were outside it. I am starting to write 
my memoirs, I am trying to write a dramatic chapter, I went to head office in 1975 when 
I think about the national executive as it was then of which I am going to be extremely 
rude and scathing about they were so intense on having a fight they did not have the 
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concept of this is the Labour Party we are taking about. It was bitter it was nasty. It was 
rude it was awful. I put my head in my hands at the moment. And in a sense Ron 
Heywood was the general secretary, Tony Benn’s behest. He wasn’t very bright Ron 
Heywood. He came up through the organisation and he should never have been the 
general secretary. He would do things I used to do a lot of international work and he 
was equally scathing there. He owed and he couldn’t do it very well because he was a 
terrible speaker. In ’79 actually the mood started to change. Roy Jenkins did the 
Dimbleby Lecture which talked about revalue content in a sense whose fault was it. 
Was it because of that that Ron Heywood had a go what it did do was set off the 
manifesto. I don’t know what Gerald said about it, he was very involved in it. They set 
it up because of the influence of Tony Benn and the power of the unions. It had some 
prominent people in it I can’t remember who they were actually. I was talking to my 
daughter and I asked her what she remembered because she was involved in all this. 
Campaign groups and manifesto groups not that she achieved anything. They were all 
negative proactive none with a programme of their own. Slightly different was the 
Tribune group who were soft left. They were a whole lot of you know my daughter was 
actually secretary and it was a group who tried to come up with ideas not negatives 
like the manifesto group. Don’t forget we have just had the winter of discontent. And 
Jim Callaghan did it all wrong going too early. Not going in ’78 who gave him that 
advice everybody has different stories whether it was Jack  Cunningham  in fact it 
cause Jim in other ways to take the blame for that election cause it should never have 
been that way and you have got all this all the pressure going all around and we lost 
the general election. Jim resigned, we then moved in, what we caused the biggest 
furore of all with Michael Foot becoming the leader. I was a very dear friend of Michaels 
and I adored him as a man, but he was hated by the left. He was hated by the right 
and he tried to sit in the middle and made some serious mistakes. That actually in a 
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sense made things even worse. Combined with that the leader should be elected by 
conference.  
I was a party official and you can’t express what you think and there was something 
very wrong. The leader of the party was the leader of the CLP and the party did not 
have a leader. So there was a case for change there really was. Whether we got that 
change right was another story. They had an agreement of the Electoral College and 
the unions agreed by the NEC of picking the leader. At the same time that all this was 
happening I actually think. I don’t want to judge I would really like to know what went 
on behind the scenes of those people got together and formed the SDP I cannot 
believe that these people suddenly happened. I think there was an attempt I am sure 
there was to try and check and change the party so it didn’t so they didn’t have to do 
that, I will check the dates. The day that the party decided to disassociate itself with 
Europe and the people that went forward to join the SDP were all pro Europe. They 
were like me like they pro Europe.  They were passionate for being pro Europe and at 
the time the party disassociated itself with Europe and that was the beginning of We 
cannot go on any longer. I have got a whole list of dissociations.  
We had this conference I was supposed to be in charge of this conference.  It was an 
absolute disaster, it was terribly hard for us as officials to do. With all this dissent and 
rows and people standing up but the other thing that affected this conference was its 
structure because we had a whole series of possible amendments t what we had. And 
each one was debated separately and we voted separately. So what you go was gaps 
between votes. And that people were sat around doing nothing. And this made matters 
worse. I was my worst experience I used to run conferences but nothing compared to 
Wembley.  
PB  Is it true that they had MPs corralled in like a pen. 
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JG   That is a bit of an exaggeration. I will tell you now that MPs always a section at 
conference even now and always had a section at the side.  
PB I think it was David Owen who said that.  
JG  I can see why they said that. We always had a trade union section a constituency 
section and a MPs sections. My memory says that we always had this structure. And 
it did not stop the MPs speaking or participating. And they always sat together. It’s an 
example of everybody blaming ever body else and the distrust. 
PB  That’s interesting you hear from the ones that left that their voices not being heard the 
way the amendments were structured. But everybody had their chance to speak and 
probably that is why MPs and party members say that party conference is being staged 
managed these days. 
JG  In those days party conference was much freer than it is now. Party conference is not 
the same it is all too structured. This year it wasn’t too bad they had good platform 
speakers and they had a good rally but it actually is a bit of a farce. You fight for what 
you want. So I think that was a real problem but the attitude was sometimes a bit of a 
farce. It was just an example of, they hated the action. I have been doing some work 
around the militant stuff, you know I got rid of all of the militant and you know exactly 
the same I have been reading Tony Benn his diaries and some of the things he is 
proud to have said were absolutely awful I mean really awful and I cannot cope with 
people who behave that way. I think for me you did get the very next day, you know 
you did get this statement and a press statement but the fact was and I cannot believe 
and maybe I am being too silly I don’t know, but I cannot believe that they went from 
that conference and the next day and they were able to produce something like that. 
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But I think by March we had twelve MPs resign so I think you could see this was the 
start of something dramatic but if you think about the facts and I don’t know the months 
and this could be significant I don’t know but there was a conference in Portsmouth, it 
was held by between the liberals and some of the would be SDPs and that was in 
1981’ but I don’t know what month it was in I will have to check that out because , and 
you still have one of the things I think is important you still had for instance you had all 
this going on and Shirley Williams and David Owen both were members of the national 
executive committee at the same time as I cannot possibly believe they were not 
organised themselves. Bill Rodgers was trying to cover up and he did resign, Shirley 
Williams resigned sometime later than the others and I don’t know when David Owen 
did, but when I was doing some of my militant stuff and we talked about it within the 
party it was said wasn’t that what the SDP did. And it was difficult and we had no 
intention of destroying the party that same way and it was interesting that they was 
seen that they were still working even though they were still in the Labour Party.  
PB  The practice is still the same Isn’t it and this is the same isn’t it whether you are to the 
left or the right you are still a party organisation, wasn’t it the social democratic 
association that  used to organise the right… 
JG  I just can’t believe that it sort of happened I mean one of the people was a back bencher 
who upset me more than anybody else I could live with the showrooms? But so what 
they were on their own agenda…..was John Cartwright he was an MP for Woolwich or 
somewhere like that and John Cartwright and an MP whose name I always forget he 
was an MP for Fulham …He was on the left and John Cartwright was he was on the 
right what was his name? And we were sent off and it showed to me examples of the 
NEC not living in the real world. We were sent off before the ’83 election to the channel 
Isles to do an analysis of when we win the 1983 general election you know this is a tax 
haven what will we do you know I have never heard such nonsense in all my life I was 
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conducting this and John Cartwright and we never ever wrote the report. Because John 
Cartwright defected and to me it was all a farce I mean the idea of that kind of thing 
in’83 against all this background against all that was going on but let’s face it we did 
we went off to the Channel Isles and it was never mentioned and I like John and I just 
thought that ...and one of the other things actually just as an aside which I found, I was 
on the Jenkins commissions booking the elections in the House of Commons and Roy 
always used to refer to us as and I said to him one day Roy you are not one of us and 
he couldn’t even all those years later couldn’t disassociate himself from us and yet in 
some ways he was very much a …and yet he still had this feeling somehow he was 
still part of us but the sad thing was he was not with us anymore. Although he was 
quite close to Tony Blair but I think in some ways it took the party a very long time to 
recover it really did because we then went from crisis to crisis actually. I think what was 
interesting was they did gradually build up what did they get they got, I can’t remember 
how many MPs went over and they gradually, I thought there was more than that, what 
have I got there, it was fifteen and then it did go to twenty five. And then what I found 
fascinating was what I found particularly interesting about the SDP I mean in some 
ways to me discredit it that made it a bit more. When you get somebody like Sue 
Slipman who I am told is an active student communist member joins the SDP I mean 
there was a big furore when she did that and one of the other very interesting things 
was that Anna Soubry is now the Public Health minister of the Conservatives and who 
actually joined the SDP from the Conservatives, so she defected. And I find that quite 
fascinating because it was quite radical and I met her a couple of weeks ago and I 
thought maybe she did have some sort of...so it is fascinating to the people that actually 
went in.  
They only got one conservative MP I think but they did then pick up all those disaffected 
people that hated the Tories and hated the Labour Party cause the Labour Party was 
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in such a mess so it did pick up this mess they became a sort of media baby the media 
loved them they absolutely loved them I find it fascinating cause you still see the media 
loving Shirley Williams like they did then.  
PB  Roy Hattersley said it’s the Shirley Williams Phenomenon.  
JG Shirley got a good reputation as a Secretary of State for Education she was an 
extremely clever women. She was terrible for making decisions. I remember someone 
saying it’s like having a jelly fish on a string. She was so bad at making decisions but 
very clever. She was also very good at telling a story over a health bill. She got very 
good publicity over how she was sorting it out, she never voted against anything on 
that bill, she voted constantly for it. David Owen never voted liberal. My brother left 
labour for the SDP and said if David Owen became leader he would quit. The reason 
was that David Owen was too far to the right. And the liberals are too soft. He was very 
arrogant. When he sat on the NEC and you were an official you were lucky to get a 
hello. If you met him in the corridor he didn’t acknowledge you. None of the drivers 
would take him because he was so rude to them. He was sure he was always right. 
What was funny was that he was passionate about the health bill. The NHS was 
something he actually believed in and to see the possibility of privatisation made him 
go back. He used to come to the Lords and very occasionally he would speak on 
foreign affairs, he never came in to visit so when he came in people said he had 
something to say until the health bill when he said a lot about his belief in the NHS. So 
I will give him credit for that. And what was that he tried to keep the SDP together and 
ended up with just a sort of right you know. They changed the legal aid bill and lost a 
lot of MPs but if you go back to their relationship with the liberals if you think were they 
stood particularly on war and minister of defence their policies were very much akin 
with the liberals and you could actually see how they could do that. I mean it’s a 
fascinating thing because the old Lib Dems party was a hard…how can I put that it 
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wasn’t right wing but it was a libertarian type a party that you could never trust. I mean 
I could always say not the quote but the conservatives were the opposition and the 
liberals were the underdog. In fact on one occasion I came bowing to a top liberal agent 
to try stopping a liberal getting a seat. We didn’t they won by about forty votes which 
quite honestly there was a real hatred but they were operators they knew how to do it. 
In fact I think they knew how to do it than the Lib Dems know how to do it. And I come 
from Leeds and Leeds…you could see in West Leeds were my ex-husband was a 
councillor they were long term organisers. They didn’t expect it to happen tomorrow so 
one ward absolutely every ward going was won everything would go into one ward. 
They would win that one ward. And then they would move everything into the next one. 
And eventually I have to say the sheer neglect by the Labour Party, I went up to Leeds 
and to a party official and he came out in tears. Because we lost that seat and I was 
still in Leeds when we put Joe Dean in, and I did open hours at the Leeds office there, 
I did all the work to get them that seat. And to see it thrown away literally through 
neglect and put Michael Meadowcroft in was absolutely devastating. It was all 
organised in a way and of course Michael Meadowcroft give him credit is still liberal. 
And he has never changed his view. But what I do think is interesting though is why 
did the electorate fall away from us. Why did that happen? And I think in some ways 
this related to the or to two things one I think that people like things solid and straight 
and I think they were a bit too liberal. And I think the other thing regarding the electorate 
why the electorate moved away gradually was that the Labour Party was putting its 
house in order. And therefore people were going back to help him do that. They were 
gradually going to come back. And you remember when we had two SDPs Peers who 
tried to come back to the Labour Party. And the Labour Party accepted their 
membership. And there was a big row here and our labour group were loath to accept 
them into the group. And being a Labour Party official I had to stand up and say this 
group has to accept every group offered to the Labour Party and therefore we did and 
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we had a big row about it because the real resentment about the people coming in was 
much more so.   
Because these people had deserted the Labour Party. They had been disloyal they 
had deserted us. And so in some ways never to be forgiven and you are hurt by this 
sort of feeling and when I think of someone like Roger Liddle. Roger Liddle went to the 
SDP and comes back as an advisor to Tony Blair. I quite like Roger but did he come 
back because he wanted to be an advisor to Tony Blair or did he come back because 
he genuinely wanted to come back. Now you know I’m being a bit unfair to him, and 
there was a lot of concern about when he did come back in the party say you know 
‘how can Tony do this?’ One of the interesting things which I think is quite interesting 
is name because calling yourself Social Democrats Party is a link to try and associate 
themselves with the European parties. And there was this suggestion that they should 
call themselves New Labour. And that got rejected. And it’s very interesting and David 
Lipsey’s was in the book at the time he was Tony Crosland’s… and he has just written 
a book and he goes on to say how he advised Tony Blair to call it New Labour. And 
David Lipsey went on to ask these things, and you could see this influence and David’s 
is a very good friend of mine. And you could see that influence coming through.  
PB  It sounds like a true confession because firstly you mention Tony Crosland, one of the 
things I have mentioned that I read about is Denis Healey and Giles Radice and David 
Marquand, another former Labour Party member who argued that if Tony Crosland 
was still alive he would not have defected. He was a true labour the same way as Roy 
Hattersley and he was on the right. So that is interesting to see the man who pretty 
much was a modern revisionist, he would not have left the party. 
JG  I think in some ways it was tribal but some people were determined to let the party 
down knowing all the problems.  I will tell you a story. The 1983 election which was 
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beyond a disaster and we had these forty people complaining and it was like a public 
meeting. I remember we used to meet at Transport House and Roy Hattersley and 
Gerald Kaufman said after the meeting lets go off and we went to Roy Hattersley’s 
house, we sat and talked with our head in our hands and said what are we going to 
do. How are we going to sort it out, I grew up with Gerald, the feeling was we had got 
to do something.  I think that people like Roy and others that the big stumbling block 
was the NEC. And their attitude, well the descent just went on. We had serious 
problems with the soft left. Were they didn’t want sanctions or expulsions. And wouldn’t 
accept that this was necessary. That Margaret Beckett who did sign the dissenting 
report on the Liverpool enquiry. It was really nothing to do with the issue more to do 
with that we disagreed with that concept. And it took them some time to realise that 
the only way to get this party back was by doing that. So they did and I remember all 
sorts of things, I remember travelling the country with Roy Hattersley I must check what 
year that was. The NEC would come up with all sorts of things.  We must build 
the membership this will get rid of this. Proper political education and all this. Roy 
Hattersley and I were commissioned to go round the country and talk. At regional 
conferences to find out how the party was thinking and feeling and all that. But it was 
an attempt by people like Roy in all fairness to see what the hell we could do there was 
a feeling of despair. Never the less they stayed and fought. It raised a wider question 
one has to think is it possible in this sort of day and age to introduce a new political 
party into the system. And if you think about in a sense it was almost overnight what 
the SDP tried to do. I think you could do it gradually, very, very gradually the concept. 
All of a sudden tried to poison that poison is the wrong word tried to introduce a new 
political concept that just didn’t work. 
PB  That’s what happened when UKIP is about. 
JG  Yes. 
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PB  That’s what the Liberal democrats are trying to take over the centre ground because 
New Labour moved to the left now they have got the coalition to try to box them in. it’s 
a very crowded centre that labour is trying to occupy as well, 
JG  I hope it is, I think we have got a lot of work to do the party to really establish itself. 
Maybe the One Nation concept is the way it is going to do it I hope so. We have got to 
be sure about what we are doing there is a lot of work going on. There is a lot of policy 
work going on. But at the end of that we have got to have and what the SDP didn’t 
have is something very solid and understandable and clear. The SDP had…Rodgers 
and Owen were MPs when this was happening voting against the Labour Party on rent 
increases, the Labour Party had accepted the rent increases, they also voted against 
the party when the party decided it was opposed to selling council houses and then 
changed its mind. There were one or two little incidents were actually they showed 
themselves to be quite brave. Where the Labour Party went wrong we did on one or 
two social things they were soft liberals and it’s inevitable they went, I am trying to think 
of when they left. What the feeling in the party was like, what it did do of course was 
the right of the party was decimated when the left grew stronger pseudo-left, they 
weren’t left. I used to argue with them for women’s issues and they used to say it will 
be alright when the revolution comes and never get on your platform with you. They 
were only playing at it. 
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Appendix Six 
Interview with the Right Honourable the Baroness Dianne Hayter of Kentish Town 
24 November 2014 
PB  The first question is about your own recollection of the party up to and including 1979 
General Election. 
DH  Oh up to the ’79 General Election because before this because it got worse, the awful 
bit was the party conference after the 1979 General Election. It got bitter. The bits 
before that were really pretty bad, I think I think I used to drink before I went to the GC 
actually. I was always the odd one out if you like. And I felt that the party was, I come 
from South Wales from a very mining community. And it really helped that I was more 
aware of their problems. I was a magistrate in the inner London so I could see the 
problems people were having with paying their rates as it was then. And then I would 
go to a Labour Party meeting and there was this sort of, I didn’t use the word contempt 
at the time, that’s looking back, I think there was sort of contempt for the electorate, 
that they knew best. That people were out of touch with Labour voters. Now that in 
itself was one thing but what there was the bitterness to people like me. It was really 
horrendous at meetings people wouldn’t sit next to me and stuff like that. And they 
would play tricks and sort of move silly resolutions and look around at you to see how 
you had voted. So there was a sort of psychological stuff going on which meant a lot 
of people of course particularly our older people just stopped going to meetings. So it 
really wasn’t very pleasant. It got worse later on but the other feeling was that people 
would use the word traitors about people who were in Government so it wasn’t that 
good. I was with the Fabians at the time, I was assistant general secretary at the time. 
But I had quite a lot to do at our local Fabians societies. And I used to find a lot of 
people who became Fabians were very good for our memberships. Because they 
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could just get away they didn’t have to go to GC.  So it was happening around the 
country but it wasn’t just in London it was worse in London. So some of the local 
Fabians were reactive cause people could just go and discuss I don’t know housing 
issues without it being for this amendment. So that to me seemed a symptom of the 
fact that a lot of people were very uncomfortable about party meetings. 
PB  It does seem like a foreign country these days when you think of the seemingly staged 
managed way conferences are run now it’s not for parties, they’ve not completely taken 
over dissent but to see the conferences back then and some might say oh that was a 
proper way of doing conferences and things like that but it was a bear pit from what…  
DH  It was a bear pit and also nonsense. Two things, there was a lot of television coverage. 
We could probably get away with dissent now, now television doesn’t cover us 
anymore. But that doesn’t matter. But of course it was all completely unrealistic 
because people even now look back and say oh in the old days we used to control it. 
When I wrote my Fabian pamphlet in 1970 after one of these conferences, maybe it 
was a bit later, but at that point the CLPs only had about 10% of the voting conference 
so they kept feeling they could put their own resolutions to conference, they could 
decide, the reality was the trade unions could control 90% of the votes at conference 
so it was complete nonsense so not only was it a bear pit but it wasn’t actually decision 
making. And that is one of the things I still find it difficult to get across to some of the 
people at the time - oh at least we were making decisions - well no they weren’t 
actually. So it was horrendous, obviously we learnt some of the wrong lessons and we 
became over control freaks. But I think if anyone had been in the bear pit, in your 
words, understood that you…I mean I remember once on  television rather like a 
Newsnight - now you’d always have a Labour person or a tory person on Newsnight 
or whatever - but in those days you would have three Labour people arguing against 
each other on television. So it was pretty horrendous. 
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PB  Sorry to bring it up. The next question is about the 1979 party conference in September 
and the subsequent special conference at Wembley. The vote was carried for the 
mandatory reselection of MPs and the control of the manifesto and further to that the 
party had its commission for enquiry, as I mentioned I spoke to Joyce, (DH Joyce had 
that in one.) Denis Healey made the contention that it was the commission that was 
the crystallisation of the breakaway. Do you think that helped to trigger deflections of 
those that went on to form the SDP? 
DH  It was the stage one conference, it was the second Wembley conference. Because at 
that time David Owen and the others still were fighting. David Owen in his case wanted 
one member one vote. I know what blouse I was wearing at the time, pale blue it had 
a kind of Chinese collar. And I can remember exactly the feeling was, what happened 
we had a lunch time meeting, a Fabian fringe  meeting at the lunchtime in Wembley 
and we were in one room and Hattersley was speaking, the picture on the front of my 
book if you’ve got the paperback is taken there, they cut Hattersley off, that’s the 
Chinese thing, that is taken at the fringe meeting during the 81’ Wembley conference 
and Hattersley was the speaker and we had an absolutely crowded meeting and the 
council for social democracy I think it was called at the time the group around what 
became the gang of four was the gang of three at the time. It was the three people that 
had written the letter to the Guardian because Jenkins hadn’t come back. It was the 
hour of three having a meeting next door and we turned up so Mary Gowdie went and 
stole all their sandwiches. To bring them in for us lot. But certainly I think at that stage 
had the vote on the election of the leader gone differently I still think they might have 
stayed. You would have to ask them but Bill Rodgers got ill at the time because he was 
so torn up by it. Everybody was really tense but of course it hits you back and I’m not 
certain had the vote gone the other way and had we had an electoral college that gave 
us votes to them I’m not, I’m still not certain it would have happened. But of course it 
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was not simply the vote on that but they saw the tactics they saw that feelings hadn’t 
really seen the light so it was a lot of things at that day. But I wasn’t at the commission, 
I wasn’t there I think it was still probably saveable. I mean there were still other 
problems. You would have to ask them.  Two of them in particular Bill and Shirley were 
really born into this movement. Bill, you know, in it from a youngster had been a fighter 
he had run CBS he’d saved them against plan Gaitskell I don’t think he practically left 
Labour. 
PB  This was one of the questions I asked Lord Radice. Do you think there would ever be 
a time when you could envisage the Gang of Three as is now returning back to the 
Labour fold? 
DH  And you know psychologically they are still Labour. But you know I would open my 
arms willingly to them because I don’t think they are… Shirley’s been a bit difficult 
about the NHS but that’s.... Deep down you know it must be quite hard to put much 
between us. 
PB   Probably say the same about some of the earlier social democrats such as Charles 
Kennedy as well. I would say. 
DH  Yes, I don’t know him but that’s quite possible. There are a number of people who I 
am not going to name who have said to me particularly after reading the book had I 
known then what I know now in other words if the unions were beginning to do it they 
might not have gone.  
PB  That’s interesting it’s also sad when you hear about John Grant defecting. And John 
Cartwright. And Tom McNally.  
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DH  Yes just harder to hear because he came in and sat on the tory Government up to that 
point that’s pretty unforgivable, Tom was a Fabian, one of my predecessors. They 
couldn’t resist the lure of Government. Power.  
PB  You just mentioned before in a fight back about the delegates heckling you received 
some unpleasant heckling at the first party conference. What was your recollections of 
what it was like for yourself. Quite unpleasant? 
DH  It was. The first time I got really badly heckled was when London was at the 
conference. I was doing the reply from the executive and I had no idea what the issue 
was. But on the platform I said, schools are run for children not the teachers - I thought 
they were going to kill me. It seemed to me such an obvious thing to say. Yes it was 
very unpleasant luckily I have always been quite tough. I have very good friends. You 
know like people who are here now like George Robinson and John Speller who were 
in the unions like Roger Godsiff. There were a group of us who worked for trade unions 
who held each other’s hands if you like. So there was always a group around me that 
got us through it. If you want the honest answer what hurt me much more was a 
personal thing that happens to one friend I was the Fabian and we had working in the 
Fabians Hope Roper and Jenny Beaver. 
Jenny was married to a lovely man called Colin, a nice man and very good and older 
than me and taught me about the Fabians.  He wrote a Fabian pamphlet that I 
published and I got to know him and his wife Jenny. Jenny came to work at the Fabians 
and Hope married John Roper who is now an MP. He was an MP somewhere up in 
Lancashire and so these were colleagues of mine who I had a duty of care towards. 
Both their husbands left the Labour Party. I had two members of staff sleeping with the 
enemy.  To watch people go through that because up till then on TV you watch a 
programme and your reactions are the same but watching TV and reading newspapers 
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and having different reactions and I was much more eaten up by that sort of thing. 
John roper who had been treasurer of the Fabians and had been very close to me and 
suddenly he was in another political party and funnily enough I found that much harder 
than being screamed at by a group of people I didn’t respect. It’s not as if I respected 
those people. 
PB  It’s when friends and close colleagues seemingly just leave. 
DH  That I found much harder I’m not saying it was a badge of honour to be shouted at but 
I was young and strong. 
PB  The next question you mention Frank Chapple of the EETPU for the capitulation at the 
Commission of Enquiry. You also said there was a lack of leadership on the right 
against the Bennite left. Why do you think the unions on the right of the party failed to 
communicate and organise before 1981. I know the liaison committee with David Owen 
why do you think there was such a disconnect.  
DH   The unions were at their most powerful, they had 13,000.000 members, but maybe 
that explains it, they did take their role as the industrial representatives for the working 
class people very strongly. They did look for political leadership and the problem was 
the MPs were completely spineless. And if there had been one really strong MP, 
although Denis Healey was great he himself was having difficulty and he was very 
concentrated on parliament. There was no great leader outside of parliament. 
Peter Shore finally got brought along side and people like that but they organised only 
in parliament so they were organising the manifesto group but it was only MPs  they 
never reached out to the other lot and so there was a real disconnect with the unions 
who were looking for leadership and the MPs. Let’s be nice to them - they were going 
through their own reselection. They were having a tough time and were focused on 
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their own survival and didn’t think about the party as a whole. We didn’t have a general 
secretary who should have done it, but the general secretary was in hock to the NEC, 
we had first Ron Haywood and then Jim Mortimer they were the wrong people to do it 
had we had a general secretary of an earlier type but the general secretary had been 
weakened so neither the party itself and the MPs were just looking internally with the 
unions waiting for guidance because it wasn’t their job. The top of the trade unions 
were always on the general council it was their number two’s who were on the NEC 
then again they weren’t as involved as they should have been . 
DH  And I think he at one point did point to the MPs like they were a separate entity and 
say this is why we are here. Because the MPs are elected by Labour voters they had 
forgotten about Labour voters. It was dreadful.  
PB  I want to talk to you about the St Ermins group which met on February 10th 1981.an 
immediate attempt to set up an organised response in wake of the Limehouse 
declaration in an attempt to keep the party together. It brought in moderate union 
leaders. They were concerned about the hard left on the NEC St Ermins group and the 
subsequent Labour solidarity were the subsequent response bringing together the 
more moderate trade unions and MPs. Were there ever a sense in the unions that they 
had to step in? We just touched on this because of the spinelessness of MPs, did they 
have to do this? 
DH  I did my interviews, they just said we have to do it because there is no one else. No 
point giving money to the Labour Party if it’s not electable. The Labour Party is to get 
elected. We set it up in 1900 to get elected to get people into parliament. Other than 
that there is no point. This is obvious they were very clever it’s got to be electable. 
They just felt it’s our party in a sense and they felt that MPs had let it drift away to the 
hard left. We must have it back and they were much more in touch with their members 
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around the country and they were hearing and they got the data that trade unions 
weren’t voting Labour.  I do think that Roger Godsiff and John Speller and Keith Heller 
were feeding the data in at the right moment. I think a certain amount of help was given 
that our own members weren’t voting Labour. They were quite tough they weren’t like 
my earlier book about all the people who left school at ten and a lot of these people 
had left at fourteen. They came up the hard way. Charlie Turner - I sent him a letter 
don’t throw your archives away. He had left school early and his father had been on 
the permanent way and he was on the trains and he read his stuff on the trains. They 
knew where they came from and it was that sense of connection. 
PB  Its interesting now in the present date of the Westminster disconnect and this was 
being said in 1981. 
DH   You are right but they didn’t use those words.  
PB  It’s the same now when Cameron is saying Unite and Unison are running Labour 
someone should say you do know who we are the Labour Party. 
DH  We have problems with the Labour Party about the unions and basically four men who 
run it now. And in terms of governance it is not right for the unions to have so much 
power.  
PB  It harks to the United States like the mega unions. I can see that for being a point of 
concern. 
DH In the states although a friend of mine is the head of Wisconsin’s union. They are quite 
in the south. We had balance in my own union the GMB we really did keep an eye on 
our union we had these regional barons which were a problem at the time. They 
probably represented their members very well, if you were a consultant and asked how 
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you would run a company called the Labour Party you would say the governance is 
not there. 
PB  So it’s quite interesting to say do you think it’s a battle for the future? 
DH  Yes we will have to do that, we will have to sort it sometime. It’s too important an 
organisation, the Labour Party, not to have its decision making correct. 
PB  One step has been made I suppose, you know, in the last eighteen months with what 
Ed Miliband has out in place. But like you say. 
DH  And it’s about how the NEC work. You go to NEC meetings and there is about 40 
people in the rooms I still have management stuff you know basically you have twelve 
people who cannot run an organisation. It’s too unwieldy. You don’t have collective 
agreements you know I mean collective commitments to decisions and stuff like that. 
PB  Anyway going on to, you know how there was a two way battle with union leaders 
trying to convince those who were thinking of leaving such as Shirley Williams, and 
Shirley Williams was also trying to convince people like Alan Tuffin to defect and now 
Alan Tuffin he was quite unequivocal saying I am not leaving, saying I am loyal ‘I might 
sympathise with some of your ideals but I am loyal to the Labour Party’. Do you think 
there was ever any chance of a union ever disaffiliating with the Labour Party? 
DH  No because the only one would have been Frank Chapple and there was no way he 
would have done you know, having got the communists out and having got this back 
into mainstream he wasn’t going anywhere  there was no way he was going anywhere. 
And somehow I knew that, I was worried about MPs. But I never worried about the 
unions seriously. And of course it did help that they setup sterling …. Straight away. 
That really solidified that. But I mean I don’t think that any of the small unions even 
thought about it. This was our party, it did feel very strong at the time. 
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PB  It’s interesting because if you think of a union such as USDAW for example which like 
in 1975 were one of the few unions that were actually saying that they were in favour 
of staying in the common market. You would have thought that might have been a case 
of well you never know. But if they didn’t like you say the unions were the party. They 
created the party and they were the ones who keepers of it. The keepers of traditions. 
DH  Also something which, and don’t take this wrongly, but their people were very 
embedded in the party locally I mean those days at our party meetings we would 
appoint magistrates essentially, not quite but you know we would certainly appoint the 
school governors or whatever, they were called school managers for juniors and 
governors for seniors. So a lot of union officials were quite embedded into the system.  
And because of the party they got positions and I’m not saying that in a sordid way it 
just means that the party to them was big, it wasn’t something up in London it wasn’t 
something but their own local party, party activity was important to them as well.  
PB  So the next thing is getting on to the leadership party itself and someone said it needed 
a leader from the left in the early ‘80s.  
DH  Crap! 
PB  That answers that one! Because some say as well that Healey wouldn’t have been 
successful, do you contend evidently that Denis Healey if he had won that things would 
be considerably different? 
DH  Yes well I’ve got a chapter in a book on what if Prime Ministers that never happened. 
and I did one about Denis Healey  And I did two actually one about had he lost the 
deputy leadership and I did one about becoming Prime Minister which was completely 
outrageous and over the top. Wonderful. I had him winning over Foot but the Falklands 
still happened so we were never going to win the ’83 elections. However I had him 
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putting on his old retired battle fatigues after we reinvaded the Falklands. Out with the 
troops which he would have done, he’d have been the Falklands he would have been 
there, he’d have had his camera. He’d have been on the beach probably, he would 
have been absolutely over the top. Outrageous. But he would have been in there. I still 
don’t think we would have won the ’83 election but I had him wining the ’87 election. 
So people didn’t vote for Foot because he was from the left. The MPs thought it would 
give them a quiet time in their constituencies. Selfish the lot of them. Some of them 
adored Michael. No account for taste. But you know there was a whole sector who 
either thought Healy was a bully and no one wants bullies to be leaders or they were 
protecting their own backs. They didn’t dare tell their GC they hadn’t voted for him. I 
don’t think many voted for him because they thought we needed someone from the 
left. To sort out the left because at that stage it wasn’t in their minds, their tiny little 
Chinese minds that a leader was going to take on the left. They weren’t forward 
thinking they were in it for survival .so no I don’t think we needed a leader from the left 
we needed a leader and Michael Foot bless him may have been many things but not 
a leader. 
PB  No he was a good leader of the House of Commons or anything nd Employment 
Secretary because he had a contact with the industrial base which was a big thing to 
be approached but I think. (He wasn’t a leader) and that’s interesting as well because 
they are also a crew and also Tony King who they talked about there were some on 
the right who voted for Foot (well Neville Sandleson was one of the ones and Mike 
Hancock?) or was he one of the ones who said we have found somewhere else to go. 
Mike Thomas, that’s it.  
DH  There was someone else besides Neville Sanderson because it was always said they 
did. I’m not sure if they did or not. It wouldn’t surprise me.  
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PB  It’s almost like they had that idea set up in order to facilitate a… 
DH  Yes I don’t think so because Neville Sanderson wasn’t particularly part of the gang of 
four. Never really swam with them he was in a different league. I think he was just 
deeply unhappy. I think it was ‘sod you’. He really wasn’t part of that, he wasn’t part of 
the system or he may have signed the big letter in the Guardian but he wasn’t a big 
player really so if it was him I don’t think it was part of setting up something else. I don’t 
think he was sufficient...He was unhappy and slightly an odd man anyway. Deeply 
unhappy. They were, what they were going through it was easier to be just shouted at. 
They had it beastly and it was their families and they were being shouted at as well. 
PB  So the setting up of the solidarity group in ’81 replaced the CLD it brought together 
MPs such as you wouldn’t necessarily think to be happy bed fellows people such as 
Peter Shaw (Peter Shaw very important) Roy Hattersley and Frank field, this might 
seem like an obvious question to ask but did such differences ever cause such 
difficulties?  
DH  It wasn’t, although I was involved no first of all it wasn’t by accident they more or less 
couldn’t set it up until they had person that was absolutely keen and Peter Shaw of 
course was fighting in particularly difficult times in Tower hamlets and having a really 
rough time. And you know I said it was good to have young people around us and of 
course David Cowling was all part of that and even then had someone else called 
Bush. I can’t remember, so other than Europe Peter was absolutely understanding of 
the fight back. So it wasn’t that difficult to bring him in. though frankly Europe wasn’t 
on the agenda at that point you know later on you had to change the policy on Europe 
but in those days it was survival it was about getting the leader, deputy leader and the 
NEC so we were very focused on stuff like that. I don’t think policy issues came up at 
all. 
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PB  The next question is about the eventual positioning to the centre by the Labour Party 
by Neil Kinnock throughout the ‘80s he put the work in to the party and he was helped 
by the right of the NEC do you think that the defections of ’81 were the start of a process 
that were to see the removal of the ultraism on both sides? Sorry, if you like, the ultra-
right on the right the SDP and the militants on the left. Do you think that was like a 
necessary process in order to get Labour onto that Labour revisionist round, which 
seemed to be always be a natural state of things.  
DH  I still don’t think it was a necessary condition. I think we need to go to the left you know 
I think that was non-negotiable if they were not part of the family they were beyond but 
as John Roper always used to say if you are part of the Labour Party no enemies to 
the left. You know you were left of everyone else. But we did have to get rid of those, 
I still think had we had a bit of backbone earlier maybe had Callaghan resigned earlier 
we could have kept what became of the SDP and still dealt with militants. It’s a great 
what if but maybe we needed a Mrs Thatcher who knows, we needed to get thrashed 
at the elections before realising what  we had to do, it was certainly getting thrashed 
at the elections that persuaded Neil he had to go further. So it may have been that 
rather more than twelve other MPs leaving that did it. So the elections probably did it 
to us.  
PB  So it helped to focus the minds afterwards. The 1983 election and then it certainly 
helped focus the mind on the. 
DH  Not that the party electors don’t like you. Move on. So the electorate were going to do 
it finally. That’s it you can’t help people out if you’re not in power. 
                                                
311 
 
PB  And the final question which comes about as a Fabian you were known in the SDP 
who created the Tawney Society.  
DH.  Oh yes, it didn’t last long did it! 
PB  No it didn’t, and I was just wondering do you think the Fabian Society may have moved 
towards the, and supported the SDP. No. same as ways that no unions would have 
done. 
DH  Yes I mean obviously for a day or two when four of our NEC went and then two of my 
staff their husbands went and for a couple of days it was horrendous. And my lawyer 
went, he didn’t go at all, he didn’t go till until a month or two later, he didn’t go until the 
beginning of ’82. And Dick Leonard, he wanted SDP members to stay on the Fabians 
and then he INC said no and then we had the ballot and all of that. So it did become 
fairly obvious fairly soon that the Fabian executive had and our Fabian members were 
absolutely solid. I had resignations from, we had the four from the left David Sainsbury 
and a few others but the fact that I had a very small pile of letters on my desk within 
days it meant its ok. So I stayed.  Interestingly because we had all these intellectuals 
by Mabel Smith, Peter Townsend, Peter Hall, although Peter did go quite close to them. 
Colin Crabbe. All these academics and none of them went. Which is really interesting. 
PB  Again it’s a Loyalty isn’t it. 
DH  Yes. And I think when you take it personally I had those lot around me who stayed 
solid and it didn’t half help when you’re having a ballot and all of that. Dave Lipsey was 
brilliant and he was chair at the time and all my staff stayed. Not sure their husbands 
might have done but all our staff stayed. Really quite quickly it was obvious to me that 
the Fabians weren’t going anywhere.  
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PB  I think with the Fabians staying where the unions sent their leave but nobody knows 
but with that being in existence like Denis Healey knowing about it and then 
subsequently Peter Shaw and Roy Hattersley their solidarity that was that front and 
again a lot of it is quite behind the scenes isn’t it but it helped to shore up the support. 
And it does make you think, we were mentioning the Falklands before and if the 
Falklands had become earlier say in late 1981 would some of those who defected in 
’82 have as a result of Roy Jenkins having won Glasgow Hill Head at one point in ’82 
whether that would have changed the fortunes again. So it’s always a question of the 
event and when they took place.  
DH  Yes, well the Falklands saved the Labour Party.  
PB  Yes that’s an interesting way of putting it because it finished the SDP. 
DH  And it was quite interesting because you know because with Syria and ISIS I suddenly 
thought oh my God it could finish off UKIP because actually in the bigger debates at 
the moment UKIP is nowhere when ISIS or anything or they sadly beheaded they are 
suddenly back to old politics. I suddenly thought oh my god it might be something awful 
like ISIS to suddenly get through and make them stop UKIP. But no the Falklands 
saved the Labour Party. And of course surprise for the left they did not expect Michael 
Foot to be. 
PB  Well no because he was the old fashioned patriot wasn’t he at the end of the day. He 
might have been the romantic unilateralist but he was still a patriot. 
DH  Again I didn’t find the Falklands difficult. It seemed to me if a nasty country walked into 
your country you had to defend it. It was straightforward. 
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PB  One of the first things I was just going to ask is that you were from the so-called soft 
left of the party at the time 
NK  Tribunite left. 
PB  Tribunite left, yes and you had been very critical of the Wilson Government and the 
Callahan Government because they were seen at the time as the old revisionist, just 
maintaining things rather than actually introducing things and actually doing anything 
because well it was crisis management wasn’t it 
NK  Well, the thing is Jim Callahan’s Government for instance he was very definitely 
introducing devolution and I was against that and the public expenditure regime that 
they were conducting, I was against that and as it turned out I was right. I didn’t know 
I was right numerically at the time, it was just that when the full figures became 
available 3 years afterwards I was on the right side of the argument, and with Harold’s 
Government and of course the thing is with both Harold and Jim’s Governments they 
were effectively minority Governments, my view was that whilst there were obvious 
limitations on what they could do and I accepted them in the same spirit as Michael 
Foot accepted them, there were never the less ways of applying policy and of 
advocating change that would have won us more support and given us a better chance 
of escaping from being a minority and who can say who was right or wrong in that set 
of circumstances, I simply made the argument. 
314 
 
The other thing was there were conventions of the left, including a Tribunite left, some 
of which I regret. I think the anti-Europeanism was a mistake and that became apparent 
to me within two years of the referendum and I should have made my move away from 
that opinion before then. And another convention of course was unilateral nuclear 
disarmament in which I was a very conditional believer and of course was stuck with it 
when I became leader. But in a lot of cases I and some people like me maintained the 
left argument because of our view that the labour party would be corroded, if not 
endangered, if that Bevanite, Tribunite convention wasn’t maintained and I’m not 
saying that as someone who’s holier than thou, some people describe it as being 
guardians of the soul of the party, I think that’s stating it much too highly and 
romantically. My view derived not from a soulful attitude but from a pragmatic view of 
the general shape of British Politics and of the Labour party.  
PB  So when it came to 1979, just after the defeat to Margaret Thatcher …you had the 
September 79 party conference which was to put it mildly… 
NK  An utter disaster 
PB  I was just about to ask what were your recollections of the Parliamentary party because 
in one of the accounts that I read you felt you were corralled into a separate bit? 
NK  Oh yeah sure, but I wasn’t because I was on the National Executive Committee and in 
some ways that made it even more appalling as an experience. First of all it was a 
shouters conference, a ranters conference. Now I’m fairly spirited in the way in which 
I undertake public speaking, not in any calculated way but because it happens like that, 
but I hope I’m not a ranter and it was a ranters conference. It was a conference that 
was playing what George Orwell called the game of ‘Fee Fi Fo Fum,  I smell the blood 
of a right-wing deviationist’, which is a favourite past-time, or it has been a favourite 
past-time of the Labour Party and it was a conference which manifested a substantial 
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chunk of the Labour Party, never a majority but a substantial chunk of the Labour Party 
departing from reality and its main effect on me was to make me sit up and think what 
the hell are we doing and a couple of months before I’d accepted the appointment of 
being Shadow Education Secretary but it was that conference that made me think that 
unless and until we deal with this chaos and anarchistic attitude, this self-indulgent, 
infantile leftism, which is what Lenin called it, then we’re never going to make any form 
of appeal to the British Public at all and I suppose without  losing a single friendship, 
partly because there were so many Tribunites who felt, as I discovered, exactly the 
same way as I did. I started to become somebody engaged in a different kind of politics. 
That was the effect on me, now what made it so hateful wasn’t just the things that I 
referred to and the massive irresponsibility of it all, but the effect on Jim. Now Jim and 
I had had quarrels, many quarrels, and many divergences but we always remained 
friends, not a close comrade like Michael Foot, or even Cledwyn Hughes, but 
nevertheless I always respected Jim and he was always very kind to me and that went 
back to the early 60s when I worked my butt off for him in Party South-East. He was 
driven to despair by that weekend conference, where I think its right to say we must 
have had a minimum of 3 National Executive meetings, maybe 4, including one on the 
Thursday where we were deadlocked over the issue of reforming the election of the 
leadership of the party  
PB  Was this the Bishop’s Stortford… 
NK  No, I didn’t go to Bishop Stortford very, very deliberately and Bishop Stortford, I think 
it came after the conference, yes I’m pretty certain it did, but as we walked in I went 
into the Hotel, The Imperial in Blackpool I think it was, and as we walked in Jim said to 
me ‘I’m going to resign at this meeting’ and I said For Christ’s sake Jim don’t do that, 
you’ll make a catastrophic situation even worse. Now I know why you want to, in your 
position I would want to but please don’t do it, don’t let them force you into that kind of 
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submission. Now I don’t know if it was me, or Michael Foot, or Denis Healey or whoever 
it was who talked him out of it or his instinct got him out of it but he didn’t resign thank 
god, but he was very, very close to it and it was a searing experience. I went home 
from that conference very miserable indeed. 
PB  You were talking about the leadership discussions that they were having in terms of 
how they were going to elect the leader and that was discussed at Bishop Stortford. 
Denis Healey refers to Bishop Stortford as the crystallisation of when those who were 
thinking of leaving from the right, that was the breaking point. Both Jim Callahan and 
Michael Foot tried to persuade the members of the Commission at Bishop Stortford 
not to go for it ….trying to keep the party together. And as you were saying Jim 
Callahan did everything that he could in order to try and prevent this from happening 
and yet this was still seen as a reason, according to Denis Healey, why Shirley 
Williams, Bill Rodgers and David Owen were to leave. You were highly critical at the 
time of those who wanted to leave but mentioning what you were saying before your 
own experiences do you looking back now have sympathy for those… 
NK  No, none at all. You see what I always think of is what people like Denis Healy and 
Roy Hattersley did even though I know that Roy for instance has always in essentials 
been in the best tradition of the left of the party. His associations, without being 
synthetic at all were with what was called the Right of the party because he was pro-
European, because he wasn’t a unilateralist, because he made the argument for 
incomes policy, all those kinds of things but in terms of his utter belief in a more 
egalitarian society and a greater sense of justice and the enablement of people and 
emancipation I discovered over the years that in some respects he was to the left of 
me and Healey was irreverence on legs, there was nothing right-wing about Denis but 
they were associated in the way in which these pretty inadequate definitions had 
developed more by commentators than participants that’s the plague of politics I 
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suppose, they were part of that group. It didn’t occur to them for one millisecond that 
the answer to the woes and afflictions and weaknesses of the Labour Party lay in them 
getting out of the Labour Party. And the fact is if Denis and Roy and people like them 
had gone, the division would have been irreparable and the Labour Party in my view 
would not have recovered because that would have taken it to an entirely different 
dimension. I think Denis is right about certainly the timing of the gestation of the desire 
to first of all I think to live alongside the Labour Party and then to depart entirely from 
it. I think their decision was partly arrogance, partly delusion, partly frustration, partly 
laziness. Now I say laziness because it would take a hell of a lot more to stay and fight 
their corner and make their argument than to cut loose. They didn’t really have the 
spirit, the determination, in the end the affection or the belief in the Labour Party to do 
that. They took refuge in the view that this isn’t the labour party I joined. It’s never the 
bloody labour party you joined, that’s called History, time moves on and the problem 
with the bloody party is in many ways it was the Labour Party that they joined, it hadn’t 
moved enough and one of the consequences of that was an ideas vacuum which was 
then filled disastrously by Bennery and you know if they had stayed and taken it on 
properly ok it would have meant civil war but we had that in any case and it would have 
maintained a broadly based politics in the labour party so we had to do it the hard way. 
But you know I really do think that it wasn’t just treachery or justified frustration or a 
sense of isolation, a sense of being persecuted that’s…..as well and it wasn’t entirely 
paranoia, I mean some were the object of real animosity and persecution but as I say 
don’t leave out laziness as one of the components of the fuel that drove them out of 
the party  
PB Why do you think it was in 1981when the deflections happened …tensions back 
then….problems that were happening in the local constituency parties. Why do you 
think they chose that particular moment? 
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NK  Well, the cumulative circumstances, there was the ‘79 conference, there was Bishop’s 
Stortford, there was the wrangling over an issue which those who were opposed to a 
more democratic system for the election of the Party thought would become a mortal 
affliction. They were very fearful of the whole process of selection and deselection and 
of course they had been, several of them, protected by union favouritism and I mean 
that happened to an extent on the left as well but it meant that they’d had politically 
less demanding lives than is desirable, I mean nobody wants to have to fight every 
inch of the way. So the year of 1980 was a year of accumulating tension, division, 
argument, quarrels, in every forum, in the PLP, in the NEC, in the tearoom, 
everywhere. Battle lines were drawn up, the campaign route, the rank and file 
mobilising committee of, god, it makes me nauseous just bloody remembering those 
days, it was so bloody miserable. The only happy things happening to me were the 
performance of the Welsh team and my kids that was about it you know. If it hadn’t 
been for holidays I’d have jumped under a train, anyway it was awful and I sort of went 
blow by blow through it with Michael who constantly argued of course for calm, for 
comradeship, for unity, for cohesion in the party and then eventually of course Jim did 
resign which was inevitable and Michael, against my view, my strong view, and against 
his preference, he never wanted to be leader of the party, was elected. Some say he 
was elected with the votes of Social democratic revolutionary pessimists, the Samson 
tendency who pull the temple down. 
PB  There does appear to be some proof of that…. 
NK  Yes, but impossible to prove, all I know is if they did that they did Michael no favours 
that’s for certain but if Denis had won, much as I loved him, the fractures would have 
turned into major cracks and compound wounds. It couldn’t have been maintained, the 
form of unity that Michael’s sheer spirit managed to maintain because Denis would 
have lost his rag without taking precaution of organising at a microscopic level to get 
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his own way. You know I would have backed him, I wouldn’t have been quarrelling with 
him, but you know I was by no means a major force then. So by the time the chaos of 
the 198o conference which was even bloody worse than 1979, even worse. Had 
produced the Wembley conference and the Wembley conference took place, the 
knowledge that at least there would be a formal organisation within the Labour Party 
at least, was pretty matter of fact. Those who thought they’d split away were in the 
minority, they didn’t include me. I just thought that people like Shirley, the only one of 
the gang about whom I’d say this people like Shirley were just too bloody Labour to 
leave and of course she did hesitate and I pleaded with her in the National executive 
Committee not to take this course but they did so the reason it happened in 1981 was 
the accumulation of events going back into maybe ’77, certainly the defeat in ‘79 
PB  Denis Healey was elected as Deputy Leader by a very narrow margin, I think you were 
canvassing for John Silkin at the time…his votes were expected to go across to Tony 
Benn and everyone was to abstain. That was considered to be the point which saved 
the Labour party because he was elected as Deputy Leader. 
NK  There’s no doubt about that.  
PB  Do you think there was a need to have Denis as Deputy Leader in order to maintain a 
link with the right? 
NK  Oh yes, it wasn’t just that. In the course of a year Denis had proved to be a pretty loyal 
Deputy to Michael, not immaculately so but it’s politics after all, but certainly more than 
a lot of people anticipated and creditably. Secondly, Denis is intellectually and 
physically a political stalwart which is bloody useful and thirdly in the event of any 
threatened departures the first conversation was naturally with him and so you know 
he was a balancing deputy. Now, you said I was campaigning for Silkin, I’ll go into the 
detail of that because it’s fascinating. Benn as you know announced at 3 o’clock in the 
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morning, and I think it was the 3rd April, that he was going to run for the deputy 
leadership. We’d had a meeting in the tribune group on the Monday evening 
considering this possibility that he was going to do it, hoping that he wasn’t because 
the overwhelming majority of the tribune group were against the graphic divisions that 
would be provoked by having a completely unnecessary deputy leadership contest. A 
lot of the tribune group were also very suspicious of Benn because he’d only joined 
the tribune group only days before, that recently ok, and when he made his 
announcement the dismay amongst a lot of people in the tribune group was evident. 
So we had another meeting and it was strongly condemnatory of Benn’s action and he 
wasn’t there, he didn’t turn up. I came to realise that this was a characteristic of Benn’s. 
Anyway, the argument went on and Eric Heffer said he was willing to put himself 
forward. I said this is bloody mad. We can’t go around denouncing somebody for 
provoking division by running for an unnecessary contest and at the same time run a 
candidate. So I’m entirely against us having a candidate of any kind and people like 
Kevin McNamara and Jeff Hooker and a few others agreed with me. But we didn’t form 
the majority there was a general acquiescence you couldn’t say there was a vote in 
favour, there wasn’t. Acquiescence that Eric should be the standard bearer of the Left. 
I then said ok, fine what if Eric gets knocked out and only Michael, Healey and Benn 
are left, what do we do then? Do we then vote for the person who provoked the bloody 
division and there was silence. So off went Heffer to his constituents in Walton already 
being infiltrated heavily by the militant and he announced to his GC that he was going 
to run and instead of acclamation they said no you’re bloody not. Nobody’s to run 
against Tony Benn so he came back on the Monday to the tribune meeting with his tail 
between his legs. We’ve now moved into the second week in April and at that meeting 
the argument went on that well if Heffer couldn’t or wouldn’t run, decided on 
reconfiguration, da,dee,da,dee,da, didn’t want to be part of the division, there was a 
lot in what Neil had said da, dee, da, dee and of course we all bloody knew that his 
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legs had been cut from under him by his own constituency party. So then Silkin put 
himself forward as far as I was concerned the same argument went on and as far as I 
was concerned there should never be anybody it should have been a straight contest 
from day one. Where everybody wold have to make up their minds. As the summer 
went on and the whole bloody movement was driven by divisions it became more and 
more and more clear to me that I wasn’t going to vote for Denis because he was from 
the right of the party, I’d had a big quarrel with him over public expenditure and he took 
a different line on defence, all those kind of things but at the same time it was bloody 
impossible for me to vote for Benn. So eventually I resolved my quandary by writing a 
long article in tribune, I wrote it on holiday actually in a place called….in Tuscany and 
in between fooling around with the kids, and swimming and going to see Florence and 
Sienna for the first time in my life which was wonderful, I wrote this piece. And I was 
provoked into writing it by things that Scargill had said the week before we went on 
holiday and I thought they had to be answered. And so I wrote it as an answer to that 
and in the course of doing it announced my intention to vote for Silkin, then abstain 
and to ask other people to do the same thing and of course it was the abstentions that 
stopped them and there were two consequences of that : First, I attracted the utter fury 
of the Benninte left, a fella tried to beat me up, I was spat on, all kinds of things and 
there were 30 pieces of silver given to me in the tribune It just showed how infantile 
the left is and was in my point of view. But as I was sitting there on the stage waiting 
for the result I thought ‘why the hell didn’t I vote for Healey?’ I felt strong enough in my 
detestation of what Benn had done and the consequences of what he’d done to chuck 
him out of the party, I mean I loathed and detested everything that ever happened. I 
thought bloody hell why didn’t I vote for Healey because if I and a few others had that 
would have put it beyond question. When the result came in 0.6, Jesus Christ…and 
the extraordinary thing was that when the result was read by a man called Idwell 
Edwards from North Wales, from…., a friend of mine, of course Benn was read first 
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and the first word was Forty and I thought thank Christ for that. But until Healey’s result 
had been read out the Bennites didn’t realise they had been beaten, because they 
thought it was impossible for them to be beaten and so they were just stunned and 
then they started to scream and all the rest of it and my first thought was Christ, you 
saved the Labour Party and then I was whisked away from the platform to go for a 
Panorama interview with Scargill where we had one of the best fights there has ever 
been on television, no punches pulled, no prettiness at all and it was cathartic for me 
and that week was cathartic because of the reactions and the threats and all the rest 
of it and my own constituency party had voted by a majority of one to vote for Tony 
Benn and the one included my agent Barry Moore who was a marvellous, decent fella, 
one of my students from the WEA who went to University and tragically died as a young 
man, he was only 45 when he died, but Barry and I were the best of comrades, we 
were really tight, and he voted for them, which amazed me but of course he was the 
one different. He got to the conference, he watched what was going on and he broke 
his mandate and voted for Healey. So you know all those things were going on and so 
it wasn’t so much campaigning for Silkin, I didn’t give one minute to campaigning for 
John. It was anything we could do to stop Benn short of voting for Denis and I realised 
as I said as the votes were being counted I was a bloody idiot not to have voted for 
Healey  
PB  When you became leader of the Labour Party in 1983 you began the process of making 
the party appear moderate in the eyes of the voters …painful process. Do you think 
that the defections of the SDP members was part of a wider process whereupon it 
made the party moderate on all levels finishing with the expulsion of Militant Tendency. 
NK  Their defection made my job much more difficult and of course if they hadn’t defected 
the chances are that Shirley would have been elected in the 1983 election and would 
have been elected leader I think it was pretty much guaranteed but they did defect and 
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they certainly seriously wounded us in the election, results show that, and it left the 
party in a weakened state in the wake of an appalling election result, crucified Michael 
of course and that’s the party I was left with. Secondly and much, much more important 
was the fact that the task I knew I had to undertake of changing the policy and in some 
respects, certainly not all, some respects the personality of the party was made much 
more difficult because some of the tracks that I knew we’d have to tread were similar 
to those trodden by the SDP and I would have to work in a way and over a long period 
of time that enabled me to rebut convincingly the allegation that I was aping the SDP 
and I didn’t prevent it, Heffer’s favourite taunt was ‘Kinnock has turned the party into 
an SDP #2 but by the time he was saying that I’d made enough moves and people in 
the party had felt enough relief to keep on moving in that direction  but it took longer 
than it should have and longer than it would have if they hadn’t defected. Now that’s 
the truth  
PB  You were mentioning about Eric Heffer’s jibe about the SDP #2 and you said about 
trying not to be seen as aping any of the moderate policies. Do you think there were 
any of the policies that the SDP put forward in their manifestos were later 
encompassed by New Labour? 
NK  But the SDP weren’t New Labour. The SDP was the social-Democratic wing when 
such definitions made a difference of the Labour party, that’s the reality. Whereas New 
Labour proved to be an effort to dis-invent and reinvent the Labour party and I think 
politically with pretty damaging results in policy terms in getting power and using it in 
Health, in Education, in combatting poverty, in Commercial Development, in Social 
Legislation – all great pluses. All the actions of an authentic Labour Government but it 
was the conduct, the body language, the company kept by New Labour that meant that 
by 2005 the New Labour enthusiasts could justifiably be thought of as people who were 
not consistent with the purposes and nature of the Labour Party. Whereas, when the 
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SDP contended that they were still real Labour they were certainly 80% right which of 
course in some ways again made my task more difficult because I had to get the 
authentic Labour Party to move away from policies and in many ways more important 
attitudes which had developed in the years before 1983. So I wouldn’t say that there’s 
a link between the SDP and New Labour, their policy overlaps and means of 
expression and quite naturally Roy Jenkins was an enthusiast for New Labour, it would 
be abnormal if he wasn’t but the perception I have of the Social Democrats made them 
a part of Labour and the perception I have of New Labour, the utter enthusiasts of New 
Labour, not everybody associated, it’s far from that, I want to emphasise that, the utter 
enthusiasts were a departure from Labour as a real alternative party and purpose in a 
three party democracy. I think in losing the distinctiveness, we gained some votes but 
I think probably more people drifted or stayed away, certainly in 2010, and 2005 
actually. The turnout for us in 2005 was pathetic. 
PB  Eric Heffer considered the defection of the SDP members as a good thing as he said 
it was…out of the way. Roy Hattersley and many of those on the right such as Giles 
Radice as well were scathing. Roy Hattersley said he would never forgive them Giles 
Radice and Bill Rodgers didn’t speak to each other for about 10 years. Do you think 
now that time has passed there will ever be the possibility and what the reaction might 
be for David Owen, for example to return back to the party 
NK  Yes, I think there’s a possibility. I think its likely age will get in the way and habit. He’s 
the only one of the three survivors who might come back and part of the reason for 
that is he detached himself from the Liberal Democrats. Shirley and Bill are still very 
much part of that. Shirley much more active than Bill obviously and I suppose if you 
press them they would say We made a big change once in our lives, we can’t do it 
twice and we’re used to being in a new circle of friends who share our unchanged 
values and I’m not quite a contemporary of theirs but I’m 70 this year and I said quite 
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a long time ago let bygones be bygones because they were plain nasty to me, they 
betrayed the Party that I love and I said some pretty vicious things about them very 
deliberately. Maybe Roy was even more bloody savage but I really got stuck into him. 
The years passed, you know if we can coexist happily with people that we fought twice 
in 25 years well there’s not much difficulty to associate now. I mean they are the people 
I go for a drink with but we’re pleasant to each other. I just wish that given the Coalition 
Government and the action that it’s taking, people whose origins were in the Labour 
Party would be more critical, more publically. I think they owe it to themselves in some 
way but they’re not, that might change and I think probably will change but so far it 
hasn’t while the Coalition has been doing, in my view, some really dreadful things in 
their area of concern Health Service, Welfare system …families, those things 
effectively squashing the alternative vote or even the real embarkation of ...they’ve had 
plenty of reasons to reassert their reason for being in politics and they haven’t done it. 
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Appendix Eight 
Interview with Paul McHugh, Cambridge, 15 January 2016 
PB  Your own recollections of the mood within the movement and the local party after the 
1979 general election? 
PM  I wasn’t in the Labour Party in 1979 and haven t been at all I’ve been a Labour voter 
through the ‘70s. I think I have probably always managed to vote Labour. So I can’t 
comment on how the election defeat in ‘79 went down. Amongst Labour I was pretty 
gutted but and so much of ’80 I can’t remember much of sequence of events I could 
easily mug them up but when the lion has declaration issues it’s beyond me. But I can 
remember when I began personally to respond to the split in the Labour Party. I could 
see it coming and I really felt it was a huge mistake to try to set up a leadership party 
which was cut off from the Labour Party which roots by the way I don’t belong to I’m a 
Liverpool low middle class catholic so you can hardly say I’m steeped in Labour 
tradition but by ’79 I was clear at that stage that the left needed to remain at one with 
the trade unions and co-ops and so and I just didn’t see the gang of four making it. So 
in ’81 the first thing I remember doing  I helped out in east Chesterton at the county  
council elections and I remember asking myself who got me to do that and  it’s just 
possible it’s Simon Cedric Jowell who you will know of  who is now sadly dead. Who 
was possibly in the Labour Party before me, perhaps not that much before me anyway 
someone got me to go and knock up and  canvas and  in East Chesterton and the 
candidate was John Perkus who was an OU tutor and I might have known him through 
the OU so it might just have been friendship and I quite enjoyed that, I have to say, 
and this was May ’81 and the mood was perfectly ok you know and I remember the 
committee being run by a young bloke who seemed to have his eye on the ball, full of 
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enthusiasm, we lost but that was not unusual in East Chesterton so ok, that was my 
appetizer, now perhaps you can remind me when the Limehouse Declaration was? 
PB January 1981 
PM  Ok, so that would be the back drop of the SDP then what happened in Cambridge is, 
at the end of the year there was a by election in Romsey  and of course this was the 
worst possible time to have a bye election, looking back it was snowing that day it was 
just awful. And the SDP fought it and they had…there and I did turn out for that and 
Simon who lived in...I didn’t know, he had something to do with that and the candidate 
was a good friend of mine Len Freeman who had been active for much, much longer 
and it was an eye opener really because the SDP threw everything into Romsey if your 
read the camaraderie of the history of the Cambridge Labour Party they had had an 
iron grip on Romsey since 1918. And it was a symbolic bye election. I think there was 
enough Labour activists out I recall there being, this is when I first came across Mark 
Todd who later became leader of Cambridgeshire county council and became a Labour 
MP in 1997. I don’t think we were short of knockers up but everything was against us 
including the weather and you just couldn’t persuade people to go out and vote 
because it was slippery under foot and the Labour vote and I think in that political stage 
in Romsey the Labour vote was quite an elderly vote. And people said oh well you’ll 
win anyway wont you, meanwhile and I was very struck by this the SDP seemed to 
have large numbers of people on the ground and actually in cars and I remember 
seeing Volvo estates in Romsey. So we lost the Romsey bye election. And that made 
me decide to join the Labour Party because I thought what the Labour Party does not 
want to do is lose the middle classes, it’s a progressive alliance, I imagine I’m a fully 
paid up card carrying member so I joined in the beginning of ’82 and how do you join 
the  Labour Party? 
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 I found out were there would be a batch meeting, I lived in Victoria park off Victoria 
road and one of my neighbours, I’d lived there about a year and a half Diane Phillips 
was it turned out was the treasurer of the local Labour Party so January ’82 I found 
myself going to my first branch meeting in (what is) now known as Rowan road in 
Cambridge and it was the pretty home of Dr. Julian Hunt who was a fellow of Trinity 
had been a county councillor, had been a governor at Chesterton community college, 
I was to be governor many years later on, and later went to London and became 
astronomer Royal , lord hunter Chesterton and the father of young Tristan. I don’t know 
when Tristan was born but I remember there being there being kids around the house 
so it may well be that if he was born before ‘82 I was seeing Tristan Hunt going t bed 
so that was it. And it was quite an engaging branch a number of interesting people and 
there was a strong antipathy to the SDP, I think the branch, it was a middle class area, 
the branch were the members were activists who had been confronted with the SDP 
and the possibility to join them had decided not to do so, so they were pretty hostile, 
not personally hostile but there was a strong feeling that it was a dead end and it wasn’t 
the way to go and I think people were much of a muchness really. What I would call 
Hattersleyite social democrats. Croslandite, yes cause cross was dead and she was 
alive. And in view of the public service and power of the state who make things better 
for people and you know a feeling of...looking after those less well off than yourself. At 
that stage west Chesterton ward had been a Tory stronghold for a long long time. And 
I’m always surprised when I look at the electoral results in Cambridge which of course 
now is easily available thanks to the work of two liberal democrats and you do find that 
Labour do bizarrely wins but we all felt that Labour had never won in west Chesterton 
not true.  The memory had faded you see and we had no chance and the liberals were 
steaming up and I think possibly in ’82 it might have been the first election I was 
involved in west Chesterton.  The liberals actually won and defeated the Tories, bit of 
a blow to them it’s a general process in which the Tories were evicted from Cambridge. 
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They had a chap called Percy Read who ran a big hair salon in town, Maurice Garner 
who was the clerk to another important tory Paddy Crossman who was a solicitor and 
Christopher Cross Goodman who I never quite figured out but he had a salmon pink 
rolls Royce and came up to see us from Queen Edith from time to time. The liberals 
gradually evicted these guys, we were on the fringes fighting the good fight putting up 
candidates who gamely did it to keep the votes up and helping the general election 
and I have been that person myself on a number of occasions and actually contributing 
to the Labour Party in Cambridge, the Cambridge Labour Party has a number of wards 
and the centre which has lots of members who are reasonably well off and they 
contribute funds, go to fund raising dinners and so on and has water on the periphery 
and fewer members but who are traditional Labour voters. That was then, I’m aware 
things may now be just so. So you are interested in the actions of the SDP. I think there 
was considerable general hostility to the SDP without not trying to make it personal, 
my boss in those days Steve Marshall was the head of humanities which became 
deputy vice chancellor at Anglia Ruskin, he was a very good guy, he left the Labour 
Party in, from his point of view in the spur and we always got on ok, I ran against him 
once and he won and the other important SDP guy about was Peter Clark who was a 
distinguish political historian worked on the liberals and the term of the twentieth 
Century  and eventually became master of trinity hall. And he was a prominent member 
of the SDP.  I don’t think that any of them had been especially active in the Labour 
Party and the Cambridge Labour Party wasn’t badly split and from memory I think the 
one Labour Councillor Gwyneth Lipstein who defected, the others remained solid. 
 I mean people left the Labour Party and then banged on about it there was someone 
or other and I got an angry statement from a chap called Paddy Gagham, who 
denounced the Labour Party as middle class and homosexual loving and so on but I 
doubt, Paddy was right wing Labour and was cheesed off with something that had 
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happened. I don’t think the Cambridge Labour Party lost any hugely significant people 
and that was important in not getting too stressed about the SDP.  
PB  That’s interesting because you mention the right wing Labour member that you revered 
to, were there any fears in the party at the time that had been going on in the ‘70s 
obviously you said you joined in ’81, were there any ongoing fears at the time or 
resentments at the time such as entryism such as the trots as they called them 
PM  Not at the time, in the early’80s I don’t think militant was at all significant at a mid- 
eighties phenomenon but members of the SDP believed that their perception of Labour 
was that it was either in the hands of and they characterised unions as dinosaur unions 
looking backwards or mad trots but I saw no evidence of mad trots in Cambridge 
Militants weren’t an issue. Take the Miners’ Strike I began to see militant things so at 
the hall, some young guys who I suspect were Cambridge under graduates who 
banged on about it but actually it’s not been a great problem or issue. 
PB  Ok for the two lodestars for the reasons for a lot of the acrimony as well from the SDP 
perspective was Europe and the issue of unilateralism were they bones of contention 
in the Cambridge party as well.  
PM   Right. Europe wasn’t I can’t remember Europe being dates in the early eighties at all. 
It doesn’t mean a resolution might have been passed in the absence of mine and for 
all I know the party might have been committed to getting out in the early ‘80s but it 
wasn’t a key issue and nobody in the Cambridge Labour Party passed a resolution as 
a problem less than they used to on all sorts of things and you have to be reminded 
about a policy on the matter. Europe wasn’t an issue really. So what else? 
PB  Unilateralism. 
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PM  Unilateralism. Yes I think we are always a unilateralist party, during the 80’s I’m sure 
we did commit ourselves to resolutions to unilateralism. One of the things which I know 
bothered the people of Cambridge is the proximity to Molesworth my party was basing 
on Christmas isles and I can remember taking one of my kids on a double decker bus 
on a picnic in Molesworth and there were lots of Labour people there. But CND in the 
early eighties was such a huge …lots of people worked on the CND that weren’t seen 
in the Labour Party and they might be members and might suddenly vote Labour but 
they were absorbed by the business of organising huge CND rallies in Cambridge. 
PB  You mentioned before those activists who left when you were still trying to keep on 
good terms with them, did you feel sympathies for the MPs at the time and how some 
of the other CND members were feeling and the activists were feeling and the 
pressures they said they felt. Did you feel sympathy towards them or did you think why 
don’t you stay and fight. 
PM  Well there were some back bench SDP members in London and two of them and 
Douglas Mann resigned and fought and lost a by-lection and I don’t know whether I 
had sympathy at the time but with the benefit of hindsight I am sympathetic to them 
being a small membership Labour Party and suddenly having these painful guys 
banging on about them. The gang of four I have no sympathy for at all I thought they 
people with exactly their believes like Denis Healey and Roy Hattersley were staying 
and fighting and I really did not think that they should go so I was pretty hostile and 
hugely angry and pretty hostile to the four of them.  
PB  And one of the things that have been contended is that because of the nature of the 
party at the time it needed a leader from the left that perceived left of the party to lead 
it which is the reason why some members of the parliamentary party cause it was still 
the old system voted for Michael Foot, Denis Healey and Roy Hattersley also 
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contended that and it did come out afterwards that some of them voted for Michael foot 
in order to give them an excuse to leave. Do you think that if Denis Healey had won 
that the situation would have been considerably different from a local perspective? 
PM  Denis Healey wouldn’t have been a problem for the Cambridge Labour Party, the 
nature of the Cambridge Labour Party is that leading members would have quite have 
respected  Denis Healey s campaigning ability and intellect he was a very attractive 
candidate, he wouldn’t have posed any problem had he been on the left but he would 
have been more on the right because I thought we were a soft unilaterist party I doubt 
that we would have collectively got on a high horse about Denis Healey Unilateralism 
we would have found away round like the Labour Party did from then on. So no I think 
Healey victory would probably have been deplored by most members and then they 
would live with it. 
PB  So conversely then at the election of Michael Foot was seen as something to be 
welcomed? 
PM  I can’t remember and there I think I would be speaking the benefit of hindsight, I can’t 
remember whether Michael Foot was looked upon as someone who was going to lead 
us to disaster which he did and what a pity whether support for him as a great guy a 
great writer and a great intellect but I can’t dredge that one up I’m afraid.  
PB  And therefore afterwards there was the great battle for the deputy leadership between 
Healey and Benn. Now that is an area where it’s been contended again that Healey 
had lost that one. And he very nearly did. That would have created huge problems for 
the party at the time. Because there were many who saw Benn as a device figure.  Do 
you think it was the thing that saved Labour, as some have contended, that because 
Healey became the deputy to Foot that that was one of the turning points that Giles 
Radice said it prevented further defections. 
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PM   I’m speaking with the benefit of hindsight in saying yes, at the time I had no particular 
hostility to Tony Benn and rather more sceptical about it now even though he’s dead 
and therefore he’s almost god like. But at the time I don’t remember feeling particularly 
hostile toward him. I preferred Healey to Benn but it didn’t see it as dramatically. I think 
Charles Radice is probably right. Michael would have spent all his time calming Benn 
and the Bennites down. It would have been pretty difficult. 
PB   And also something that you mentioned before. You were talking about the party at 
the CLP in Cambridge as being Croslandites in many respects almost social liberal, do 
you think that the social liberal strand in the Labour Party affected or damaged because 
of the association not the brand I don’t like using that phrase but the strain of thought 
also being associated with Roy Jenkins he being seen. 
PM  No I don’t think so. I don’t think people like me were given a hard time at all. I think 
there is always a sort of rye or respectfulness between the core wards full of and hard 
liberals and the outer liberals and that for working class activists. One of the strengths 
the working party did have of guys, mostly guys who were plainly working class trade 
unionists and effective councillors, people like Peter Cowl and…and there’s just a 
residue of that in trade unions now who does its own thing in terms of organisations 
and gets people out of the Labour and none of us can quite figure out how they do it 
but they do. So I don’t think that the progressive liberal side of the party felt betrayed 
by the gang of one therefore more awkward. I can see that some areas that might be 
the case. Why don’t you go they’ve gone Baring in mind that the balance of power in 
the Cambridge party was probably evenly split. There were plenty of liberals and social 
democrats around. Not to feel too isolated.  
PB  Considering the eventual positioning towards the central drought throughout the ‘80s.  
do you think that 1981 was the start of the defections and the creation of the SDP was 
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part of a process that that was seen as a corrective process which also lead to the 
expulsion of militants do you think it was sort of the party themselves, they might not 
have thought of it direct but it was part of a process that they obviously saw that they 
needed in order to. 
PM  This is the Lib Dem argument that the Lib Dems were necessary to Labour Party to 
clean itself up, yes. No I don’t buy that. I think that the British left was appallingly 
damaged by the defection of the SDP and the greater and power ones of the liberals 
when they found their allies with the liberal democrats. And it’s taken us till now in the 
mire of defeat to Lib Dems to back to where the liberals were in the late ‘70s. I’m an 
old fashioned socialist guy and would much have preferred the Labour Party to have 
carried on and to have won the 1983 election. Which I think could perfectly well have 
happened. If they had not split and some people forget how unpopular Thatcher was. 
At the time when all this was happening. And this assumption that the victory of the 
Falklands was bound to win I think is debatable. But that’s counter factual history.  
PB   Radice contends that New Labour in many respects was on classic Godesberg Social 
Democrat and some of the things they said would not have looked out of place the 
Social Democrats said in New Labour. And David Owen also contended that the New 
Labour was the SDP. Do you see that the case in a separate development? 
PM  I think that the most significant think about New Labour was it determination to avoid 
being defeated. It was anything for wining really and I don’t think the SDP’s departure 
was an influence on that. The SDP departure made the Labour a losing party for 
thirteen years. That’s true. But true intellectual Labour policy was a determination not 
to put a foot out of place and victory at all costs. And the Labour Party today is trying 
to understand where it is going in reaction to that. I am not very tolerant of the Lib Dem 
or the SDP argument. That you guys wouldn’t be where you are today. If we hadn’t 
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have pulled out. Well indeed not we might have been in a better place a Denis Healey 
Government in the ‘80s wouldn’t have been a bad thing for Britain certainly better than 
a thatcher Government. 
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Appendix Nine 
Interview with Austin Mitchell MP, 4 November 2014 
PB  Before and after the 1979 general election and it’s asking about your own recollections 
and the mood within the labour movement at the time. The mood and the bitterness.  
AM  Well, I couldn’t understand it really because there was certainly a bitterness on behalf 
of the left because the government certainly hadn’t done what they wanted they had 
ruled more in the interest of the big business and the United States than they wanted 
which was a folly really because that government had struggled to hold the post war 
settlement together as it had done so with the incomes policy and maintaining the 
welfare state standards up and when economic circumstances were against us as they 
were and it had won through because certainly things were reviving by 1979. It would 
have been better if Jim had hung back and stopped the election in retrospect he should 
have done. As it was to go in October when there was such bitterness in the air and 
we hadn’t suffered the collapse of the incomes policy and the rebellion of the trade 
unions who behaved stupidly and betrayed us. Things would have been very different. 
Judgement rather than misgovernment would pay the price for that and anger was 
exacerbated by a kind of infiltration by militants wasn’t really a serious threat but a 
nuisance and by the determination of the left to bind the poisoner of the 
constitutional reforms as a way of getting the political change they wanted. Also 
constitutional reforms conference would decide policy and reselection of MPs 
leadership election by the party. Jim effectively gave way at the conference. Clive 
Jenkins played a part.  
PB  Is that the Commission of Enquiry? 
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AM  No, there was a big meeting at Bishop’s Stortford in face of the onslaught Jim just gave 
up, and stood down which of course ceded the case really. There was a moment of 
fatalistic despair on behalf of the party particularly MPs saw themselves under threat 
of deselection and a feeling on the part of the right that basic policies like defence 
nuclear weapons on the American side were threatened. This caused them to organise 
and fight back and caused those with any port in a storm to jump ship. The clincher 
was the ’81 conference when there was an emergency conference. I remember putting 
David Lord who at that time was the leader of the labour party and he was horrified it 
was so insane and so was I, so it was that conference that produced the defection of 
the big four. Rodgers was always the most loath to leave the party but I said to Shirley 
Williams don’t go but Roy Jenkins was going to find a new destiny to wreck the labour 
party and form a new party. Shirley Williams was naive. Rodgers hesitantly concerned 
about defence but more about Europe in the sense he saw this anti Europe mood 
developing and labour committed against EU membership, which was never really 
fought and Hattersley resisted them. They were committed Europeans especially 
Jenkins, they defected, they were immediately joined by a number of older MPs and 
right wing MPs who were threatened with reselection. Indeed it was argued that some 
of them had voted for Michael Foot as leader in order to wreck the party but I don’t 
know whether that is true. I think this might be true of one or two, that’s a bit to cunning 
for most of them, as they were just frightened creatures. They reformed an organisation 
called Solidarity, I was treasure for a while. Peter Shore and Roy Hattersley were in 
charge to keep the party together.   
PB Do you think when the SDP left, that it affected the social liberal elements of the Liberal 
Party? 
AM   I don’t think so it certainly strengthened the left and there were certainly more 
numerous and remained so. The group Solidarity which combated them was really 
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pretty moderate in its policies. Ours was Michael Foot, a traditional lefty of course he 
accepted the majority of the parties decision and moved to the centre ground you can 
only rise from the centre ground if nothing changes at all.  
I think it was for a time the strength of the trade unions for the party but they were 
weakened by Thatcherism and the destruction of the basic industries. Oddly enough 
they became much more enthusiastic about Europe before any other party. They all 
came over in ’87 and spoke at the conference and told them all the wonderful things 
Europe would do for them. Downing Street was totally deaf to the trade unions and 
hostile. The GMB went from being anti Europe to Pro European and that I think pushed 
the party in the same direction. And I think they did make us aware the need to stop 
the left taking over that fizzled anyway they were quite easily defeated. In fact they 
disappeared I remember one of the solidarity thing was to hit out at both sides.  The 
defectors fought but we didn’t need to fight all that hard. Militant discredited 
themselves and the fiasco in Liverpool helped in that direction. In Grimsby they 
disappeared from the scene. Just like snow melting, they had been coming along to 
labour party meetings and moving all sorts of insane resolutions  like MPs should live 
in a council house on the Willows estate, what kind of hostility would that induce. They 
never got anywhere, as I think people didn’t take them seriously and nationally the fight 
was very bitter. I don’t know what the situation was in Liverpool but it was messy. The 
party moved left anyway.  
When the SDP left, it weakened the social mobility of the labour party and changed 
the ethos of the Labour Party substantially, after with being against Europe before. 
Before the SDP left, it was eliminated after they had gone. That would have happened 
anyway as well and I think you know a self- correcting mechanism which didn’t allow 
to operate they just threw up their hands in despair. It is an unrealistic view how parties’ 
work as it is slow and long term and you cannot preach to them and suddenly shock 
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horror I’m pissing off, it’s just like Cameron you can’t piss off. And they were maligned 
cause Jenkins I believe if you read Campbell’s biography he wasn’t coming back to 
the Labour Party because he couldn’t be leader and I think Williams is a bit 
naive.  What I most admire Bill Rodgers, he felt he was being overruled as Defence 
Minister, Defence spokesman in opposition and being a great managerialist, so he left. 
He wasn’t going to get very far in the Labour Party. So his ego and ambition as well as 
ideology. 
PB  You became MP for Grimsby after the passing of Tony Crosland you were described 
at the time as a Gaitskellite.  
AM  I am still a Gaitskellite. 
PB  David Marquand said that Crosland wouldn’t have joined the SDP because it was not 
a Crosland party. Do you think he would have stayed? 
AM  Nobody thinks that what I say he loved the labour party and he was really sceptical on 
Europe, he never gave a firm lead to the labour party either for or against it. The 
Europeans were a bit baffled that he wasn’t more supportive.  He wouldn’t have liked 
our position on defence and unilateralism but he saw it has more the instrument of the 
kind of society he wanted. Historically looking back these breakaways never succeed. 
He would have been very clear on that. By the stage if had lived Jenkins in Campbell’s 
book said they were lovers physically at Oxford. And were rivals didn’t trust each other 
and would have been reluctant to accept Jenkins as leader. He would have trusted 
Rodgers but he thought Shirley was barmy and she was, I think that is just wishful 
thinking.  
AM  Marquand went and I’m not sure if he came back on not. 
PB  He went over to Brussels as well and fought the bye elections in Ashford. 
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AM  He is a narcissist really but brilliant, he officiated by his pro Europeanism and Crosland 
did not feel that, he was always cool and sceptical of Europe. On the one hand it’s ok 
and the other hand why bother it’s a problem. I don’t think people would have bothered 
either if he had gone. Well me as a Gaitskell, as well as Gaitskell spent all his time 
holding the party together as did Harold Wilson what if Gaitskell had gone to the SDP, 
I doubt that he would have taken a firm position on Europe, he had also taken a firm 
decision on defence, I would have agreed but, there were three polices on defence 
Europe and eco and the other way up of which of those three would have  affected 
who ego wouldn’t have counted on Crosland’s part  nor with Europe same to of 
Gaitskell had he lived. So I think all these retrospective things, some would have joined 
and some would not look at Roy Hattersley who is much more passionate about 
Europe and is much more Europe than Crosland ……. 
PB  Tribalism? 
AM  Sorry, well there is that too. Crosland wouldn’t have had tribalism he just liked the party 
I’m sorry if there is more you want to achieve …but Europe would have pulled into 
them. As probably would defence. So I don’t see it as a …. I see the friendship between 
them the similarity between them is the reason they stayed and did stay.    
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Appendix Ten 
Interview with the Right Honourable the Lord Giles Radice PC, 28 November 2012 
 
PB What are your own recollections of the mood within the party at the time both before 
and after the 1979 General Election, both as a member of the PLP and during CLP 
meetings in your constituency? 
GR In a way it was a shocking defeat, not that we didn’t know that we were going to lose, 
it was just that the circumstances of losing were awful. If you think back to 
September/October 78 we were level pegging in the polls, there was a feeling that 
Healey had done a good job as Chancellor, he was being called one of the best 
Chancellors at the time. Jim had been an unexpectedly good Prime Minister as he 
hadn’t been a good Chancellor or Foreign Secretary. 
PB He was a good chairman. 
GR He was a very good chairman. So to be in the situation were in we got to February and 
having got through the Winter of Discontent which basically destroyed us. I obviously 
blame trade unionists and the shop stewards but I above all I blame Jim Callaghan, 
and Denis Healey and Michael Foot, the old men who were in charge. We young ones, 
when asked, said where shall we go now? You know, what were they going for five 
percent? It was a bit too much and provided a sort of locus belli for shop stewards and 
insurrectionists to beat against. So it was a disaster and we could that quite quickly 
was destroying our argument for governing and how we could get on with the unions. 
PB The Social Contract had been under Wilson. 
GR Yes and we’d been relatively successful particularly in the last couple of years and 
people Jack Jones had worked their butts out to help us and suddenly it didn’t look 
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viable method any longer in the broader sense. We looked a divided and demoralised 
party with ministers who didn’t know what to do. And then we were defeated and then 
recriminations started and my God did when they started! There was the Conference 
of 79 and I can’t remember what was passed there… 
PB There was the Commission of Enquiry agreed there… 
GR The Commission of Enquiry which didn’t look very good news. The right in a sense 
was blamed because it was said the right ‘you’d been in power and look where you led 
us’. T Benn realised this was his opportunity and he was absolutely amazing in his 
objective as he whizzed about all over the country and appeared to be offering an 
alternative, even if most of it was chimera but he did seem offering an economic policy, 
the AES, the Alternative Economic Strategy which was actually, basically ‘Socialism in 
One Country’ as it was based on import controls and all this kind of thing, which wasn’t 
really viable in this modern world. 
PB Especially as we were members of the then Common Market? 
GR Yes and of course also we were on a world market, Globalism had already started! But 
then you added to that he had a party constitutional agenda which was certainly quite 
plausible, indeed one member one vote which he wasn’t in favour of but re-electing 
your Member of Parliament seems a legitimate thing to do  
PB  The mandatory reselection of MPs… 
GR Yes, and the third thing is controlling the manifesto and I still remember an 
exceptionally lying speech from Benn accusing Tony roughly saying Jim Callaghan 
had prevented all sorts of things going into the manifesto. And we were under great 
pressure, really. And my friends began to get shifty in the Summer of 1980 and they 
were beginning to feel desperate. They were older than me (Williams and Rodgers), I 
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was not attracted by their idea of moving out, leaving the Labour Party. I think it was 
partly because I was sentimental about the Labour Party, I joined it…it was a big move 
for me to join it in the first place, I wasn’t hereditary. I thought it could be won round, it 
would take a long time – they didn’t. 
PB That’s interesting because one of the questions I was going to ask was whether you 
were contemplated leaving and obviously you didn’t… 
GR  Oddly enough I didn’t. I did contemplate leaving politics altogether. 
PB Yes because some people thought leaving full stop rather than defecting? 
GR Yes, well it’s mentioned in the index of Crewe and King, I think they explain the 
difference. 
PB Roy Hattersley mentioned that there were some who he said felt so down and 
depressed about the situation and they were thinking of leaving politics altogether but 
that was different. 
GR That was different, but I didn’t feel, I wasn’t attracted by my friends’ alternative. At the 
bottom it was sentimental, romantic if you like… 
PB It’s a tribal loyalty? 
GR Tribal loyalty but it was a tribal loyalty to a tribe that I wasn’t born into, it was an 
intellectual commitment. 
PB So you chose to go into the Labour Party itself? 
GR Yes, I had a cousin who was the Secretary of the Fabians in the 30s but that was about 
it, my Grandfather was a Tory MP… 
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PB So there was nothing there to say that it was preordained?  
GR No, it wasn’t like Kinnock…it’s his tribe, but it had become my tribe. But I also thought 
it wasn’t a viable political project, theirs. I thought that it wouldn’t work, I thought that 
the Labour Party would stop them, prevent them breaking through, enough of the 
Labour Party, which proved to be true. Though if we had all left then of course we 
wouldn’t but I don’t know. I suppose if we all left the Labour Party would have ended 
up like the French Communist Party. The Social Democrats would have been like the 
Socialists in France. But it didn’t happen like that. I wasn’t attracted to that and it was 
dreadful seeing them leaving. I remember trying to stop them leaving, I noted in my 
diary meeting with Shirley, in either late 80 or early 81 and Shirley, me and her two 
other PPSs met for lunch. Bob Mitchell said no to her question ‘can the Labour Party 
recover?’ John Cartwright said probably not and I said yes but it would take time. And 
they both left in time to join the SDP. I haven’t told you that the awfulness of the 
situation, two or three years of holding one’s position. In a way my friends were leaving 
and I was being attacked in my constituency by as traitor, ‘you’re bound to leave soon.’ 
It was the Trots, it was a terrible time, I felt like Marshall Ney fighting a rear-guard 
action! 
PB So you were fighting a rear-guard action in your Constituency Labour Party at the time 
a lot of many members were. Roy Hattersley again wasn’t very sympathetic. You felt 
that pressure as you said for two years and it was a lot of late meetings from what I 
have read… 
GR The old ladies came for me for the GMCs, the Trots said some horrible things, I was 
deliberately targeted by the Rank and File Mobilising Committee, they were the Trots, 
I was a well-known moderate and they wanted to deselect me, it was as simple as that 
and I knew that, my friends knew that. And I always had a majority except once, a 
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majority usually of 2:1 and they were terrific meetings of about 150 people! My wife 
used to kick me under the table to try and egg me on. 
PB It must have been quite intimidating? 
GR Yeah, well I had to give leadership, basically. 
PB I think people forget that, you are selected by the party and are beholden to the party 
but you are the leader. 
GR My friends loved me bashing the Trots! I used to take them apart intellectually. I said 
you are entryists, what you are trying to do is take over this bloody party which is a 
well-known Trotskyite…which indeed it was. And eventually they were kicked out, it 
did take a bit of time. The ever-lasting debt to the Labour Party to Neil is getting rid of 
the Trots.  
PB It had to come from someone on a position on the left? 
GR I think it was much easier coming from the left but…I’m sad that he failed to win the 
election for us but he wasn’t very good at fighting elections, really. He didn’t look like 
a leader but I am always grateful for him making the Labour Party a decent party to 
belong to again. I mean it was a reign of terror basically for those of us. One of the 
reasons why Healey didn’t get the leadership was because there were about thirty 
people whose will buckled and though their heads…they voted for a quiet life and voted 
for Michael Foot even though they didn’t think he was much good. 
PB Do you think do you think that if Healey had been more clubbable he would have won? 
GR I think that Healey fought very badly, he could have been leader of the party. I think 
Callaghan ought to have gone straight away when we lost in 1979, I think it was 
disgraceful that he didn’t. I think Healey (quotes from his book Friends and Rivals), I’ll 
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read this paragraph: ‘Healey leaves us with one of the great might have beens of 
Labour Party history. It would certainly have prevented an SDP breakaway’, I don’t 
think they could have broken away. ‘Even if Mrs Thatcher had still won in 1983 it would 
have been by a much narrower margin, leaving Labour well-placed to both modernise 
itself and then to stage a political comeback at least one, if not two election points 
before it finally took 1997 place in 1997’. Maybe that’s being too optimistic there I think 
that’s probably right. ‘Yet Healey, because of his poor tactics following Labour’s defeat 
in 1979 keeping his down, and especially after Bishop’s Stortford when he basically 
ought to have said ‘now look here, we can’t have this’, he didn’t provide leadership and 
therefore must share some of the blame for Michael Foot’s victory and the SDP 
breakaway’. I mean he totally underestimated the chance of Shirley and Bill and David 
Owen going, to them he was terribly complacent. 
PB There seems to be a running theme with regards to Healey in as much of the fact that 
he said to those who were thinking of defecting ‘you have nowhere else to go’ and 
someone sent him a postcard back saying ‘found somewhere else to go’, which is quite 
a riposte. 
GR It’s partly complacency and remember he didn’t quite have Jim Callaghan’s ability to 
appeal to the centre ground, he wasn’t quite of the centre ground, really. He was a 
tough old social democrat stroke right winger in a way in spite of spite of being a real 
intellectual which Jim Callaghan wasn’t. But he realised he had to appeal to the 
Callaghan constituency who included some people who probably in the end voted for 
Michael Foot so he didn’t want to make too much of a row for fear frightening them off, 
so you can see his dilemma.  
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PB The one thing Healey was really remembered for was winning the Deputy Leadership. 
Reading Dianne Hayter’s book Fightback! It was down to the St Ermin’s Group and the 
Labour Solidarity campaign 
GR And indeed me, I was virtually his campaign manager, he didn’t appoint anyone I had 
to appoint myself! I wanted the Labour Party to survive and the fact that Healey was a 
rotten organiser. He was perfectly willing to go to all these meetings and stand up for 
himself and he had to be quite brave really, there was a lot of intimidation and shouting 
which Benn did nothing to stop. The reason all of us don’t think he was a nice, sweet 
clubbable little fellow as he now goes around is because of this period when he went 
around like a little fascist.  
PB The narrowness of the victory… 
GR In reality it wasn’t narrow because the T&G cheated. I mean the T&G…the fact is that 
they had a consultation which came out overwhelmingly for Healey at the area level 
which they chose to ignore. They chose to vote for Silkin and in the second ballot voted 
for Benn. 
PB Which was against the union members’ wishes… 
GR Well it was, basically. NUPE had a consultation which they obeyed. The T&G ignored 
theirs. 
PB  That’s one of things that came out of the St Ermin’s Group, after the Special Wembley 
Conference, with the Limehouse Declaration, it was almost the next day, wasn’t it, the 
St Ermin’s Group formed the moderate trade union leaders and they realised that the 
representatives at Conference and on the NEC were manipulating things. Without St 
Ermins and without your group – 
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GR We wouldn’t have done it. 
PB Which is why you were convinced, you wrote in your diary that night, ‘we have saved 
the Labour Party tonight’, because it would have been thirty or forty MPs who would 
have defected. 
GR I think that if Healey had lost it would have been difficult to bring it back, it may have 
taken two or three more elections than it did. I mean we eventually got rid of Benn 
because he would have lost catastrophically. 
PB  And he lost his seat, didn’t he, he lost Bristol… 
GR Well, yes he lost his seat. And I have to say he then went to Chesterfield which when 
he left turned Liberal. 
PB Which only just turned Labour again at the last election. 
GR Yes, that’s outrageous. Funnily enough I don’t think he was a good constituency MP. 
And he was getting on.    
PB It’s interesting looking back and you said it was long hard slog, it was a battle but do 
you think after the Special Conference and after the Wembley Conference and after 
the election of Healey, do you think with the SDP having left and the slow, slow battle 
against the Militant Tendency, do you think that was the beginning of the drawing of 
the blood and the removal of the extremes on both sides? 
GR Yes but…Shirley was one of the most popular members of the party, she wasn’t 
extreme it was a minus for us when she left.  
PB You might say Neville Sanderson might have been… 
349 
 
GR  Well there were one or two. I don’t buy that actually, these were vote getters, the 
brightest of their generation, it was very damaging for us whereas those guys in Militant 
were vote losers. 
PB Denis Healey said the creation of the SDP caused a decade of Thatcherism… 
GR That’s not quite right, the SDP…no. He got something slightly wrong, when Roy 
Jenkins died, Healey made…(’the only critical note’ this was when Jenkins died ‘came 
from his former colleague and rival Denis Healey. Healey praised Jenkins’s civilising 
influence as a reforming Home Secretary but argued that setting up the SDP was really 
very unfortunate “as it made it difficult for me and less likely for me to become leader 
and made it possible for Margaret Thatcher to win the 1983 election.” This was a re-
writing of history’, this was me, ‘Healey had already been defeated for his Labour 
leadership by Foot before the creation of the SDP in March 1981. Indeed Healey’s 
defeat was probably to be the deciding factor that led to the SDP split’. So he slightly 
got it wrong.  ‘As for Thatcher’s 1983 victory the formation SDP in Alliance with the 
Liberals undoubtedly increased the Conservative majority but it’s difficult to see how a 
Labour Party led by Michael Foot or any unreformed Labour Party could have won an 
election in the 1980s.’ So I think we did have to reform ourselves.  
PB There was also the external factors such as the Falklands issue that certainly did play 
a part in 1983 as there was a time when Mrs Thatcher’s Government was deeply 
unpopular. 
GR It was. So that was a slight re-writing of history. We were in bad shape. We needed to 
be reformed, we needed a revisionist change. Funnily enough I found the constitutional 
agenda quite useful in the end when we got it to one member one vote in the end. I 
think we didn’t go far enough with the unions. I prefer them not to be in the party, I like 
unions, I’d prefer it if we were like the continental socialist parties where the unions 
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don’t have a constitutional role in the party. I mean I thought it was unfortunate that Ed 
Miliband owes his victory to the union vote. It’s true that union vote has been improved 
by the fact it’s meant to be on the basis of one member one vote but sometimes…but 
we can always be beaten with it. The trouble is I rather like the union money and I can’t 
think of any other way to finance the party. I mean that’s something for the future, we 
won the 97 election without, we’d reduced the influence of the unions and party 
membership had gone up, it hasn’t now, I’m not sure what it is now.  
PB Going back to the Solidarity Group, it was quite a disparate grouping of MPs, you got 
Frank Field and Peter Shore who were seen as being anti-European sentiments 
compared to yourself and Roy Hattersley. Were there difficulties at times? 
GR Not much, it wasn’t about policy really, it was basically the sensible guys got together 
irrespective of our views on certain policies, we had to get together or we’d be 
slaughtered. 
PB So it was coalescing around the greater sense of what was required? 
GR That’s very well put, hang on to that! 
PB There’s just one other thing which comes from ‘Friends and Rivals’ regarding the 
Limehouse Declaration where you said that it was ‘an unexceptional revisionist 
document,’ that would appeal to ‘nearly all German Social Democrats, most Labour 
right-wingers of the time and indeed the vast majority of Tony Blair’s New Labour 
Party.’ Looking back, do you think that the New Labour came about as a result of the 
SDP, as contended by David Owen, or do you view New Labour as a separate 
development? 
GR Not quite like that, it’s more complex, I think it came, if I wanted to give anyone the 
credit other thank Tony Blair I would probably give it to Mrs Thatcher and John Major, 
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the successive defeats of the Labour Party, as there’s nothing like four defeats to get 
you to think yourself through as to what you should be doing.  
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Appendix Eleven 
Interview with the Right Honourable the Lord Clive Soley of Hammersmith PC, 
18 November 2014 
 
PB  The first question is what your own recollections of what the mood of the party was like 
at the time in 1979? 
CS  It was grim, in a word. When I came in here in nineteen seventy nine the mood in the 
Parliamentary Labour Party was really almost desolate, they were demoralised, they 
were divided, they were battered and shattered because I remember they hardly had 
a majority at all so the last year or two that Government had been really tiring. And I 
remember remarking publicly somewhere or other that sitting in that tea room with 
Labour MPs was like sitting in a Battle of Britain crew room after a particularly bad 
sortie because they would all be talking about who didn’t come back, because so many 
people defected and I think there were only ten or eleven of us who were new members 
of the parliamentary Labour party and many of them were in seats were people had 
stood down. 
PB  And what was the first conference, the September 1979 Conference like, I understand 
that it was quite a bitter experience? 
CS  Yes it was. That one and several following it which were very bitter and there was a 
mood in which MPs felt vilified. 
PB  Denis Healey contends that it was the 1980 Special Conference and the Bishop’s 
Stortford Commission of Inquiry was the chrysalis for the SDP creation. 
CS  I think the 1980 Special Conference was because it was this business of both taking 
away powers from the PLP combined with the growing arguments for withdrawal from 
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Europe and defending the nuclear deterrent which set David Owen and Shirley 
Williams and others to form a growing alliance which was heading to the exit. 
PB  Why do you think in 1981 the defections came about, why not earlier like in the 
Seventies? 
CS  I do think they made a pretty conscious decision that they needed to sit down and talk 
about how they were going to get their new party airborne and they came to a 
conclusion that the best way of doing that was to have a period over time were member 
after member of the parliamentary labour party withdrew from the Labour party and 
joined the SDP because that way you wore down an already worn down parliamentary 
Labour Party and you would need to confirm that but that was my reading of their 
tactics.  
PB  So it’s been contended that it needed someone from the left of the party to lead the 
Labour party in the early nineteen eighties hence the reason for Michael Foots election. 
Do you think it needed someone like Michael Foot at the time or do you think if Denis 
Healey had been in charge it would have been radically different.  
CS  I think if Denis had lead the party our chances of reviving the public fortune would have 
gone up but the divisions in the party probably would have got deeper, we were in this 
impossible position where the public wanted Denis but the party wanted Michael or 
better still Tony Benn, because Michael was a bridge to walk over actually. But I think 
if Denis had got it well it would have been pretty bloody and pretty bruising. It’s just 
possible the party might have recovered and pulled itself together but it’s very hard to 
know. 
PB  And considering the eventual position in the party towards the centre by Neil Kinnock 
throughout the Eighties, do you think this was part of a corrective process where the 
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extremists if you will, like the extremists on the right and the militant left, were being 
purged, do you think it was part of the corrective process that needed to happen in the 
party? 
CS  Yes, the party was deeply split and as with all deep splits in any political party and 
indeed any organization and the battle for control and the battle surge is backwards 
and forwards that’s what was happening one minute you thought that the left was 
winning and next minute you thought that the right was wining. But it’s very much like 
that now I remember one man telling people are you with us now, he was someone 
who went to the SDP and when I answered no he said oh well we know you will be 
with us in the long run. So in a way those were the conversations that were happening 
from time to time. 
PB  Do you think that the SDP with its initial leadership was with Roy Jenkins so it was an 
association more shall we say the Liberal legislation that it was associated with in the 
1960s? With the SDP being formed and everything was there ever a fear that that 
social Liberal wing of the Labour party had been weakened by them leaving?  
CS  Well it was weakened by them leaving there was no doubt about that but I think the 
reason was much more about the commitment by Jenkins and others to the common 
market as it was then and to the nuclear weapons programme. It was those two issues 
which presented the people with the SDP as right wingers and that enabled the left 
wingers in the Labour party to present them as right wingers. I remember in my own 
party which came very much from the side of the left saying they probably dub the SDP 
as the salads…and you know the argument was they were weak washy Liberals but 
not about the liberal small ‘l’ liberal policies more about Europe and nuclear weapons. 
PB  Giles Radice  as contended the Lime house Declaration , what’s the quotation, ‘would 
appeal to nearly all German Social Democrats , most Labour right wingers of the time 
355 
 
and the vast majority of Tony Blair’s new labour Party’. Do you think new Labour came 
about as a result of the SDP or do you think new Labour was an entirely different?  
CS  No, I do think it came out  by that process it was as I said when parties get divided 
lines its very  rarely resolved quickly and the tragedy of my generation is we were in 
opposition for eighteen years precisely cause you couldn’t solve it quickly and the Tory 
party had the same problem after nineteen ninety seven. It took them only eleven years 
that’s a long time and I do think parties get into such states when the divisions are very 
deep and real. The Labour party now is very united despite arguments about Ed 
Miliband’s leadership. The party as a party is united in a way that it wasn’t in the 
nineteen seventies, eighties. And similarly you say the same for the Tory party in the 
late 1990S, early 2000. 
PB  Obviously it was obvious there was much bitterness and rancour with the defections 
that took place not just from the left of the party but also from those who considered 
themselves to be from the right people like Roy Hattersley and such forth and 
everything.  Because of this do you think there is ever any chance of there being some 
sort of rapprochement, some reconciliation between those who defected and those 
who came back. I know there was some within the Lords for example who left and 
came back in the late eighties early nineties and David Owen who has since become 
and independent Social Democrat who has aligned almost with the Labour party again. 
Do you think there might be that where some of them might actually consider to come 
back again? 
CS  If you had been there Tony Blair deliberately brought them back, Andrew Adonis, for 
example, was in his office. And a number of them who joined the SDLP and by the 
time before Tony they fought over the leadership there was a willingness to take people 
back because we had dealt with the militant bit. What was happening in a way 
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particularly with militants was managing to brand anyone who sounded like they 
wanted to build bridges as someone who was a potential betrayer. You had this as 
Neil Kinnock pointed out anyone who was not on his side was a betrayer and he was 
quite right. That was actually used by militants and others on betraying the cause and 
it’s a classic case I think where all the ideologies whether they are political or religious 
for that matter do tend to divide and the division becomes very, very bitter and very 
hard to recover from. As long as you have an election to win and then the electorate 
do it for you. And that make you, enables you to recover. If we don’t have elections we 
just split and fight and you can see that in religious organisations and at other times in 
political organisations, because they have an ideology if you are being elected all the 
time when you get a good kicking it makes you sit down and think how do we recover. 
PB   Well absolutely and that’s the thing about the Labour party as well because it does not 
have a fixed ideology as such does it there are so many different strands of thinking. 
CS  But some of them tried to make it happen they had a clear ideology they clearly had in 
their minds eye an ideology, the problem was that a) the majority of the party didn’t 
fully understand it and b) they didn’t like it! But they were very well organised, it wasn’t 
just militant, it was people who hung on to militant, people like me weren’t clear enough 
in our opposition, if we had been clearer and more out spoken at an earlier stage and 
more organised actually we might have been better. Part of the problem was that the 
right wing wasn’t attractive either. I replaced an MP who was the last member of the 
PLP who was in favour of hanging who had a prison in his constituency and didn’t take 
letters from prisoners , he would often come out with anti-immigrant statements which 
didn’t go down well in places like Hammersmith. I find it very difficult to try to help him. 
The party had to deselect before they could select, I literally tried to talk to him but he 
wouldn’t talk to me.  Even if you were trying to get some sort of agreement you had 
not got a cat in hell’s chance actually. I for one was thinking to myself what have I let 
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myself in for. Why don’t I go and do something else. I think it was the historian Peter 
Hennessey in here who described people like myself us as the lost generation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
358 
 
Appendix Twelve 
Interview conducted with the Right Honourable Baroness Williams of Crosby 
27th April 2004 
 
PB Lady Williams, thank you for agreeing to this interview. The dissertation in which I am 
writing about is regarding the difficulties faced by the Labour Party in the 1970’s in 
relation to membership of the European Community. What are your recollections of 
the party’s opinion at large with regard to membership around the time of the European 
Communities Bill in 1971? 
SW The Party was deeply split. The referendum was held by Harold Wilson to hold the 
party together. For Harold Wilson that was always the major priority, not just on Europe 
but on every issue that came up. What most mattered to him was to be able to say, 
‘I’ve held this party together.’ So, in the run-up to the referendum, indeed the whole 
period from the loss of the election in 1970, all the way through to the referendum in 
1975, there were huge differences within the party. There was one group which was 
led by Roy Jenkins, which I was certainly part of. There was another group led by Tony 
Benn, which Eric Varley and many other members of the left were part of. Essentially, 
it was about whether we should stay within the European Community or not. Finally 
Harold, in a desperate attempt both to hold the party together and to effectively stop 
the divisions and struggles that were splitting the party further and further apart, agreed 
to Tony Benn’s proposals for a referendum. Tony, I think, clearly expected a 
referendum to be unfavourable, to go for a ‘No’ vote, because all the polls showed that 
the opposition to the European Community was roughly two to one against, and he 
(Wilson) was rather reluctant to concede but eventually he did, and the referendum 
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campaign emerged out of that, with people of all parties on the ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ 
campaigns.  
 
PB What were your recollections of the campaign itself, the referendum campaign? 
SW I think it was brilliant. There were two things, I think that characterised it, one was that 
for the first time, in effect party loyalties were set aside for the purposes and for the 
period of the referendum and they were actually held up remarkably well. I think it was 
the first time that the Cabinet was allowed to abandon collective responsibility for 
separate positions and it came together after the referendum really very easily and 
very well without that leaving a lasting scar. The other thing that then led to two major 
all-party campaigns, both ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ because the Government of the day was not 
prepared to exercise party loyalty and so at that point the Conservatives and the 
Liberals both step into line in the same way. So the entire campaign was fought on an 
non-partisan basis. 
PB In your opinion do you think the referendum helped to soothe the divisions within the 
Labour Party, in the short term at any rate? 
SW Yes, in the short term it did. They were there and they popped up again after the 1979 
General Election was lost, but they did largely manage to hold it at bay through the 
period of the Labour Government of 1975 to 1979.  
PB And do you think that Harold Wilson deserves some credit for going ahead and holding 
the referendum? 
SW Yes, I do. I mean he actually played a very small part in the referendum campaign 
itself, people forget that. He left the larger part of the campaigning to his colleagues. It 
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wasn’t clear until the very end where he stood I don’t think! So it wasn’t that his role in 
the campaign was terribly important, but the roles of Ted Heath and Roy Jenkins and 
so on were much more important. It was more about his handling of the issue within 
the party that’s very successful.  
 I’ve a couple more things that might be helpful to you? One was that both sides worked 
very to get trade union support, and the trade unions actually tended too, were 
themselves divided. You had some trade unions like the NUGMW who were strongly 
pro-Europe. You have others like the T and G that were strongly against, a great deal 
depended on the leaders and very often they actually reflected the opinion of a 
particular leader of the union. So the unions were not as one, they are now much more 
pro-European as a whole then they were then. The business community tended on the 
whole to be pro-European, I think more then than they are now. So most of the major 
business people, the big business people tended to support the ‘Yes’ campaign but 
often the small business tended to support the ‘No’ campaign.  
PB It’s interesting to see that the newspapers at the time were almost unanimous in 
supporting the ‘Yes’ campaign. 
SW The newspapers were mostly, I think there were one or two that were against… 
PB The Morning Star, I think was one of the exceptions wasn’t it? 
SW I’m not sure about the Mail. Most of the major, certainly the broadsheets were in favour. 
I think you need to look at the Telegraph and the Mail, I’m not sure about them, 
because the Telegraph tended to be rather favourable to Enoch Powell. But if you were 
to look at the newspaper headlines, I think you’ll find that the Telegraph was really 
willing to both support Conservative pro- and Conservative-anti. 
PB So it was really taking the Conservative line in general? 
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SW Yes, I mean they took articles from both sides, I think they made comments on both 
sides, I think they were quite careful to position themselves so that they were not one 
hundred percent one way or another. 
PB Lady Williams, thank you very much for your time. 
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